promani

BEA reports are similar to reading newspaper reports. You are told only what the editor wants you to know, and not what you want to know. Maybe more will be revealed through the media in due course.
I said a long time ago that there may be a possibility of an FA/CSM being on the flight deck. But I have no proof of this. Only dear BEA knows for sure.

xcitation

@SaturnV

Whilst I totally agree that it is very odd, one has to be careful when making inferences about PF behaviour based on circumstantial evidence. It is possible that the belt was released after impact.

A33Zab

This is a non issue, Cockpit door can be unlocked from the pedestal.

GarageYears

Thank you A33Zab!

I was scratching around for that info.... I have it somewhere, but couldn't remember if it was the pedestal or overhead.

Can we stop with this door opening stuff now?

airtren

I could not remember if it were Air France that had Combination Locks at the cockpit doors.... I am quite sure American or United, or both have that...

airtren

Hello Takata,

To your own advantage: getting yourself side tracked, by focusing on “how I have read your post, mind or imagination”, instead of “how you wrote your own posts”, is not going to resolve the lapse in consistency of using your own criteria, which I’ve got myself side tracked to point out.

The Saviola, ChristianaaJ and others’ posts regarding “il viens”, being about the Captain and not an “object – the a/c”, had clues about the use of “il”, that apply to this case too.

Some say that “you have to have it inside, or hear it in your ears”, the way French, and colloquial French differentiate between referring to persons and objects by using a “demonstrative pronoun” instead of “personal pronoun” when referring to objects:

It's “c’est ou ca?” or “’c’est ou cela?” instead of “il est ou”....

So, I am pretty sure, “il est ou, euh” is referring to the Captain, as the PNF uttered that while getting to the "buzzer button"...…

Finally, I should follow “jcjeant” and others’ suggestion, that we’ve spent already too much time on this …..

airtren

Grity,

Besides its technical merrit, and technical track it can open, your observation seem to reinforce the simple observation made by some postes regarding the importance of the PF beeing buckled down. The lack of it has created room for move in the seat, and false impressions, as he was being bounced by turbulence, or self induced pitch and roll oscillations.

xcitation

airtren

PF was found unbuckled. This does not mean he was flying unbuckled or buckled, only after impact he was found unbuckled.
I find it very unlikely that PF would not be strapped in whilst entering turbulence, at the onset of AP disconnnect, approaching impact. Surely the capt or FO would say something? I don't think that FDR capture a seat pressure sensor and belt activity.

HundredPercentPlease

Why did he pitch up like a madman? This, to me, is the critical error.

In Normal law, overspeed is shown by a red and black ladder. It is not that uncommon to suddenly arrive in an overspeed at high altitude (sudden wind shift etc) and you may have to disconnect and pull up to get the speed off.

█
█
█
█
█
█


The low speed area on the tape is denoted by an amber line and an amber ladder and then a solid amber bar. So no confusion there...

BUT

• A/P off.
• Alternate law.
• IAS incorrectly displayed as very low.

What do you get on the speed tape in alternate law at very low speed? A red and black ladder filling your speed tape?

And what do you do when you suddenly see your speed consumed by red and black? Pull up pronto until you get your speed below the bottom of the red and black ladder.

Could it have happened this way?

takata

Read me again. I have just said the opposite.
Cockpit's door was recorded "locked" when captain left for resting.
Nonetheless, it seems that is was not the case previously, before captain rest. Hence, yes, it is reported by the BEA that they could not determine if the door was locked before this point.

What I meant is that they are supposed to make a serious investigation about everything and, the report is about their findings up to this point.
- If they found that there was any kind of trouble with cockpit's door opening when captain came back to the flight deck... be sure that it would be noticed and mentioned !
- If they could determine that someone else was on the flight deck during the accident... be sure that it would be reported also !

Consequently, why making up stuff that doesn't exist anywhere in reports and discuss those meanigless issues as if they were real?
Captain entered the cockpit and nobody has had to stand up for opening to him. Why would they? Is it clear enough?

vbp.net

According to this paper, one recommendation about the STALL/AOA logic to be reviewed by AB as requested by the BEA was deleted 48h before publication of this report #3. The paper cites "several sources" and goes as far as pretending some members of BEA staff would consider resignation.

Vol Paris-Rio : le rapport d'enquête a été caviardé

vbp.net

Here is a quick (Google) translation of the paper :

According to our information, a recommendation on the stall warning of the Airbus planned in the near-final report of the BEA, 48 hours before publication, did not show up in the official version. Air France brought this to the European Aviation Safety.

The controversy over the crash of the AF 447 Paris-Rio is not going to go out. The shadows hangs on the third progress report of the Investigation & Analysis Bureau (BEA) released on Friday that pointed to the responsibility of the pilot of the Airbus A330-200.

According to several sources, a recommendation on stall warning device, which was part of the near-final version of the report 48 hours before its official publication, has not been published. Envisaged under the precautionary principle, this recommendation was to immediately begin a process of analysis and reassessment of the logic of operation of such alarms.

When asked by The Tribune, the BEA said "they did not comment on the steps that led to a recommendation or not." Inside BEA, some did not appreciate and even threaten to resign.

According to our sources, Air France has sent a letter to the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) requesting that the matter be reviewed quickly. When questioned, Air France has confirmed that they took the EASA on August 1 about the failures of the stall warning.

For pilots and Air France, these problems have played a major role, since "the multiple activations and stops unwanted and misleading, contrary to the state of the aircraft, have greatly contributed to the difficulty for the crew to analyze the situation, "stated the airline in a statement released Friday in response to the report of the BEA.

Between 2:11 minutes and 45 seconds, the night of the accident on 1 June 2009, and the crash time, the alarm has reactivated a dozen times with durations ranging from 2 to 8 seconds. The longuest reactivation of the alarm took place when the crew tried to restore the plane to a normal attitude. As a matter of fact, the alarm can stop when the aircraft is stalled and recur if recovery of a valid speed. Experts speak of a "case of reverse operation of the alarm."

Indeed, it stops when the speed is less than 60 knots, because it was considered that there was no reason why the aircraft can be found at this speed. But every time the pilot gave the order to lower the nose (the correct order) and sped it on over 60 knots (rearing, its speed had slowed considerably), the alarm went on, making him believe that his action was wrong.

Therefore they had no comprehension to the actual situation of the aircraft. This explains why the actions of the pilots of flight Rio-Paris appeared incomprehensible according to their colleagues.

vbp.net

Vol Paris-Rio : le rapport d'enquête a été caviardé

DozyWannabe

Rubbish - poorly researched article.

The stall warning sounded continuously from the apogee of the climb (at which point the aircraft approached and entered stall) for 57 seconds, after which point the aircraft was already unrecoverable. Intermittent warnings were triggered by the AoA being in the stall warning range (thanks mm43), and the only time the stall warning did not sound when it should have was past the point of no return.

It would appear that one thing that has not changed since 1988 is the predeliction on the part of certain parties to attempt to use the press to muddy the waters when the finger appears to be pointed in their direction.

xcitation

You might have this already 100%.
According to manual see red and black then [stick back] "reflex action".

Quote from airbus manual, my bold for emphasis.

airtren

Xcitation,

I was very surprised myself to read the BEA report's section on cockpit PF and PNF seats - section 1.12.4.2.1.3. I was also dissappointed, as it has made no special reference to the pilots, just the seats. One can only infer the pilots state based on the generic comment in Section 1.13. which has only one sentence on the new found bodies referring to the previous analysis.

That being said, I've thought about the problem of him flying unbuckled, and the rest of what you've mentioned.

With the risk of repeating of what was already said, that means that either the impact, the shock unbuckled him, or him being alive and unbuckle himself. If it were the latter, then the Section 1.13 would not apply, which invalidates the latter. If it were the first, the BEA investigation would have found some evidence, but that is not mentioned at all.

This leaves us open to speculation.....

airtren

Edit: added
A word for word translation of the BEA Report text I have referred:
1.13 Renseignemants medicaux et pathologiques

L'examen des corps remontes lors de la phase 5 confirme les observations consignees dans le rapport d'etape nr 2.

1.13 Medical and Pathologique Information

The examination of the human remains recovered during Phase #5 /conforms with/confirms/ the observations mentioned in the Phase #2 Report.

1.12.4.2.1.3 Les sieges du cockpit

Sur le siege situe en place gauche, les centuires ventrals etaient attachees, le centure de 'l'entrejambe et les harnais d'epaules ne l'etaient pas.

Sur le siege situe en palce droite aucune ceninture n'etait attachee.


1.12.4.2.1.3 The cockpit seats

On the left side seat, the ventral belt was attached, the between the legs and the shoulder harnass were not.

On the right side seat none of the belts were attached.

takata

Not wanting to sound rude, but guys, please, stop making up stuff.
Can't you make the difference between pilots bodies and seats?
Facts:
Both pilot seats were recovered and analysed. (structural analysis).
it was found that at impact:
- both were occupied;
- one was belted (PNF, LHS) -> at impact!
- one was not belted (PF, RHS) -> at impact!
This is the only clue they have. They can't deduce anything about when the pilot umbelted before impact, or if he ever was belted during the flight.

Who ever told you anything about pilot's bodies state and details, beside tabloids? We don't even know officially, beside captain's body, if they were actually recovered.

airtren

Thank you for posting.

If you have posted a link to the article, I've missed it.

If you didn't post a link, please post a link, by editing your post.

JD-EE

(You guys are outrunning my reading time.)

bearfoil, there is no electronics failure that will fill an aircraft cockpit with ozone. Ozone production requires voltages that are not present. When they stink electronics failures are very distinctly not ozone smells. Phenolic (not used anymore) has a distinctive smell when it burns. Various wire insulation materials have their own distinctive smells. Burned transformer varnish and insulation has yet another smell. Burned carbon composition resistor (not used anymore) is yet another smell. Burned metal film resistors have too little smell to worry about. Burned epoxy fiberglass circuit boards are burned epoxy smell. (Don't ask. It was after three months of 60-70 hour work weeks.) The blue smoke from integrated circuits has little or no smell because it's generally magical and in small quantities. (No, you cannot stuff that blue smoke back inside, either.) When an electrolytic capacitor overheats and dies the odor is "impressive"; but, it is not ozone. A modern cockpit has few if any motors present spinning at high currents and high voltages.

In fact, modern cockpits are not Hollywood props that burn up dramatically with all manner of fireworks and squibs going off. (When your home computer fries it's smoke not ozone you smell.)

And, yes, in more than 60 years playing with electronics and electricity I've smelled all those smells above, some under rather dramatic conditions. (Wet slug tantalum capacitors don't stink much at all. They just embed themselves in ceilings. They're not used anymore.)

Your fancy is getting too many flights of late. Maybe you should have it take a vacation. It's not in the competition for frequent traveler miles. I know people who could run rings around your imagination.

Old Carthusian

Lonewolf 50
I believe we differ on how much one can attribute machine involvement in this accident. I would say that once the initial pitot freezing has occurred it is all down to human factors. The machine operatives (pilots) are not reacting in an appropriate way to the situation. It is not that the machine is malfunctioning but that the people are not evaluating and acting in a way that will solve the issue. All machines have their differences and it is wise to know these. The aircraft I fly are all different and there is no one rule fits all. One has to be aware of this.
This accident is more of a training and culture issue. It is also a psychological issue (I have some thoughts on this but am not going to speculate until I see the final report. I simply do not have the information to back up my suspicions). I will say this - the answer lies in how people react to situations not in how the aircraft is designed or how the man/machine interface operates.