JAL incident at Haneda Airport
On another note, the Dash 8 has a fuselage length of 25m and a wingspan of 26m. That would be covering a lot of runway lighting when looking through a HUD would it not?
There would be a lot of TDZ and centreline lights not visible with a Dash 8 sitting over them.
The anti collision lights are also lit whilst on the runway, these are designed to be viewed over a 360 radius up to 3 nm. Are HUDs now negating the impact of aircraft lighting?
If HUD is seen to be a contributing factor in this event, I can see the lawsuits lining up…
There would be a lot of TDZ and centreline lights not visible with a Dash 8 sitting over them.
The anti collision lights are also lit whilst on the runway, these are designed to be viewed over a 360 radius up to 3 nm. Are HUDs now negating the impact of aircraft lighting?
If HUD is seen to be a contributing factor in this event, I can see the lawsuits lining up…
An interesting aspect revealed via The Aviation Herald:
"According to ATC recordings the A359 as well as a number of other aircraft departing runway 34R were handed off to Tower Frequency 118.725MHz, however, the Coast Guard DH8C was handed off to tower at 124.350MHz. JL-516, upon being handed off to tower by approach, was told by tower to "continue approach", about 90 seconds later tower cleared the aircraft to land."
Source: https://avherald.com/h?article=5132b9fe&opt=0
"According to ATC recordings the A359 as well as a number of other aircraft departing runway 34R were handed off to Tower Frequency 118.725MHz, however, the Coast Guard DH8C was handed off to tower at 124.350MHz. JL-516, upon being handed off to tower by approach, was told by tower to "continue approach", about 90 seconds later tower cleared the aircraft to land."
Source: https://avherald.com/h?article=5132b9fe&opt=0
RJTT-App-Jan-02-2024-0830Z.mp3 (LiveATC)
12:43 APP JapanAir 516 contact Tokyo TWR 124,35
12:50 A/C 12435 JapanAir 516
I've isolated the transmissions in attached clip, listen for yourselves...
Last edited by DIBO; 3rd Jan 2024 at 10:54. Reason: typo: APP io TWR instructed handover, of course
Another very important aspect to consider is the FRMS aspect and role it may have had on any and all of the participants,
pilots,atc,firies, cc.
Am certain no one will ever hear anything on this. It is public enemy number 1 in these occupations yet is treated with utter contempt by agencies,companies, regulators, unions and governments alike.
pilots,atc,firies, cc.
Am certain no one will ever hear anything on this. It is public enemy number 1 in these occupations yet is treated with utter contempt by agencies,companies, regulators, unions and governments alike.
All of the Airlines I have worked at have an SOP that strobes go on entering the runway, even if you are just crossing so I don’t think the SOP of turning them on when starting the take off roll is the most common method of managing the strobes. Am I wrong?
On a different note, I know that personally having stop bars u/s at a place where there is normally stop bars is a huge threat for runway incursion. If I see that NOTAM I make special mention of it in the take-off brief and encourage the f/o to remind me as we approach the runway. Other people probably aren’t effected in the same way but I know it’s a threat for me.
On a different note, I know that personally having stop bars u/s at a place where there is normally stop bars is a huge threat for runway incursion. If I see that NOTAM I make special mention of it in the take-off brief and encourage the f/o to remind me as we approach the runway. Other people probably aren’t effected in the same way but I know it’s a threat for me.
I think the unserviceable aerodrome lighting is going to be a key player here. If stopbars are inoperative how does that affect the runway environment alerting systems? Presumably when a working stop bar is deselected, (turned off), alerts are muted or withdrawn as ATC has positively authorised runway entry. Stop bars normally have an auto on function eg 1minute and then automatically returns to red (on). So if maintenance or failure requires the stop bars to be switched off for extended periods, what happens to the alert systems for the unserviceable section of lighting? Are they simultaneously unserviceable as well?
Please reread what East of Koksy said. ATC can cross couple two or more frequencies so that any transmission on one is received and then (almost) instantaneously retransmitted on the other.
if the frequencies were cross coupled in this manner than they were effectively on the same frequency.
if the frequencies were cross coupled in this manner than they were effectively on the same frequency.
I'm sure you're right, however looking at the video recordings the strobes were clearly NOT on. A few blips of the ACLs is visible from the camera angle.
Much discussion of HUD, strobes, flare angle resulting in not being able to see another object on the runway. This sems to me to focus on the wrong issues.
'See and avoid' should the very LAST item on a risk control table for this sort of event* - especially at night. Light years behind:
* the existance of recent events when see & avoid saved the day only strengthens my conviction here.
'See and avoid' should the very LAST item on a risk control table for this sort of event* - especially at night. Light years behind:
- Accurate situational awareness and monitoring by ATC
- Correct comms in standard terms by all parties
- Conformation to comms by flight crews
- Maintenance of movement controlling air and ground equipment
* the existance of recent events when see & avoid saved the day only strengthens my conviction here.
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Reuters
Japan releases transcripts of fatal aircraft collision
By Maki Shiraki, Daniel Leussink and Lisa BarringtonJanuary 3, 202412:59 PM GMT+1Updated 3 min ago
<A0283> note … but article does not contain a link to the text
Not relevant anymore as both aircraft were on same TWR frequency 124,35
Last edited by DIBO; 3rd Jan 2024 at 11:08. Reason: added 'aircraft' to 'as both ...'
From what we know so far, a classic case of Swiss cheese that will likely make it into future textbooks. Investigation will take months to years, but I doubt any significant new information will be added other than a more elaborate analysis of the individual holes:
- 34R was T/O only runway previously, JL516 was the first to use it for landing. The MA722 crew may have had a mental picture not to expect any landings on this runway. For same reason, they may not have expected the need to hold short.
- Usage of "Number one" by ATC may have further reinforced the MA722 crew, missing the "abeam C5" or misunderstanding it as hold ON RWY abeam of C5 (which is exactly what they did). While usage of English in all ATC comms in Japan is commendable, in this case it probably just added to the confusion.
- Stop bar and taxiway lighting INOP.
- JL516 and MA722 on different frequencies
- MA722 was sitting aligned on the runway for 45+ seconds. Probably Japanese culture at play, it is impolite to challenge authority or appear impatient, they were likely patiently waiting for ATC to clear them for T/O.
- DL taxied past MA722 a good 20-25 seconds before the collision, it was already out of their view and expectantly on its t/o roll as the A350 was approaching, so no extra set of eyeballs to wave off JL, as it was done in SFO.
- The combination of HUD and LED lighting probably prevented the JL crew from seeing MA722 even at close range, I'd wager they never saw what they hit.
- Visibility of a DH3 from the rear in the dark is practically nil. The only visible tail light is white, probably flooded out by runway lights, and the flashing orange upper ACL is obscured by the high tail from the approach angle. The otherwise fully warranted SOP of not using strobes until the beginning of T/O roll did not help in this case.
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No, if you take power away the fuel shut off valves (SOVs) stay in the position they were in when power is removed. In normal operation that would be open but could be closed or even somewhere between if the vave was moving at the time of power loss. The fuel SOVs are motorised not pressure operated.
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It looks to me as if, nose-high, the A350 has knocked off the Dash's fin and crushed its fuselage under its belly. The Dash's wings have made the dents in the A350's engine intakes, which might also have knocked off the outer wings. The A350's MLG have removed the Dash's inner wings and engines and dragged them down the runway. This explains the large fire under the A350 as it rolls out, and the smoke blackening visible under the A350's wings before it burns out.
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Aerial video shows the Dash fuselage wreckage all together in a line along the runway centreline. The wings and engines are missing; also little sign of the fin and tailplane.
It looks to me as if, nose-high, the A350 has knocked off the Dash's fin and crushed its fuselage under its belly. The Dash's wings have made the dents in the A350's engine intakes, which might also have knocked off the outer wings. The A350's MLG have removed the Dash's inner wings and engines and dragged them down the runway. This explains the large fire under the A350 as it rolls out, and the smoke blackening visible under the A350's wings before it burns out.
It looks to me as if, nose-high, the A350 has knocked off the Dash's fin and crushed its fuselage under its belly. The Dash's wings have made the dents in the A350's engine intakes, which might also have knocked off the outer wings. The A350's MLG have removed the Dash's inner wings and engines and dragged them down the runway. This explains the large fire under the A350 as it rolls out, and the smoke blackening visible under the A350's wings before it burns out.
In an equivalent size other landscape someone could walk that far in that time
And the separately posted quoted assumption by AV Herald about something to do with runway 05 really doesn't make much sense when you see
Last edited by aox; 3rd Jan 2024 at 12:24.
Too mean to buy a long personal title
Isn't 05 the runway on the island at the very southern end of the airport?
Near the time of accident, only Charlie was mentioned, but maybe earlier in the 722A's taxi instructions 05 was mentioned
GND ???? 722A continu to Charlie holding point
GND ???? 722A contact TWR 124,35
A/C Cleared to land 34R JapanAir 516
TWR CostGuard 772A Tokyo Tower, good evening taxi to hold abeam ... Charlie 5
Last edited by DIBO; 3rd Jan 2024 at 12:25. Reason: removed cross-posting / replaced with new text