AF447
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ACLS65,
As a matter of fact, it seems that the French BEA is investigating that exact scenario: a major wastewater leak that would have first permeated the a/c structure, then its freezing would have allowed the a/c in-flight breakout.
Article is available in French here:
Vol AF447: une nouvelle piste sur les causes du crash? - Yahoo! Actualités
(Sorry, had it just translated into English, but it was deleted and I'm too lazy to do it again...)
As a matter of fact, it seems that the French BEA is investigating that exact scenario: a major wastewater leak that would have first permeated the a/c structure, then its freezing would have allowed the a/c in-flight breakout.
Article is available in French here:
Vol AF447: une nouvelle piste sur les causes du crash? - Yahoo! Actualités
(Sorry, had it just translated into English, but it was deleted and I'm too lazy to do it again...)
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Yep JuggleDan I was replying to your previously deleted post.
Here is a link to the Google translation of that page.
Google Translate
(Perhaps a French speaker can provide a better translation?)
One interesting quote...
"According to "informed sources" quoted in the first edition of the Journal du Dimanche, released Saturday, the Office of Investigations and Analysis (BEA) consider "the track of a leak on a circuit of the wastewater device, reported shortly after take-off by a first automated message warning of the Airbus A330. ""
Perhaps there are ACARS messages prior to what we have seen that may be significant and/or that lav ACARS message might be more significant.
Here is a link to the Google translation of that page.
Google Translate
(Perhaps a French speaker can provide a better translation?)
One interesting quote...
"According to "informed sources" quoted in the first edition of the Journal du Dimanche, released Saturday, the Office of Investigations and Analysis (BEA) consider "the track of a leak on a circuit of the wastewater device, reported shortly after take-off by a first automated message warning of the Airbus A330. ""
Perhaps there are ACARS messages prior to what we have seen that may be significant and/or that lav ACARS message might be more significant.
Last edited by ACLS65; 20th Jun 2009 at 22:24.
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Folks - since the last pics were posted by Damian (excellent work, by the way) we have had a frenzy of "it's this bit!"/"no it isn't it's this bit"/"it broke off this way" - coming up now to 200 posts.
May I suggest:
There are investigators in S America who can readily determine what and how - far better than anyone here from a photo
All this incredible knowledge and intellect (I am NOT being facetious) SHOULD surely be directed at what started all this?
It appears that for at least 4 minutes it was phoning home to mother about all the things that were going wrong. No 'sudden' breakup/explosive lightning bolt. The apparent loss of successive bits of important flight information must surely be a one-way street to loss of control with an inevitable consequence, given the time, altitude and weather conditions. Where 'this bit and that bit came from and how' FROM HERE - after 20+ days of wreckage release and drift is not actually going to do anything for the investigation. I believe attention to systems, software and pilot training/drills is where we should focus. A thorough understanding of the way these apparent failures interact and are handled would be useful.
The latest 'news' of the "water leak" (presumably triggered by the release of the Toilet waste ACARS?) does not ring true either. I can understand the theory but I come back to the time scale and I cannot see how any water leak could cause the apparently failing pressure sensors UNLESS it was leaking into an E&E bay, of course. (I've seen the effects of that!). Surely too much of a coincidence?
May I suggest:
There are investigators in S America who can readily determine what and how - far better than anyone here from a photo
All this incredible knowledge and intellect (I am NOT being facetious) SHOULD surely be directed at what started all this?
It appears that for at least 4 minutes it was phoning home to mother about all the things that were going wrong. No 'sudden' breakup/explosive lightning bolt. The apparent loss of successive bits of important flight information must surely be a one-way street to loss of control with an inevitable consequence, given the time, altitude and weather conditions. Where 'this bit and that bit came from and how' FROM HERE - after 20+ days of wreckage release and drift is not actually going to do anything for the investigation. I believe attention to systems, software and pilot training/drills is where we should focus. A thorough understanding of the way these apparent failures interact and are handled would be useful.
The latest 'news' of the "water leak" (presumably triggered by the release of the Toilet waste ACARS?) does not ring true either. I can understand the theory but I come back to the time scale and I cannot see how any water leak could cause the apparently failing pressure sensors UNLESS it was leaking into an E&E bay, of course. (I've seen the effects of that!). Surely too much of a coincidence?
Hi BOAC;
Re, "about 200 posts ago", yes, understand what you're saying but in the absence of data from the recorders and the cryptic messages from the ACARS, we are collectively "kicking tin", solving an aircrash the old-fashioned way.
I think most appreciate that there are very good people who are similarly kicking tin in South America from the actual parts and not the photos and could tell us in a few moments what it has taken us 200 posts to explore.
But neither that has occured nor have more definitive photos appeared; I discount the importance of the discussion from the point of view that "we" are not about to solve this mystery because we can't, and if we do it would be by serendipity and not finding "the" 'smoking gun', (to use an atrocious media metaphor). But we can posit what is reasonable to each and let the emerging evidence sort out theory.
Aileron, elevator, flap, leading edge behind the slat?...it doesn't matter. Mid-air breakup or impact of an intact structure with the sea and subsequent breakup - there are arguments to be made everywhere in the absence of experience on this side, and substantive evidence on the other. We're just kicking tin.
Re, "about 200 posts ago", yes, understand what you're saying but in the absence of data from the recorders and the cryptic messages from the ACARS, we are collectively "kicking tin", solving an aircrash the old-fashioned way.
I think most appreciate that there are very good people who are similarly kicking tin in South America from the actual parts and not the photos and could tell us in a few moments what it has taken us 200 posts to explore.
But neither that has occured nor have more definitive photos appeared; I discount the importance of the discussion from the point of view that "we" are not about to solve this mystery because we can't, and if we do it would be by serendipity and not finding "the" 'smoking gun', (to use an atrocious media metaphor). But we can posit what is reasonable to each and let the emerging evidence sort out theory.
Aileron, elevator, flap, leading edge behind the slat?...it doesn't matter. Mid-air breakup or impact of an intact structure with the sea and subsequent breakup - there are arguments to be made everywhere in the absence of experience on this side, and substantive evidence on the other. We're just kicking tin.
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The alternative of a "flat" spin suggesting a "pancake" impact has also been made, (the theory which has suggested that that is how the VS broke loose - upon impact, "tilting back" and fracturing the rudder structure - I submit that the tail-structure in that area is far more frangible and would do little to no damage to a vertical structure striking it from the top), but such an impact would result in very high 'g' loading so one would expect far more deformation of the larger parts seen in the photographs than is evident.
There is a common aspect to everything seen in the photographs; the structures are all relatively light in comparison to wings/engines/horizontal stabs/landing gear. Perhaps, like Challenger, (and as has been suggested here by various posters before), these lighter parts fell out of the main, heavier structures which had already failed into a number of open sections and continued to fall for many minutes with a comparatively, (and obviously) benign water-impact.
There is a common aspect to everything seen in the photographs; the structures are all relatively light in comparison to wings/engines/horizontal stabs/landing gear. Perhaps, like Challenger, (and as has been suggested here by various posters before), these lighter parts fell out of the main, heavier structures which had already failed into a number of open sections and continued to fall for many minutes with a comparatively, (and obviously) benign water-impact.
Crash Sequence of the XB-70
LIFE: Xb-70 Wreckage - Hosted by Google
Subject aircraft impacted the ground relatively flat. Its structure was mainly titanium semimonocoque and stainless steel honeycomb sandwich panels. Therefore, materials can not really be compared with the wreckage of AF447 but it does give an impression of the damage done to an aircraft destroyed in a flat spin.
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ACLS65,
I'll give a 2nd pass at French-aided Google translation, and see if the mods let this one live, who knows...
BOAC,
I thought of passing on this piece of information after reading a recent exchange between PJ2 and tquehl: "It is extremely hard for me to believe that the aircraft broke up inflight".
Maybe the water leak could answer that question, maybe not. I'm just the messenger, you guys are the experts... I'll leave it to you from there!
I'll give a 2nd pass at French-aided Google translation, and see if the mods let this one live, who knows...
A new possibility is under investigation regarding the causes of the crash.
According to an "informed source" quoted in the first edition of this Saturday's Journal du Dimanche (JDD), the French BEA consider "the possibility of a leak in the wastewater conduits, reported shortly after take-off by a first automated message warning from the Airbus A330."
"The leak, undetectable to the crew" may have "caused a prolonged water flow," says Le Journal du Dimanche.Then, when the aircraft hit temperatures below -50°C, the water flow would have produced "a major frost outburst within the composite membrane (half metal, half-composite carbon-type)", explains the weekly newspaper.
This composite membrane is located inside the fuselage at the rear of the aircraft. According to the "informed source" quoted by Le JDD, it would be "frost which caused a sudden in-flight break-out of the aircraft structure."
According to an "informed source" quoted in the first edition of this Saturday's Journal du Dimanche (JDD), the French BEA consider "the possibility of a leak in the wastewater conduits, reported shortly after take-off by a first automated message warning from the Airbus A330."
"The leak, undetectable to the crew" may have "caused a prolonged water flow," says Le Journal du Dimanche.Then, when the aircraft hit temperatures below -50°C, the water flow would have produced "a major frost outburst within the composite membrane (half metal, half-composite carbon-type)", explains the weekly newspaper.
This composite membrane is located inside the fuselage at the rear of the aircraft. According to the "informed source" quoted by Le JDD, it would be "frost which caused a sudden in-flight break-out of the aircraft structure."
I thought of passing on this piece of information after reading a recent exchange between PJ2 and tquehl: "It is extremely hard for me to believe that the aircraft broke up inflight".
Maybe the water leak could answer that question, maybe not. I'm just the messenger, you guys are the experts... I'll leave it to you from there!
Last edited by JuggleDan; 20th Jun 2009 at 22:54. Reason: Corrected a few typos
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Originally Posted by Will Fraser
Elevator needs no 'airfoil', it's work is done by deflecting airflow, as a trim tab would, and 'lift' isn't part of the purpose.
Tailplanes very often have non-symmetrical (cambered) sections. Frequently they have negative cambered foils, as they are optimised for nominal downward trimming loads (c.g ahead of a.c) for stability.
The elevator would be a continuation of this section, containing a modicum of the camberline.
These are supercritical sections, and their aerofoil section also influenced at the root by local flow (note the main wing's section on modern airliner's has a camberline that also looks negative - at the root, due to wing-body interaction)
So whilst I've been out of this business for some years, I'd still bet that tail section is unlikely to be symmetrical. It wouldn't though, at the mid to tip sections, be heavily cambered (negative or positive).
Rgds,
HM
Green-dot;
Re the damage pattern, yes exactly and that has been my point all along.
My thinking is, the only way in which a large, relatively fragile structure such as the galley that we see is for it to be ejected cleanly, without impediment or collision, from the interior of the cabin and for that to happen, the fuselage itself has to have already broken up at least in that area.
An uncontrolled impact with the water regardless of bank angle, would shatter/fragment most of the interior structure or at least leave substantial tell-tale marks or damage from collision with other parts s they too were ejected during the impact sequence and not simply eject it intact, with all the bins remaining in place and no damage to the support structure.
The galley structure along with many other interior pieces, are what in what we might call "pristine" condition, given the substantial forces involved under the circumstances which all but excludes both a controlled ditching (a highly unlikely scenario) and a flat spin impact with the sea.
I'm not arguing for this or that theory of course - I'm observing and thinking about what is evident and what fits the theory of a substantial mid-air breakup. Such a notion is clearly open for other interpretation providing what we see also fits and can explain both a controlled ditching for example and a galley, floating freely in the ocean. It's possible, just not probable.
ACLS65;
Re PHCs - yes there are 3 PHCs which control the probes and ports heating. The Captain's pitot is powered by the AC ESS bus; the F/O pitot is powered by the AC2 bus and the Standby pitot is powered by the AC1 bus. If the AC1 bus loses power, it can be switched to the AC ESS using controls in the cockpit.
"The PHC tramsmits one ARINC 429 low-speed data bus for fault message to the CMC."
I believe these messages are in turn picked up by the ACARS. I am assuming too that all 3 PHCs would send this kind of message should faults occur within the system or the PHC itself.
On the theory concerning water in the EE Bay from a forward Galley or lavatory overflow, this kind of a problem has occurred - I've seen it - in our case there were no problems. It may cause problems if sufficient water/fluid enters the EE bay (underneath the cockpit) but generally cabin crrew have such a "flood" under control long before much fluid escapes. I can't see water escaping on the ground, unnoticed, freezing, and then causing a problem, (if that is what the poster meant).
Regarding not having "objects from the cockpit", actually the green Oxygen bottle seen in the photographs is from the EE compartment area below the cockpit. There are no other such cylinders on the 330/340:
Re the damage pattern, yes exactly and that has been my point all along.
My thinking is, the only way in which a large, relatively fragile structure such as the galley that we see is for it to be ejected cleanly, without impediment or collision, from the interior of the cabin and for that to happen, the fuselage itself has to have already broken up at least in that area.
An uncontrolled impact with the water regardless of bank angle, would shatter/fragment most of the interior structure or at least leave substantial tell-tale marks or damage from collision with other parts s they too were ejected during the impact sequence and not simply eject it intact, with all the bins remaining in place and no damage to the support structure.
The galley structure along with many other interior pieces, are what in what we might call "pristine" condition, given the substantial forces involved under the circumstances which all but excludes both a controlled ditching (a highly unlikely scenario) and a flat spin impact with the sea.
I'm not arguing for this or that theory of course - I'm observing and thinking about what is evident and what fits the theory of a substantial mid-air breakup. Such a notion is clearly open for other interpretation providing what we see also fits and can explain both a controlled ditching for example and a galley, floating freely in the ocean. It's possible, just not probable.
ACLS65;
Re PHCs - yes there are 3 PHCs which control the probes and ports heating. The Captain's pitot is powered by the AC ESS bus; the F/O pitot is powered by the AC2 bus and the Standby pitot is powered by the AC1 bus. If the AC1 bus loses power, it can be switched to the AC ESS using controls in the cockpit.
"The PHC tramsmits one ARINC 429 low-speed data bus for fault message to the CMC."
I believe these messages are in turn picked up by the ACARS. I am assuming too that all 3 PHCs would send this kind of message should faults occur within the system or the PHC itself.
On the theory concerning water in the EE Bay from a forward Galley or lavatory overflow, this kind of a problem has occurred - I've seen it - in our case there were no problems. It may cause problems if sufficient water/fluid enters the EE bay (underneath the cockpit) but generally cabin crrew have such a "flood" under control long before much fluid escapes. I can't see water escaping on the ground, unnoticed, freezing, and then causing a problem, (if that is what the poster meant).
Regarding not having "objects from the cockpit", actually the green Oxygen bottle seen in the photographs is from the EE compartment area below the cockpit. There are no other such cylinders on the 330/340:
Last edited by PJ2; 20th Jun 2009 at 23:59.
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Regarding not having "objects from the cockpit", actually the green Oxygen bottle seen in the photographs is from the EE compartment area below the cockpit. There are no other such cylinders on the 330/340:
Do we know how that is fixed in the EE bay, can anyone 'speculate' then, on how that came to be floating about by itself, I presume empty?
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interim report
Maybe the interim report will inform in details what exactly all those ACARS messages mean with the corresponding docs, including the lav (which lav ?) message.
I still would like to know what could generate that ISIS fault (comparison with ground speed data from the ADIRUs, and so on) and at what moment (realignment, initialization ?)
I also would like to know if discrepancy between pitots is detected directly or through the ADRUs
I still would like to know what could generate that ISIS fault (comparison with ground speed data from the ADIRUs, and so on) and at what moment (realignment, initialization ?)
I also would like to know if discrepancy between pitots is detected directly or through the ADRUs
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Re: floating oxygen cylinder
I suspect that if it was still charged with gas to the pressure limit of the cylinder and valve, it would probably still float. Pressurized gas doesn't have a whole lot of mass.
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Frozen waste water in the rear of the aircraft caused a loss of Air Data and subsequent maladies?
Sounds rather half baked if you ask me, like something cooked up at The Sun, The National Enquirer (US) or a certain silly online aviation enthusiast's forum (Not PPRuNe) which shall remain nameless.
Sounds rather half baked if you ask me, like something cooked up at The Sun, The National Enquirer (US) or a certain silly online aviation enthusiast's forum (Not PPRuNe) which shall remain nameless.
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To put numbers on this:
Typical emergency O2 tank pressure is 1850 psi. From
rho = P / (R*T)
follows the density of the pressurized O2 is about 168 kg/m^3, less than a fifth that of water. Add about 30kg of steel for an assumed 40cm diameter by 1m length oxygen cylinder and the combined density of the O2 tank is about 450kg/m^3, or about half the density of water (and even less than that for salt water).
Thus, an O2 tank floating in 30 degree water will float, regardless of whether it is full or empty of pressurized O2.
Cheers
Doc
Typical emergency O2 tank pressure is 1850 psi. From
rho = P / (R*T)
follows the density of the pressurized O2 is about 168 kg/m^3, less than a fifth that of water. Add about 30kg of steel for an assumed 40cm diameter by 1m length oxygen cylinder and the combined density of the O2 tank is about 450kg/m^3, or about half the density of water (and even less than that for salt water).
Thus, an O2 tank floating in 30 degree water will float, regardless of whether it is full or empty of pressurized O2.
Cheers
Doc
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I agree, Any leakage in the back would have no effect on pitot, static ports and probes. With no flight data why would they publish this nonsense. I sense they are trying to take attention away from the Airbus and put it on sensors.
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Except the attach points on the elevator are more evenly-spaced, while the aileron attach points are close together.
I can't judge the size because I don't know how large the elevator is compared to the aileron, at that point in either structure. An oxygen bottle is about a meter long and that's about how wide the flight control we're examining is.
I don't think it's flap, (because of the two attach points) but further photos are needed before we can determine origin.
I think it is important (especially with so little real evidence) because one outcome is "wing" and the other is "tail feathers".
regards,
PJ2
I can't judge the size because I don't know how large the elevator is compared to the aileron, at that point in either structure. An oxygen bottle is about a meter long and that's about how wide the flight control we're examining is.
I don't think it's flap, (because of the two attach points) but further photos are needed before we can determine origin.
I think it is important (especially with so little real evidence) because one outcome is "wing" and the other is "tail feathers".
regards,
PJ2
Having finally had a chance to look through Dorian's very complete album, there is another image that provides a different angle and much better sense of scale regarding this piece of wreckage.
dd5b67ca-ac0d-4440-ae29-e90158f179b.jpg picture by DorianBanks - Photobucket
It is clearly evident in this picture (as was not the case in the other two) that the piece is from one end of a flight control. There is also an object protruding outwards from the piece just below the gentleman's right hand. One can't be certain but it does look like it could be a hinge attachment fitting. If so, this would tend to validate your identification of the two slots and suggest very strongly that this is the outboard portion of an aileron.
If that is what it is then I would I think that it's highly probable that it's from the left wing as opposed to the right. My reasoning for this goes back to the grease mark. In my experience I have only seen such marks on the underside of the airplane (which, granted, is the portion I see far more of on walk arounds). A plausible explanation for this mark would be a small glob of grease falling from one of the slat tracks on the slat forward of the aileron. I'm no expert at how such a glob might move in the airflow but my semi-educated guess is that it is far more likely to strike the under side than the upper side of an aileron. So, if what we are seeing is the bottom of the aileron then the hinge points would be at the left extremity looking forwards and hence on the left wing.
I would also agree that the piece of wreckage besides the flight control is quite likely a portion of a canoe. I don't think that it is a forward portion where the RAT is stowed, however. The size and taper are more in agreement with the aft portion of an outboard canoe. Additionally, the "door" portion of the canoe that houses the RAT has a rounded as opposed to squared off appearance.
Knowing which sides of the aircraft that the canoe and aileron (if that's what they are) come from along with where they were picked up could provide significant information about the proximity of the major components at the time the aircraft hit the water. Unfortunately what we see is insufficient to draw a conclusion, but it's a fair bet that those on the scene do know and that these particular bits will help forward the investigation.
ELAC
ELAC;
Thanks, I hadn't seen that photo either, so that helps with "scale". I think your assessment of the grease marks is as reasonable as anything we can put forward and would agree.
On the canoe, re not being the RAT door, yes, concur - I think the black line is a sealant not a door.
There is a photo that came out right at the beginning when the photo of the galley showed up (around the 7th) that showed a lot of wiring and air conditioning ducting. I think that's from the cockpit area as well - that's where a lot of complex airconditioning ducting is found, in the overhead ceiling area. Again, entirely a guess; there's a honeycomb hatch-structure in the background upon which all this material is either resting or attached. There also appears to be a "stringer" structure in the darkened background but this may just be the ground cloth etc the material is lying upon - imagination is okay so long as its controlled.
The exercise of identifying parts is worthwhile even here; we just never know.
HarryMan;
Yes, I have the AMM drawings of the actual installation but didn't want to put too much detail here. The schematic I provided is quite specific on where it is mounted (right below the F/O's seat location) but not how - it's strapped down, longitudinal axis perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the aircraft, with the valve/regulator facing starboard.
Thanks, I hadn't seen that photo either, so that helps with "scale". I think your assessment of the grease marks is as reasonable as anything we can put forward and would agree.
On the canoe, re not being the RAT door, yes, concur - I think the black line is a sealant not a door.
There is a photo that came out right at the beginning when the photo of the galley showed up (around the 7th) that showed a lot of wiring and air conditioning ducting. I think that's from the cockpit area as well - that's where a lot of complex airconditioning ducting is found, in the overhead ceiling area. Again, entirely a guess; there's a honeycomb hatch-structure in the background upon which all this material is either resting or attached. There also appears to be a "stringer" structure in the darkened background but this may just be the ground cloth etc the material is lying upon - imagination is okay so long as its controlled.
The exercise of identifying parts is worthwhile even here; we just never know.
HarryMan;
Do we know how that is fixed in the EE bay,
Last edited by PJ2; 21st Jun 2009 at 04:06.
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Folks - since the last pics were posted by Damian (excellent work, by the way) we have had a frenzy of "it's this bit!"/"no it isn't it's this bit"/"it broke off this way" - coming up now to 200 posts.
May I suggest:
There are investigators in S America who can readily determine what and how - far better than anyone here from a photo
All this incredible knowledge and intellect (I am NOT being facetious) SHOULD surely be directed at what started all this?.
May I suggest:
There are investigators in S America who can readily determine what and how - far better than anyone here from a photo
All this incredible knowledge and intellect (I am NOT being facetious) SHOULD surely be directed at what started all this?.
Both true points, however, the problem is that there is just not sufficient information in the public realm to build any single supportable hypothesis about what started this yet. I can easily envision at least 3 different scenarios all with different implications regarding the aircraft, crew and meteorological conditions. I'm sure others could imagine more, many without any foundation in the known facts. Until some fact leading to a more supportable conclusion than that a VSC message implies that frozen water was the culprit (for Pete's sake!) shows up I think we're at a bit of a standstill. We can posit til we're blue in the face but we can prove almost nothing.
It appears that for at least 4 minutes it was phoning home to mother about all the things that were going wrong. No 'sudden' breakup/explosive lightning bolt. The apparent loss of successive bits of important flight information must surely be a one-way street to loss of control with an inevitable consequence, given the time, altitude and weather conditions.
Where 'this bit and that bit came from and how' FROM HERE - after 20+ days of wreckage release and drift is not actually going to do anything for the investigation. I believe attention to systems, software and pilot training/drills is where we should focus. A thorough understanding of the way these apparent failures interact and are handled would be useful.
None of this discussion is going to solve this sad mystery in itself, but at least when we start talking about things that we can attempt to prove or disprove with available information we are using this forum more as it was intended as opposed to pushing out various personal theories that have no supporting facts.
Cheers,
ELAC
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Air France Search Scaled Back
ABC Australia reporting that the search for parts and bodies has been scaled back.
Air France search scaled back - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
Air France search scaled back - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
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It may not be the ADIRU that failed
The ATSB report of VH-QPA, 7 oct 2008 describes the intermittent failure of ADIRU 1 during cruise, leading to sudden elevator movement of 10 degs, initiating a pitch down of 8 degs.
Could there be similarities, purely speculative, a possible impact by EMI because of earlier incidents in approx the same geographic area, near Learmonth, which lead the investigators to consider electromagnetic interference, so now coming back to this accident, heavy thunderstorms, nearby lightning, or even lightning strike. All components should comply with RTCA DO160-D, but if e.g. the ADIRU itself or interfacing wiring doesn't, there's a possibility for inadvertent flight control movement.
And further; there seems to be lack of comparison-check between the 3 different ADIRU's for the flightcontrol systems, FCPC's to base its decisions on. And last ; an ADIRU to cause an elevator deflection during cruise almost beyond the airplane's design limits , I wonder how most more elev deflection the airplane could sustain and where is the PRIM's protection against that.
rgds Peter
Could there be similarities, purely speculative, a possible impact by EMI because of earlier incidents in approx the same geographic area, near Learmonth, which lead the investigators to consider electromagnetic interference, so now coming back to this accident, heavy thunderstorms, nearby lightning, or even lightning strike. All components should comply with RTCA DO160-D, but if e.g. the ADIRU itself or interfacing wiring doesn't, there's a possibility for inadvertent flight control movement.
And further; there seems to be lack of comparison-check between the 3 different ADIRU's for the flightcontrol systems, FCPC's to base its decisions on. And last ; an ADIRU to cause an elevator deflection during cruise almost beyond the airplane's design limits , I wonder how most more elev deflection the airplane could sustain and where is the PRIM's protection against that.
rgds Peter
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Hello,
I was waiting for several days that someone more qualified than me would post something about the SAR but, as nothing is comming, I'll post a few maps to illustrate my findings. Beforehand, I would like to point out that the Press releases so far are fairly inacurate or contradictory about what actually happened to AF 447. If you want to cross-check my data below, please, go to the BEA:
Press Releases
Information on Investigation
and FAB
FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA - Asas de um povo soberano
So, we'll start with the few (real) facts we already had on hand and everybody should be able to reconstruct the maps as I did. For doing so, we need to place a few points on Google Earth (coordinates below are in decimal degrees):
1. Waypoints & Flight Plan
During the first hours of June 1st, AF 447 flight on its way between the waypoints INTOL and TASIL:
- INTOL (-1.362, -32.832)
- TASIL (4.005, -29.990)
AF 447 automaticaly reported its position to Air France HQ (ACARS) every ten minutes. This is shown in this BEA Reconstituted flight path which use the same AF ACARS source: http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...light.path.jpg
2. Last Position, Turbulences & ACARS
The last auto-report was sent at 0210Z and revealed that AF 447 was in cruise (Mach 0.82) at FL350 (BEA).
- Last Position Reported was (2.98, -30.59)
I found this position, page 2, in the 6 June SHOM pdf (Services Hydrographiques et Océanographiques de la Marine,- SHOM, 6 juin 2009) from the French BEA site which is is missing in the English part:
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....hom.050609.pdf
I cross-checked this position with the BEA presentations and it is always the same spot matching those coordinates. For unknow reason, the Brazilian "Ultimo reporte" is off 20 km (longitude) in their powerpoints.
Flight AF 447 was on track (slighty west 3NM) at 0210Z heading 30 to TASIL. The throttle settings (AUTO) and speed are showing that it was not in "turbulence" mode (A/THR OFF, Mach 0.80) at 0210Z. It might have encountered turbulences @ 0200Z but it cannot be acertained at the moment: basicaly this point is extrapolated from AF 1st press release:
Press Releases
From the above press release, it is not clear if the 0200Z situation was:
a) an AF assumption because of the meteo reports;
b) an AF assumption extracted from the automated ACARS which included also the aircraft performances beside the positional report @ 0200Z.
So far, I tend to believe that no direct report was made by the crew about the so-called "fortes turbulences". Never, so far, the BEA did imply such a fact. Beside, this AF press release is counterfactual about the "electrical failure" pointed by the ACARS as this problem wasn't reported.
Between 0210Z and 0214Z, 24 maintenance ACARS were automaticaly sent by AF447. They are time stamped but unsorted in the listing. Those maintenance ACARS do not transmit the position of the aircraft => The real position of F-GZCP @ 0214Z is unknow. By flightplan extrapolation, She should have been about 31 NM further on its way to TASIL (3.432, -30.328).
5. Search & Rescue, recovery:
The BEA pdf "Sea search operations" page 10: http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...search.ops.pdf
is showing a clear partern of the body distribution (red dots) along a South-North axis. By Picking up the northern red dot each day, it would give roughly the daily speed of the sea drift.
- 6 June (3.566, -30.458) -> dot 06
- 7 June (3.810, -30.485) -> dot 07
- 8 June (4.045, -30.460) -> dot 08
- 9 June (4.415, -30.525) -> dot 09
- 10 June (4.730, -30.505) -> dot 10
There is no need [for this presentation purpose] to consider the other parts of the aircraft as the bodies are very unlikely to be affected by the wind like the other materials from the airframe. From d06 to d10, the distance is about 128 km covered in four days, then an average drift of 0.37 m/sec, with an heading of 357.
A quick Verification using the SHOM pdf linked above, there is a map, page 8, of the surface drift forecast (right map) in this area (red circle) for the period 6-12 June. The right gauge indicate that a 0.40+ m/s drift is pretty close and the heading is also North. Then, this rounded measure is correct enough for an estimation.
7. Probable Crash Zone
By doing an extrapolation of the surface sea drift allocated to the period following the crash we'll find that the recovery of d06 is dated ~0900Z on 6 June. Hence, 126.5 hrs after the crash. During this period, assuming that the drift speed (0.40 m/s) and heading (357) was the same, the bodies would have covered 182 km, which point to about 100 NM south of d06.
- Estimated Crash Area (1.915, -30.390)
8. Hypothesis and course post 0214Z
Considering that d06 was recovered ~127 hrs after the supposed crash hour at only 11 nautic miles North-West of the planned AF 447 position @ 0214Z, it seems very unlikely that F-GZCP crashed anywhere near this place if one is taking into account the surface speed of the drift and its heading to the North. The pattern of the recovered bodies seems very regular and is pointing directly to the crash zone and its surroundings.
The only possibility for F-GZCP to reach such a remote place, considering her flightplan, was to make a 180 turn East. After having suffered whaterver crippling instrumentation/airframe damages due to the weather or other cause. Her crew certainly attempted to divert for an emergency landing solution in Fernando de Noronha, at any time past 0210Z (last know position).
Depending at what time the Captain decided to turn back (even after 0214Z as, from the ACARS, no catastrophic failures occured until then), the flight might have lasted much longer than we thought, involving a cripled aircraft unable to keep its cruise speed and certainly also its altitude.
Therefore, the lack of subsequent ACARS past 0214Z should be considered as the consequence of the failure/destruction of the SATCOM system (i.e. ice/hail) rather than the consequence of an immediate fatal dive/break up. Moreover, F-GZCP had a COM3 inop when she took off from Rio. This was revealed by Eurocockpit.com yesterday.
Of course, this is a rough estimation of either the crash zone and the real weather situation. A much more detailed analysis of the actual surface sea drift between 1-6 june would be very usefull to confirm this estimation but, even if the drift was actually half my figure (it may also be twice), AFF 447 would have turned back and not crashed close to 2014Z. I tend to believe also that such a move concured a lot to the delays before the SAR could find any wreckage close to the supposed crash zone around TASIL as they reached it only 5 days later.
S~
Olivier
I was waiting for several days that someone more qualified than me would post something about the SAR but, as nothing is comming, I'll post a few maps to illustrate my findings. Beforehand, I would like to point out that the Press releases so far are fairly inacurate or contradictory about what actually happened to AF 447. If you want to cross-check my data below, please, go to the BEA:
Press Releases
Information on Investigation
and FAB
FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA - Asas de um povo soberano
So, we'll start with the few (real) facts we already had on hand and everybody should be able to reconstruct the maps as I did. For doing so, we need to place a few points on Google Earth (coordinates below are in decimal degrees):
1. Waypoints & Flight Plan
During the first hours of June 1st, AF 447 flight on its way between the waypoints INTOL and TASIL:
- INTOL (-1.362, -32.832)
- TASIL (4.005, -29.990)
AF 447 automaticaly reported its position to Air France HQ (ACARS) every ten minutes. This is shown in this BEA Reconstituted flight path which use the same AF ACARS source: http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...light.path.jpg
2. Last Position, Turbulences & ACARS
The last auto-report was sent at 0210Z and revealed that AF 447 was in cruise (Mach 0.82) at FL350 (BEA).
- Last Position Reported was (2.98, -30.59)
I found this position, page 2, in the 6 June SHOM pdf (Services Hydrographiques et Océanographiques de la Marine,- SHOM, 6 juin 2009) from the French BEA site which is is missing in the English part:
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....hom.050609.pdf
I cross-checked this position with the BEA presentations and it is always the same spot matching those coordinates. For unknow reason, the Brazilian "Ultimo reporte" is off 20 km (longitude) in their powerpoints.
Flight AF 447 was on track (slighty west 3NM) at 0210Z heading 30 to TASIL. The throttle settings (AUTO) and speed are showing that it was not in "turbulence" mode (A/THR OFF, Mach 0.80) at 0210Z. It might have encountered turbulences @ 0200Z but it cannot be acertained at the moment: basicaly this point is extrapolated from AF 1st press release:
Press Releases
The Airbus A330-200, registration F-GZCP, left Rio on 31 May at 7:03pm local time (12:03am in Paris). The aircraft hit a zone of stormy weather with strong turbulence at 2am this morning (universal time), i.e. 4am in Paris. An automatic message was received from the aircraft at 2:14am (4:14am in Paris) indicating a failure in the electric circuit a long way from the coast.
a) an AF assumption because of the meteo reports;
b) an AF assumption extracted from the automated ACARS which included also the aircraft performances beside the positional report @ 0200Z.
So far, I tend to believe that no direct report was made by the crew about the so-called "fortes turbulences". Never, so far, the BEA did imply such a fact. Beside, this AF press release is counterfactual about the "electrical failure" pointed by the ACARS as this problem wasn't reported.
Between 0210Z and 0214Z, 24 maintenance ACARS were automaticaly sent by AF447. They are time stamped but unsorted in the listing. Those maintenance ACARS do not transmit the position of the aircraft => The real position of F-GZCP @ 0214Z is unknow. By flightplan extrapolation, She should have been about 31 NM further on its way to TASIL (3.432, -30.328).
5. Search & Rescue, recovery:
The BEA pdf "Sea search operations" page 10: http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...search.ops.pdf
is showing a clear partern of the body distribution (red dots) along a South-North axis. By Picking up the northern red dot each day, it would give roughly the daily speed of the sea drift.
- 6 June (3.566, -30.458) -> dot 06
- 7 June (3.810, -30.485) -> dot 07
- 8 June (4.045, -30.460) -> dot 08
- 9 June (4.415, -30.525) -> dot 09
- 10 June (4.730, -30.505) -> dot 10
There is no need [for this presentation purpose] to consider the other parts of the aircraft as the bodies are very unlikely to be affected by the wind like the other materials from the airframe. From d06 to d10, the distance is about 128 km covered in four days, then an average drift of 0.37 m/sec, with an heading of 357.
A quick Verification using the SHOM pdf linked above, there is a map, page 8, of the surface drift forecast (right map) in this area (red circle) for the period 6-12 June. The right gauge indicate that a 0.40+ m/s drift is pretty close and the heading is also North. Then, this rounded measure is correct enough for an estimation.
7. Probable Crash Zone
By doing an extrapolation of the surface sea drift allocated to the period following the crash we'll find that the recovery of d06 is dated ~0900Z on 6 June. Hence, 126.5 hrs after the crash. During this period, assuming that the drift speed (0.40 m/s) and heading (357) was the same, the bodies would have covered 182 km, which point to about 100 NM south of d06.
- Estimated Crash Area (1.915, -30.390)
8. Hypothesis and course post 0214Z
Considering that d06 was recovered ~127 hrs after the supposed crash hour at only 11 nautic miles North-West of the planned AF 447 position @ 0214Z, it seems very unlikely that F-GZCP crashed anywhere near this place if one is taking into account the surface speed of the drift and its heading to the North. The pattern of the recovered bodies seems very regular and is pointing directly to the crash zone and its surroundings.
The only possibility for F-GZCP to reach such a remote place, considering her flightplan, was to make a 180 turn East. After having suffered whaterver crippling instrumentation/airframe damages due to the weather or other cause. Her crew certainly attempted to divert for an emergency landing solution in Fernando de Noronha, at any time past 0210Z (last know position).
Depending at what time the Captain decided to turn back (even after 0214Z as, from the ACARS, no catastrophic failures occured until then), the flight might have lasted much longer than we thought, involving a cripled aircraft unable to keep its cruise speed and certainly also its altitude.
Therefore, the lack of subsequent ACARS past 0214Z should be considered as the consequence of the failure/destruction of the SATCOM system (i.e. ice/hail) rather than the consequence of an immediate fatal dive/break up. Moreover, F-GZCP had a COM3 inop when she took off from Rio. This was revealed by Eurocockpit.com yesterday.
Of course, this is a rough estimation of either the crash zone and the real weather situation. A much more detailed analysis of the actual surface sea drift between 1-6 june would be very usefull to confirm this estimation but, even if the drift was actually half my figure (it may also be twice), AFF 447 would have turned back and not crashed close to 2014Z. I tend to believe also that such a move concured a lot to the delays before the SAR could find any wreckage close to the supposed crash zone around TASIL as they reached it only 5 days later.
S~
Olivier
Last edited by takata; 21st Jun 2009 at 09:13.