takata

It seems to be a BEA concern that FDs were not set OFF as per UAS procedure as they were comming back many times for a while (They are not sure about the effect or indications given to PF). It is still a work in progress at this point.

HarryMann

Fact is.let's say PF was only strapped waist belt..
Would that prevent accurate SS in moderate to strong turbulence ?

PJ2

Takata;
My understanding of the FDs is that they reflect data being sent to the FCPCs by the FMGECs. At this point, the raw data on the PFD would be the most important thing to look at - the FD's would not be presenting useful information. However, as we know, they may have tried to use the FPV to confirm what the VSI was telling them, and we know it didn't work because the FPV was not available at the time.

The simulator sessions probably have helped here I would think but it is very much a work in progress which much remaining to be understood concerning Phases 2 and 3 of the three phases indicated in this report. Phase 1 stands alone as a topic of great interest, in my view anyway. At some point, a formal calculation needs to be made, (I know that some calculations have been done by some experienced engineers), as to whether the aircraft was recoverable after the stall had fully developed moments after the apogee with AoA >16deg, (meaning stick held fully forward, engines at idle thrust, until very clear indications of rapidly increasing speed were obtained), and whether this would be moreso if the THS were rolled forward, and if so, to what setting.

PJ2

HarryMan;

My sense of it is, the arm and hand "unit" has sufficient mass to be moved about on its own but that would be turbulence very much in the moderate to moderate + territory. Anything lighter than that would be controllable, but one must not grip the stick firmly but "ride it at the top" while making corrections. Unless the inertial reels fastening the shoulder harnesses are locked tight around the upper body, they won't prevent movement, especially sideways.

That's one view...there will be several thousand others. ;-)

HazelNuts39

PJ2 and DJ77, my thanks to you both. I understand that the recorded changes of selected V/S do not indicate a pilot action, and have no effect on the aircraft with AP OFF. Would they affect the FD and thereby influence the PF's actions?

Regarding the indicated V/S, I note that the source switched several times between IR and ADR. Would that be automatic too?

Shadoko

From a "tourist" PoW (me), the BEA report is not as harsh against pilots than it could be. But, if you "read between the lines", it seems (to me, imho), to reflect some kind of sideration at what BEA people discovered by reading CVR and flight data. Is the final wording more politically correct than it may have been? Have the Air France "leaks" they will buy Boeings, just few days after the black boxes been read (see for example: Air France urged to back Airbus in plane order: Thomson Reuters Business News - MSN Money), something to do with this too kind wording? Some extracts gave my attention (non professional, non pilot, just interested):
One of the co-pilots (the PF) seems to have an altitude "obsession":

- Around 1H45 (p.74): "le copilote propose de demander à monter au niveau 360 non standard" (the co-pilot suggested asking for a climb at non-standard level 360).
- Just after 1H52 (p.75): "Le copilote attire de nouveau l’attention du commandant de bord sur la valeur du REC MAX, qui atteint alors le FL 375." (The first officer again draws the attention of the captain on the MAX REC value, which then reaches the FL 375.). Is this not a remark to obtain a climb permission? The captain didn't comment.
- Around 2H00 (p.9, p.51 et p.75): "malheureusement on ne peut pas trop monter pour l’instant" (unfortunately we can not climb for now): briefing between two co-pilots
- Just after the Captain left (p.75): "Les deux copilotes discutent encore de la température et du REC MAX." (The two co-pilots are discussing again about the temperature and REC MAX.).

In one of the occurences (p.75), the BEA wrote a guess about this "préoccupation constante de l’équipage" (constant concern of the crew): "probablement pour limiter les turbulences." (likely to limit turbulence.). OK. Perhaps.
But there is something strange: at 2 h 06 min 54, the PF said (p.91) "Moins quarante deux on utilisera pas les anti ice c’est toujours ça de pris " (litteral translation: minus forty two we don't have to use anti icing it is always something taken. Blue sentence probably translates: better than nothing).
Why he said this?
Concern about fuel consumption? Same for higher altitude? Same for straight road through ITCZ?
Something to do with salary "add-on"? The salaries of Air France pilots are a non readable black box for people outside the company (and even for many inside).
But it has also been said the company encouraged fuel economy, so it all could be a "good practice" learned by pilots, and very difficult for them to make balance with flight security.

Hope I am not too harsh.

Two questions: did you think the transcription is complete? Seems to me very few is said after Captain came back. And what about (apparently) total ignorance of alarms and synthetic voice?

@ jcjeant: did your post #1028 (It's seem's that is one more stranger for those 3 strangers ... the plane .... ) means you think the plane was a stranger to the crew (and not a strange plane as suggested)? If true, it is the same for me. Who might have suspected such a story if the black boxes had not been retrieved?

Sorry for my Frenchie English. Sorry for this too long and probably stupid post, but the reading of the CVR transcription is so appalling I can't tell nothing. Peace to all these souls.

HarryMann

PJ2

That clarifies it fine, thanks

L337

Below minus 40 all water is assumed to be ice. So below minus 40 engine anti-ice is not selected on.

I think that explains the quote.

SaturnV

Cockpit seats 1, 2, and 4 were retrieved, along the bodies of PF and PNF. We do not know whether both bodies were retrieved simultaneous with the seat they were sitting in. My guess is that they were, for that would facilitate recovery. Retrieval of other bodies was deferred until after the DNA testing was completed on these two bodies.

This third interim report says very little about the bodies recovered in the last phase, where they were seated in the airplane, and whether the recovered bodies were all seated and belted. The report does say that the autopsy results for the bodies recovered by Ile de Sein were consistent with the autopsy results for the bodies recovered floating.
_______________________

Rather strange that none of the pilots comments on the change in heading as the plane circles back.

JD-EE

whenitreallyhurts must have a problem thinking. Yes, the crash was caused by inappropriate behavior in the cockpit. Now, what does that have to do with the price of airline safety?

Perhaps we should ask WHY? That's a simple three letter word that eludes those anxious to have somebody, that is SOME BODY, to BLAME and be our Judas goat so that "the bad is cast out."

That simple question raises interesting specters that BEA has pretty much confirmed and AF's rant (despite it's one good point) rather confirms. Those pilots were basically untrained for the kind of situation in which they found themselves. There also seems to be a pattern of similar failures. So given a pattern one can deduce the reason for the pattern. AF and ABI positively screwed up the training. And ABI's stall warning system (cough) "Needs work."

JD-EE

Lemurian - jcjeant appears to not recognize the meaning of "preliminary" or "interim."

jcjeant

Hi,

Exactly

If we want take a look at facts .. BEA report N°3 indicate that the waist belt of PNF was secured and no belts were secured for PF on the seats recovered
But as JD_EE remark .. it's only preliminary report
Maybe in the next report (maybe final) .. they will write that all belts were secured .. I never know .. with BEA ...

Ian W

'Keeping the rubber side down isn't that hard?

Really? You have experience of flying an A330 close to its ceiling in turbulence at night in alternate law with instruments that are failing? If so you must be one of the few A330 pilots in the _world_ with that experience.

There is a lot of difference between being given a situation that you have been trained for and making errors, and being given a situation that you have never trained for and being expected to ace it from no experience.

It would appear that 'bus drivers are all conditioned that its just going to motor on and you can forget all that 'fly the aircraft stuff' that you might have been taught. All that is needed is a knowledge of the laws and a list of mental exercises to recite at the periodic check and if in doubt pitch and power.

Well in this case that was not true and people died.

This is not so much 'pilot error' as pilots being put in a situation that they had no chance of recovering as they'd never been trained to do so. What reactions they did have were in line with the by rote training they had received.
Indeed it may be that even an ace manual pilot may have had difficulty, given that it was night time in turbulent weather conditions, the lack of reliable instruments and squirrely behavior of an aircraft close to its ceiling with some protections but not others.

But I am sure you would have had no problem with your high skill and infallibility you would have needed no training and just have another story over pastis the next day.

Loerie

Which argument puts it right back in AF s`court.......why were they not trained to see what they were seeing and take corrective action?After reading this for two years it does seem that every opportunity has been given the PF and others that they were finding themselves in a very difficult corner for which they were untrained......shame on AF and ,probably,AB.

Lonewolf_50

Dozy:
Not quite so. There was the matter of a few pitot tubes going AWOL for a bit that was trigger to this event. Absent that, no UAS, and no issues with hand flying way up there where the air is thin, and a bit bumpy. Granted, that is a malfunction, and there are procedures for it, but there was something wrong with the aircraft. Something fundamental.

Ian, please don't hate me for what follows:

First note: if the two pilots were both aware of them being in condition UAS, what is the likelihood that they were skeptical of stall warning, knowing that airspeed is a component of stall AoA calculations? That might explain in part the apparent "ignore" of the stall warning.

Second note:

From the latest release, the aircraft went into a condition of unreliable airspeed. What leaped out at BEA was that (if I read this rightly) the crew didn't progress to the unreliable airspeed checklist/procedure as was standard practice at the time. (If I misunderstand that, my apologies).

The information released shows me a PNF who had to focus on flying problems rather abruptly. His requirement to assist (rather than take over from??) the PF, to include the switch to (F/O 3 on the ATT select?? takata's illustration informs this) indicates to me that he felt that the PF was having difficulty with his PFD. Given the number of things going wrong on displays, and the PF being unclear on what he was seeing (from PNF perspective) giving the PF a better inertial unit to run his would be a helpful copilot (role) assisting PF. (If this guess is off, apologies).

In the meantime, hand flying at altitude with UAS in Alt 2: is this trained for?

If not, the PF was playing catch up.

A human factors question arises that may be answered by AF SOPs or habits, or it may not have an answer.

With what appears to be the senior pilot between the two recognizing a pilot who was fighting the aircraft a bit, or chasing it, his initial "talk him back into the scan/situation" is what most of us would do as good copilots ( in terms of our role at the time.)

At what point should/would it have been "I have the controls" when the PF kept chasing the attitude and the PNF kept having to prompt him to go in a different direction? (Aside: Isn't that the question every Captain must have a clear answer to before takeoff, or an instinct for, in terms of his threshold of "that's enough, I have controls" when his copilot is flying?) If the PNF made a number of inputs on the SS but didn't take controls, I know a few CRM people who'd be aghast, as the preference is that one pilot is on controls, the other isn't. (We could probably spend all day debating the intricacies of what's behind that.) WIth a SS, his inputs won't be felt by the PF, so the "summing" function may have less than the desired effect, as opposed to conventional controls where the PF would have felt what PNF was doing. <== Is this a shortcoming of SS, or an advantage? I can see it both ways. (Anyone whose instructor "rode the controls" while you were learning probably sees the issue here).

The SOS call to the Captain was a good idea. I am unclear on the problem that seems to have delayed the Captain's return ... maybe it wasn't delayed, but PNF was in a mild case of temporal distortion -- time was slowing down or speeding up for him.

If the PF was unable to get level, you can argue that PNF can't get to the next logical task: procedure for airspeed indications being unreliable, and announced in the cockpit, acknowledged, and subsequently they follow the step by step UAS procedure.

The PF's flying occupied most of his attention.

Why PF couldn't get to straight and level is a question AF has to answer.

If the aircraft can enter a given mode, (degrade into ALT Law 1 or 2 or direct) then the pilot must be trained to fly it in that mode. Likewise direct law. Not just initial training, but proficiency, and/or refresher.

You never know when you'll need it.

t54

Shadoko
Wife in the back?

PJ2

HN39;

The switch-over would be automatic. The FDs would not have any influence on the crew's behaviour. Raw data's the thing in circumtances like this. They had attitude, vertical speed, altitude all engine instruments and everything else required for stable flight. All that was missing was airspeed information, and that for less than a minute.

jcjeant

Hi,

Maybe we can add to the missing items list a reliable stall alarm

Heathrow Flyer

I agree that it is not an issue of whether the pilots made an error, but to understand why they made an error.

So I was pleased to see it reported that:

Old Carthusian

If those of us who follow the news remember the Toyota brake pedal scandal in the US we actually have a possible explanation. The people drving the cars swore blind that they pressed the brake pedals but that the cars accelerated. In fact as detailed examination of several incidents showed they pressed the accelarator pedals. When faced by unexpected circumstances people do not do what they think they do. This accident is a prima facia case of such a reaction and no Lonewolf 50, it is not the aircraft. It is inadequate training and a culture which encourages a disregard of SOPs. If there is any blame to be apportioned it is to AF who allowed these circumstances to develop. Both the more experienced pilots could have taken over from the PF and to my mind this is the biggest mystery. Why did neither do so?