JAL incident at Haneda Airport
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Good points, meleaguertoo. I hadn't seen that photo with the C6 board. Perhaps the Dash had started his takeoff roll which would put him further down the runway. Wonder why then the 350 flight deck is undamaged? Hitting a Dash from behind would put that big tail right there, slicing.
I understood aircraft fire fighting aimed to suppress a fire for long enough to allow an evacuation, not necessarily to put the fire out. And the First responders had three fires to deal with. Not hard to imagine back up could take a while to arrive, or was judged unnecessary, given everything else the Japanese are dealing with at the moment.
Id ignore the 'no evacuation announcement' comment: I've been down the slides for real and in the heat of the moment did not see or hear the cabin crew at the door even though they were praised for their behaviour in the accident report. "I did not hear an evacuation announcement' is not the same as 'there was no evacuation announcement'.
Was leaking fuel ignited by the engine or did the fire spread from the engine?
Id ignore the 'no evacuation announcement' comment: I've been down the slides for real and in the heat of the moment did not see or hear the cabin crew at the door even though they were praised for their behaviour in the accident report. "I did not hear an evacuation announcement' is not the same as 'there was no evacuation announcement'.
Was leaking fuel ignited by the engine or did the fire spread from the engine?
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C is the the taxiway at left of runway 34 R (at left if heading 16 L).
BUT it's called with letter C on the blueprints of Haneda (A,B,C and D the four runways) and all of its exits from 1 to 11 (C1, C2, etc).
Last edited by guadaMB; 2nd Jan 2024 at 15:25.
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This is purely speculation on my part but I flew for JAL for nearly 15 years. What I have witnessed during those years was that while the English proficiency level of JAL pilots are acceptable for international operations, proficiency levels of the non-civilian Japanese pilots are usually not that great. That could have led to a mis-understanding of an ATC instruction by the Coast Guard crew as most of the time (unlike China, France etc.) Japanese ATC speaks English to even the Japanese pilots. RIP to those who perished.
Someone on here has said that ATC transmissions suggested that the Dash had been asked to hold at C5, so that's pretty close to the A359's touchdown point if so. The video doesn't look like an aircraft that's had brakes and reversers on for 1500m to me, but again that's purely subjective. I should point out that the charts I'm looking at have C5 shown as a regular turn off much closer to the to the landing end than the fast turnoff indicated in this post.
Slide design issue?
Non-functional NLG happens often enough that I wonder how the trade-offs are being evaluated between rear-door escape slides that can cope with the situation and those that can't. Perhaps that needs revisiting?
If anyone has links to relevant documentation, I'd be grateful. It seems odd to have apparently functional emergency escapes that are likely to seriously injure or kill their users.
Ships can use vertical slides/chutes that disgorge into inflatable life-rafts. They might not be high enough throughput for aircraft.
https://www.seawardsafety.com/produc...escape-chutes/
Subsequently, I found
https://skybrary.aero/articles/evacu...ctional-issues
https://skybrary.aero/articles/emerg...vacuation-land
The latter references the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) paper Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Passenger Aeroplanes - https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4292.pdf
In that reference it states:
Separately ETSO-C69c_CS-ETSO_0.pdf ( https://www.easa.europa.eu/download/..._CS-ETSO_0.pdf ) states:
Looking at some of the pictures, it seems that the rear escape slides had extensions that didn't deploy correctly, or perhaps did, but became non-functional. No doubt it will come out in the analysis.
If anyone has links to relevant documentation, I'd be grateful. It seems odd to have apparently functional emergency escapes that are likely to seriously injure or kill their users.
Ships can use vertical slides/chutes that disgorge into inflatable life-rafts. They might not be high enough throughput for aircraft.
https://www.seawardsafety.com/produc...escape-chutes/
Subsequently, I found
https://skybrary.aero/articles/evacu...ctional-issues
https://skybrary.aero/articles/emerg...vacuation-land
The latter references the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) paper Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Passenger Aeroplanes - https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4292.pdf
In that reference it states:
In brief the EASA 25.810 requirements are:
(a list, which includes)
The assist means must be of such a length that when fully deployed that the toe end of the evacuation slide is self-supported on
the ground and provides safe evacuation for passengers and crew with one or more of the landing gears being collapsed;
(a list, which includes)
The assist means must be of such a length that when fully deployed that the toe end of the evacuation slide is self-supported on
the ground and provides safe evacuation for passengers and crew with one or more of the landing gears being collapsed;
4.13 Device Length Extensions.
4.13.1 The device extension must be capable of being inflated at any time after inflation of the basic
device has been initiated. The time required to complete extension of the device must not exceed 4 seconds beyond
the time required to inflate the basic device.
4.13.2 Inflation of the extension must be initiated by separate controls from those for the basic device.
The controls must be clearly identified and must be located separately from the manual inflation actuation controls
to minimize the possibility of inadvertent actuation.
4.13.3 The junction of the basic device and the extension must not impede evacuation
4.13.1 The device extension must be capable of being inflated at any time after inflation of the basic
device has been initiated. The time required to complete extension of the device must not exceed 4 seconds beyond
the time required to inflate the basic device.
4.13.2 Inflation of the extension must be initiated by separate controls from those for the basic device.
The controls must be clearly identified and must be located separately from the manual inflation actuation controls
to minimize the possibility of inadvertent actuation.
4.13.3 The junction of the basic device and the extension must not impede evacuation
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Newbie here, there is a picture on the UK daily mail report on the UK daily mail report (about 2/3rds way down) taken presumably from the plane behind the A350 going around, looks like the A350 came to rest at about C8, difficult to tell but also looks like collision point before C5, but not sure if runway map posted above is to scale.
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Some interesting details and updated reports from NHK:
www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20240102/k10014307191000.html
Some (more relevant to here) eyewitness reports loosely translated:
www3.nhk.or.jp/news/realtime/rt0010026.html
www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20240102/k10014307191000.html
- The fire now extinguished had burned for 6 hours
- 14 passengers injured, 4 hospitalised with non-life threatening injuries
Some (more relevant to here) eyewitness reports loosely translated:
- " Inside the plane, there were announcements saying, ``Please calm down,'' ``Don't take your luggage, and don't stand up.''"
- "We took turns getting off the escape shooter and were instructed to form a circle of 10 people close to the aircraft, holding hands, and the flight attendants checked for injuries."
www3.nhk.or.jp/news/realtime/rt0010026.html
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I think the burning wreakage at C7 are parts of the Dash that were dragged by the A350 and left behind half way down the RW.
On the videos it looks like they collided right on touchdown or shortly after while lowering the nose gear. That way the very sturdy wing box took most of the impact. The nose just impacted the tail or horizontal stabilizer.
On the videos it looks like they collided right on touchdown or shortly after while lowering the nose gear. That way the very sturdy wing box took most of the impact. The nose just impacted the tail or horizontal stabilizer.
If you're going to be unusually slow in getting onto the runway for departure, might you want to check that the approach is clear before actually moving? Whilst the Dash was on the taxiway the A350 was approaching on the Dash captain's opposite side. I'm not going to suggest that the FO didn't look but I do wonder why an aircraft lit up like a Christmas tree on short finals wasn't spotted.
Or was the Dash already on the runway and lined up, but for some reason had not yet commenced takeoff? What is not clear to me in all the info so far released is in which direction the Dash was facing. Was it pointing across, or down the runway?
Remarks above concerning the visibility of aircraft on runways at night are pertinent, especially if the Dash had lined up.
Or was the Dash already on the runway and lined up, but for some reason had not yet commenced takeoff? What is not clear to me in all the info so far released is in which direction the Dash was facing. Was it pointing across, or down the runway?
Remarks above concerning the visibility of aircraft on runways at night are pertinent, especially if the Dash had lined up.
Judging by the damage to the nose of the A350, the -8 must have been either lined up or had crossed the centreline during the line up process, but that’s about all you can say at the moment. Amazing that it was completely survivable, except for the crew of the smaller aircraft, unfortunately.
I would imagine a few people giving each other the nod in Toulouse today, and, although the fatalities in the coast guard aircraft are very sad indeed the A350 frame did what it was meant to do in terms of fire resistance and frame intergrity.
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Someone on here has said that ATC transmissions suggested that the Dash had been asked to hold at C5, so that's pretty close to the A359's touchdown point if so. The video doesn't look like an aircraft that's had brakes and reversers on for 1500m to me, but again that's purely subjective. I should point out that the charts I'm looking at have C5 shown as a regular turn off much closer to the to the landing end than the fast turnoff indicated in this post.
This is the reason we have ONLY the A-350 exchange with tower.
All the taxi/hold/access comms between Dash and GND are in another record (and not public YET).
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Have a scroll back though, someone said that it had been on GND. Can't vouch for the veracity of it, but according to my 6.1.23 Jeppesen, C5 doesn't look far off where the collision seems to have occurred, so it's feasible, But yup, there's better people than me, and maybe even you, on the case.
Amazing to see the core of the No 2 engine continue to idle with the fan totally destroyed (taken out by the ) and the FADECs doing what they are supposed to do. Suspect fuel SOV disabled with fuselage / wing damage. Fire handle pull should have shut it. I bet the crew did all the emergency shutdown procedures.
Last edited by Diff Tail Shim; 2nd Jan 2024 at 16:10.
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Terrible accident.
Are all A350 delivered with the HUD on both sides?
Airplanes can be extremely difficult to spot on a runway amongst all the lighting, especially if they are stationary, but I would have thought with two pilots looking through the HUD, it could help reduce this risk.
Are all A350 delivered with the HUD on both sides?
Airplanes can be extremely difficult to spot on a runway amongst all the lighting, especially if they are stationary, but I would have thought with two pilots looking through the HUD, it could help reduce this risk.
Ok, I'm known to search for facts. Here's a first guess from the video in post #29!
The CCTV camera shows a local time, I refer to that
17:47:27 An Orange Shine from offscreen is visible on the right edge of the cam frame.It's rather sudden, so a kind of explosive event, not a steady burning object that simply comes closer. Little later a bang can be heard. (can s.b. measure time to see distance from cam?)
17:47:39 (12s later) JAL A350 enters the cam frame from the right. After 4-5 rewinds my first estimation "more than 50KN, less than 100KN"
17:47:56 (17s later) The A350 exits the cam frame to the left. Hard to tell how much slower it got.
So I detected, how much "aircraft length" the cam covers of the runway and how long the crossing took. The visible aircraft length should be less perspective angle dependent than estimating length units.
I count 10.8 lengths of a 350-900 (~67 metres).
On cam entry, it takes avg of 1.35s to proceed 1 length. That's ~100KN
The full travel through the cam frame takes 10.8s. Thats an average of 80KN
On cam exit, it takes avg of 1.7s to proceed 1 length. That's ~79KN
Thus, we are talking of a high speed collision. Assuming that the collision took away a bit of speed, we must assume at least 90KN. If the video entry happened at 100KN, we must assume 110KN or even more (we don't know when and how braking action started and persisted)
Anybody want to crosscheck?
Where is the camera located?
Is there a GND chart at known scale? once we know the position, we can get an idea where the collision took place
The CCTV camera shows a local time, I refer to that
17:47:27 An Orange Shine from offscreen is visible on the right edge of the cam frame.It's rather sudden, so a kind of explosive event, not a steady burning object that simply comes closer. Little later a bang can be heard. (can s.b. measure time to see distance from cam?)
17:47:39 (12s later) JAL A350 enters the cam frame from the right. After 4-5 rewinds my first estimation "more than 50KN, less than 100KN"
17:47:56 (17s later) The A350 exits the cam frame to the left. Hard to tell how much slower it got.
So I detected, how much "aircraft length" the cam covers of the runway and how long the crossing took. The visible aircraft length should be less perspective angle dependent than estimating length units.
I count 10.8 lengths of a 350-900 (~67 metres).
On cam entry, it takes avg of 1.35s to proceed 1 length. That's ~100KN
The full travel through the cam frame takes 10.8s. Thats an average of 80KN
On cam exit, it takes avg of 1.7s to proceed 1 length. That's ~79KN
Thus, we are talking of a high speed collision. Assuming that the collision took away a bit of speed, we must assume at least 90KN. If the video entry happened at 100KN, we must assume 110KN or even more (we don't know when and how braking action started and persisted)
Anybody want to crosscheck?
Where is the camera located?
Is there a GND chart at known scale? once we know the position, we can get an idea where the collision took place
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Have a scroll back though, someone said that it had been on GND. Can't vouch for the veracity of it, but according to my 6.1.23 Jeppesen, C5 doesn't look far off where the collision seems to have occurred, so it's feasible, But yup, there's better people than me, and maybe even you, on the case.
¿Was the A359 STILL ALOFT in the C5 zone?
¿Isn't it not very FAR from the recommended touchdown point (cause apparently the A359 pilots were more than handly at the moment of the hurry)?
IF the collision with the Dash was in the C5 access, WHERE was the Dash facing?
C5 is NOT a crossing (to nowhere/water).
There are only two possibilities: was on the TO procedure (had to be waved and confirmed) or doing nonsense because that's not a place to HOLD.
It's all very rough estimation with significant errors possible! May it helps to get a bigger picture,
My take on the impact, just from the photos and videos, is how surprisingly little damage there is to the A350. The nosecone is very light structure, yet only has a dent, and both engines appear to have light damage to their intakes.
Therefore one must assume that most of the A350 impact was taken on the lower front hull and nose landing gear.
Obviously we don’t yet known the 2 aircraft’s configuration at impact but it’s still difficult to see how the bigger aircraft got away with such little obvious damage, particularly to the wing structure.
Therefore one must assume that most of the A350 impact was taken on the lower front hull and nose landing gear.
Obviously we don’t yet known the 2 aircraft’s configuration at impact but it’s still difficult to see how the bigger aircraft got away with such little obvious damage, particularly to the wing structure.
My take on the impact, just from the photos and videos, is how surprisingly little damage there is to the A350. The nosecone is very light structure, yet only has a dent, and both engines appear to have light damage to their intakes.
Therefore one must assume that most of the A350 impact was taken on the lower front hull and nose landing gear.
Obviously we don’t yet known the 2 aircraft’s configuration at impact but it’s still difficult to see how the bigger aircraft got away with such little obvious damage, particularly to the wing structure.
Therefore one must assume that most of the A350 impact was taken on the lower front hull and nose landing gear.
Obviously we don’t yet known the 2 aircraft’s configuration at impact but it’s still difficult to see how the bigger aircraft got away with such little obvious damage, particularly to the wing structure.