737-200 V1 cut
OK, it seems that you are dealing with an old simulator and have yet to develop a technique.
Firstly, if the cut is 5 to 10 knots BEFORE V 1 you should be rejecting the take-off. Do you mean before V 2 ?
So, assuming the failure is at or after V 1 it should be controllable if you hold it straight with a smooth but steady rudder input and commence a smooth rotation at V r, holding wings level with slight aileron input. It is essential to make small, steady corrections with each control (and this also applies to use of trim, thrust and speedbrake) to give the old computers and hydraulics in the simulator time to process what you want and provide the necessary feedback via control loading, instrument readouts and motion. A lot for the old thing to digest and if you start overcontrolling, it will quickly get out of shape, i.e. be seen and felt by you to be reacting poorly. It is certainly worse than the real aircraft, though not totally unrealistic. Old simulators simply do not process rapid or multiple inputs as seamlessly as the latest electric platform jobs, so the trick is make an input, wait for a result, then increase or reduce the initial input as necessary. Get the instructor to demonstrate his technique. If he won't, it says something about the fidelity of the sim, or the ability of the instructor.
Don't give up, just work on your simulator 'technique'. The aircraft will seem a walk in the park afterwards!
Firstly, if the cut is 5 to 10 knots BEFORE V 1 you should be rejecting the take-off. Do you mean before V 2 ?
So, assuming the failure is at or after V 1 it should be controllable if you hold it straight with a smooth but steady rudder input and commence a smooth rotation at V r, holding wings level with slight aileron input. It is essential to make small, steady corrections with each control (and this also applies to use of trim, thrust and speedbrake) to give the old computers and hydraulics in the simulator time to process what you want and provide the necessary feedback via control loading, instrument readouts and motion. A lot for the old thing to digest and if you start overcontrolling, it will quickly get out of shape, i.e. be seen and felt by you to be reacting poorly. It is certainly worse than the real aircraft, though not totally unrealistic. Old simulators simply do not process rapid or multiple inputs as seamlessly as the latest electric platform jobs, so the trick is make an input, wait for a result, then increase or reduce the initial input as necessary. Get the instructor to demonstrate his technique. If he won't, it says something about the fidelity of the sim, or the ability of the instructor.
Don't give up, just work on your simulator 'technique'. The aircraft will seem a walk in the park afterwards!
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I use an old 400 sim and Mach E Avelli has it just about correct. As he says you need to use the rudder but be smooth gentle with all controls. Sometimes the rudder runs out of authority so dial in a little rudder trim to help.
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If the a/c is rolling on you, you have either too much or not enough rudder in. Most likely it's not enough. I can't emphasize enough that if the stick is not straight in you hands your rudder is not applied correctly. Someone said look at your thumbs, they should be more less level with each other. Step on the downside to bring them level then trim off the pressure with rudder trim when you have time. Don't be in a hurry to reach for trim. It can be a distraction. Do it when you are fully stable.
Few if any simulators have representative side force / lateral acceleration. The ‘ball’ might provide an indication, but the all-important body sense of going sideways is missing. Thus in a simulator the pilot lacks both a detecting sense for an engine failure, and a guide to the effectiveness of corrective action – how fast / much rudder application is required.
In part, this deficiency results in poorly matched lateral directional responses in the simulator. Also in some aircraft these aspects change with pitch rate/attitude and/or ground effect.
In part, this deficiency results in poorly matched lateral directional responses in the simulator. Also in some aircraft these aspects change with pitch rate/attitude and/or ground effect.
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Originally Posted by PEI_3721
Few if any simulators have representative side force / lateral acceleration. The ‘ball’ might provide an indication, but the all-important body sense of going sideways is missing. Thus in a simulator the pilot lacks both a detecting sense for an engine failure, and a guide to the effectiveness of corrective action – how fast / much rudder application is required.
In part, this deficiency results in poorly matched lateral directional responses in the simulator. Also in some aircraft these aspects change with pitch rate/attitude and/or ground effect.
In part, this deficiency results in poorly matched lateral directional responses in the simulator. Also in some aircraft these aspects change with pitch rate/attitude and/or ground effect.
While it is true that there are quite a few simulators in use today, as anyone would recognize, the 6DOF simulators that have entered service, particularly those entering service within the past 10 – 12 years or so, are quite good – and do provide the kinds of side-force/lateral acceleration (as well as acceleration forces in all of the degrees of freedom characteristic of an airborne airplane) that you say is not very common. The correction I think is necessary comes from the fact that, in the US (and unfortunately I don’t have access to similar numbers for the rest of the world) of all the aircraft flight simulators (not flight training devices) in service today number just a bit more than 660 – where only something like 25 of them do not incorporate a 6DOF platform motion system. Surely, the more modern the simulator, the more technically capable it will be – and those placed into service within the past 10 – 12 years would be expected to be at the top of that list of most technically capable – but 635 out of 660 is certainly not “a few.”
Of course, anyone familiar with simulation will recognize that using a simulator that is mounted on the kinds of motion system bases currently in use cannot provide sustained “g-forces” (i.e., accelerations) in any of the degrees of freedom – but, even in the airplane, it is the “on-set” cues that provide the most significant cueing to the pilot at the controls. Once that “on-set cue” is recognized, there are other, equally important references that any pilot can (and should) use to verify the initial acceleration … outside visual references, instrument responses, sound cues, to name just a few. I can say this because in an airplane were a pilot to experience a recognizable and continuous “g-force” (acceleration) in any axis, that he/she did not initiate and is not maintaining, that pilot should immediately recognize that an abnormal condition exists and should be taking immediate steps to correct the flight path. Some will argue that as long as “acceleration” continues, the associated “g-forces” will continue to be experienced, and from that, conclude that my statements here are “bogus.” To those persons I would recommend the following … if you have the availability of having an additional person in the cockpit or if you can suspend something from a non-objectionable location in the cockpit, which is observable by at least one of the pilots, where this object, having at least some relative weight, can be suspended by a string or thread or similar, and allowed to swing freely during taxi-out … during the takeoff roll, you will see this object be displaced toward the rear of the airplane (displacement opposite the direction of aircraft movement and in the direction of acting force on stationary objects in the airplane) and as the acceleration continues, you will see this object begin to return to its original “straight-down” position. Depending on the smoothness of the runway surface and the timing to the initiation of the rotation for takeoff, the suspended object will return to its original, straight down position relative to other objects in the cockpit – because it too, will be accelerating at a rate that will eventually equal that of the airplane – and while the airplane continues to accelerate toward rotation speed, the suspended object will (until rotation is initiated – when acceleration forces are changed) retain that straight down position. You’ve recognized this exact sensation on every takeoff you’ve ever made. Initially, you are pressed into the back of your seat, but eventually (sooner, rather than later) you, just like the suspended object, just like the airplane and all of its contents, will continue to accelerate to match the acceleration of the airplane – and since there is no acceleration differential along that axis, all seems to return to just what it was just prior to brake release.
As a pilot you can confirm your continued acceleration by outside visual references, the movement of the airspeed indications, as well as various changes in sound – but the relative differences between you and the rest of the contents of the airplane (including the suspended object) will reach the acceleration of the airplane. It is these kinds of relationships – and their changing over time – that are the basis on which the effectiveness of simulation is accepted … i.e., “just like the airplane.” Of course, a simulator does not (it cannot) accelerate continuously – but it DOES provide an on-set acceleration cue – and then reduces that on-set cue value at a rate that is below the threshold of recognition to the occupants. Simulators that used to have extremely poor motion cueing, did not do that – at least not very well, and sometimes not at all. In fact, I recall the Navy putting it’s A-7 pilots on a “do-not-fly” restriction for 72 hours (it might have been more, but I don’t think so) after having competed a “recurrent simulator training session” for that airplane at the Jacksonville NAS, Florida, in the mid-1980s. In fact, that particular simulator had extreme latency problems in a lot of its systems but particularly so in its motions systems.
The goal of simulation is to provide as many of those “on-set” motion cues as possible … then reduce them at a rate that is not recognized by the human body – and relying on the other cueing provided (visual, feel, and sound cueing presented just as would be seen, felt, and heard in the airplane) to verify to the simulator occupants that the acceleration is continuing just as you would have expected it to continue. Simulators with very long motion actuator legs are better able to do this than simulators with shorter actuator legs – which may be required by the structure of the facility or other limitations to that particular simulator installation. Electric motion systems (verses the older, but still used, hydraulic motion systems) are gaining in popularity due to its more immediate response, the greater amount of control it provides, less messy areas (hydraulic systems leak – and electrons don’t accumulate under the machine!) and do so with a shorter required actuator movement – and at an astonishingly low maintenance cost of only 20% of what a hydraulic system costs.
I’m not saying that a pilot should not be able to tell the difference between being in a simulator and being in the airplane. But – and it’s a significant “but,” the instructor and the simulator – together – should be able to provide any pilot a sufficiently accurate on-set cueing system (particularly that of motion on-set – or acceleration on-set) that will allow that pilot to learn what to feel in the “seat of his/her britches,” in coordination with what he/she sees, hears, and feels in the controls, to make a direct connection with the same (or very closely approximated) experience in the airplane. If we don’t do this – as a MINIMUM – what we’ll be doing is training and checking – both initially and recurrently – in a simulator – and then allowing those pilots to go fly something that is significantly different from what he/she was used to working with … and hope that these pilots “learn” sufficiently well, how to fly the airplane and then shift gears to demonstrate his/her ability in flying the simulator – and “never the twain shall meet.” THAT is what I am seriously concerned about. And, I can point to airline after airline, at least in the US, where THIS is exactly what is happening … training pilots in reasonably good simulators – or partially training them in such equipment, and then finishing the training and getting “checked” in a flight training device (which is even less like the airplane than a relatively poor simulator) and then not only allowing pilots to go fly the airplane, but expecting them to do so professionally and competently – when the training has been structured so as to engender activity unlike what is necessary to safely and competently operate their airplanes.
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I remember on a 737-300 sim, it was incorrectly set by the computer folk and it was like the engines were beyond the tips of the wings in terms of force and the rudder was not able to do the job. After the sim instructors couldn't control the plane the computer boys got to work and OOOPS.
They finally fixed it.
AS to the thumbs. When you lose an engine there is an almost imperceptible reaction by using ailerons to control the plane's initial yaw. Our instructors demonstrated that when you had both hands on the yoke, your thumbs pointed towards the side of the rudder pedal to be used. Give it a try.
V1 is called at V1 minus five at our airline. How about yours? Do your instructors turn down the engine sound (they can). With the engine sound up fully it can be your first indication something is wrong as the engines go out of sync.
SIMULATORS are just that, simulators. AT one time in our contract, a pilot could demand a check ride in the real plane and not a sim!
They finally fixed it.
AS to the thumbs. When you lose an engine there is an almost imperceptible reaction by using ailerons to control the plane's initial yaw. Our instructors demonstrated that when you had both hands on the yoke, your thumbs pointed towards the side of the rudder pedal to be used. Give it a try.
V1 is called at V1 minus five at our airline. How about yours? Do your instructors turn down the engine sound (they can). With the engine sound up fully it can be your first indication something is wrong as the engines go out of sync.
SIMULATORS are just that, simulators. AT one time in our contract, a pilot could demand a check ride in the real plane and not a sim!
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Originally Posted by glendalegoon
I remember on a 737-300 sim, it was incorrectly set by the computer folk and it was like the engines were beyond the tips of the wings in terms of force and the rudder was not able to do the job. After the sim instructors couldn't control the plane the computer boys got to work and OOOPS.
They finally fixed it.
AS to the thumbs. When you lose an engine there is an almost imperceptible reaction by using ailerons to control the plane's initial yaw. Our instructors demonstrated that when you had both hands on the yoke, your thumbs pointed towards the side of the rudder pedal to be used. Give it a try.
V1 is called at V1 minus five at our airline. How about yours? Do your instructors turn down the engine sound (they can). With the engine sound up fully it can be your first indication something is wrong as the engines go out of sync.
SIMULATORS are just that, simulators. AT one time in our contract, a pilot could demand a check ride in the real plane and not a sim!
They finally fixed it.
AS to the thumbs. When you lose an engine there is an almost imperceptible reaction by using ailerons to control the plane's initial yaw. Our instructors demonstrated that when you had both hands on the yoke, your thumbs pointed towards the side of the rudder pedal to be used. Give it a try.
V1 is called at V1 minus five at our airline. How about yours? Do your instructors turn down the engine sound (they can). With the engine sound up fully it can be your first indication something is wrong as the engines go out of sync.
SIMULATORS are just that, simulators. AT one time in our contract, a pilot could demand a check ride in the real plane and not a sim!
THE ENGINES WERE BEYOND THE TIPS OF THE WINGS: The situation you describe with your B737-700 simulator, if accurate, must have occurred “in-house” at some point AFTER the FAA had evaluated and qualified that particular simulator. And, in the off-chance that your simulator was/is located outside of the US, and was initially qualified by another national regulatory authority, I can confidently say that no regulatory authority in the world would allow such a configuration to go unchallenged and unchanged before completing the necessary qualification. That means that if this actually occurred, someone, probably within your company, who had access to that simulator, was “playing” with the programming and either set it up that way – or was unable to restore the original parameters. In addition, I simply cannot believe that any pilot, and certainly, any instructor, would not immediately stop whatever training or evaluation session was in progress, and point out the problem to competent technicians so as to make the necessary corrections. Such a situation would not be allowed to go beyond the initial recognition – and anyone who would, should have his/her pilot certificate examined for being counterfeit.
THUMBS: “When you lose an engine there is an almost imperceptible reaction by using ailerons to control the plane's initial yaw.” Of course this is true. The last time I checked ailerons controlled movement around the longitudinal axis of the airplane. When on the ground there is likely not going to be much “roll” around that axis before something unwanted happens. Also, during the takeoff roll, the amount of air over the wings is not consistent (of course!) and only when sufficient lift is generated will an asymmetrical lift (due to aileron displacement) provide any rolling moment. So far, we’ve not even touched on the direction of the airplane. Of course, any extension of an aileron surface into the air moving over a wing will result in some yawing moment (but it is more than likely that moment would be difficult to discern through instrumentation … let alone the “finely tuned hands” of a line pilot), and there would likely be a larger moment due to the “drag” (aft movement) of the wing with the “up” aileron than due to the “down” aileron – HOWEVER – that moment alone would not be TERRIBLY significant in any B737, and would be all but irrelevant when the airplane is still ON the ground during acceleration. During the initial portion of the takeoff, the rudder pedals (and NOT the rudder surface) has the “lion’s share” of control over the directionality of the airplane – and that through the nose wheel – controlled by nose wheel steering. As for the “thumb position” on the control yoke – once power is set, the non-flying pilot should be ensuring that no change in throttle position or power indication is allowed to occur so that the pilot flying will have both hands on the control wheel. The last time I checked, both hands have a thumb, and both thumbs would be on the inside of the control wheel – left and right – so it escapes me to understand how that might be an indication of what rudder pedal might be the appropriate one if a directional control problem were to occur. AND I know of NO competent instructor (perhaps it’s my definition of “competent” that is the issue?) who would even remotely consider using the position of one’s thumbs on the control wheel to be used as a “gouge” for whether the left or right rudder pedal was to be used to control a directional problem! I would whole-heartedly recommend that this idea be “round-filled” YESTERDAY!
V1 IS CALLED AT V1 MINUS FIVE AT OUR AIRLINE: I certainly cannot be the only person reading this statement and from that understands the level of dichotomy being presented. Again, if true, it is quite obvious that the person or persons who came up with this “not-so-splendid-adjustment” simply does not understand what V1 actually means and how it is derived. Making this kind of “adjustment,” particularly in such a broad and indiscriminate manner, may well have ramifications that are unknown until a catastrophe occurs … which, naturally, will be too late! I keep saying that we must stop trying to substitute a “cheat-sheet” method of operating an airplane. Airplanes were designed and from that a set of procedures were developed to allow the airplane to do what it was intended to do, and do it under the direct and continuing operational control of the pilot flying, and from that we developed procedures to teach others how to do what needs to be done to have the airplane do what it was designed to do. If we come along and attempt to substitute an alternative way – particularly if that “alternative” way has underpinnings of idiocy involved, we are moving farther and farther away from the “plumb-line” understanding (basic truth) of aviation. Just as JT opined earlier in this thread with respect to changing the way airplanes should be flown. He said … and he is absolutely correct:
Originally Posted by john_tullamarine
Fly it like the ops engineering folk planned it or, else, get them to change the plan to fit the way you want to fly it.
SIMULATORS ARE JUST THAT, SIMULATORS: Given the understanding that older simulators are not as well designed or simulate the airplane as accurately as do the more modern simulators, which I certainly do, I also believe that it is pure folly to categorize ALL simulators into a grouping with an understanding that all simulators are just like those designed, developed, constructed, and used, 3 or 4 decades ago. However, IF (and that word is getting lost as to its understood definition in many cases) but IF competent and well-trained instructors are used, even in those older simulators, even then, an adequate learning of necessary knowledge, duties, responsibilities, and skills can be achieved. Of course I advocate using such competent and well-trained instructors in ANY and ALL simulators to ensure that some stray thought or some short-circuited system does not contravene the designed understanding and ultimate operation of the airplane being simulated. The basic premise of the use of a simulator, instead of returning 7 to 9 decades in history, is that we can fly the simulator as we would expect to fly the airplane. The point that must be remembered – and it can be as accurate as we want to make it depending on the competency and professionalism of the well-trained simulator instructors – is that we always simulate in an airplane but we never simulate in a simulator. For those who immediately want to scratch you head in wonder over that statement … in an airplane we never actually “fail” an engine – we simulate doing it … we never actually land the airplane with the landing gear retracted – we simulate doing it down to a “safe altitude” … we never take an airplane into an actual bucking, kicking, rolling aerodynamic stall – we simulate doing it down to the stick shaker or initial buffeting … we never take off an airplane in a crosswind that is in excess of the demonstrated values – we simulate it … and the list can (and DOES) go on and on. However, in a simulator we don’t simulate any of that … we actually do it. And, particularly in the newer simulation equipment, validated with the newer flight test data acquisition systems and the facilities of electric control loading and motion systems, the newer dynamically accurate and field of view comparable visual systems, etc., what we have is an exceptionally close replication (trying to avoid the “S” word) of what would happen in an airplane. This is what simulation was intended to provide. However, and AGAIN, I point out the advantages of doing this in a simulator that has all of its limitations and characteristic competently known by the instructor using it. A simulator is precisely a simulator … and we all should be glad that they exist.
Last edited by AirRabbit; 9th Jan 2014 at 20:19.
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To me this is a disappointing thread. Going to the internet for answers isn't the optimum solution when they should be addressed by his instructor, training partner, or experienced pilots within his organization.
The OP talks about reducing pitch and getting to close to the ground. Being uncomfortable at 400', asking if he should reduce thrust, etc.
IMO there are multiple training issues, and deficiencies, that shouldn't be or can't be addressed without observation.
The OP talks about reducing pitch and getting to close to the ground. Being uncomfortable at 400', asking if he should reduce thrust, etc.
IMO there are multiple training issues, and deficiencies, that shouldn't be or can't be addressed without observation.
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Going to the internet for answers isn't the optimum solution when they should be addressed by his instructor, training partner, or experienced pilots within his organization
Concur .. in an ideal world .. which doesn't exist.
Reality is that the general level of technical knowledge in the Industry is highly variable and a lot of folks who should know a lot more than they do .. simply don't.
The net always presents the problem of discriminating between competent advice and waffly garbage and, I guess, that will be the way it stays.
However, knowing the IDs of some of the folk who play in Tech Log .. I have to say that, were readers buying their professional advice out in the real world on a consultancy basis .. it would be costing a pretty penny.
If we were to list the technical degrees, doctorates etc., held by members of the group it would be a long list. Indeed, we have a number of folk who hold serious university professorial chairs .. one doesn't get their advice cheaply out in the real world and, here, we get it for free because they are interested in what we talk about.
Not for me to say who is who .. but, in general, the discriminating reader ought have not too much trouble sorting the wheat from the chaff. If something too silly for words gets put up for consideration, usually one of the competent folk will gently (and, sometimes, not terribly so) urge a more appropriate view ...
The relevant areas of PPRuNe, overall, offer a VERY valuable source of competent knowledge bases.
Concur .. in an ideal world .. which doesn't exist.
Reality is that the general level of technical knowledge in the Industry is highly variable and a lot of folks who should know a lot more than they do .. simply don't.
The net always presents the problem of discriminating between competent advice and waffly garbage and, I guess, that will be the way it stays.
However, knowing the IDs of some of the folk who play in Tech Log .. I have to say that, were readers buying their professional advice out in the real world on a consultancy basis .. it would be costing a pretty penny.
If we were to list the technical degrees, doctorates etc., held by members of the group it would be a long list. Indeed, we have a number of folk who hold serious university professorial chairs .. one doesn't get their advice cheaply out in the real world and, here, we get it for free because they are interested in what we talk about.
Not for me to say who is who .. but, in general, the discriminating reader ought have not too much trouble sorting the wheat from the chaff. If something too silly for words gets put up for consideration, usually one of the competent folk will gently (and, sometimes, not terribly so) urge a more appropriate view ...
The relevant areas of PPRuNe, overall, offer a VERY valuable source of competent knowledge bases.
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JT - I agree about the depth of experience and knowledge that's available, for free(!. )But the OP talks about reducing thrust while s/e to maintain a/c control right after takeoff. To me it appears that a basic understanding is missing, or perhaps weak, and the expertise available is behind the scope of the problem.
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To me it appears that a basic understanding is missing, or perhaps weak, and the expertise available is behind the scope of the problem
.. and, were the expertise available in his own organisation, the problem ought to have been sorted out already. The fall back is resources such as PPRuNe.
It was the early (Vital 4 I believe) visual system effects, latency and bilious, cartoonish display that created that lingering dizziness and nausea.
Likewise, my first sim fun was in an early 727 which didn't match up all that well to the real McCoy. Not as bad as what you describe but the thrust is much the same. Visuals were best addressed by either not looking or closing one's eyes and working it via Braille.
.. and, were the expertise available in his own organisation, the problem ought to have been sorted out already. The fall back is resources such as PPRuNe.
It was the early (Vital 4 I believe) visual system effects, latency and bilious, cartoonish display that created that lingering dizziness and nausea.
Likewise, my first sim fun was in an early 727 which didn't match up all that well to the real McCoy. Not as bad as what you describe but the thrust is much the same. Visuals were best addressed by either not looking or closing one's eyes and working it via Braille.
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air rabbit
WHY would I make up anything like this?
The callout of V1 is to start at V1 minus 5 knots to ensure that the call is complete by V1. And our airline got this from boeing.
AS to the simulator problem in the 737-300, it was in the USA, it did happen and they fixed it. Imagine that, a technical problem with a high tech gadget. And at the time, the 737-300 was a new plane.
THE thumb thing works when you are airborne , not so much on the ground. But on the ground if you are ''visual'' you can see yaw as the plane heads towards the weeds without correction.
WHY would I make up anything like this?
The callout of V1 is to start at V1 minus 5 knots to ensure that the call is complete by V1. And our airline got this from boeing.
AS to the simulator problem in the 737-300, it was in the USA, it did happen and they fixed it. Imagine that, a technical problem with a high tech gadget. And at the time, the 737-300 was a new plane.
THE thumb thing works when you are airborne , not so much on the ground. But on the ground if you are ''visual'' you can see yaw as the plane heads towards the weeds without correction.
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Originally Posted by glendalegoon
WHY would I make up anything like this?
Originally Posted by glendalegoon
The callout of V1 is to start at V1 minus 5 knots to ensure that the call is complete by V1. And our airline got this from boeing.
Originally Posted by glendalegoon
AS to the simulator problem in the 737-300, it was in the USA, it did happen and they fixed it. Imagine that, a technical problem with a high tech gadget. And at the time, the 737-300 was a new plane.
Originally Posted by glendalegoon
THE thumb thing works when you are airborne, not so much on the ground. But on the ground if you are ''visual'' you can see yaw as the plane heads towards the weeds without correction.
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Originally Posted by OK465
(The A-7 sim didn't have a motion system, just a 'G' seat. It was the early (Vital 4 I believe) visual system effects, latency and bilious, cartoonish display that created that lingering dizziness and nausea. ANG rule was you just couldn't fly the same day after a sim session, but ANG guys were tougher than the USN types. )
As memory serves (…and I’ve often complained that it doesn’t do that very well any more…) that A-7 “sim” was, indeed, a “piece of work." I was one of the “outsider participants” that was asked to come take a look at this machine … I don’t recall any specific concern with the overall quality of that machine, and don’t recall anything specific about the visual scene content, even though VITAL 4 (which stood for “VIRTUAL TAKEOFF AND LANDING”) was, at that time, a pretty “standard” fixture in the world of simulation. What actually stands out is my vivid memory of the latency numbers we found between control input and visual system response. A poor simulator at that time had latencies of between 500 and 600 milliseconds …this one was easily twice that and at times pushed 2.5 times those “poor system” values! That’s almost enough time to make a control input, go to lunch, and return in time to see the visual respond! No wonder the guys got sick!
...and I'll pass along your comments to my Navy buds for their enjoyment (?!) ... as I was a "blue suiter" myself.
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REGARDING the V1 call being started at V1 minus 5. I assure you this is the case at my rather large airline. It has been the case for many, many years.
AS to the paperwork supporting it, I've long since thrown it away as it has been on every sim ride for at least 15 years and possibly more.
I see the need for it and the rhyme and reason are very clear. I don't know anyone at boeing, but the people who sign my checks said they got it from boeing. Our airline has many boeing planes and I have no reason to doubt my airline. And thousands of our pilots do it that way.
AS to the simulators, calling them high tech gadgets is like calling a cute girl a bird. It is a bit of slang.
AND as you say, the offending simulator was coming online circa 1987/88. I don't even think we were saying online back then in the same context.
THE whole point of this thread was to help a new pilot to fly a very old plane and old simulator.
LETS ask the original poster if anything did help him pass his checkride.
OH, I further researched the V1 minus 5 business. Did an online search. Found a PPRUNE thread from about a dozen years or so ago. READ the last post.
V1 or V1 minus 5kt callout? [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums
AS to the paperwork supporting it, I've long since thrown it away as it has been on every sim ride for at least 15 years and possibly more.
I see the need for it and the rhyme and reason are very clear. I don't know anyone at boeing, but the people who sign my checks said they got it from boeing. Our airline has many boeing planes and I have no reason to doubt my airline. And thousands of our pilots do it that way.
AS to the simulators, calling them high tech gadgets is like calling a cute girl a bird. It is a bit of slang.
AND as you say, the offending simulator was coming online circa 1987/88. I don't even think we were saying online back then in the same context.
THE whole point of this thread was to help a new pilot to fly a very old plane and old simulator.
LETS ask the original poster if anything did help him pass his checkride.
OH, I further researched the V1 minus 5 business. Did an online search. Found a PPRUNE thread from about a dozen years or so ago. READ the last post.
V1 or V1 minus 5kt callout? [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums
Last edited by glendalegoon; 11th Jan 2014 at 00:26.
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Originally Posted by glendalegoon
THE whole point of this thread was to help a new pilot to fly a very old plane and old simulator.
However, there were some caveats that were laid out and as technology improved over time, those caveats began to be met more readily … and this continued to improve until the development of Part 121, Appendix H, and the associated Advisory Circular – that clearly, and for the first time, allowed ALL of the training AND the check of a pilot to be accomplished and completed in a qualified airplane simulator. The first time the pilot actually saw the airplane (in many cases anyway) he/she was involved in obtaining his/her line operating experience with passengers on board. That was in June of 1980. We’ve come some 34 years now and in during this time the “knowledge generation” has been reduced from about 8-10 years to 8-10 weeks! Of all the simulators that have ever been qualified and used in the US – and there have been almost 1400 since mid-1980, but the fact that there are only a whisper more than 800 of these devices currently active means that almost that number have fallen by the wayside in those years.
I say all of the above to say … in response to your comment quoted above … as most of the “regulars” here can attest, my “hot button” issue is the development of “cheat sheet” short cuts to satisfy the requirements that are often watched and signed off in a simulator. I’ve seen so many “cheat sheet” suggestions that “seem to work” in the simulator – having absolutely nothing to do with how the airplane should actually be flown – but fool the inattentive or ill-trained instructor or evaluator that we run the risk of admitting good “slight-of-hand” artists – who “talk” a good game, and have “demonstrated their ability” through the use of a set of canned numbers and suggestions to “get through the simulator session” – that I’m beginning to fear for the safety of the industry. I’m not interested in what appears to work in the simulator that looks good to an observer. I’m interested in using these devices on the basis that these devices provide identical “on-set cueing” information that is just exactly like what would be recognize in the airplane under the same conditions … that the simulator performs and handles “just like the airplane” in similar circumstances. There are some simulators that do this regularly – but the point is that even with the oldest simulator in the industry, if the instructor is properly and completely trained and pays proper attention to his/her students’ actions while operating the simulator, that student should be able to learn exactly what the airplane will do and learn exactly what he/she must do in response. Anything less does not do anything but jeopardize the safety of anyone flying with those person(s). The only way to do this and do it regularly is to have simulators that perform to the standards that have been agreed upon and for instructors and evaluators to expect identical performance of the student/examinee … just as would be expected were it all to have been done in the airplane. Finding ways around the programming or fudging the fact that a simulator does not really “fly,” and give the impression that all is good – is, in fact, not good and very easily could be catastrophic in the most negative manner possible. And, if I had to, I could point out case after case, after case where this is clearly evident. That is the reason I participate on these forums – not to toot my horn or have people be “in awe” of my brilliance … that is why I remain anonymous … THAT is not my goal … competency in the cockpit is my goal … and that is the reason I participate here – and I thank JT for the opportunity … probably nowhere near often enough.
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Originally Posted by glendalegoon
OH, I further researched the V1 minus 5 business. Did an online search. Found a PPRuNe thread from about a dozen years or so ago. READ the last post.
Each of the “V speeds” that the regulations require be computed have a specific reason, that must be taken all together to ensure that if all things turn out to be as expected, the airplane can be safely taken off if all of those parameters are met.
14CFR part 25 §25.107 Takeoff speeds.
(a) V1 must be established in relation to VEF as follows:
(1) VEF is the calibrated airspeed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail. VEF must be selected by the applicant, but may not be less than VMCG determined under §25.149(e).
(2) V1, in terms of calibrated airspeed, is selected by the applicant; however, V1 may not be less than VEF plus the speed gained with critical engine inoperative during the time interval between the instant at which the critical engine is failed, and the instant at which the pilot recognizes and reacts to the engine failure, as indicated by the pilot's initiation of the first action (e.g., applying brakes, reducing thrust, deploying speed brakes) to stop the airplane during accelerate-stop tests.
(b) V2MIN, in terms of calibrated airspeed, may not be less than—
(1) 1.13 VSR for—
(i) Two-engine and three-engine turbopropeller and reciprocating engine powered airplanes; and
(ii) Turbojet powered airplanes without provisions for obtaining a significant reduction in the one-engine-inoperative power-on stall speed;
(2) 1.08 VSR for—
(i) Turbopropeller and reciprocating engine powered airplanes with more than three engines; and
(ii) Turbojet powered airplanes with provisions for obtaining a significant reduction in the one-engine-inoperative power-on stall speed; and
(3) 1.10 times VMC established under §25.149.
(c) V2, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected by the applicant to provide at least the gradient of climb required by §25.121(b) but may not be less than—
(1) V2MIN;
(2) VR plus the speed increment attained (in accordance with §25.111(c)(2)) before reaching a height of 35 feet above the takeoff surface; and
(3) A speed that provides the maneuvering capability specified in §25.143(h).
(d) VMU is the calibrated airspeed at and above which the airplane can safely lift off the ground, and continue the takeoff. VMU speeds must be selected by the applicant throughout the range of thrust-to-weight ratios to be certificated. These speeds may be established from free air data if these data are verified by ground takeoff tests.
(e) VR, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected in accordance with the conditions of paragraphs (e)(1) through (4) of this section:
(1) VR may not be less than—
(i) V1;
(ii) 105 percent of VMC;
(iii) The speed (determined in accordance with §25.111(c)(2)) that allows reaching V2 before reaching a height of 35 feet above the takeoff surface; or
(iv) A speed that, if the airplane is rotated at its maximum practicable rate, will result in a VLOF of not less than —
(A) 110 percent of VMU in the all-engines-operating condition, and 105 percent of VMU determined at the thrust-to-weight ratio corresponding to the one-engine-inoperative condition; or
(B) If the VMU attitude is limited by the geometry of the airplane (i.e., tail contact with the runway), 108 percent of VMU in the all-engines-operating condition, and 104 percent of VMU determined at the thrust-to-weight ratio corresponding to the one-engine-inoperative condition.
(2) For any given set of conditions (such as weight, configuration, and temperature), a single value of VR, obtained in accordance with this paragraph, must be used to show compliance with both the one-engine-inoperative and the all-engines-operating takeoff provisions.
(3) It must be shown that the one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance, using a rotation speed of 5 knots less than VR established in accordance with paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this section, does not exceed the corresponding one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance using the established VR. The takeoff distances must be determined in accordance with §25.113(a)(1).
(4) Reasonably expected variations in service from the established takeoff procedures for the operation of the airplane (such as over-rotation of the airplane and out-of-trim conditions) may not result in unsafe flight characteristics or in marked increases in the scheduled takeoff distances established in accordance with §25.113(a).
(f) VLOF is the calibrated airspeed at which the airplane first becomes airborne.
(g) VFTO, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected by the applicant to provide at least the gradient of climb required by §25.121(c), but may not be less than—
(1) 1.18 VSR; and
(2) A speed that provides the maneuvering capability specified in §25.143(h).
(h) In determining the takeoff speeds V1, VR, and V2 for flight in icing conditions, the values of VMCG, VMC, and VMU determined for non-icing conditions may be used.
(a) V1 must be established in relation to VEF as follows:
(1) VEF is the calibrated airspeed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail. VEF must be selected by the applicant, but may not be less than VMCG determined under §25.149(e).
(2) V1, in terms of calibrated airspeed, is selected by the applicant; however, V1 may not be less than VEF plus the speed gained with critical engine inoperative during the time interval between the instant at which the critical engine is failed, and the instant at which the pilot recognizes and reacts to the engine failure, as indicated by the pilot's initiation of the first action (e.g., applying brakes, reducing thrust, deploying speed brakes) to stop the airplane during accelerate-stop tests.
(b) V2MIN, in terms of calibrated airspeed, may not be less than—
(1) 1.13 VSR for—
(i) Two-engine and three-engine turbopropeller and reciprocating engine powered airplanes; and
(ii) Turbojet powered airplanes without provisions for obtaining a significant reduction in the one-engine-inoperative power-on stall speed;
(2) 1.08 VSR for—
(i) Turbopropeller and reciprocating engine powered airplanes with more than three engines; and
(ii) Turbojet powered airplanes with provisions for obtaining a significant reduction in the one-engine-inoperative power-on stall speed; and
(3) 1.10 times VMC established under §25.149.
(c) V2, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected by the applicant to provide at least the gradient of climb required by §25.121(b) but may not be less than—
(1) V2MIN;
(2) VR plus the speed increment attained (in accordance with §25.111(c)(2)) before reaching a height of 35 feet above the takeoff surface; and
(3) A speed that provides the maneuvering capability specified in §25.143(h).
(d) VMU is the calibrated airspeed at and above which the airplane can safely lift off the ground, and continue the takeoff. VMU speeds must be selected by the applicant throughout the range of thrust-to-weight ratios to be certificated. These speeds may be established from free air data if these data are verified by ground takeoff tests.
(e) VR, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected in accordance with the conditions of paragraphs (e)(1) through (4) of this section:
(1) VR may not be less than—
(i) V1;
(ii) 105 percent of VMC;
(iii) The speed (determined in accordance with §25.111(c)(2)) that allows reaching V2 before reaching a height of 35 feet above the takeoff surface; or
(iv) A speed that, if the airplane is rotated at its maximum practicable rate, will result in a VLOF of not less than —
(A) 110 percent of VMU in the all-engines-operating condition, and 105 percent of VMU determined at the thrust-to-weight ratio corresponding to the one-engine-inoperative condition; or
(B) If the VMU attitude is limited by the geometry of the airplane (i.e., tail contact with the runway), 108 percent of VMU in the all-engines-operating condition, and 104 percent of VMU determined at the thrust-to-weight ratio corresponding to the one-engine-inoperative condition.
(2) For any given set of conditions (such as weight, configuration, and temperature), a single value of VR, obtained in accordance with this paragraph, must be used to show compliance with both the one-engine-inoperative and the all-engines-operating takeoff provisions.
(3) It must be shown that the one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance, using a rotation speed of 5 knots less than VR established in accordance with paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this section, does not exceed the corresponding one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance using the established VR. The takeoff distances must be determined in accordance with §25.113(a)(1).
(4) Reasonably expected variations in service from the established takeoff procedures for the operation of the airplane (such as over-rotation of the airplane and out-of-trim conditions) may not result in unsafe flight characteristics or in marked increases in the scheduled takeoff distances established in accordance with §25.113(a).
(f) VLOF is the calibrated airspeed at which the airplane first becomes airborne.
(g) VFTO, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected by the applicant to provide at least the gradient of climb required by §25.121(c), but may not be less than—
(1) 1.18 VSR; and
(2) A speed that provides the maneuvering capability specified in §25.143(h).
(h) In determining the takeoff speeds V1, VR, and V2 for flight in icing conditions, the values of VMCG, VMC, and VMU determined for non-icing conditions may be used.
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air rabbit:
I mentioned that my airline (and it seems many others according to the link to an archived pprune thread)starts the V1 call at V1 minus 5.
THIS procedure has been in use for many years. THE FAA could have unapproved it, but has not.
AND while it is very nice of you to make your post, I do not anticipate anything changing.
I remember what a big deal it was when it first came out. AND it came out last century.
I AM NOT making an argument for or against the use of this way of calling V1.
BUT it is the way that many airlines do it.
AND unless you buy my airline and change things (which would involve paperwork galore) I shall continue to say V1 starting at V1 minus 5.
JUST in case something had changed at my airline in the last day or so, I called a training captain and explained the discussion I was having on PPRUNE. He confirmed that nothing had changed and it was still V1 minus 5 to start the callout.
HE had some choice words for you, which I shall not post here out of respect for forum rules.
I mentioned that my airline (and it seems many others according to the link to an archived pprune thread)starts the V1 call at V1 minus 5.
THIS procedure has been in use for many years. THE FAA could have unapproved it, but has not.
AND while it is very nice of you to make your post, I do not anticipate anything changing.
I remember what a big deal it was when it first came out. AND it came out last century.
I AM NOT making an argument for or against the use of this way of calling V1.
BUT it is the way that many airlines do it.
AND unless you buy my airline and change things (which would involve paperwork galore) I shall continue to say V1 starting at V1 minus 5.
JUST in case something had changed at my airline in the last day or so, I called a training captain and explained the discussion I was having on PPRUNE. He confirmed that nothing had changed and it was still V1 minus 5 to start the callout.
HE had some choice words for you, which I shall not post here out of respect for forum rules.
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The FAA defines V-1 as the speed the maximum speed at which the takeoff maneuver can be initiated and the airplane stopped within the remaining field length under the conditions and procedures defined in the FAR's. Also the "go procedures, but this does not apply this particular discussion.
It has changed from a decision speed to an action speed. My airline teaches the V-1 call at V-1 minus 3 knots in order to initiate an abort by V-1.You can go to Faa.gov and search "takeoff safety" or go/no go decision. Way too much to post here, but full of good info.
It has changed from a decision speed to an action speed. My airline teaches the V-1 call at V-1 minus 3 knots in order to initiate an abort by V-1.You can go to Faa.gov and search "takeoff safety" or go/no go decision. Way too much to post here, but full of good info.
Re simulator fidelity checks where scheduled checks may include engine failures during and immediately after take off. Normally the test crew includes technicians and qualified on type flight crew.
I have often wondered how an engine failure during a fidelity check can be assessed as like the real thing when the assessing pilot may never have experienced a real engine failure on take off in the type of aircraft he is assessing. How valid therefore is this assessment in terms of fidelity? Or is it a case of tongue in cheek "seems OK to me" assessment?
I have often wondered how an engine failure during a fidelity check can be assessed as like the real thing when the assessing pilot may never have experienced a real engine failure on take off in the type of aircraft he is assessing. How valid therefore is this assessment in terms of fidelity? Or is it a case of tongue in cheek "seems OK to me" assessment?