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JAL incident at Haneda Airport

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JAL incident at Haneda Airport

Old 3rd Jan 2024, 10:45
  #381 (permalink)  
 
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On another note, the Dash 8 has a fuselage length of 25m and a wingspan of 26m. That would be covering a lot of runway lighting when looking through a HUD would it not?

There would be a lot of TDZ and centreline lights not visible with a Dash 8 sitting over them.

The anti collision lights are also lit whilst on the runway, these are designed to be viewed over a 360 radius up to 3 nm. Are HUDs now negating the impact of aircraft lighting?

If HUD is seen to be a contributing factor in this event, I can see the lawsuits lining up…
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 10:50
  #382 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by xcris
An interesting aspect revealed via The Aviation Herald:
"According to ATC recordings the A359 as well as a number of other aircraft departing runway 34R were handed off to Tower Frequency 118.725MHz, however, the Coast Guard DH8C was handed off to tower at 124.350MHz. JL-516, upon being handed off to tower by approach, was told by tower to "continue approach", about 90 seconds later tower cleared the aircraft to land."
Source: https://avherald.com/h?article=5132b9fe&opt=0
WRONG, by The Aviation Herald. they were on the same frequency
RJTT-App-Jan-02-2024-0830Z.mp3 (LiveATC)
12:43 APP JapanAir 516 contact Tokyo TWR 124,35
12:50 A/C 12435 JapanAir 516

I've isolated the transmissions in attached clip, listen for yourselves...
Attached Files
File Type: zip
JAL516 Contact TWR.zip (14.6 KB, 177 views)

Last edited by DIBO; 3rd Jan 2024 at 10:54. Reason: typo: APP io TWR instructed handover, of course
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 10:51
  #383 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by 10JQKA
Another very important aspect to consider is the FRMS aspect and role it may have had on any and all of the participants,
pilots,atc,firies, cc.
Am certain no one will ever hear anything on this. It is public enemy number 1 in these occupations yet is treated with utter contempt by agencies,companies, regulators, unions and governments alike.
True, and many of those involved, pilots, ATC, first responders etc may never work again. RIP to the crew of the Dash 8 who died.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 10:55
  #384 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by framer
All of the Airlines I have worked at have an SOP that strobes go on entering the runway, even if you are just crossing so I don’t think the SOP of turning them on when starting the take off roll is the most common method of managing the strobes. Am I wrong?
On a different note, I know that personally having stop bars u/s at a place where there is normally stop bars is a huge threat for runway incursion. If I see that NOTAM I make special mention of it in the take-off brief and encourage the f/o to remind me as we approach the runway. Other people probably aren’t effected in the same way but I know it’s a threat for me.
I’ve seen a variation in ‘strobes on’. Most are on when entering the active runway, but some activate on actual t/o clearance. In the videos so far, there doesn’t appear to be stationary, visible strobes in the sequence for the coastguard, or as it taxis into position. If that’s correct then the twr controller whom is 2km away doesn’t get a visual clue, neither does JAL. From what we know neither ATC/JAL are aware of the DH8 on the runway and haven’t got ‘prompts’ in the transmissions to cross check where it is. Are unserviceable white strobes an MEL no go departure item?

I think the unserviceable aerodrome lighting is going to be a key player here. If stopbars are inoperative how does that affect the runway environment alerting systems? Presumably when a working stop bar is deselected, (turned off), alerts are muted or withdrawn as ATC has positively authorised runway entry. Stop bars normally have an auto on function eg 1minute and then automatically returns to red (on). So if maintenance or failure requires the stop bars to be switched off for extended periods, what happens to the alert systems for the unserviceable section of lighting? Are they simultaneously unserviceable as well?
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 10:59
  #385 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Del Prado
Please reread what East of Koksy said. ATC can cross couple two or more frequencies so that any transmission on one is received and then (almost) instantaneously retransmitted on the other.
if the frequencies were cross coupled in this manner than they were effectively on the same frequency.
Please listen to the ATC recordings (both frequencies) posted earlier in the thread. They were clearly not coupled.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:02
  #386 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by framer
All of the Airlines I have worked at have an SOP that strobes go on entering the runway, even if you are just crossing so I don’t think the SOP of turning them on when starting the take off roll is the most common method of managing the strobes. Am I wrong?
I'm sure you're right, however looking at the video recordings the strobes were clearly NOT on. A few blips of the ACLs is visible from the camera angle.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:04
  #387 (permalink)  
 
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Much discussion of HUD, strobes, flare angle resulting in not being able to see another object on the runway. This sems to me to focus on the wrong issues.

'See and avoid' should the very LAST item on a risk control table for this sort of event* - especially at night. Light years behind:
  • Accurate situational awareness and monitoring by ATC
  • Correct comms in standard terms by all parties
  • Conformation to comms by flight crews
  • Maintenance of movement controlling air and ground equipment
(you can probably add to this list)

* the existance of recent events when see & avoid saved the day only strengthens my conviction here.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:05
  #388 (permalink)  
 
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Reuters

Japan releases transcripts of fatal aircraft collision

By Maki Shiraki, Daniel Leussink and Lisa Barrington
January 3, 202412:59 PM GMT+1Updated 3 min ago

<A0283> note … but article does not contain a link to the text
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:05
  #389 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by andrasz
Please listen to the ATC recordings (both frequencies) posted earlier in the thread. They were clearly not coupled.
Not relevant anymore as both aircraft were on same TWR frequency 124,35

Last edited by DIBO; 3rd Jan 2024 at 11:08. Reason: added 'aircraft' to 'as both ...'
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:11
  #390 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by andrasz
From what we know so far, a classic case of Swiss cheese that will likely make it into future textbooks. Investigation will take months to years, but I doubt any significant new information will be added other than a more elaborate analysis of the individual holes:
  • 34R was T/O only runway previously, JL516 was the first to use it for landing. The MA722 crew may have had a mental picture not to expect any landings on this runway. For same reason, they may not have expected the need to hold short.
  • Usage of "Number one" by ATC may have further reinforced the MA722 crew, missing the "abeam C5" or misunderstanding it as hold ON RWY abeam of C5 (which is exactly what they did). While usage of English in all ATC comms in Japan is commendable, in this case it probably just added to the confusion.
  • Stop bar and taxiway lighting INOP.
  • JL516 and MA722 on different frequencies
  • MA722 was sitting aligned on the runway for 45+ seconds. Probably Japanese culture at play, it is impolite to challenge authority or appear impatient, they were likely patiently waiting for ATC to clear them for T/O.
  • DL taxied past MA722 a good 20-25 seconds before the collision, it was already out of their view and expectantly on its t/o roll as the A350 was approaching, so no extra set of eyeballs to wave off JL, as it was done in SFO.
  • The combination of HUD and LED lighting probably prevented the JL crew from seeing MA722 even at close range, I'd wager they never saw what they hit.
  • Visibility of a DH3 from the rear in the dark is practically nil. The only visible tail light is white, probably flooded out by runway lights, and the flashing orange upper ACL is obscured by the high tail from the approach angle. The otherwise fully warranted SOP of not using strobes until the beginning of T/O roll did not help in this case.
The only important question remaining is why did the approach controller not notice that 34R was occupied ? Even if MA722 was not where it was supposed to be, surely HND has SMR, there should have been both visual and aural warnings as a measure of last resort.
I agree with others that this is a good summary, but I find it a little misleading in the first bullet point. Replays of e.g. ADSB-Exchange show 34R being used in mixed mode until 0829z when ANA456 arrived, with around 30 arrivals onto 34R in the 90 or so minutes prior to this. So the "T/O only" mode only lasted 19 minutes until the accident at 0848z. In addition, there was was at least one aircraft (JAL16) on approach to 34R behind the accident A350.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:22
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Originally Posted by mrdeux
If you take the power away, they fail ‘open’.
No, if you take power away the fuel shut off valves (SOVs) stay in the position they were in when power is removed. In normal operation that would be open but could be closed or even somewhere between if the vave was moving at the time of power loss. The fuel SOVs are motorised not pressure operated.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:23
  #392 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GeeRam
Almost as if the MLG of the A350 has touched down just aft of the Dash's engines (or even right on top of them) and that's what's ripped through the whole lot and the MLG has dragged the fireball along the runway.
Aerial video shows the Dash fuselage wreckage all together in a line along the runway centreline. The wings and engines are missing; also little sign of the fin and tailplane.

It looks to me as if, nose-high, the A350 has knocked off the Dash's fin and crushed its fuselage under its belly. The Dash's wings have made the dents in the A350's engine intakes, which might also have knocked off the outer wings. The A350's MLG have removed the Dash's inner wings and engines and dragged them down the runway. This explains the large fire under the A350 as it rolls out, and the smoke blackening visible under the A350's wings before it burns out.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:36
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:40
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Originally Posted by Iron Duck
Aerial video shows the Dash fuselage wreckage all together in a line along the runway centreline. The wings and engines are missing; also little sign of the fin and tailplane.

It looks to me as if, nose-high, the A350 has knocked off the Dash's fin and crushed its fuselage under its belly. The Dash's wings have made the dents in the A350's engine intakes, which might also have knocked off the outer wings. The A350's MLG have removed the Dash's inner wings and engines and dragged them down the runway. This explains the large fire under the A350 as it rolls out, and the smoke blackening visible under the A350's wings before it burns out.
I agree - and increasingly have no idea how the Dash Captain survived and was (possibly) seen limping across the runway afterwards. His chair must have been thrown clear of it all or something - like the Shoreham Hawker pilot.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:41
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Where did the DH-3 (1916 biplane) mentioned by several posters come from? The coastguard aircraft was a DHC-8-300 common name "Dash Eight".
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 11:46
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Originally Posted by Thruster763
Where did the DH-3 (1916 biplane) mentioned by several posters come from? The coastguard aircraft was a DHC-8-300 common name "Dash Eight".
DH3 is the IATA code for a -8 Q300
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 12:03
  #397 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Tetsuo
They might have been taxiing for so long. The hangar for the coast guard is on the other end of the airport. As a matter of fact, it's sister Dash 8 (JA723A) is parked very close to the hangar I marked on the NW side of the airport on the google maps satelite view.

The time taken will be more a function of the place being busy, not the distance

In an equivalent size other landscape someone could walk that far in that time

And the separately posted quoted assumption by AV Herald about something to do with runway 05 really doesn't make much sense when you see it's much nearer to that base, so no need to tour most of the airport en route. Edit: see correction below

Last edited by aox; 3rd Jan 2024 at 12:24.
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 12:15
  #398 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by aox
And the separately posted quoted assumption by AV Herald about something to do with runway 05 really doesn't make much sense when you see it's much nearer to that base, so no need to tour most of the airport en route
Isn't 05 the runway on the island at the very southern end of the airport?
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 12:18
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Originally Posted by Globaliser
Isn't 05 the runway on the island at the very southern end of the airport?
Er, yes, sorry, what I looked at too briefly looks more like 03 or 04 or so.

edit: zoomed in on Google Maps: 04
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Old 3rd Jan 2024, 12:18
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Originally Posted by aox
And the separately posted quoted assumption by AV Herald about something to do with runway 05 really doesn't make much sense when you see it's much nearer to that base, so no need to tour most of the airport en route
is there anything to substantiate the RWY 05 story??

Near the time of accident, only Charlie was mentioned, but maybe earlier in the 722A's taxi instructions 05 was mentioned

GND ???? 722A continu to Charlie holding point
GND ???? 722A contact TWR 124,35
A/C Cleared to land 34R JapanAir 516
TWR CostGuard 772A Tokyo Tower, good evening taxi to hold abeam ... Charlie 5

Last edited by DIBO; 3rd Jan 2024 at 12:25. Reason: removed cross-posting / replaced with new text
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