vanHorck

In my post #952 I wrote:

this in my view should be read as 2 separate statements made by the captain

CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of

CAP: là ça descends
That one indicates a descent

Subsequently a consensus seems to emerge (#966 #968) that my analysis may be wrong and it is more likely the "Là je said pas" is intended to suggest that the CDB does not know what is going on as a reply to the question of the PF asking what is going on.

One needs the original recordings for the intonations to decide the intention of the wording. Perhaps there is a French native captain who can answer this:

If one wanted in French to reply to an urgent question (from a junior) of what is going on, I believe the proper answer would be: "je ne said pas" or " je ne said pas encore" (I do not (yet) know).

By adding "Là" if taken on it's own it is almost an expression of non-responsability in the sense of "don't ask me" (!!) or at the very least a form of very casual talk, not likely in this situation.

Is this explanation correct?

In French "Là ... et Là ..." is often used to point at different subsequent things.

I am not accusing any pilot just trying to get to the cockpit management issues at hand

blind pew

Gentlemen I think you are failing to see the wood from the trees.

The aircraft was equipped with substandard parts which were inadequately tested, when this was realised there should have been a mandatory replacement program within a definite time scale.
Down to manufacturers and the authorities.

Air France were also negligent and it took not only the accident but pilot strike action to get them replaced.

Air France carried out a series of simulator tests with similar conditions to the RIO flight, most of the crews crashed.
Those that didn't had a member who flew small aircraft in his spare time.

To AF credit they recruited a committee to look at their operation that included two Anglo-Saxons.
One ex military and the second one whose initial flying course was of two years duration, including an aerobatics test and whose employee gave instructors courses to young first officers to augment their handling abilities.

Whilst there were definite errors on the part of the crew notably the captain leaving the flight deck during ITCZ transit - they were not sufficiently trained to deal with a situation which, before the advent of glass cockpits, was extremely rare.
They were not taught correct pitch power flying - PNF should not have had to delve into a checklist - it should be known by heart.

Which poses a question about the BEA, DGAC and EADS;
Since the inauguration of the airbus we have had a series of accidents involving top Air France and Airbus personnel. Halbesheim, Strasburg, Gulf de Lion, Etihad at Toulouse as well as 447 to name a few (plus the construction software design fiasco between the french and the germans), If EADS can get the design philosophy / human interface so wrong that the one group of pilots that should not be crashing them does then what chance do mere mortals in the third world have????
(this was also demonstrated by a Russian pilot's son!)

As we all know EADS are responsible for the checklists, as are the DGAC in overseeing the AOC holder - so to purely blame Air France and it's pilots is a mistake.

I have known collusion in four western aviation authorities, all carried out in THE NATIONAL INTEREST - it is about time that they exercised their powers in the interest of the passengers and crews.

The industry has had two crew operation forced upon them - I believe it is intrinsically unsafe.( as demonstrated here when PNF was in the checklists and not monitoring PF).

Training has continually evolved along with sophisticated electronics to the detriment of handling skills - this needs to be addressed.

In the good old days most pilots could cope with multiple failures and fly the aeroplane - is the cost of ensuring adequate flying currency too expensive with respect to the cost of a hull loss?

vanHorck

Blind Pew,

Whilst you are essentially correct, you are at risk of being side-lined as an old-school pilot who refuses to see the advantages of modern technology....

To further enhance your argument: There are now automatic messages for pilots exceeding the narrowest of tolerances during hand flying, resulting in gentle phone calls from ops to the PF and/or the captain urging them at the very lest caution if not nudging them to use the automation rather than flying by hand. This clearly results in less hand flying than would otherwise be the case.

One could debate that automated flying is excellent "systems training" but should not count towards flying hours for more than say 10% of the time...

Perhaps some GA flight time (without AP) should be made mandatory, just a block of 2 hours per month of which one hour upper air work and one hour circuits would do the trick.

But life is not like that, unfortunately...
Companies (manufacturers as well as airlines) will always strive for more automation to "cut out the middle man" (less strikes or illness is less money lost) and to compensate for human deficiencies (fatigue, spacial disorientation etc).

Whilst I agree some crashes are the result of the automation, how do we decide the crashes which have been prevented by the same automation? Because that is the side the companies are on.

BOAC

Note for PJ2 - trying to follow your link to 'P114', but please be aware that page numbers here are meaningless since they depend on individual settings of posts per page. If you can link to post numbers that helps.

Re VS - is the AB system like the Boeing? Initial Inertial reading with time related barometric damping? Are you referring to some sort of pilot selectable 'selector' between IR and baro in your post #1080? "There is an "ADR" and "IR" vertical speed selection I see." or is this software driven?

Why would PNF feel the need to change PF to 'IR3'? Does this indicate that IR3 was giving erroneous info?

Why all the queries about SS inputs left and right? Surely the FDR trace will show who was doing what?

Old Carthusian

vanHorck, blind pew

Go away and read up on historical accidents caused by pilot error. Read about the psychological aspects of accidents. Then come back and comment when you actually know what you're talking about. (Clipper Skippers anyone?). Flying is immesurably safer now than it was in the past precisely because of the increase in computerisation and automation.

Hand Solo

Agreed, but all major manufacturers have been guilty of this.


Do you have a reliable source for this? The FDR/CVR were found only a matter of months ago. Prior to that the conditions of flight were largely unknown. If most Air France crews crashed in these conditions then that is a matter of grave concern. I have flown unreliable IAS at altitude in an Airbus simulator numerous times and haven't crashed once, nor do I know anyone who has. I do not fly light aircraft and consider myself averagely skilled. If I can do it why can't they?

Train your crews right and the captain should have no problem leaving the cockpit during ITCZ transit. I don't know of any European major where this is considered a factor during augmented crew ops.

Unreliable IAS is a memory drill and the attitudes and power settings should be known by heart. Why did they not recognise the situation and call for the drill? If you know the pitch and power settings but don't use them what does that say?


Was a checklist ever called for, let alone commenced?


There were a lot more crashes in the good old days. Nostaligia is great fun but you're shooting yourself in the foot with this one.

gonebutnotforgotten

BOAC

I assume 'p114' refers to BEA's Etape 3 report page, not this thread. It shows the Paramètres longitudinaux traces including the all-important positions of the Side Sticks.

blind pew

Yes I agree I am an old fuddy duddy and automation has saved many lives but we have had far too many replies on several threads asking as to what the automatics were doing!
If it is so wonderful then why do so many people get it wrong?

CRM has changed things as has the information highway but this is a major western carrier where the aircraft is built and the systems designed.
It is wrong of the press to put the blame on the pilots and airbus to issue a statement that they could have recovered the situation when they obviously didn't understand what was happening.



My source was a senior AF training captain and I believe the exercise was based upon the original acars data. I have no reason to disbelieve him but he is old school as well and amuses himself with aeroplanes outside of work.

I still believe that if one major long haul carrier decided in the 1960s that they needed two years of basic training for their cadets and a further two years or more before they were fully fledged to operate P2 then perhaps the modern system of under a third of that time is a mistake.

Yes I know it is cost orientated but the demise of a major carrier also carries a cost let alone the needless deaths.

Air France is lucky in that it has a captive customer base - the French wouldn't dream of flying with Johnny Foreigner.

Re power attitude - there was a post stating that PNF was reading from a checklist.

I still go 100% behind my comment that it was a lack of airmanship from the captain to leave the flight deck during the transit of the ITCZ. Having crossed it many times over a period of 7 years as a first officer there was NEVER an occasion when the captain was out of the flight deck. It was, especially in the middle of the night and over the South Atlantic, the most demanding cruise phase of a modern airliner -(poss exception CAT over Andes).

If modern training is sufficient to allow relatively low time first officers to man the flight deck during critical phases of flight that why did they crash and why did my last company who pioneered the direct route fly with two full three man crews?

I still believe the regulatory authorities need to get their A@@@ in gear.

grity

thanks to HN and PJ2 and others to clear up the vertical speed settings...




and a question to the calculators abaut the inizial of the first pitchup between 2:10:07 and 2:10:17 detailed on s.44 of the french 3.interim pdf

the AP disengaged at 2:10:05 and before he hold the bird with pitch 3deg through the turbulencen with elevator movments in the range +/- 0.5 deg

PF moved the elevator for 10 sec just up to -1.0 deg (pulling) and the reaction was the beginning of the climb at 2:10:17 with pitch up 12 deg; vertical speed 6000FT/min; acceleration normal 1.3 G after 10 sec

is the system in this high at this speed so sensible that 1.0 deg wrong elevator lets move (pitchup) the heavy bird so fast so strong?

HazelNuts39

With the DFDR data released in Interim Report no.3, it is now time to add a few observations to my july 10 post #30 on page 2 of this thread. While the earlier post was for still air, the new element is the role that movements of the air masses traversed by the airplane played around 02:10.

In the preceding minute the level of turbulence had been increasing from an amplitude peak-to-peak of about 0.2 g at 02:09:30 to about 0.5 g when the AP disengaged at 02:10:05. At that time the vertical speed was passing through zero, decreasing at the rate of 400 fpm per second, or 0.2 g. The normal acceleration was thus 0.8 g at that point. The airplane’s pitch attitude was then increasing through about zero, i.e. much less than the 2.5 degrees it would have been in steady, unbanked level flight. In the two seconds after AP disconnect until the first movement of the side stick, pitch increased to about 1.3 degrees. The pitch attitude continued to increase progressively from 2:10:08.4 and the vertical speed became positive at about 02:10:10. The engine N1’s which were close to 100% up to 02:10:00, then dropped to about 83% 6 seconds later (the commanded N1 dropped to 75% in about 3 seconds). When the pilot grabbed the SS, he was looking at pitch 1.3 degrees NU, 7 degrees right bank, and –400 fpm vertical speed.

My tentative explanation of these events is that the airplane was traversing the fringe of an area with significant updraft velocity (1024 fpm fits the data). The AP pitched the nose down to maintain altitude, and the A/THR reduced engine thrust to maintain airspeed. After disconnect of AP and A/THR, the FCS increased pitch to regain 1 g normal acceleration, and thrust was locked at significantly less than required to maintain airspeed in level flight in still air.

More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?

BOAC

- ah - thanks for that. I am waiting for Wednesday to download that.

- and therein, as I'm sure you ?realise?, lies the problem.

takata

Hi vanHorck,
It could, but this is not correct in this context, as you seems obviously not used to hear this kind of talk which is completely informal. "Là" is used in such talk as a pointer meaning "now, at this point". It is very common talk and everybody I know speaks like that in real life, including the PF:

- "Là c’est bon là, on serait revenu les ailes à plat [là]..." => now (at this point) it is good, now we are back to wings level...
- "je suis entrain de descendre là?" ) => Am I descending now?
- "là je monte okay alors on descend [là]..." => Now I'm climbing... okay then now we'll go down...

If one want to point at something (an instrument), he will very likely use "çuilà" (celui-là) or "çuici" (celui-ci):
- çuilà (celui-là) monte = this one is rising
- çuici (celui-ci) descend = that one is falling

or even more undefined, "ça":
- ça monte, ça descend...
but you could find also "là ça" as an attention getter:
- là ça monte, là ça descend


It is obvious from the conversation that the crew is talking freely and that there is no formality between each others, including the captain.

grity

at the start of the event 2:10:07 the ship was rolling 8 deg left 8 deg right and so on every 2 sec to the other side......the acceleration lateral was also left-right-left with around 0.1G

PF put his hand to the stick and was moving the stick from left to right and so on...... nearly counter-syncron with the rolling (s.31)

question: is this the perfekt movment (and he just overreacted a little bit) or will be the dumping effect better if he moves phase-shifted?

hetfield

I'm asking myself, would this accident also have happened with

- an artificial feel (yoke) instead of a constant bungee force in the stick
- a conventional stall warning

?????

airtren

The adverbs:

La (French) - there (English)
Ici (French) - here (English)

are included/embeded when composing "demonstratives" words, which include an indication/meaning of proximity/distance. For instance:

"ce-la" - "that" (English) - there is an implying of "there"
"ce-ci" - "this" - there is an implying of "here"

The use of the addition of "la" in slang/colloquial French sentences, with a meaning/implying of locality (in space or time) relative to the speaker, is quite similar if not identical to the use of proximity/distance qualifiers in other languages, particularly those deriving from, or having a strong Latin influence.

For instance, I would put in that category in the CVR, the

PF's: j'ai plus the vario la
Captain's: doucement avec le pallonier la

But, in the case you pointed to, as that particular use of "la" is IMO, a "shorter "ce-la", which translates into "that", which makes the English translation into "that one" IMO quite correct.

Even, if his response is relative to someone pointing to the screen to to two items, to which he refers to by their location on the screen, in which case, it would be "there, that one", and "there, that one", the meaning of the translation is still correct.

Lastly, it is reflecting "casual talk", but I would definitely NOT add any association of meaning a degree of responsibility to it...

bearfoil

Hazelnuts39 re: #1110

Virtually from the outset, I have been trying to engage others in a discussion of the possibility of Autopilot loss due to other than UAS, or ICE. It was the fulcrum upon which I placed a snarky insult to PJ2, for which I am eternally regretful.

So thanks. The A/P is programmed to disconnect by itself when it cannot "keep up". The Definition of "Keeping Up" is what got me on PJ2's dark side, I fear. Also, what remains of LAW at this type of disconnect is NORMAL LAW. So, did the dropout cause the UAS instead of ICE? Via airflow disruption due manouvering in turbulent air? Were the first perhaps clumsy inputs of PF the cause of unreliable IAS?

Aside from that interesting discussion is the trail of Flight Path post a/p loss, imho. In ALTERNATE LAW, the a/c is "sensitive". Not in the way of a small fighter, way different. A wide Body is massive, and must be flown gently, when inputting a control if you can sense it at all quickly, it is probably too much? Driving heavy equipment requires a separate set of "Buns".

After A/P drop, the a/c was commanded NU. As his (PF's) first input, can we opine that it was "too much"? Likely without a quick response, the PF may have put in "more"?

HN, you assume a turbulence in cruise that is a given from the beginning (yes?) I believe. The autopilot manages such that the ride is "comfortable", but both pilots obviously were cognizant of airframe movement about the "best" Flightpath? So, as a surprise hand back, the PF must begin his manual flight without a current "feel" for response?

The first step in "correcting" is to stop the trend, not go the other way?

His first input was too much, he forgot to "wait"? With the rolling, is this an evidence of overcontrol?

However the a/p dropped out, isn't allowing the a/c to exhibit "sensitivity" a NO NO?

Somewhere between "Do Nothing" and ACM, isn't there a better transition avaliable?

takata. Bonjour! Thank you for the Pic. Note the damage at the lower collet, evidence of the jackscrew "pulling through" whilst trying to lessen the NU? Jammo?

grity. #1113. A Pilot Induced Roll Oscillation? (PIRO)? Is the SS damped to prevent "Coffee Stirring"? One surprise with all the calcs re: climb and KE is the absence of the rolling factor, a draggy circumstance, and without it, could the a/c have survived?

airtren

For what is worth,

In your post #1112

- çuilà (celui-là) monte = this one is rising

Correct is "that" instead of "this"

I would translate "that one is ascending"

- çuici (celui-ci) descend = that one is falling

Correct is "this" instead of "that"

I would translate "that one is descending"

airtren

Hazelnut39,

It's a direction of thought, and question that I am certainly interested in...

I've posted at one point, the opinion that the "nose-up" along with the "roll" SS command applied by the PF when taking control from the AP, was because the AP has disconnected during a time interval, in which due to turbulence, it was controlling the A/C in an attempt to return it to level, and thus the A/C was not level yet. So the PF attempted to complete that "return to level" "started but not completed" by the AP.

airtren

whenrealityhurts

Let's assume the pilots were good...let's assume the aircraft was decent....looking at the cockpit of your typical google search Airbus panel, I am struck with this idea.

Your in a very strong tropical thunderstorm. Lightning hits the cockpit, avionics bay, multiple times. Tubes go dead, avionics take a pretty hard hit.

I get the impression that pilots on a dark and rainy night, getting 10k up and down drafts in a cell, have no engine, A/S, or AI reference from non tube instruments.

So your trying to maintain attitude control in what is probably a dark cockpit under IMC conditions and your getting slammed.

If there is an iron gyro back up AI, etc...ok disregard, but I couldn't find one in the pics that I saw.

bearfoil

airtren

Would you consider other than Pitot issues as cause? That would involve other than a "time interval" approach? The A/P is 'dynamic' (constant) in its inputs, No? So the disconnect is "instant", not sequential? The important vector is the 'logic' of its loss? Not the "cause"?

So also the discussion involves a possible "remnant" of NORMAL LAW? Unfortunately, this introduces "mode Confusion".