AF 447 Thread No. 8
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@Machinbird....
The rusty pilot problem is one of the regulator's making. It is they who must fix the problem. In their haste to provide higher traffic capacity, they have ignored the long term problems they have created. They are going to have find a way for pilots to actually fly again within the route structure, and they should probably mandate hand flying minimums time requirements for pilots. AF447 is one of their chickens that came home to roost.
Yes. And no.
You ignore the complicity of the line....
The rusty pilot problem is one of the regulator's making. It is they who must fix the problem. In their haste to provide higher traffic capacity, they have ignored the long term problems they have created. They are going to have find a way for pilots to actually fly again within the route structure, and they should probably mandate hand flying minimums time requirements for pilots. AF447 is one of their chickens that came home to roost.
Yes. And no.
You ignore the complicity of the line....
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The regulator does not live in a vacuum. There is enormous pressure, political, and economic, for the regulator to demure to profit. Whence comes the pressure?
You seem very surprised? Have you been following the evolution of Air France v/v their public presentation of this accident, from the beginning?
Proactive and moral concern for others departed the gate long ago...for profits.
See: "pencil whip", "deferred in the field", and more obvious, though less quantifiable bud/bud "degradation" of what was once a functional system....
Your dudgeon is affected, yes? (You Kid?)
In the course of time, things produce what cannot be avoided. BEA acquiesced to AIRBUS to release a memo to burnish the reputation of the a/c manufacturer. Had they refused, there would have been trouble....and improvement in AirBus commitment to safety, in all ways.....
Airbus engineered a new technology for the 380.To save the weight of six passengers, they tried a composite/metal sandwich that was new. Ribs are fracturing. RR engineered a stub pipe for the Trent. Boeing developed a huge leap in application of two phase construction, the Dreamliner. Throughout its testing, their was applause, or chagrin, as if in some kind of ego filled soccer match.
The Shuttle program exhibited the same sort of fan interest, but the astronauts knew the risks....
If you don't know exactly what you are doing, work for the Space program, where risk is acknowledged. The hustle for money and prestige belongs NOT in airline transport....
I am a partisan. You should consider becoming one.
You seem very surprised? Have you been following the evolution of Air France v/v their public presentation of this accident, from the beginning?
Proactive and moral concern for others departed the gate long ago...for profits.
See: "pencil whip", "deferred in the field", and more obvious, though less quantifiable bud/bud "degradation" of what was once a functional system....
Your dudgeon is affected, yes? (You Kid?)
In the course of time, things produce what cannot be avoided. BEA acquiesced to AIRBUS to release a memo to burnish the reputation of the a/c manufacturer. Had they refused, there would have been trouble....and improvement in AirBus commitment to safety, in all ways.....
Airbus engineered a new technology for the 380.To save the weight of six passengers, they tried a composite/metal sandwich that was new. Ribs are fracturing. RR engineered a stub pipe for the Trent. Boeing developed a huge leap in application of two phase construction, the Dreamliner. Throughout its testing, their was applause, or chagrin, as if in some kind of ego filled soccer match.
The Shuttle program exhibited the same sort of fan interest, but the astronauts knew the risks....
If you don't know exactly what you are doing, work for the Space program, where risk is acknowledged. The hustle for money and prestige belongs NOT in airline transport....
I am a partisan. You should consider becoming one.
Last edited by Lyman; 30th May 2012 at 16:17.
Lyman;
Now this, I understand. In fact, I have been "partisan" during my entire tenure here on PPRuNe and have written extensively on a neoliberal political economy since the 70's and government's increasing complicity especially post-deregulation in the late 80's, in enabling the legal circumstances under which shareholder value and corporate profit have singularly governed the approach to corporate behaviours over the past three decades. To the exclusion of all other values, this is how business these days is conducting itself and airlines are no exception. While shortcuts in aviation are not new, there is a brashness and robustness to cost-control which is, in my view, inappropriate to the tasks at hand in aviation.
But the BEA Report is not going to address any of these, and in fact the themes which you broach and with which I agree, require an in-depth and informed discussion all by themselves. Read from this pov, your entries make complete sense.
I am a partisan. You should consider becoming one.
But the BEA Report is not going to address any of these, and in fact the themes which you broach and with which I agree, require an in-depth and informed discussion all by themselves. Read from this pov, your entries make complete sense.
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Lyman,
I answered you in that way because you sometimes make up obscure phrases that don't always communicate what you're trying to say. I was left completely boggled by, "You ignore the complicity of the line...."
I know what complicity is but I didn't know what you meant by "the line."
In fact, I pretty-much agree with your take on this, and have long-mistrusted the ties between industry and regulators. I'm 62 years old and I've seen it time and again. (Hope I don't have to argue this with Dozy a hundredth time) But the worst....please don't accuse me of being non-partisan. I am always on the side of The People, and suspicious of avaricious bottom-line corporations and their bedfellows. I've tried to keep an open mind throughout this thread, since this accident was so complex, but by this time, it is apparent that Machinebird's assessment, "They are going to have find a way for pilots to actually fly again within the route structure, and they should probably mandate hand flying minimums time requirements for pilots. AF447 is one of their chickens that came home to roost" is absolutely dead-on, pun intended.
I'm afraid that PJ2 may be right, that this will not be addressed. If it's not, I'm not going flying anymore.
I answered you in that way because you sometimes make up obscure phrases that don't always communicate what you're trying to say. I was left completely boggled by, "You ignore the complicity of the line...."
I know what complicity is but I didn't know what you meant by "the line."
In fact, I pretty-much agree with your take on this, and have long-mistrusted the ties between industry and regulators. I'm 62 years old and I've seen it time and again. (Hope I don't have to argue this with Dozy a hundredth time) But the worst....please don't accuse me of being non-partisan. I am always on the side of The People, and suspicious of avaricious bottom-line corporations and their bedfellows. I've tried to keep an open mind throughout this thread, since this accident was so complex, but by this time, it is apparent that Machinebird's assessment, "They are going to have find a way for pilots to actually fly again within the route structure, and they should probably mandate hand flying minimums time requirements for pilots. AF447 is one of their chickens that came home to roost" is absolutely dead-on, pun intended.
I'm afraid that PJ2 may be right, that this will not be addressed. If it's not, I'm not going flying anymore.
SS v CC
Not wishing to reignite the Airbus sidestick versus Boeing control column debate, but read this in a recent Flight International article on the Thomson Airways B767-300 heavy landing at Bristol in Oct 2010.
It said: "The main gear contacted the runway at 2.05G - enough to classify as a heavy landing - but the crown damage occurred when the jet rapidly de-rotated and its nose-gear struck the runway, possibly as a result of the pilot being thrown forward and pushing on the control column".
I speculate this would be less likely to happen in a SS controlled aircraft?
It said: "The main gear contacted the runway at 2.05G - enough to classify as a heavy landing - but the crown damage occurred when the jet rapidly de-rotated and its nose-gear struck the runway, possibly as a result of the pilot being thrown forward and pushing on the control column".
I speculate this would be less likely to happen in a SS controlled aircraft?
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Originally Posted by Lyman
The regulator does not live in a vacuum. There is enormous pressure
Originally Posted by PJ2
the BEA Report is not going to address any of these, and in fact the themes which you broach and with which I agree, require an in-depth and informed discussion all by themselves
EASA - European Aviation Safety Agencywww.easa.europa.eu/ :
"The European Aviation Safety Agency is the centrepiece of the European Union's strategy for aviation safety" (sic)
Pressure are only politic.
You see nice aircrafts, but it is a black and brown story.
If you want to make money choose an other activity than aviation !
If you want to travel in safety, "take the train !" (Tenenbaum Director of DGAC after Habsheim crash)
They are also human problems : in the early 80's automation was going victorious to artificial intelligence . A lot of the very fews of that speciality disapeared with AIDS : today's "intelligence articielle" (IA in French, AI in English not to be confused with Airbus Industry in our threads) is limited in some expert systems, and domestics robots, with exception of chess game. IA needs very long studies mixed to hard work experience. Airbus wanted to do IA, but were not able.
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SRMman, If the restraints were being used properly, he goes nowhere. All systems are interdependent to some extent, and control columns depend on accurate and appropriate physical movement, as do SS. Does the elbow strap in?
We think from the evidence that the restraints aboard 447 may have been in other than appropriate attach. To me, the SS seems more vulnerable to an unrestrained crew member than the column, (turbulence comes to mind), but it makes for interesting discussion.
BEA acquiesced to AIRBUS to release a memo to burnish the reputation of the a/c manufacturer. Had they refused, there would have been trouble....and improvement in AirBus commitment to safety, in all ways.....
Don't be surprised if BEA does in fact push back for this "accomodation". They have taken heat, for the memo, and for other things. The game is dynamic, and no one entity calls the shots, it is qpq, tit for tat, and the balance sheet is not written, it is carried, mentally, sub rosa, and used as ammunition in time of WAR. Though co-operative, they remain distinct, and in time if great upset, they retreat into their own particular fortress, for a time....
PJ2. Thank you, my friend, it is most welcome to find common ground.
We think from the evidence that the restraints aboard 447 may have been in other than appropriate attach. To me, the SS seems more vulnerable to an unrestrained crew member than the column, (turbulence comes to mind), but it makes for interesting discussion.
BEA acquiesced to AIRBUS to release a memo to burnish the reputation of the a/c manufacturer. Had they refused, there would have been trouble....and improvement in AirBus commitment to safety, in all ways.....
Don't be surprised if BEA does in fact push back for this "accomodation". They have taken heat, for the memo, and for other things. The game is dynamic, and no one entity calls the shots, it is qpq, tit for tat, and the balance sheet is not written, it is carried, mentally, sub rosa, and used as ammunition in time of WAR. Though co-operative, they remain distinct, and in time if great upset, they retreat into their own particular fortress, for a time....
PJ2. Thank you, my friend, it is most welcome to find common ground.
Last edited by Lyman; 30th May 2012 at 18:12.
Re PJ2's comments:
I htink PJ is shining a light on what is fast becoming the prime (yet oft hidden) contributing factor to a vast array of accidents and incidents.
Though this may seem to be "off thread" in the specific sense, it is on topic in the general sense (of contributing factors to this accident).
I am currently involved in various types of aviation safety assessments in many diverse parts of the world (including Europe, North America, Asia and Africa). I can say with no hesitation that what PJ alludes to is as widespread as civil aviation itself. From airport operators building fancy new terminals whilst their operational infrastructure (runways, nav aids, etc.) are not up to standard; to ANSP's refusing to staff enough controllers or install needed equipment whilst engaging in "revenue generation" activities; to air carriers providing inadequate ongoing training to air crew, and exerting pressure to always operate on time. All of the above exist in ALL areas of the globe.
There are many reasons (IMO) for this current lack of balance between "production" and "protection" (profit v/s safety) but overall there is a direct relationship to the composition and philosophy of the senior management and Boards of Directors of today's "commercialised" entities.
We are all partisans.
I'd be happy to explore this discussion further on the safety forum.
government's increasing complicity especially post-deregulation in the late 80's, in enabling the legal circumstances under which shareholder value and corporate profit have singularly governed the approach to corporate behaviours over the past three decades. To the exclusion of all other values, this is how business these days is conducting itself and airlines are no exception. While shortcuts in aviation are not new, there is a brashness and robustness to cost-control which is, in my view, inappropriate to the tasks at hand in aviation.
I htink PJ is shining a light on what is fast becoming the prime (yet oft hidden) contributing factor to a vast array of accidents and incidents.
Though this may seem to be "off thread" in the specific sense, it is on topic in the general sense (of contributing factors to this accident).
I am currently involved in various types of aviation safety assessments in many diverse parts of the world (including Europe, North America, Asia and Africa). I can say with no hesitation that what PJ alludes to is as widespread as civil aviation itself. From airport operators building fancy new terminals whilst their operational infrastructure (runways, nav aids, etc.) are not up to standard; to ANSP's refusing to staff enough controllers or install needed equipment whilst engaging in "revenue generation" activities; to air carriers providing inadequate ongoing training to air crew, and exerting pressure to always operate on time. All of the above exist in ALL areas of the globe.
There are many reasons (IMO) for this current lack of balance between "production" and "protection" (profit v/s safety) but overall there is a direct relationship to the composition and philosophy of the senior management and Boards of Directors of today's "commercialised" entities.
We are all partisans.
I'd be happy to explore this discussion further on the safety forum.
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Yes. The Boardroom. And the GO room. They are hand in hand, and they too have those to whom they answer, and it is not you and I....The safety forum?
Last edited by Lyman; 30th May 2012 at 19:18.
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Right - see you in July!
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Hi,
DW
That's not a problem for the BEA .. they are used to .... 
Stormy sky on Independence
Google*Traduction
Ciel orageux sur l
DW
Put another way, the BEA were willing to put their reputation on the line
Stormy sky on Independence
Google*Traduction
Guardianship. The law guarantees its "independence", but without giving him the means, because it is a service of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), itself under supervision of the Minister of Transport. However, the BEA is likely to investigate the DGAC, but also on Airbus and Air France, whose state is a shareholder. Where the risks of interventions and conflicts of interest. The Concorde crash in 2000, following a tire burst having punctured the wing, is a textbook case. At the trial, an investigator from the BEA, Michel Bourgeois, reported being pressured in a similar incident on the plane in 1979: "We were told to be quiet and not bother with Air France. "The judge also found that incidents of tires" could cause significant sized holes "in the wings, which" apparently he embarrassed the manufacturer. " Actually: EADS (Airbus parent) asked in August 2000 to add the BEA in its report that the holes were "small." That the BEA has accepted. But we did know that ten years later. This example and that of the Rio-Paris (see cons below) involve the methods of the BEA, often criticized for its "lack of transparency." He sends his report before publication to stakeholders, without ever saying it took into account their comments in its final version. Unlike the Court of Auditors, which does not modify its reports, but publish the attached response of the organizations it involves.
Last edited by jcjeant; 31st May 2012 at 00:06.
Organfreak;
I believe that the circumstances which built and delineated the wider context for AF447 and other accidents were at least burnished in the historical and the current political economy.
The name, “neoliberal”really doesn’t describe it anymore but merely describes the changes in the “arrangements”between private corporate interests and governments of western countries slowly awakening to a post-war, post-Keynesian world.
This doesn’t mean it’s all going to 'h' in a handbasket and that we should avoid all flying...not at all. Our highest risks by far, are the cab or car rides to the airport.
Agree or no, Kahneman has some interesting things to say about making such assessments; - I think the book is worth at least an examination.
Within a troubling political economy there are many more successes than failures if we are in the discourse of business and technology which counts multi-trillion dollar economies as "successful", (...and if we are in the discourse of ecology and livable systems, the present arrangements are inhumane, but...another thread).
"Success" within a troublesome mainstream doesn’t mean outcomes such as those being discussed here are acceptableand should be tolerated because of the flim-flam notion that the good fortunes of the unbelievably, privately wealthy will trickle down upon the masses if we just let greed have its way. These are social and organizational issues which profit renders invisible or at least inconvenient. Inconvenient truths in the safety data are almost universally unwelcome if fixing the problems revealed in the data is going to increase costs. That must change. Put voice and video recorders in board rooms for a start.
I think there are millions of innocent victims in such social systems as governed by the present rules of economic engagement which are mostly invisible to all. Here, with AF447, tragically, sadly, the two F/Os are in a scintillatingly-harsh spotlight which could shine on any one of us at any moment in circumstances far removed from our own making.
If this phenomenon isn’t understood for whatit is, both politics and the law will continue the trend to find out who to blame and then crucify individuals at the pointy end.
If we are looking for the pattern that connects all this, failing to comprehend the true sources of this accident and others like it, guarantees repetition until such outcomes are no longer tolerable to the very system which fostered them.
This does not excuse the absence of fundamental and trained responses designed to maintain cockpit order and discipline, as well as to deal with mere abnormalities via procedures considered quietly, between many experts at their desks and then tried over and over in simulators before making it into the AOM. Making one's own responses up and then acting out of instinct as opposed recalling one’s SOP and CRM training is inexcusable for a professional airline pilot, but truly, the sources of these errors do not entirely originate within individual pilots no matter who they could have been.
I hope the BEA, mindful of the legal cases pending, are able to strike a fine balance in these two very large and significant themes.
I'm afraid that PJ2 may be right, that this will not be addressed. If it's not, I'm not going flying anymore.
The name, “neoliberal”really doesn’t describe it anymore but merely describes the changes in the “arrangements”between private corporate interests and governments of western countries slowly awakening to a post-war, post-Keynesian world.
This doesn’t mean it’s all going to 'h' in a handbasket and that we should avoid all flying...not at all. Our highest risks by far, are the cab or car rides to the airport.
Agree or no, Kahneman has some interesting things to say about making such assessments; - I think the book is worth at least an examination.
Within a troubling political economy there are many more successes than failures if we are in the discourse of business and technology which counts multi-trillion dollar economies as "successful", (...and if we are in the discourse of ecology and livable systems, the present arrangements are inhumane, but...another thread).
"Success" within a troublesome mainstream doesn’t mean outcomes such as those being discussed here are acceptableand should be tolerated because of the flim-flam notion that the good fortunes of the unbelievably, privately wealthy will trickle down upon the masses if we just let greed have its way. These are social and organizational issues which profit renders invisible or at least inconvenient. Inconvenient truths in the safety data are almost universally unwelcome if fixing the problems revealed in the data is going to increase costs. That must change. Put voice and video recorders in board rooms for a start.
I think there are millions of innocent victims in such social systems as governed by the present rules of economic engagement which are mostly invisible to all. Here, with AF447, tragically, sadly, the two F/Os are in a scintillatingly-harsh spotlight which could shine on any one of us at any moment in circumstances far removed from our own making.
If this phenomenon isn’t understood for whatit is, both politics and the law will continue the trend to find out who to blame and then crucify individuals at the pointy end.
If we are looking for the pattern that connects all this, failing to comprehend the true sources of this accident and others like it, guarantees repetition until such outcomes are no longer tolerable to the very system which fostered them.
This does not excuse the absence of fundamental and trained responses designed to maintain cockpit order and discipline, as well as to deal with mere abnormalities via procedures considered quietly, between many experts at their desks and then tried over and over in simulators before making it into the AOM. Making one's own responses up and then acting out of instinct as opposed recalling one’s SOP and CRM training is inexcusable for a professional airline pilot, but truly, the sources of these errors do not entirely originate within individual pilots no matter who they could have been.
I hope the BEA, mindful of the legal cases pending, are able to strike a fine balance in these two very large and significant themes.
Last edited by PJ2; 31st May 2012 at 00:28.
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Balance.
Equilibrium is the enemy of the entrepreneur, and in service to his own, and the culture of his clients and investors, the goals are set.
Action impels interest. Interest compels venture. Success breeds competition, and great success breeds ruinous competition. In the ashes of the ruins of failed schemes, survivors merge, freeze out competition, create their own credo and tacit co-operation, to create a stasis. Unsatisfying and not profitable, the goal shifts from value and service to survival, and it is these instincts that create danger. Success long gone, survival makes animals of men, and liars of the shepherds.
BEA will do nothing out of the ordinary, save to "maintain the status quo"
The document will be pure joy to dissect. In its language will be the compromise discussion of what I have just written. The industry is failing.
White knuckles used to have no basis in reality...
Equilibrium is the enemy of the entrepreneur, and in service to his own, and the culture of his clients and investors, the goals are set.
Action impels interest. Interest compels venture. Success breeds competition, and great success breeds ruinous competition. In the ashes of the ruins of failed schemes, survivors merge, freeze out competition, create their own credo and tacit co-operation, to create a stasis. Unsatisfying and not profitable, the goal shifts from value and service to survival, and it is these instincts that create danger. Success long gone, survival makes animals of men, and liars of the shepherds.
BEA will do nothing out of the ordinary, save to "maintain the status quo"
The document will be pure joy to dissect. In its language will be the compromise discussion of what I have just written. The industry is failing.
White knuckles used to have no basis in reality...
