Hello,
I was waiting for several days that someone more qualified than me would post something about the SAR but, as nothing is comming, I'll post a few maps to illustrate my findings. Beforehand, I would like to point out that the Press releases so far are fairly inacurate or contradictory about what actually happened to AF 447. If you want to cross-check my data below, please, go to the BEA:
Press Releases
Information on Investigation
and FAB
FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA - Asas de um povo soberano
So, we'll start with the few (real) facts we already had on hand and everybody should be able to reconstruct the maps as I did. For doing so, we need to place a few points on Google Earth (coordinates below are in decimal degrees):
1. Waypoints & Flight Plan
During the first hours of June 1st, AF 447 flight on its way between the waypoints INTOL and TASIL:
- INTOL (-1.362, -32.832)
- TASIL (4.005, -29.990)
AF 447 automaticaly reported its position to Air France HQ (ACARS) every ten minutes. This is shown in this BEA Reconstituted flight path which use the same AF ACARS source:
http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...light.path.jpg
2. Last Position, Turbulences & ACARS
The last auto-report was sent at 0210Z and revealed that AF 447 was in cruise (Mach 0.82) at FL350 (BEA).
- Last Position Reported was (2.98, -30.59)
I found this position, page 2, in the 6 June SHOM pdf (Services Hydrographiques et Océanographiques de la Marine,- SHOM, 6 juin 2009) from the French BEA site which is is missing in the English part:
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....hom.050609.pdf
I cross-checked this position with the BEA presentations and it is always the same spot matching those coordinates. For unknow reason, the Brazilian "Ultimo reporte" is off 20 km (longitude) in their powerpoints.
Flight AF 447 was on track (slighty west 3NM) at 0210Z heading 30 to TASIL. The throttle settings (AUTO) and speed are showing that it was not in "turbulence" mode (A/THR OFF, Mach 0.80) at 0210Z. It might have encountered turbulences @ 0200Z but it cannot be acertained at the moment: basicaly this point is extrapolated from AF 1st press release:
Press Releases
The Airbus A330-200, registration F-GZCP, left Rio on 31 May at 7:03pm local time (12:03am in Paris). The aircraft hit a zone of stormy weather with strong turbulence at 2am this morning (universal time), i.e. 4am in Paris. An automatic message was received from the aircraft at 2:14am (4:14am in Paris) indicating a failure in the electric circuit a long way from the coast.
From the above press release, it is not clear if the 0200Z situation was:
a) an AF assumption because of the meteo reports;
b) an AF assumption extracted from the automated ACARS which included also the aircraft performances beside the positional report @ 0200Z.
So far, I tend to believe that no direct report was made by the crew about the so-called "fortes turbulences". Never, so far, the BEA did imply such a fact. Beside, this AF press release is counterfactual about the "electrical failure" pointed by the ACARS as this problem wasn't reported.
Between 0210Z and 0214Z, 24 maintenance ACARS were automaticaly sent by AF447. They are time stamped but unsorted in the listing. Those maintenance ACARS do not transmit the position of the aircraft => The real position of F-GZCP @ 0214Z is unknow. By flightplan extrapolation, She should have been about 31 NM further on its way to TASIL (3.432, -30.328).
5. Search & Rescue, recovery:
The BEA pdf "Sea search operations" page 10:
http://www.bea.aero/anglaise/actuali...search.ops.pdf
is showing a clear partern of the body distribution (red dots) along a South-North axis. By Picking up the northern red dot each day, it would give roughly the daily speed of the sea drift.
- 6 June (3.566, -30.458) -> dot 06
- 7 June (3.810, -30.485) -> dot 07
- 8 June (4.045, -30.460) -> dot 08
- 9 June (4.415, -30.525) -> dot 09
- 10 June (4.730, -30.505) -> dot 10
There is no need [for this presentation purpose] to consider the other parts of the aircraft as the bodies are very unlikely to be affected by the wind like the other materials from the airframe. From d06 to d10, the distance is about 128 km covered in four days, then an average drift of 0.37 m/sec, with an heading of 357.
A quick Verification using the SHOM pdf linked above, there is a map, page 8, of the surface drift forecast (right map) in this area (red circle) for the period 6-12 June. The right gauge indicate that a 0.40+ m/s drift is pretty close and the heading is also North. Then, this rounded measure is correct enough for an estimation.
7. Probable Crash Zone
By doing an extrapolation of the surface sea drift allocated to the period following the crash we'll find that the recovery of d06 is dated ~0900Z on 6 June. Hence, 126.5 hrs after the crash. During this period, assuming that the drift speed (0.40 m/s) and heading (357) was the same, the bodies would have covered 182 km, which point to about 100 NM south of d06.
- Estimated Crash Area (1.915, -30.390)
8. Hypothesis and course post 0214Z
Considering that d06 was recovered ~127 hrs after the supposed crash hour at only 11 nautic miles North-West of the planned AF 447 position @ 0214Z, it seems very unlikely that F-GZCP crashed anywhere near this place if one is taking into account the surface speed of the drift and its heading to the North. The pattern of the recovered bodies seems very regular and is pointing directly to the crash zone and its surroundings.
The only possibility for F-GZCP to reach such a remote place, considering her flightplan, was to make a 180 turn East. After having suffered whaterver crippling instrumentation/airframe damages due to the weather or other cause. Her crew certainly attempted to divert for an emergency landing solution in Fernando de Noronha, at any time past 0210Z (last know position).
Depending at what time the Captain decided to turn back (even after 0214Z as, from the ACARS, no catastrophic failures occured until then), the flight might have lasted much longer than we thought, involving a cripled aircraft unable to keep its cruise speed and certainly also its altitude.
Therefore, the lack of subsequent ACARS past 0214Z should be considered as the consequence of the failure/destruction of the SATCOM system (i.e. ice/hail) rather than the consequence of an immediate fatal dive/break up. Moreover, F-GZCP had a COM3 inop when she took off from Rio. This was revealed by Eurocockpit.com yesterday.
Of course, this is a rough estimation of either the crash zone and the real weather situation. A much more detailed analysis of the actual surface sea drift between 1-6 june would be very usefull to confirm this estimation but, even if the drift was actually half my figure (it may also be twice), AFF 447 would have turned back and not crashed close to 2014Z. I tend to believe also that such a move concured a lot to the delays before the SAR could find any wreckage close to the supposed crash zone around TASIL as they reached it only 5 days later.
S~
Olivier