JAL incident at Haneda Airport
is there anything to substantiate the RWY 05 story??
Near the time of accident, only Charlie was mentioned, but maybe earlier in the 722A's taxi instructions 05 was mentioned
GND Nippon 722A continu to Charlie holding point
GND Nippon 722A contact TWR 124,35
A/C Cleared to land 34R JapanAir 516
TWR CostGuard 772A Tokyo Tower, good evening taxi to hold abeam ... Charlie 5
Near the time of accident, only Charlie was mentioned, but maybe earlier in the 722A's taxi instructions 05 was mentioned
GND Nippon 722A continu to Charlie holding point
GND Nippon 722A contact TWR 124,35
A/C Cleared to land 34R JapanAir 516
TWR CostGuard 772A Tokyo Tower, good evening taxi to hold abeam ... Charlie 5
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Did the controller want the Dash to hold on Charlie abeam C5 en route to runway 05? I thought I herd hold abeam C5 on the audio play? Maybe a non standard call with the stop bars not working.
Easy if SA lost to hear as via C5 line up. Again no stop bar. Or if pilot unfamiliar with RJTT.
Easy if SA lost to hear as via C5 line up. Again no stop bar. Or if pilot unfamiliar with RJTT.
Could someone please clear up a bit of confusion on my part? Is it a DH3 or a DH8? I've seen both used in this thread.
Thanks.
Thanks.
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From the discussion so far, it’s not clear to me whether we know (yet) exactly how the Dash-8 entered the runway. Did the crew use C-5, or might they have - apparently believing that they had takeoff clearance - cut the corner and used C-6 for a faster entry? From C-5, more or less right-angle entry, a routine glance up the approach path couldn’t have missed an A350 on short finals. But if they used C-6, the approaching A350 would have been invisible to the left-seat pilot and behind the right shoulder of the right-seat pilot.
Last edited by OldLurker; 3rd Jan 2024 at 13:49.
I assume that the ICAO phraseology will be changed after this accident. Hold short (stop on taxi way), position and hold (stop on the runway but no take off clearance), holding position (stop on the taxi way) are too ambiguous and can be mixed with clutter on the frequency or wishful thinking of a tired crew.
* both aircraft on same TWR frequency
* 516 landing clearance given, some 10 sec. before 722A came up on TWR freq
* TWR instruction "taxi to holding point C5" given and fully read back by 722A
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Apparently the coastguard plan JA722A was not equipped with ADSB, that means it is tracked using multilareration which requires three or more receivers to work together to calculate the aircraft position from the arrival time of signals from the aircraft transponders.
ADSB would have told the A350 that it was in its path.
It does raise the question of whether aircraft without ADSB should be allowed to use major civilian airports.
ADSB would have told the A350 that it was in its path.
It does raise the question of whether aircraft without ADSB should be allowed to use major civilian airports.
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Hi All, I’m a 78 skipper. Although new to this forum, its certainly made for an interesting read regarding yesterdays sad events. Previously I had many many years of 75/6 experience and moving some time ago to the 78, i can certainly see the issues with the HUD (at night on a LED lit runway). To have an obstacle in the touchdown zone sitting there quietly for nearly a minute and the inevitable has unfortunately happened. The Swiss cheese lined up perfectly and unfortunately people have died. A great shame and let’s hope it doesn’t happen again.
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Just interested SLF here, please forgive my lack of knowledge.... How come we see the #2 engine still running and the JAL plane not engaging reversers or spoilers? Do you think this was a case of no time to deploy due to the sudden impact, or maybe severed lines or a technical issue due to the collision. Impressive braking to bring her to a stop just with wheel braking and potentially missing FLG. Anyone have any insight on what might have been happening on deck following the collision? I assume there must be SOP's to follow re. fire supression and shutting fown the fans?
That would only be true if collision avoidance systems didn't filter out signals from aircraft on the ground. I presume the Dash-8 would have had its Mode S transponder on, especially as the crew seem to have been under the impression they were cleared to line up, so it is probably not the lack of a detectable signal which would been the issue here. Rather, it would be the filtering which would have prevented the resulting TCAS return being displayed to the approaching A350 crew. The pros and cons of displaying returns or giving aural warnings against aircraft on the ground must have been exhaustively studied in coming up with the TCAS display criteria; I'm sure someone can point to the proceedings of some arcane ICAO forum, but my guess is that the relative inaccuracy of Mode 3/S bearing information would have been judged to produce such a high rate of false alarms from aircraft transponding at runway holding points as to make full suppression the only viable option. ADSB positional data would allow tighter filtering for display of returns directly on the landing path, but I am not aware of collision avoidance display criteria having been revised to take that potential into account. Even then, small changes of track during final approach, or small velocities towards the runway as taxying aircraft draw up to holding lines would make it quite a difficult filter to specify without incurring false warnings and go-arounds. I stand to be corrected of course, but I do not think ADSB would have directly alerted the A350 crew to the Dash-8's presence at current equipment standards. (I accept that it would have given ATC a greater opportunity to detect the runway incursion.)
Last edited by Easy Street; 3rd Jan 2024 at 13:41.
I assume that the ICAO phraseology will be changed after this accident. Hold short (stop on taxi way), position and hold (stop on the runway but no take off clearance), holding position (stop on the taxi way) are too ambiguous and can be mixed with clutter on the frequency or wishful thinking of a tired crew.
I assume that the ICAO phraseology will be changed after this accident. Hold short (stop on taxi way), position and hold (stop on the runway but no take off clearance), holding position (stop on the taxi way) are too ambiguous and can be mixed with clutter on the frequency or wishful thinking of a tired crew.
If that is available and accurate, then what happens next?
TWR; JAL166 Tokyo TOWER good evening. No 2 RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 329/8, we have departure, reduce speed to 160 knots.
JAL166; Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening.
TWR; JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed.
Does this mean JAL166 had had their permission to land rescinded because there was a departure?
JAL166; Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening.
TWR; JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed.
Does this mean JAL166 had had their permission to land rescinded because there was a departure?
Assuming that transcript is accurate, the comms appear normal and icao standard compliant.
I assume that the ICAO phraseology will be changed after this accident. Hold short (stop on taxi way), position and hold (stop on the runway but no take off clearance), holding position (stop on the taxi way) are too ambiguous and can be mixed with clutter on the frequency or wishful thinking of a tired crew.