poitiers: The Airbus design is specific compared to most aircraft in the fact that the warnings are thorougly filtered during the take-off run. Much of the typical failure asessment does not even become a part of the play because simply you only see the problems the designers intended you to see.
I've had a situation where upon setting TOGA/FLX the security door lock (electrically operated) clacked. Upon passing 1500 ft the ECAM went off with ELEC: GEN 2 FAULT which was sorted out quickly. Point is that the GEN tripped after selecting high N1 (GS=5kt) but the first realistic moment for the crew to realize was once airborne.
On 737 the company policy included naming the high speed reject causes. On 320 we brief none - a situation made possible through the design and quite not transferrable to different ops. But the answer to your question, strictly Airbus, what we are asked to do (company manuals here 100% identical with manufacurer guidliness):
ENG: LO OIL PRESS - red master warning button, red alert on ECAM and continious repetitive chime througout the TO roll, i.e. no TKOF inhibit: STOP (until V1).
F/CTL: L (R) SIDESTICK FAULT - amber master caution button, amber alert on ECAM and single chime, no TKOF inhibit: STOP (until V1).
references:
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Airbus FCTM: N.O. > Pre-start > Tkof briefing
For any failure before V1:
CAPT will call "STOP" or "GO"
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Airbus FCOM 1 Indicating/recording systems 1.31.10 p2 > Warning/caution classification
LEVEL 1 Red Warining> The configuration or failure requires immediate action:
-Aircraft in dangerous configuration, or limit flt conditions ...
-System failure altering flight safety ...
LEVEL 2 Amber Caution> The FC should be aware of the configuration or failure, but does not need to take any immediate action. However, time and situation permitting these cautions should be considered without delay to
prevent any further degradation of the system ...
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Airbus FCTM: A.O. > Ops techniques > Decision making
DECISION MAKING
A rejected take-off is a potentially hazardous manoeuvre and the time for
decision-making is limited. To minimize the risk of inappropriate decisions to
reject a take-off, many warnings and cautions are inhibited between 80 kts and
1500 ft. Therefore, any warnings received during this period must be considered
as significant.
To assist in the decision making process, the take-off is divided into low and
high speeds regimes, with 100 kts being chosen as the dividing line. The speed
of 100 kts is not critical but was chosen in order to help the Captain make the
decision and to avoid unnecessary stops from high speed:
. Below 100 kts, the Captain will seriously consider discontinuing the take-off if
any ECAM warning/caution is activated.
. Above 100 kts, and approaching V1, the Captain should be "go-minded" and
only reject the take-off in the event of a major failure, sudden loss of thrust,
any indication that the aircraft will not fly safely, or if one of the following
ECAM warning/caution occurs:
. ENG or APU FIRE
. ENG FAIL
. CONFIG
. ENG REV UNLOCK
. L+R ELEV FAULT
. SIDESTICK FAULT
If a tire fails within 20 kts of V1, unless debris from the tire has caused
noticeable engine parameter fluctuations, it is better to get airborne, reduce
the fuel load and land with a full runway length available.
The decision to reject the take-off is the responsibility of the Captain and must
be made prior to V1 speed:
. If a malfunction occurs before V1, for which the Captain does not intend to
reject the take-off, he will announce his intention by calling "GO".
. If a decision is made to reject the take-off, the Captain calls "STOP". This
call both confirms the decision to reject the take-off and also states that the
Captain now has control. It is the only time that hand-over of control is not
accompanied by the phrase "I have control".
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FCOM 3 (my OM-B the binding document)
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Yours,
FD (the un-real)