Research data confronted the black boxes with actions and answers the cabin of the aircraft and point to the design of the cockpit, the operator of the Airbus and the lack of proper training are among the main conditions for the pilots did not understand why the plane went down

I am on the first page, so far nothing new.

"A disposiçăo de informaçőes no painel e o design da cabine da aeronave foram fatores que contribuíram para dificultar que a tripulaçăo identificasse a açăo errada do copiloto menos experiente "

SI CONDUITE DU VOL AFFECTEE DANGEREUSEMENT le CDB annonce "IAS DOUTEUSE" - effectuer les actions immédiates suivantes :
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If this is really written in the final report, then one could read between the lines, that those who criticized the SS layout sound more credible now, even in the eyes of BEA.

Brazil receives final report on the fall of 447

France officially release the document on July 5. Tragedy that killed 228 people completed three years on Friday

Tahiane Stochero

The pilots of flight 447 did not understand the time the plane lost support after a procedure wrong copilot's newest and this led to the crash, which killed 228 people on 1 June 2009. In the final seconds, they tried to prevent the accident, but the aircraft was already so low speed reversing the decline of the Airbus A-330 Air France - which had departed from Rio de Janeiro and went towards Paris - the Atlantic Ocean, three years ago, it was virtually impossible . The provision of information on the panel and the design of the cabin of the aircraft were factors that contributed to hinder the crew identified the wrong action of the less experienced co-pilot - who was with the commands - and also that the plane was falling because he has lost support.



These records included in the final report that the BEA (Bureau of Investigations and Analysis, in charge of the investigation) says it will unveil on July 5. The document has been received from Brazil, USA and Germany to the final considerations, as found the G1 . According to international law, the Chicago Convention, countries have 60 days to forward its position. BEA can not change the text based on the weights made, but they should be included in the final report.

Research data confronted the black boxes with actions and answers the cabin of the aircraft and point to the design of the cab, the operator of the Airbus and the lack of proper training are among the main conditions for the pilots did not understand why the plane went down. Three other preliminary reports were produced by the French organ. The latter already had the information from black boxes and copilot reported that the youngest was in command of the aircraft. The commander had left the post to go to sleep just before entering into a storm, without a clear division of tasks between the co-pilot.

When passing the storm, low external temperature sensors pitot freeze and block the speed measurement. Without accurate information, the Airbus out of the autopilot. The copilot assumes newest commands, and an attitude that does not know how to explain, raises the nose of the aircraft, causing the stall alarm (loss of lift) double tap. With the procedure of climb, the plane loses speed even more and really start to lose support. The stall horn playing more than 70 times - some for nearly a minute uninterrupted. copilot The youngest, who is in command, it keeps climbing action, while the corrreto would play the nose of the plane down speed and retrieving support and prevent the accident. None of the pilots had received training in case of loss of support of Airbus in high altitude and speed without reliable information. The more experienced co-pilot comes to giving, at times, the order for his colleague to take the right attitude, but is not aware of the mistaken action of his companion, and this was hampered by a lack of information about the real situation in stall Airbus panel.

When called upon by more experienced co-pilot, the captain returns to the cabin about 3 minutes after the fall of the autopilot. He does not understand what occurs and does not take any action. Less than 1 minute later, the Airbus collides with water.
In no time, passengers were given notice of the problem. All 228 aboard died in the tragedy. Only 153 bodies were identified after a search.

Control System

BEA created a working group to try to understand the actions of the crew cabin and psychological factors - such as pressure, stress, work overload, or prior knowledge - interfered with the tragedy. But what the pilots thought at the time it is impossible to determine. One of the hypotheses are the changes made ​​during the flight control modes of "fly-by-wire" Airbus.
When the autopilot disconnected, the computer becomes "normal law" (so that it protects against the plane movements and avoid the wrong stall) for "alternate law" (with few protections on the actions of the pilot). There are two forms of "alternate law" - one with and one without protection stall.
When pitots computer froze and began to receive information from disparate speeds, the A330 went into "alternate law" unprotected stall. It is possible that the rookie driver did not understand some of the restrictions of the system and had never flown in this mode.
Check out 11 factors that led to the accident on 447 on 1 June 2009:

Flight control

Flight 447 departed from Rio International Airport, in Rio de Janeiro on the night of May 31. When flying over the region monitored by Cindacta of Recife, the controller makes contact with the flight crew believed to be another flight, also from Air France, which had left St. Paul at the same time. The commander realizes the error and warn.
Minutes later, the controller is a new radio frequency that the crew should use to contact with Senegal (the next area of radar coverage). The commander repeats the numbers (the action is called collation), but a return of 12 digits. The controller in Recife do not realize the error. Later, a Brazilian driver attempts to contact - unsuccessfully - three times with 447. The region is not covered by radar, the aircraft was not connected to a satellite system that would allow sending data.

Location and rescue

Air France was no delay in reporting the disappearance of the flight and to start the search. It also controls the airspace of Brazil and Senegal took to notice the disappearance of the Airbus A330.
Aircraft and ships from France, USA and Brazil have been moved to the area only during the day. According to the black box, the drop occurred at 2h14min28s GMT (23h14 in GMT). The first wreckage and bodies begin to be found almost a week later.

Storm (weather)

When the aircraft goes into the storm, the clouds a bit concerned about the pilots. They comment on the meteorological factors and had already faced similar situations and worse. The turbulence level increases slightly, but that's not enough to scare. The storm may have acted as a psychological factor, such as increased stress. And there was a failure in the analysis of weather conditions. The crew could have changed the route and diverted the storm, as other aircraft that have made ​​the same trip that night.

Pitot probes

In the passage above the storm, the outdoor temperature drops too and there is ice buildup on pitot probes, which ceased to have correct information about the speed. The system began to receive information three different speed, and the autopilot disconnected. Air France said at the time he was in the process of exchange of other probes that resist up to - 50 ° C. The manufacturer and the agencies that regulate civil aviation in Europe and Brazil could have required that the model only fly at high altitudes with pitot greater resistance.

Lack of understanding

Pilots do not understand what is happening, even with the stall horn playing 75 times. They also do not understand what information was correct. None of the pilots identified formalmanente stall the situation and none of the pilots mentions aloud the stall, which is standard procedure. The passengers received no warning.

Error procedure

When the autopilot disconnects, the youngest rider began to put the plane's nose upward, causing a stall situation. No one knows the reason which led him to make such a decision. The correct action would be to play the Airbus nose down to gain speed and recover support.
The BEA noted that "in less than a minute after turning off the autopilot, the plane leaves its field of flight as a result of the actions of pilot manual, mainly to raise the nose."

Management cabin

The failure of management control cabin (CRM as the acronym is known in the aviation community) is considered an important factor. The commander was rest and gave his place to the most novice copilot, while recommendations and clear division of tasks between the co-pilot. The less experienced co-pilot (Pierre-Cedric Bonin, 32, and 2936 hours of flight) takes over.
The more experienced co-pilot (David Robert, 37, and 6547 hours of flight) take long to realize that his partner was taking the wrong attitude. Just got in the last seconds before the Airbus colliding with water.
The preliminary report has already pointed out the need for a system with greater autonomy for the post of co-pilot, allowing a greater division of labor in the control of Airbus.
Automatism
There is no way of knowing what caused the less experienced co-pilot to commit the mistake and why the other two pilots did not understand the stall horn. One possibility is the control system of the Airbus (fly-by-wire). Pilots could be believing they were in a control mode - where the aircraft went in after the loss of information and the fall of the autopilot - he had protection for stall (loss of support). not known whether the pilots ignored the stall horn because they believed it was a spurious signal. Another issue is the lack of a visual indicator to pilots during the fall, the actual level of stall (the factor is called the incidence and activates the alarm loss of support).

Cabin Design

The position and design of the cabin may have impaired the most experienced driver to miss the wrong attitude of the beginner. The "control stick" (or "side stick" device similar to the video game controller used to send orders to the computer) is positioned below the side window next to the seat of each pilot. This position could disrupt one of the pilots to see the orders that the other is going to the aircraft. This observation, however, is relativized because the command appears on the control panel in front of the pilots when the order is given. Despite the low speed and the aircraft no longer flying, pilots, cabin, did not realize, nor had the view that this occurred.

Training

The pilots had not received training to deal with loss of control at high altitude and not on reversing situations stall at high altitude.

Stall

The loss of lift of the aircraft is the cause of decrease of A-330. The plane estolou and remained in this situation because of the wrong procedure of the pilot, according to BEA.
The final report will recommend improvements in the alarm system and the manner in which pilots can view directly on the panel the incidence of slope and position of the aircraft stall.

The G1 searched Air France, but until the publication of this article received no return. In a statement to the G1 , Airbus said that "the authorities investigating the accident did not identify any problems related to aircraft" and that "to date, no recommendations "related to the model. "The report of the BEA has not yet been published, so any mention in the press is mere speculation," says the manufacturer. About the functionality of the cabin, Airbus says it "has been used for decades and was designed with the drivers of companies Airlines and industry officials. " The construction adds that "the system of cockpit Airbus Fly-by-Wire is in operation since 1988 and already counts 143 million flight hours and 65 million flights today."

When called upon by more experienced co-pilot, the captain returns to the cabin about 3 minutes after the fall of the autopilot. He does not understand what occurs and does not take any action. Less than 1 minute later, the Airbus collides with water.