Originally Posted by glendalegoon
WHY would I make up anything like this?
That is the same question I had ….
Originally Posted by glendalegoon
The callout of V1 is to start at V1 minus 5 knots to ensure that the call is complete by V1. And our airline got this from boeing.
What?! “…to ensure that the call is complete by V1?” How long does it take to say “V-One?” If I were told to do that by one of my company managers or instructors, I would politely ask to see the note or the bulletin in which that recommendation is included. I know a lot of folks at Boeing … and to my knowledge none of them would make that kind of recommendation.
Originally Posted by glendalegoon
AS to the simulator problem in the 737-300, it was in the USA, it did happen and they fixed it. Imagine that, a technical problem with a high tech gadget. And at the time, the 737-300 was a new plane.
“High-tech gadgets” and “full flight simulators” are light-years apart in so many different understandings – I am a loss to provide a comparison … and, many here would be
shocked to hear me say anything like that! However,
having said that, of course, during the initial design and build process of almost anything new – particularly something as complex as a computer version of an air transport category airplane, some kinds of errors will inevitably creep into the process. But, as you describe the airplane as “new,” it would have to have been sometime between mid-1985 and probably the start of 1987 … I know the last deliveries of this airplane were sometime during late 1998 – 1999 time frame. So, the simulator would likely have been ordered / built / delivered / tested (in that order) starting perhaps as early as the end of 1985 … so delivery and FAA evaluation would likely have taken place around 1988 – 1990. By that time, I know several simulator manufacturers that had orders for and had delivered quite a few of what, at that time, was known as Phase III simulators (that same level is now called Level D) and I know that the first Phase III simulator ever ordered was for a B737-200 from a manufacturer in the UK named Rediffusion in 1982 … this manufacturer later became known as Redifon Flight Simulation – and the visual manufacturing portion remained in business for some time after the parent company became part of Thales. There were a lot of hurdles that had been jumped during that order/manufacturing process – not without some skinned knees, but those were generally due to first-off circumstances and once understood had been substantially overcome for subsequent orders. Given this understanding, it sounded, to me at least, that having such a sophisticated piece of machinery delivered with such basic programming errors of such a magnitude as you described … is so far off the charts as to sound … well, suspicious.
Originally Posted by glendalegoon
THE thumb thing works when you are airborne, not so much on the ground. But on the ground if you are ''visual'' you can see yaw as the plane heads towards the weeds without correction.
I was under the impression that you were discussing takeoff rolls and certainly engine problems on the ground and in the air are different – have differing causes – and have differing choices regarding how to react. Again, operating in 3-dimensional space can be “simulated,” but only up to a point – and, while I may be somewhat prejudiced as to how well its done today – there are many who have seen and flown such simulators that are absolutely convinced that these machines are, in fact, the ONLY way, and the BEST way to train and check pilots. As I’ve maintained for sometime now, I continue to urge that ALL simulators be used under the direct observation and control of a specifically trained, competent, and knowledgeable flight instructor or evaluator. Having said this, engine failures on the ground or in the air can be very realistically simulated in modern full flight simulators – and provided simulator sessions are overseen by the kind of instructor / evaluator I have described, they regularly result in an exceptionally well trained and competent aviator. This is the specific reason that I keep harping on having the simulator provide as much on-set cueing information to the flight crew – as close to what the airborne airplane will provide – and is the only way we can train a crew member to perform the same in training as we expect during on-line operations. We cannot accept a pilot with 2 skill sets – one that is focused on how to successfully operate a simulator … and one that is used to fly airplanes … i.e., not trained, not observed, not evaluated, but accepted because the regulator qualified and approved that simulator for training and testing. That is a formula for failure.