Pax sue Boeing in DBX crash

[Piltdown Man]

I don't disagree with you safetypee but although it's implied I'm not criticising the crew. They were just unfortunate to be at the the sharp end when things went wrong that day. They were let down by the system that placed them there and 'unexpected' modes designed into the aircraft. So questions have to be asked as to why this crew first found themselves into a position that required a late go around and then why the manoeuvre was executed in the way it was. So the only solution to incidents like this is a proper investigation into the human factors, training and culture behind this incident - as ever. And then maybe, just maybe, the investigators will consider the questions surrounding rigid SOPs and manual flying.

[akindofmagic]

Now that's refreshing to hear that a company can encourage/discourage rather than simply mandate 'you are to' or ban 'you are not too'.

Explicitly encouraged at my outfit, in the OM-A, and in practice on the line. I try to impress upon the FOs I fly with the importance of being absolutely comfortable with the aeroplane regardless of the level of automation used.

My personal preference, heretical as it is on the Airbus, is to use manual thrust whenever I fly manually.

[RAT 5]

They were just unfortunate to be at the the sharp end when things went wrong that day. They were let down by the system that placed them there and 'unexpected' modes designed into the aircraft. So questions have to be asked as to why this crew first found themselves into a position that required a late go around and then why the manoeuvre was executed in the way it was.

You're asking questions about root cause. Good idea. The GA, we are told, was called by RAAS (I think) Is the SOP a mandatory GA? What I am asking is, if the captain, who is good visual at a familiar runway, could treat the auto-call of long landing as advisory, would there have been a GA at all? Or rather a successful landing with no worries. i.e. is the root cause an SOP that is stubborn adherence to a computer call?
(I apologise if I'm in error with some technical jargon)

[M.Mouse]

A 'Long Landing' automated callout is a compulsory GA in Emirates. The airline is very strict on adherence to SOPs.

[Hibernia]

Alas poor Boeing.

Good grief! If you want to mitigate against the 'creativity' of the dumbest pilot in the room, buy Airbus and keep your fingers crossed nothing goes badly wrong. If you actually believe in the superiority of a properly trained crew and experience based airmanship, buy Boeing and get your ass behind evidence based training.

This crash was caused by fear of going off the reservation with Emirates famous balls-in-a-vice SOP regime. Let's just pause a moment. This aircraft would have landed long, but safely. Poor old Pavlov's dog. Screwed up approach for sure. Earlier go around a better idea for sure. Same as Ryanair and a growing number of others. "We legislate for every contingency." Follow the SOP with a truly missionary zeal and nothing can ever go wrong. Right? Do you own thing, demonstrate independent thought, judgement or, heaven forfend, airmanship (draw breath sharply) and several hurdles will appear in your immediate future.

Consider the provinence of nascent commanders these days. Straight into an FAR25 jet as first officer fresh from flight school with maybe 200 hours. Left hand seat three years later and all you've ever known is rigid SOP and a carefully constructed climate of fear if you dare to deviate. Bored with that after 1000 hours in "command" and off to bigger metal we go. Hooray! Then training department, for the fundamentalists, and even management for those truly devoted to doctrine.

Evolved SOP, CRM, lower authority gradients and all that good stuff still brings us to this point, time and time again. It ain't the manufacturers that have screwed the (Pavlovian) pooch on this one folks. Chicago lawyers take note.

"For though the world has stood up and stopped the bastard, the bitch that bore him is in heat again."
Bertolt Brecht.

[RAT 5]

It can be sometimes confusing and disturbing that commanders are chosen, selected and trained because they have demonstrated that characteristic of being able to make competent decisions under different levels of stress: plus of course being cognisant with SOP's and one would hope standard handling capabilities.
Then, the desk jockeys make SOP's that, at real time, do not seem to be the best choice to handle the situation. However, the commander's decision making discretion is confined to the trash. Bring on the single pilot and dog. Why have a commander and then handcuff them?
Oh, and then when the poo hits the air-conditioning in a non SOP environment, the commander is expected to magic-up a solution.

"We legislate for every contingency." Follow the SOP with a truly missionary zeal and nothing can ever go wrong."

There are those who do just that, except it's impossible. The real world does not operate to the plans & whims of the SOP department. It is trying to find loopholes and cracks in your operation all the time. The SOP guru & trained monkey philosophy can succeed on an ideal day; but how many of those are there? That method of operating tends to be reactive, not proactive. One of the prime characteristics of good crews was to be proactive to prevent the problem occurring. That requires not only monitoring of trends drifting from the norm, but being well ahead of the a/c and even preventing the trend starting. It's called being 'on top of things with an eye on the ball'. That type of pilot is in decline because they believe the SOP's will provide a protective bubble, and the a/c has so many automatic warnings & back up systems that human monitoring is not required.

This long landing warning being a mandatory SOP was also highlighted at MAN and caused, what some believe, to be an unnecessary diversion to LHR. Should it be an advisory? Was it designed to be an advisory? There have been comments that modern electronics and systems were designed as an aid & tool, not to be in command. Some SOP's have not followed that format. We all know computers can hiccup. What we need are pilots who do not.

[M.Mouse]

In an earlier post I posted a graph of accident statistics over the past 40 years. For some reason it disappeared.

The statistics are easy to find with a simple search but my point earlier had been that despite all the huffing and puffing contrary to the impression that lack of manual handling skills and rigid adherence to SOPs is making things more dangerous the statistics would indicate otherwise.

I do not have the answers but in my view the accident in Dubai was caused by a poorly flown approach leading to a deep landing followed by a mandatory GA due to the 'Long Landing' warning. The PF clearly did not fully understand the TOGA system nor did he follow through on the thrust levers which, again in my opinion, is basic airmanship.

The PM did not follow SOPs by NOT ensuring thrust had been applied which was compounded by calling a positive climb due to the inertia of the aircraft giving just that, albeit very temporary.

So if PF had understood the system and PM monitored the application of power by following the SOP then the accident would not have happened.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Mouse

the impression that lack of manual handling skills and rigid adherence to SOPs is making things more dangerous the statistics would indicate otherwise.

While automation (and in particular GPWS) has improved safety, lack of manual handling skills and rigid adherence to SOPs are causing the few accidents we are still having.

Originally Posted by Mouse

So if PF had understood the system and PM monitored the application of power by following the SOP then the accident would not have happened.

You can only "memorise" so much out of a book. Had that crew regularly practised bounced landings/touch and goes (the most dangerous thing we do), this would never have happened. It's called muscle memory, and it is why the old-timers still fly the pants off the magenta kids. They did it (or similar) all the time; it was "SOP" to always push up the throttles or look at the N1s to make sure Capt Joe Bloggs did actually push the throttles up.

When did that crew last practice a "startle" touch and go? We do it, canned, in the sim; the last thing you do is pull the nose up immediately. The fact that the Captain did just that indicates to me he was either startled badly or hadn't had much practice at touch and goes. Given that a probable time to get that "Long Landing" is just before or after touchdown, it is incumbent on the operator to make sure that it's pilots could cope with/be good at it. Did it?

[HPSOV L]

Was the approach poorly flown?
By my calculation the density altitude was about 4500'.
IAS across the threshold was within stabilisation criteria at target plus 7 giving about 171 TAS. The temperature was 48 C so ISA plus 33. An RNAV approach was flown and I figure the temperature error would result in a 3.4 degree approach angle. Given the turbulent conditions and tailwind changing to headwind, hot runway and visibilty only the length of the runway, I'd say landing longer than 3000' was almost a probability for the average pilot.

[cessnapete]

So why go around with 9000ft plus remaining??

[Herod]

Because it was mandatory, iaw SOP. The first hole in the cheese.

[The Fat Controller]

I had a conversation with an Emirates 777 crew before they flew me home from Dubai, my understanding from our chat was that the "long landing" warning meant a go-around before touchdown but was only an advisory once you were on the runway.

[Ian W]

So the RAAS warning comes at 30ft in the flair and by the time pilot has reacted the aircraft has all main wheels firmly on the runway - what does the SOP say about that? If you are going to insist on SOPs being followed as rigidly as if they were a computer program then you have to treat them like programming and consider every potential case. The pretense that SOPs improve safety was shown up in this case. All SOPs do is reduce training expenditure as you teach your crews to fly by SOP numbers.

[The Fat Controller]

@Ian W, so what if it is in the flare, the aircraft has NOT landed so the go-around should commence even if the wheels subsequently touch the runway and as far as I can see, TOGA mode would have still been available in that position.

[PEI_3721]

Recent post are grasping for straws:-
How does the Smart Landing feature work, features, function, input, output. When will it warn, what optional settings and calls has the operator chosen.
How does the TOGA switching work 30 ft ok, < 5 ft +2 sec inhibited.
Does the aircraft have a rad alt call at 5 ft, or is it pilot judgement - measured wheel height vs view from the flight deck.
Do Smart Landing alerts override a rad alt call; what's the priority for a rare advisory alert function vs rad alt callout used every day.
A new SOP for all of the IF - THEN situations, but be very, very clear about the EXCEPT, because they are the gotchas.
Quiz in 5 mins time, or later during a slightly extended flare on a very long runway.
Fix the system (technical and organisational), not the pilot.

[Vessbot]

Originally Posted by PEI_3721

Fix the system (technical and organisational), not the pilot.

Why not both?

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by The Fat Controller

@Ian W, so what if it is in the flare, the aircraft has NOT landed so the go-around should commence even if the wheels subsequently touch the runway and as far as I can see, TOGA mode would have still been available in that position.

Read the conditions I start from again:

So the RAAS warning comes at 30ft in the flair and by the time pilot has reacted the aircraft has all main wheels firmly on the runway

So although the aircraft was airborne it touches down before the PF selects TOGA - and therefore TOGA will be inhibited.

Just identifying a case where the simplistic SOPs would not be applicable but are mandated.

[galaxy flyer]

Had that crew regularly practised bounced landings/touch and goes (the most dangerous thing we do), this would never have happened. It's called muscle memory, and it is why the old-timers still fly the pants off the magenta kids.

I did 63 touch and goes and 3 full stop landing, in the plane (C-5), in one week. Some of them tactical arrivals from 10,000 at night to a runway lacking any visual glide path guidance and 7,000' long. Never thought it dangerous even once.

GF

[GICASI2]

Originally Posted by Ian W

Read the conditions I start from again:



So although the aircraft was airborne it touches down before the PF selects TOGA - and therefore TOGA will be inhibited.

Just identifying a case where the simplistic SOPs would not be applicable but are mandated.

TOGA is a tool to give VERT and LAT guidance AND indicate the GA THR limit. That is it: a TOOL. We pilots must fly the aircraft first - POWER, (when the thrust is established) ATTITUDE and then trim. Even the C150 kids can do that! After we have done the pilot's stuff, then we can do some (video game) FD following. There is NO excuse for the actions (or lack thereof) of the EK crew. How many more muppets are out there, taking money under false pretences? There are only 3 critical phases in a commercial pilot's life: takeoff, landing and go around, the rest is mundane. If you cannot accomplish these 3 tasks in an exemplary fashion, 100% of the time, look for another career.

The post from our US MIL C5 colleague above says it all!

[RAT 5]

Tools, and their evolution in our modern world e.g. FBW. There have been any wonderful improvements made via technical advances. I wonder if there are some that have, subtly, been less perfect.

In underslung engined basic control a/c you increase umph and the nose rises. You feel this in your backside as well as see it outside or on the PFD. Your stretch your arm and your body gives some feedback that thrust has been applied. This happens without having to apply back elevator. That is done to expedite the change in V/S from -ve to +ve.
There is also the large trim change, usually from nose up on approach to having to take some off during the rotation to GA attitude. This elevator force, plus your backside, inform your senses that thrust has increased. If I understand correctly FBW removes this trim change. Thus, for us older pilots, a physical sensation, and tactile action, of GA has been removed. I appreciate that pilots who've flown only FBW will not miss anything, but I wonder if removing all these various sensations is in fact an improvement. The debate about non-moving thrust levers on AB has been beaten to death with no firm conclusion. Those against that philosophy thought that allowing thrust to change with out any tactile indication, or trim change on the elevator, isolated PF a little from what was going on.
I've never flown FBW or manual approaches with A/T. It disturbed me, and caused a comment, when I watched F/O's as PF on autolands, not follow through on the controls all the way down. On choppy days it was reassuring to feel the control column and A/T doing their thing, and then feel the nose up trim come in <500'. It connected you to the machine. Even more important if it was only a CAT 1 ILS to man land. You were more in tune with the machine and the elements. I wonder if FBW, where it seems you just point the a/c where you want it to go and auto-trim & auto-throttle take care of everything else, is the B's & E's it's all cracked up to be?
Those who've made the transition will have helpful educational comments, I'm sure.