company policy during take off

[lomapaseo]

ok airbus girl but an eng oil low press is a mast warning

are you sure it is not inhibited on takeoff?

[FlightDetent]

poitiers: The Airbus design is specific compared to most aircraft in the fact that the warnings are thorougly filtered during the take-off run. Much of the typical failure asessment does not even become a part of the play because simply you only see the problems the designers intended you to see.

I've had a situation where upon setting TOGA/FLX the security door lock (electrically operated) clacked. Upon passing 1500 ft the ECAM went off with ELEC: GEN 2 FAULT which was sorted out quickly. Point is that the GEN tripped after selecting high N1 (GS=5kt) but the first realistic moment for the crew to realize was once airborne.

On 737 the company policy included naming the high speed reject causes. On 320 we brief none - a situation made possible through the design and quite not transferrable to different ops. But the answer to your question, strictly Airbus, what we are asked to do (company manuals here 100% identical with manufacurer guidliness):

ENG: LO OIL PRESS - red master warning button, red alert on ECAM and continious repetitive chime througout the TO roll, i.e. no TKOF inhibit: STOP (until V1).

F/CTL: L (R) SIDESTICK FAULT - amber master caution button, amber alert on ECAM and single chime, no TKOF inhibit: STOP (until V1).

references:
--------------
Airbus FCTM: N.O. > Pre-start > Tkof briefing
For any failure before V1:
CAPT will call "STOP" or "GO"
--------------
Airbus FCOM 1 Indicating/recording systems 1.31.10 p2 > Warning/caution classification

LEVEL 1 Red Warining> The configuration or failure requires immediate action:
-Aircraft in dangerous configuration, or limit flt conditions ...
-System failure altering flight safety ...

LEVEL 2 Amber Caution> The FC should be aware of the configuration or failure, but does not need to take any immediate action. However, time and situation permitting these cautions should be considered without delay to
prevent any further degradation of the system ...
--------------
Airbus FCTM: A.O. > Ops techniques > Decision making

DECISION MAKING
A rejected take-off is a potentially hazardous manoeuvre and the time for
decision-making is limited. To minimize the risk of inappropriate decisions to
reject a take-off, many warnings and cautions are inhibited between 80 kts and
1500 ft. Therefore, any warnings received during this period must be considered
as significant.
To assist in the decision making process, the take-off is divided into low and
high speeds regimes, with 100 kts being chosen as the dividing line. The speed
of 100 kts is not critical but was chosen in order to help the Captain make the
decision and to avoid unnecessary stops from high speed:
. Below 100 kts, the Captain will seriously consider discontinuing the take-off if
any ECAM warning/caution is activated.
. Above 100 kts, and approaching V1, the Captain should be "go-minded" and
only reject the take-off in the event of a major failure, sudden loss of thrust,
any indication that the aircraft will not fly safely, or if one of the following
ECAM warning/caution occurs:
. ENG or APU FIRE
. ENG FAIL
. CONFIG
. ENG REV UNLOCK
. L+R ELEV FAULT
. SIDESTICK FAULT
If a tire fails within 20 kts of V1, unless debris from the tire has caused
noticeable engine parameter fluctuations, it is better to get airborne, reduce
the fuel load and land with a full runway length available.
The decision to reject the take-off is the responsibility of the Captain and must
be made prior to V1 speed:
. If a malfunction occurs before V1, for which the Captain does not intend to
reject the take-off, he will announce his intention by calling "GO".
. If a decision is made to reject the take-off, the Captain calls "STOP". This
call both confirms the decision to reject the take-off and also states that the
Captain now has control. It is the only time that hand-over of control is not
accompanied by the phrase "I have control".
--------------
FCOM 3 (my OM-B the binding document)

--------------

Yours,
FD (the un-real)

[DFC]

Why on earth would he say stop stop when the decision to stop or go is the captain's alone.

The final decision is the PIC's alone as it is with every other decision.

Unlike the PIC failing to go arround when told by the FO at DA if not visual and the FO taking over, close to V1 there is an even smaller margin for delay.

Therefore our SOP is anyone can call "STOP" but the PIC can override that decision by using the command - "negative continue". This is a far quicker process (in both the GO and STOP situations) than FO calls problem, Captain thinks, decides and makes call and then FO does what expected.

Another issue is incapicitation. This is a very critical situation. If the PIC on a 3 eng aircraft has not noticed the failure of the number 2 10 knots prior to V1, do you want to pass V1 saying "what was that you said?" If the PIC has failed to notice the failure they are at that instant incapicated / not paying attention or what ever you want to call it.

Finally, please read the certification basis eg CS-25. Look at the time period involved in the most critical situation. Read carefully about the fact that this time must be increased if an action has to be called for. The A/C manufacturer needs to show evidence of using a realistic delay period appropriate to the situation of the FO calling a failure and the PIC making a decision. Has the manufacturer donw this with your aircraft? If so what extra time period have they used?

By using an SOP of PIC only calls stop, you effectively define the latest speed at which an emergency can be called by the FO and a decision made by the Capt and the FO makes the initial stopping action at V1. This speed will be quite some speed below V1 in an aircraft with rapid acceleration.

At the same time, the FO calls a problem just before he calls V1. How far above V1 will the aircraft be before the Capt decides to stop and takes the initial action?

I think that everyone is confusing the PIC having the final decision and the rejected / continued take-off procedure which has very closely defined time periods of things to be done if the scheduled performance is to be met.

[FlightDetent]

I do not get it, DFC. In the definition of ASDA and TODA/RA is a leeway to cater for this chit-chat you point at. However, with CM1-only decision structure, there is no need to ask (and monitor!) the FO to do the stopping. The CM1 will just act and work will be done quite within the specs. Of course, the CM1 keeps hands on TLs to make this simple.

FD (the un-real)

[john_tullamarine]

In the definition of ASDA and TODA/RA is a leeway to cater for this chit-chat you point at

Not to any great extent, other than for ASDR post Amendment 42 .. and even then we are talking about fleeting moments ...

The mantra - "if we aren't already stopping by V1, then we're going .." has a lot to recommend it on ASDR limited runways for the very great majority of events.

Even then, the 2 seconds built in for later certifications is a VERY short time interval if you want to talk things over. A prudent operator will have a fairly rigid SOP trying to minimise time while maximising crew effectiveness ..

[FlightDetent]

Thank you J.T. We are in agreement that the importance of V1 as a last action speed cannot be overemphasized. Whatever happens shortly before needs to be quick and decisive.
Simply I wanted to point out that if the crew's coordination in hadling a failure procrastinates V1 you are safe to fly which immediately becomes the only option. Indeed this only works when the SOPs are strict, short, and effective.

FD (the un-real)

[DFC]

The 2 second acceleration post V1 is not time for making a decision it is for establishing the required deceleration. Remember that in many aircraft closing the throttles will not immediately stop the acceleration.

Other issues involve V1 minimum. If V1 is at V1 minimum, does the "identify problem and then PIC make decision by V1" not in effect move the speed at which a failure occurs and GO choice is made somewhat below V1 mini? Will the aircraft get airborne in the distance with such a low GO speed?

What about VmcG. FO is PF. With a most critical engine failure situation (in respect of VmcG) and minimum runway width, is there time for the FO to call the problem, the captain to call stop and the throttles to be closed before the aircraft departs off the side?

If the a/c is certifed for 2 crew. Making the stop call a captain's only call means that for the take-off the aircraft is single crew.

The best one however, is explained by using the unfortunate accident at LFPG some time back where a SD360 infringed and was struck by a departing aircraft to describe a potential situation.

Think about the situation with your SOP's while sitting in the cockpit of the departing aircraft involved;

One of the reasons for stopping is "Danger" eg runway infringement.

Aircraft is rolling.

At 105Kt, FO can see- aircraft infringing on the left, well down the runway. What words are they going to use?

They are going to say "DANGER"

PIC is going to say "where" because they have no idea of what is causing the danger. If they did, they would already be stopping.

Now give me the words that in .001 of a second or less explain to the PIC why they have to stop ASAP!!!!!!

OR;

Call STOP STOP

If the PIC will automatically call STOP when FO calls DANGER then why not have the FO call STOP in the fiorst place.

If the PIC will not automatically stop, then the stop will often be started too late to avert disaster.

I think that many have become confused with the big difference between having final responsibility and making a call.

If the PIC is 100% aware of the reason for calling STOP they can override that call. However, how often will the PIC be 100% sure that the call is in error. With such a small amount of time available, A well practiced, well briefed well understood "either pilot can call stop the PIC can override the call" reduces the chance of over-run / failure to get airborne in the distance available / failure to clear obstacles after a late rotation.

[Henry VIII]

alf5071h
In aviation one of the requirements is to communicate clear and brief, post #2 respects that requirement, answering according to the question.
Above 100Kts no room to spend time about

What is a ‘sudden’ loss of thrust vs a ‘less than sudden loss’

Why should any amber warnings have to be considered at high speed?

Because the manufacturer consider those specific warnings DANGEROUS to fly. If you disagree feel free to question Mr. Airbus about it.

Current aircraft hidden or display failure(s) in certain flight phases according the manufacturer evaluation about their riskiness level.
Basically, the pilot decision making is reduced and replaced by system judgment. And we have to cohabit with this philosophy.

[Max Angle]

DFC,

I quite agree that the PIC is not always going to be 100% certain and that there are some situations where having either pilot able to call stop or to action the RTO may be an advantage. However the fact is that the advice from the two major jet transport manufactures, based on many incidents, is for the PIC to call stop or go and to carry out the stopping actions. It might not be perfect, nothing ever will be, but that is what they reckon gives the best chance of a successful outcome to a high speed RTO decision whether it's a stop or go.

There are a very small number of airlines that disagree with that policy and go their own way but the vast majority, in my opinion quite rightly, stick with what Boeing and Airbus recommend.

[poitiers]

specifically on Airbuses which non inhibited alarm should lead to a rejected T/O?
for what reasons the manufacturer request a stop on a side stick fault?

[Henry VIII]

specifically on Airbuses which non inhibited alarm should lead to a rejected T/O?

A319/320/321:
Fire warning or severe damage;
Sudden loss of engine thrust;
Malfunctions or conditions hat give unambiguous indications that the aircraft will not fly safely;
Any red ECAM warning;
Any amber ECAM caution listed below :
F/CTL SIDE STICK FAULT
ENG FAIL
ENG REVERSER FAULT
ENG REVERSE UNLOCKED

A330/340:
Fire warning or severe damage;
Sudden loss of engine thrust;
Malfunctions or conditions hat give unambiguous indications that the aircraft will not fly safely;
Any red ECAM warning;
Any amber ECAM caution of the ENG system or the F/CTL system.

for what reasons the manufacturer request a stop on a side stick fault?

A side stick fault could order full flight control deflection and, if not quickly overriden by the other crew member pressing the take over pb, could lead to dangerous attitude in a very low altitude phase of flight.

[BizJetJock]

If I recall correctly, and I'm afraid I haven't any references with me, the shift of both the major manufacturers to the captain always deciding on and carrying out the stop had nothing to do with decision making. Following a particular incident (with a DC-10 if memory serves) NTSB/NASA in conjunction with several airlines ran a series of sim trials where they found that F/O's - particularly inexperienced ones - rarely managed to stop the aircraft in anything like the scheduled distance, whereas most captains did.
They put this down to the general lack of experience of the F/O's. Note: not low flying hours, many had thousands of hours of driving around in serviceable aircraft, just they hadn't seen any real emergencies and were frozen with indecision for a critical second or two.
I don't know but this may relate to the addition of the two second response time to the certification requirements.
Interesting, of course, is that those F/O's are now the captains 25 years on and may still never have seen a real emergency.

[lomapaseo]

Interesting, of course, is that those F/O's are now the captains 25 years on and may still never have seen a real emergency

Of course hopefully they do have a lot more sim time with takeoff aborts.

[Centaurus]

Thankfully, a high speed rejected take off on a limiting runway is an event that very few pilots will experience in their career. For any pilot, captain or first officer, it will probably be the singular most critical decision he will ever make. Especially if the over-run area is also dangerous. Countless airports have lethal over-run areas.

PNF and PF political correctness aside, as a captain faced with a situation near V1 where a sudden call of "Stop" by the F/O, with no time to explain why the call was made, I would be extremely reluctant to take an irrevocable action without knowing exactly why I was stopping.

Thus, when an inexperienced first officer is given the enormous authority to decide whether the captain should stop or go - because that is why the first officer calls "Stop" in the first instance - he may have no idea how his directive to the captain will finish up. There has been countless Pprune posts over the years commenting on the new generation of extremely low hour pilots being recruited directly into the second in command seat of big jets. It is not their fault that these pilots are by default second in command with precious little experience apart from a simulator. A wrong call of "Stop" at a critical point near V1 by an apprentice type rated pilot is recipe for a disaster. Far better the first officer call the problem - not the decision.

Take it or leave it.

[alf5071h]

Henry, re # 28, I agree with the need for clear and concise communication, but the object of communication in SOPs is to achieve understanding, and thence correct action; this is the aspect which I question.
Do we really understand what some procedures mean, how they should be interpreted, how executed. None of this is self evident in many of the posts above.

My question on Amber warnings was partly rhetorical. The problem as I see it is not an agreement or disagreement with the manufacturer’s advice; it is whether we understand the advice (why, when, how).
We cannot hide behind manufacturers’ recommendations or some system logic, particularly if ambiguous or not applicable to a specific situation.

The need for understanding does not ignore manufacturers’ procedures, but if not already apparent, operators must seek or add clarification. As examples:-
‘Engine Failure or Fire’ might reduce opportunity for error in identifying ‘severe damage’ vs ‘other’ damage (#31). This, together with explanatory (training) text defining an engine failure, e.g. more than 2% drop of N1 (power parameter) and associated indications on N2/EGT, could eliminate the need for interpreting or even requiring an entry for ‘sudden loss of power’. Additionally this could provide some differentiation between an engine failure and a transient engine surge when the combination of indications might not be observed, although both events could be associated with a distracting loud bang – as could a tyre burst.

IIRC the original context of unsafe or unable to fly came from the “Industry/FAA Takeoff Safety Training Aid”; this refers to decisions after V1 (paras 2.3.1.2. & 2.3.6.10.). The point apparently missed by the ‘brevity’ of the SOPs quoted in this thread and also by the manufacturers (which is surprising because they drafted the training aid).

There is similar guidance in ”Revisiting the Stop Go Decision” (Takeoff and Departure Operations), which introduces ‘doubt’ that the aircraft will fly safely when above 100kts (part III). A subsequent note states “The Captain can consider to reject a takeoff when the aircraft is above V1, only in the event that the aircraft is not able to ensure a safe flight.” Then part IV introduces ‘conditions’ and ‘indications’ of being unsafe or unable to fly, but without further definition.
Thus in both references, the reader has to establish appropriate meaning. Words are part of communication, but meaning (understanding) is often far from clear. What are ‘unambiguous indications’ that the aircraft will not fly safely?

IMHO many contributors in this thread appear to be content to quote SOP listings without further thought or qualification. If this reflects their understanding of the SOP, then with a critical event during takeoff, they might be ill-equipped to choose the correct course of action.

[Henry VIII]

alf5071h

Do we really understand what some procedures mean, how they should be interpreted, how executed.

It's a training dept. duty to teach, details and update the single items meanings, in case of doubt it's a good matter for rereshment course, sim session or direct specific question to the instructors.

[alf5071h]

Henry – “It's a training dept. duty to teach, details and update the single items meanings…”
I would agree, but taking care not to devolve personal responsibility for understanding, to someone else’s duty, e.g. are the details and updates taken from a single company reference, or is there latitude for individual instructor’s interpretation – one of many human factors problems in operations.

Nor must we forget that the decision at the end of an SOP – the judgement of risk, reasons, and ‘certainty’, remains the responsibility of the Captain. Thus it is in everyone’s interest to think through the issues well in advance of a potential RTO situation.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Centuarus has a point until everyone is on the same page I don't fell many FO's are trained well enought o handle THAT decison ---at best we'll get a nervous Nelly at worst [if folks remember an ssg]

PA

[PEI_3721]

An interesting and thoughtful view of RTOs here:- gen-10.htm

I cannot vouch for the statistics, but they are presented in a simple, meaningful format.

“… There cannot be a rigid set of rules for all occasions … ” interesting but true.

[Henry VIII]

alf5071h

it is in everyone’s interest to think through the issues well in advance of a potential RTO situation.

never writted otherwise.

“… There cannot be a rigid set of rules for all occasions … ”

very true note.