Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Joined: Jan 2015
Posts: 48
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From: Europe
You're having a giraffe ? Presumably crashed fully fuelled. Locals said they couldn't get near it for some time because of the conflagration. And the fire appears to have been hot enough to disappear any vestige of the alu/mag structure of the aircraft. What chance any plastic and resin parts in the digital recorders e.g. circuit boards and components.
More PR comfort food ?
More PR comfort food ?
And as I mentioned boxes probably are buried (that's why they are not found yet) underground. It makes additional isolation layer.
Anyway, there is nothing to worry about a prori.
Almost every serious accident is with fire and boxes are unusable very rarely.
Joined: May 2012
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From: Italy
Recovering the whole FDR/CVR is not important. What it is important is to recover the crash survivable memory units, which are on separate boxes, very resistant to shock, vibration, high temperatures (i.e. flames). They are based on solid state memory components. Even if these very sturdy units are damaged there is the option to open up the very chips and recover the silicon die that can be probed for data using special tools.
Paxing All Over The World
Joined: May 2001
Posts: 10,841
Likes: 328
From: Hertfordshire, UK.
Global News (Canada) has video showing locals walking on the site of the wreckage.
Last edited by PAXboy; 10th March 2019 at 19:39. Reason: typo
Joined: Aug 2012
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From: Northeast Area, USA
“One high-ranking Boeing official said the company had decided against disclosing more details to cockpit crews due to concerns about inundating average pilots with too much information — and significantly more technical data — than they needed or could digest.”
So they:
1) Design an aircraft that has an inherent tendency to pitch up
2) Impliment an a system to persistently add control inputs during critical phases of flight
3) Do NOT disclose system description to pilots in FCOM
How about fundamental rules:
Understanding what automation systems do.
Control the automated systems according to strong pilot skills.
* MCAS may or may not have been a contributing factor in this tragedy
So they:
1) Design an aircraft that has an inherent tendency to pitch up
2) Impliment an a system to persistently add control inputs during critical phases of flight
3) Do NOT disclose system description to pilots in FCOM
How about fundamental rules:
Understanding what automation systems do.
Control the automated systems according to strong pilot skills.
* MCAS may or may not have been a contributing factor in this tragedy
Last edited by Indelible Spirit; 10th March 2019 at 18:08.
Joined: Jan 2019
Posts: 112
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From: Up
https://globalnews.ca/news/5040395/c...s-plane-crash/
Another side to the story.
Joined: Jan 2008
Posts: 17,687
Likes: 2,030
From: Reading, UK
That has been corrected.
The last transponder data were received from position N9.027 E39.153 about 21nm east of Addis Ababa at FL086. Terrain elevation at that point is 8130 feet MSL, FL086 reported by the Mode-S Altimeter (which always measures to standard pressure 1013 QNH) corrected for QNH indicates the aircraft was flying at 9027 feet MSL at that position.
A pressure altitude of 8600' equates to approximately 9125' AMSL, so about 100' higher than the figure quoted by Avherald (they appear to have used the SL pressure lapse rate, which is greater than that at altitude).
Joined: May 2011
Posts: 40
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From: Canada
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). I wonder what the Augmentation word really refers to. Don't use software to correct design deficiencies. It is two too many for a new aircraft especially coming from this manufacturer. It might not be the case on this one but the bad wrap is already lasting too long to be put to rest. ... is monitoring closely the situation is becoming meaningless at this point.
Cheers,
Cheers,
Joined: Mar 2014
Posts: 16
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From: Trinidad And Tobago
That one fell in many many pieces,this one seems to have struck the ground like a missile in one piece at high speed,hence the substantial cratering...
Joined: Nov 2000
Posts: 630
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From: Canada
Joined: Oct 2011
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From: NV USA
Understood. Thank you.
https://globalnews.ca/news/5040395/c...s-plane-crash/
Another side to the story.
https://globalnews.ca/news/5040395/c...s-plane-crash/
Another side to the story.
Joined: Feb 2015
Posts: 18
Likes: 0
From: Hampshire
It is sad to see a pik of the CEO demonstrating to the world what you should not do on a crash site! The site is the 'property' of the investigators (and maybe police) and the last people to be meddling with the wreckage are airline management. Surely he must know that!
Joined: Apr 2004
Posts: 775
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From: near EDDF
Joined: Dec 2000
Posts: 64
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From: 30W
You have to have the ashtray on the outside of a 747 lavatory door or else you have to lock the whole lav off for the entire flight as per the MEL. Lots of dumb anomalies exist everywhere. Now MCAS is being refereed to in here as a de facto stick pusher. Spose it is. That’s not a superfluous bit of info. Colgan Buffalo? Dynamic system that could mess you up if you didn’t know about it? Now a Certain plane maker likes you to know that fire loops contain Eutectic Salt. That is not worth the brain cells necessary to learn it. I only remember it as it’s such a dumb thing to know. What, is it from Eutectia? A trim thing, I think I’d like to know about.
Joined: Sep 2012
Posts: 261
Likes: 42
From: Europe
. I feel this is not the thread for discussion or speculation about MCAS until further facts are known that might suggest it being involved. But please do not defend the design choice to use software to fix a bad design and leaving the crew flying the planes out of the loop intentionally until one falls from the sky.
Joined: Aug 2009
Aviation Qualifications: Military
Posts: 9,328
Likes: 2,175
From: Texas
There was an extended discussion on PPRuNe about what pilots need to know - as opposed to what was commonly in the conversion course content - about the MAX's flight control system after the LionAir crash in October.
Asking anyone who flies the 737 Max: What, if any, guidance and training have you received since the LionAir accident regarding the potential issues that accompany an AoA sensor failure?
Why do I ask this?
A data point from a bit further up: the captain of this flight was recently qualified in this model (November). His previous experience was in other aircraft. (perhaps previous 737 models, that info will doubtless become available in due course).
Would his conversion training have had the benefit of what came to light after the LionAir accident, or, would that training course have been before the LionAir accident?
LionAir crash was in October of last year. As I understand the info provided, this Captain's qualification on the new model was in November of last year.
The question is of particular interest if a flight control anomaly was major hole in the layered slices of swiss cheese. (Another point made earlier was "on the ground three hours, no significant write ups" which is a significantly different case than LionAir's situation).
If the key cause(s) was(were) something else, it's still of interest in terms of how training and systems operations information is disseminated.
Information like this one: the FAA emergency airworthiness notice of 7 November 2018.
Given the recency of the LionAir accident, and that the FAA issued that to all owners and operators, then I'd expect all operators to have taken an active interest in making sure their flight crews were up to speed on this feature of the Max. Under that assumption (perhaps valid, perhaps faulty) air crews would have some awareness of what to do if that same problem cropped up. It being some months since that accident, would all operators have updated their SOPs, procedures, etc, given the seriousness of this particular malfunction at low altitude?
Asking anyone who flies the 737 Max: What, if any, guidance and training have you received since the LionAir accident regarding the potential issues that accompany an AoA sensor failure?
Why do I ask this?
A data point from a bit further up: the captain of this flight was recently qualified in this model (November). His previous experience was in other aircraft. (perhaps previous 737 models, that info will doubtless become available in due course).
Would his conversion training have had the benefit of what came to light after the LionAir accident, or, would that training course have been before the LionAir accident?
LionAir crash was in October of last year. As I understand the info provided, this Captain's qualification on the new model was in November of last year.
The question is of particular interest if a flight control anomaly was major hole in the layered slices of swiss cheese. (Another point made earlier was "on the ground three hours, no significant write ups" which is a significantly different case than LionAir's situation).
If the key cause(s) was(were) something else, it's still of interest in terms of how training and systems operations information is disseminated.
Information like this one: the FAA emergency airworthiness notice of 7 November 2018.
Given the recency of the LionAir accident, and that the FAA issued that to all owners and operators, then I'd expect all operators to have taken an active interest in making sure their flight crews were up to speed on this feature of the Max. Under that assumption (perhaps valid, perhaps faulty) air crews would have some awareness of what to do if that same problem cropped up. It being some months since that accident, would all operators have updated their SOPs, procedures, etc, given the seriousness of this particular malfunction at low altitude?
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 10th March 2019 at 17:24.
Joined: Jul 2009
Posts: 133
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From: USA
How unaware people to say a CEO at the site is contaminating data instead of showing concern for passengers, employees, everybody. I see footage of the Lauda crash with Niki at the site as he had a great interest in the investigation and in fact if not for Niki the real problem may not have been uncovered as it was stated that reverser deployment in flight would not cause a crash. He forced it to the point where a test crew on a DC-8 determined a reverser deployment in flight is extremely serious and would in the case of a 767 unrecoverable. A CEO at a crash site is an important sign of a company commitment.
Joined: Oct 2007
Posts: 52
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From: New York