Should it be deemed necessary, it is very likely that an electronic backdrive of a not in use sidestick could be done within the space available. Of course, the interpreting software would need significant "adjustment" to the new circumstances.
From the dialog reported in interim report 3, it is clear to me that neither PF or PM's scans ever came up to speed, but instead got stuck staring at just a few parameters. The process of integrating the data into a full picture never actually happened.
IMHO, That is the root cause of this accident. Whatever PF was attempting to do with the aircraft, he did not integrate what effects his control inputs were having on his mental picture of what the aircraft was doing.
The only cure I know of for such a scan problem is hand flying---Lots of it! You could do it in the sim, but the natural fallout would be a much larger installed base of simulators to support the program.
Perhaps it is possible to develop a computer application that could be positioned in pilot briefing areas that would provide this refresher training, or within one's own laptop for practice as you felt the need.
However, I still look at all that cruise flying that is presently being given to Otto as the best, most realistic, cheapest, potential vehicle for training.
I am a firm believer in overtraining in such a critical skill as scan. For example, USN's theory on carrier landing practice was to do the first familiarization bounce pattern during the day, and then move all the remainder of the bounce periods into night work. For your edification, the night bounce was flown identically to the day pattern with a 600 foot downwind altitude. The bounce field was in an area with little ground lighting (until the housing moved in much later
). This was a combination of instrument scan and visual scan to fly the pattern (which is about as demanding and realistic as you can get.) Each pass was graded by a qualified Landing Signals Officer, so there was no playing around. This instilled in all of us a virtually unbreakable scan.
It remains to be seen whether AF447 is indeed the canary in the coal mine for more LOC accidents of this type.
Note: I am using a definition of scan which includes developing a mental picture of what the aircraft is doing. I believe others are using this term as the process of just reading the indications on the instrument panel.