Pax sue Boeing in DBX crash
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My point exactly. It was slightly sarcastic. One claim has been made that Boeing were in error for not having a warning that the TOGA button did not activate. It performed as designed, but some feel that is not enough because pilot memories are fickle. (I did not know about the audio for A/T disconnect in normal circumstances, only the visual)
This thread continues to demonstrate the range human thinking (see # 57). Perhaps this reflects modern society, instant answer web search, knowledge retention not required, text a question to provoke reaction, and litter the thread with lengthy quotes like a wiki with meaningless content.
Some have suggested a like / dislike button response, but explanation would better develop understanding which is an objective of this forum.
Perhaps an APP which prevents posting without first visiting previous pages, it might provoke thought or even answer questions.
The moderators have a difficult task, but has the balance between free expression (even commercial influence) detrimentally changed the high ideals of Pprune.
Relating the above to the thread subject; why don’t the regulators intervene, identify threats and then strengthen technical and operational defences; preferably proactively, or at least in response to an accident
But there are always external influences; commerce rules the world, modification will cost someone, but without cost, financial, thinking, or action, then where will the safety improvements which the industry need come from.
What was the last major independent intervention - U.K. CAA Stick shaker? Trans Atlantic harmonisation is good, but compromise often results in the lowest acceptable level of safety.
Some views suggest that we are safe enough - low stats, others judge that with increasing traffic low stats will not be enough.
Boeing appears to follow the stats; similarly for regulators, both avoiding change based on history and certification like grandfather rights or ‘acceptable’ system weaknesses (sleepy AT Arm (777), rad alt monitor (737 AMS). This attitude overlooks the changing operational environment and decreasing training resource, and the unchanging, limited human capability, or even degraded capability due to societal effects as above.
This is not to blame manufacturers or regulators, they depend on the same human judgement which pilots are required to execute, but they might have the greater capacity for change and time to do it - it is their day job.
We must not ask pilots to do something which manufacturers or regulators are unable to do.
Society has the right to judge the line of acceptability; the court in Chicago will make a judgement, but whatever the result, will this add safety value. Out-of-court settlements might be a better commercial value than retrospectively modifying aircraft; but without change the industry will be the poorer. Safety requires an appropriate culture, will a court judgement change safety culture; one small step to improve culture or a giant leap backwards.
Wild speculation and inaccuracy in this thread will not help; we need to re-establish the valued ‘Pprune’ culture.
We should be concerned about the unhelpful range of views appearing in an aviation forum possibly influencing the unwary pilot or ‘wannabe’, and also concerned that these views might be held by the public or those selected as a jury, but that's freedom.
Some have suggested a like / dislike button response, but explanation would better develop understanding which is an objective of this forum.
Perhaps an APP which prevents posting without first visiting previous pages, it might provoke thought or even answer questions.
The moderators have a difficult task, but has the balance between free expression (even commercial influence) detrimentally changed the high ideals of Pprune.
Relating the above to the thread subject; why don’t the regulators intervene, identify threats and then strengthen technical and operational defences; preferably proactively, or at least in response to an accident
But there are always external influences; commerce rules the world, modification will cost someone, but without cost, financial, thinking, or action, then where will the safety improvements which the industry need come from.
What was the last major independent intervention - U.K. CAA Stick shaker? Trans Atlantic harmonisation is good, but compromise often results in the lowest acceptable level of safety.
Some views suggest that we are safe enough - low stats, others judge that with increasing traffic low stats will not be enough.
Boeing appears to follow the stats; similarly for regulators, both avoiding change based on history and certification like grandfather rights or ‘acceptable’ system weaknesses (sleepy AT Arm (777), rad alt monitor (737 AMS). This attitude overlooks the changing operational environment and decreasing training resource, and the unchanging, limited human capability, or even degraded capability due to societal effects as above.
This is not to blame manufacturers or regulators, they depend on the same human judgement which pilots are required to execute, but they might have the greater capacity for change and time to do it - it is their day job.
We must not ask pilots to do something which manufacturers or regulators are unable to do.
Society has the right to judge the line of acceptability; the court in Chicago will make a judgement, but whatever the result, will this add safety value. Out-of-court settlements might be a better commercial value than retrospectively modifying aircraft; but without change the industry will be the poorer. Safety requires an appropriate culture, will a court judgement change safety culture; one small step to improve culture or a giant leap backwards.
Wild speculation and inaccuracy in this thread will not help; we need to re-establish the valued ‘Pprune’ culture.
We should be concerned about the unhelpful range of views appearing in an aviation forum possibly influencing the unwary pilot or ‘wannabe’, and also concerned that these views might be held by the public or those selected as a jury, but that's freedom.
Sure, but you miss the point.
I never disputed that the crew failed, or that the overwhelming majority of crews would not fail.
Nevertheless, the crew did actually command thrust.
The aircraft did actually silently ignore that command.
Do you believe that the automatics had a better view of the suitability of the commanded thrust level than the crew did?
I think the result says no, and on this edge the automatics has a fault in it.
Perhaps this isn't the most brilliant example.
However, there is a limit to the acceptable sum total of "modes and buttons that do not work as advertised".
Even assuming this case fails, I see no harm in court cases like this playing a role in establishing where that limit lies.
I never disputed that the crew failed, or that the overwhelming majority of crews would not fail.
Nevertheless, the crew did actually command thrust.
The aircraft did actually silently ignore that command.
Do you believe that the automatics had a better view of the suitability of the commanded thrust level than the crew did?
I think the result says no, and on this edge the automatics has a fault in it.
Perhaps this isn't the most brilliant example.
However, there is a limit to the acceptable sum total of "modes and buttons that do not work as advertised".
Even assuming this case fails, I see no harm in court cases like this playing a role in establishing where that limit lies.
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I was about to ask this - as an Airbus driver it's instinctive for me to push the thrust levers forward to instigate a go-around / baulked landing.
Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?
Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?
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What is the SOP in Emirates regarding following thrust level movement on takeoff? Do they just press TOGA and hands off, or does someone follow them through to the correct setting? I've read a long way back that the SOP call for GA includes "check thrust" before raising the gear. That should be a given, command to not. However, if the SOP technique on takeoff is to follow through, then why not also on GA? Guys are talking airmanship in saying that they always do, and they believe all self respecting pilots should do so. In this day of 'SOP says and monkey does' we have to be careful in such assumptions.
The crew forgot to 'check thrust' before raising the gear, as per SOP. An error, critical. If the SOP/technique for takeoff says PF or PM follows the TL's until thrust is set, is that the same for GA's. And if not, why not. IMHO GA's should be as similar to a normal takeoff as possible to avoid the often quoted screw ups. Pilots blame lack of practice, startle factor etc. I found in some operators the difference in GA procedure to takeoff procedure did not help matters. Guys had to remember 4 differing profiles: normal takeoff, normal all engine GA, EFATO and engine out GA. Why not try and make them as similar a possible? The same with an RTO. It can be very similar to a normal landing if you so design it. That way the startle factor will less likely cause a screw up.
Will an Emirates pilot comment of the takeoff & GA TL techniques please.
The crew forgot to 'check thrust' before raising the gear, as per SOP. An error, critical. If the SOP/technique for takeoff says PF or PM follows the TL's until thrust is set, is that the same for GA's. And if not, why not. IMHO GA's should be as similar to a normal takeoff as possible to avoid the often quoted screw ups. Pilots blame lack of practice, startle factor etc. I found in some operators the difference in GA procedure to takeoff procedure did not help matters. Guys had to remember 4 differing profiles: normal takeoff, normal all engine GA, EFATO and engine out GA. Why not try and make them as similar a possible? The same with an RTO. It can be very similar to a normal landing if you so design it. That way the startle factor will less likely cause a screw up.
Will an Emirates pilot comment of the takeoff & GA TL techniques please.
I was about to ask this - as an Airbus driver it's instinctive for me to push the thrust levers forward to instigate a go-around / baulked landing.
Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?
Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?
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Zlin, If you are manually pushing the thrust levers to the stops you are overriding the automatic function that provides you with a 2000 fpm rate of climb. There is a reason for that function, full power can lead to other problems especially with a low level off altitude.
I find in the 777 sim when it comes to a goaround the majority of pilots push a TOGA switch and then immediately transfer the thrust lever hand to do a two handed rotation because on takeoff they are used to rotating with two hands. When I do a goaround having pressed TOGA I keep my hand on the thrust levers for that little bit longer to ensure they have moved forwards significantly before transferring it to to the control column.
Controversial, moi?
Maybe I'm a little odd, but whenever I select TOGA in a 777 I always manually push the thrust levers to the stops.....what do other 777 pilots do?
If you want more power pushing the TOGA buttons twice gives you full GA thrust.
Out of curiosity, will the autothrust on a 777 retard the thrust levers again if you don't prod one of the silly go-around buttons?
As M Mouse notes, pushing to the firewall for a GA on Boeing may not be a good idea - for aircraft handling reasons GA thrust is often less than full takeoff thrust. It's normally not a big deal, but there are cases (such as doing a GA with an engine inop) when it may cause problems.
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For a 'bolter' GA on the runway, we teach and practice the following procedure (assuming THR REV has not been selected - if it has, a full stop MUST be achieved. We also calculate the 'last touchdown' point prior to TOD):
- PF selects TOGA and applies THR to the 'straight arm' level. PM follows the selection through to ensure ~ GA THR has been achieved
- WITH the engines spooled up (!) PM calls ROTATE at >Vref
- PF selects ~ 12°PA and when airborne, With TOGA armed once more, presses TOGA once to give a commanded 2000fpm and calls 'GA FLAP20' to signal a 'normal' GA package is now required
So, muscle memory is invoked by pressing TOGA on the runway; however, our pilots know that they HAVE to select GA THR manually. (It has surprised me how many B777 operators I have spoken to (mainly residding in the desert) are not aware of or have practiced this scenario! I know which airlines will NOT be getting my holiday $s!). No reference is made to the automatics, at all, until the aircraft is flying, at the correct attitude, speed and THR setting. Once all this is achieved, the automatics are reinstated. We have a company rule that prohibits, for sound reasons, turns below 400ft AAL; so the vertical portion of a MAP is achieved and the lateral portion will be, post 400' and TOGA selection. In fact, most of our pilots wait for 400' AAL to be passed before selecting TOGA to avoid rushing and subsequent pigs!
- PF selects TOGA and applies THR to the 'straight arm' level. PM follows the selection through to ensure ~ GA THR has been achieved
- WITH the engines spooled up (!) PM calls ROTATE at >Vref
- PF selects ~ 12°PA and when airborne, With TOGA armed once more, presses TOGA once to give a commanded 2000fpm and calls 'GA FLAP20' to signal a 'normal' GA package is now required
So, muscle memory is invoked by pressing TOGA on the runway; however, our pilots know that they HAVE to select GA THR manually. (It has surprised me how many B777 operators I have spoken to (mainly residding in the desert) are not aware of or have practiced this scenario! I know which airlines will NOT be getting my holiday $s!). No reference is made to the automatics, at all, until the aircraft is flying, at the correct attitude, speed and THR setting. Once all this is achieved, the automatics are reinstated. We have a company rule that prohibits, for sound reasons, turns below 400ft AAL; so the vertical portion of a MAP is achieved and the lateral portion will be, post 400' and TOGA selection. In fact, most of our pilots wait for 400' AAL to be passed before selecting TOGA to avoid rushing and subsequent pigs!
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Not sure what the two-handed technique achieves.
I see so many 'new' pilots who require two hands to land after reducing to idle. Majorly flawed method and an indicator of poor coordination. Arm rest down, the outboard appendage should be able to smoothly fly in most any regime.
I see so many 'new' pilots who require two hands to land after reducing to idle. Majorly flawed method and an indicator of poor coordination. Arm rest down, the outboard appendage should be able to smoothly fly in most any regime.
Good airmanship dictates the PF always should have one hand on the thrust levers and the other on the control wheel on final approach, flare and after touch down. The control forces at the flare are not that heavy that you need two hands in a modern jet transport.
Or you're already doing something stupid 
Boeing FBW provides tactile feedback through the control wheel forces to simulate what the pilot would experience in a non-FBW aircraft. During the Asiana SFO investigation, Boeing stated that the control wheel feedback would have been ~80 lbs., which somehow failed to alert the PF that something wasn't right...
Boeing FBW provides tactile feedback through the control wheel forces to simulate what the pilot would experience in a non-FBW aircraft. During the Asiana SFO investigation, Boeing stated that the control wheel feedback would have been ~80 lbs., which somehow failed to alert the PF that something wasn't right...
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The system that advised a Go-around in DXB in error that not enough runway was available when it obviously was.... I feel is possibly where the main systems error lies...and where the lawyers should also attack Boeing and Emirates.
I also question the rostering wisdom of crewing an Arab National personality with an Australian personality...a fear of loss of face combined with a lightning quick actioning Aussie is basicly poor rostering of two crew members profiles...could anyone seriously expect these diverse personalities, nationalities,and religions to actually work well as a flight team?
GF 072 cockpit was legally stuffed with basicly incorrect rostering profilesc....in these two cases lessons need to learned regarding rostering poor cross cockpit profiles...there is no flight engineer these days to keep these rostering personalities defects under control.
I also question the rostering wisdom of crewing an Arab National personality with an Australian personality...a fear of loss of face combined with a lightning quick actioning Aussie is basicly poor rostering of two crew members profiles...could anyone seriously expect these diverse personalities, nationalities,and religions to actually work well as a flight team?
GF 072 cockpit was legally stuffed with basicly incorrect rostering profilesc....in these two cases lessons need to learned regarding rostering poor cross cockpit profiles...there is no flight engineer these days to keep these rostering personalities defects under control.
Last edited by Flight leveler; 28th Aug 2017 at 13:53.
Except that RAAS is basically an aftermarket system that was not part of the Boeing type cert. It's part of an "STC" (Supplemental Type Cert) that would normally be done without Boeing input (disclaimer - I'm not familiar with RAAS so I don't have any way of knowing if there was any Boeing input into the RAAS certification - I just know that STCs don't normally include airframer inputs).
Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) is a standard part of Honeywell's EGPWS, as such, probably on all EGPWS-equipped planes. Activation, modes used and alerts are up to the operator. It's all dependent on the "strapping". But, with lots of time using it and demo'ing it; it can be useful. BUT it is advisory, it doesn't replace pilot judgement which in the EK SOP, it does. The combination of SOP and FOQA as discipline is to blame.