company policy during take off
 

hi,
i'd like to know what is your high speed decision policy in your airlines during take off. I mean, for what reasons are you supposed to perform a stop during take off, at what speed. On A320. On other aircrafts.
My airline request us to perform a stop after 100kts if:
i encounter a loss of power on either eng
or any fire alarm comes up
or i am sure the aircraft cannot fly

tks

Above 100Kts only for :

1. Fire warning or severe damage;
2. Sudden loss of engine thrust;
3. Malfunctions or conditions hat give unambiguous indications that the aircraft will not fly safely;
4. Any red ECAM warning;
5. Any amber ECAM caution of the ENG system or the F/CTL system.

B737 300

Reject above 80kts only for :

Any fire
Engine failure
T/off config warning
Control malfunction
Blocked runway
Predictive Windhear Alert (if fitted)

Are these recommandations sticking to Airbus or Boeing policy or typically airlines recommandations?

Manufacturer policy........

I do confirm, manufacturer policy.

Thanks for replying
and what is expected from the Pilot Non Flying when such events occur?
what does (s)he announce?

"STOP STOP"

At least that is the SOP where I am.

Only captains can perform an RTO at our outfit (in normal circumstances of course), even if the FO is performing the takeoff. Whoever notices the malfunction/condition states it and then the captain makes the decision to stop or continue.

Boeing 757.

Why on earth would he say stop stop when the decision to stop or go is the captain's alone. Surely all that is needed from the F/O is to call the nature of the perceived problem and simply tell the captain who then decides what to do about it.

Some companies allow the FO to call the stop. Mine doesn't - he calls the failure/symptom, I make the decision. For us above 80 kts, stop for:

Any fire
Engine failure
A/c unsafe/unable to fly

Personal view, if the FO is trusted to diagnose and call "Engine Failure" I think he should be able to call "STOP" which would be a whole lot quicker.

What decision is Captain's alone?
 

Presumably you do a comprehensive departure brief in which you state what you will stop for at different stages of the takeoff, as per the original question. Why then can the F/O not call "Stop" as per your briefing?

Have operators really thought through what the SOPs mean; how should procedures be interpreted and actually carried out?

Henry VIII, not aiming this at you specifically, but post #2 provides several examples, which also appear elsewhere:-
Exactly what ‘unambiguous’ malfunction or condition will enable the crew to judge that the aircraft will not fly safely – and how do you judge ‘safely’? This might appear pedantic, but if we are not able to answer these aspects before the event then many opportunities for error could occur in ‘real event’ situations.
IMHO crews will not be able to determine the aircraft’s ability to fly until rotate (after V1). Humans might perceive that a ‘bang’ is bomb-related structural damage and not an engine stall, or that vibration from a flailing tyre is aerodynamic stall. Unless we have experience these events, trained for them or thought carefully about each situation, we all remain at risk from our ideas, preconceptions, and biases.

Whilst Red level warnings are usually unambiguous (lamp and sound), conditional Amber warnings may require additional assessment – perception and comprehension. How long does this take; possibly 2-4 secs and then another 1-2 sec to react. Pilots must have initiated the first stopping actions at or before V1, not just having thought about them (CS 25.107). What speed range does 5-6 secs of acceleration time represent?
IIRC aircraft certification requires that any failure resulting in inability to fly must be warned at the red level, thus critical systems are duplicated to avoid ‘hazardous failures’. Why should any amber warnings have to be considered at high speed?

What is a ‘sudden’ loss of thrust vs a ‘less than sudden loss’? This may be playing with words, but it indicates the need to define acceptable limits. Some aircraft can tolerate a reduction of 2% N1, others perhaps more critical, cannot. Thus it is necessary to provide guidance of what an engine failure is and how it is determined – some operators require a change in two engine related parameters or specific values. Similarly what is ‘severe’ damage? Again this is a judgement call, but without guidance and forethought there are many opportunities for error during a critical stage of flight.

In an airmanship model, judgement depends on awareness and knowledge, it requires currency both in thought and action, and as a foundation, discipline, again in thought and action. There is not much time for ‘thinking’ during a take off acceleration, thus we should make every effort to ‘know before we go’, but of course not prejudging events, yet remaining ‘go’ minded.
SOPs should reflect the points above and provide guidance for crews, if they don’t then crews must identify the problems to management – management initiate procedures, but the SOPs must ‘belong’ to the crew who are accountable for the action.

As an industry we need to think at lot more about our procedures, why they are written and how they can or might be followed.

BzJJ:
Because my briefings (drill reviews) include words such as: "for any problems up to V1 you decide and (if) calling STOP have the controls...". The decision that RTO is Captain's-only game had probably been made after having considered the experience/capability/liability/authority issues. If other operators reach a different conclusion, that's fine with me however my job description prescribes otherwise.

Yours,
FD (the un-real)

above 80 kts

fire, failure, blocked runway, control jam, smoke, structural failure, severe vibration

alf5071h

Spot on to all that you said above:ok:

IMO the thought process must be thorough first at the manufacturer, second at the operator and last at the pilot. I don't mean to take anything away from sound descision making but in the heat of the stress the pilot is less able to make decisons other than by specific rote or training. I even call into question the ability to make sound decisions from simply reading what we post here on PPRune.

Thus I point first to anything the manufacturer has said as being the basis of sound decision making, and as always follow what the procedures are as written by your company in the cockpit. If you are of a mind to do your own decision making in 1-2 sec time periods in takeoff regimes then you ought to have at least vetted these with your other crew members.

It is far easier for the safety offices to correct a procedural issue then to correct an individual error in judgement.

typically there are so many reasons to perform a stop in high speed range during T/O meanwhile there are so few.
but specifically on Airbuses, what would you do if an ECAM alarm comes up, say F/CTL L SIDESTICK or ENG OIL LOW PRESS? what does your airline request you to do?

low oil press at high speed - continue!

the engine will still produce power, I think ours will last 5 mins with no oil

We brief that we would stop above 100 knots if:-

- Loss of thrust, confirmed by 2 parameters, one of which may be external.
- Master Warning
- Blocked runway
- any reason we think the aircraft won't get airborne

We would also consider it for an ATC call of STOP.

I've flown with different SOPs, some where either pilot can call STOP, some where the FO just calls the fault, but the reject decision is always the Captains. Personally I think its sensible for the FO to call STOP and state why - this gives the Captain a good early heads up. Otherwise by the time the FO has said "we've got a light, its a red one, and it looks like we have an engine failure (or whatever)....." we are gonna be 20 knots faster and that bit further down the runway!!! Whereas if the FO says "STOP, engine failure" its a pretty easy quick decision for the CPT.

At speeds close to V1 you don't have time to do a full diagnosis, which is why we just brief those 4 items - they are all easy to spot and the decision is ingrained. Things that you shouldn't stop for have the Master Warning suppressed during the take-off run at high speed anyway (ie. if something you need for stopping should break on the T/O roll) because you are far better to get airborne, reduce weight if necessary, then come back in using the full length of the runway, or divert to a longer runway if necessary, having fully briefed and got the thing as sorted as you can.

ok airbus girl but an eng oil low press is a mast warning . It can be a transmitter pb, faullty detector or a real low press. in either cases you don't have immediate loss of power...