Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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Good post Harry. Much to agree with.
Except:
You only get the config warning whilst on the ground. Once you're airborne, you are no longer 'taking off', and hence don't get the take off config warning.
As a point of interest, because you generally don't have much accelerating to do before reaching the bug and rotating, config warning only occurs for a very few seconds.
Except:
You only get the config warning whilst on the ground. Once you're airborne, you are no longer 'taking off', and hence don't get the take off config warning.
As a point of interest, because you generally don't have much accelerating to do before reaching the bug and rotating, config warning only occurs for a very few seconds.
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Exactly. It is not mandatory to go around - merely an alert. To continue with landing or go-around is a judgement call. Although not ideal, one can land 4000' down a long runway and be perfectly safe.
Although not ideal, one can land 4000' down a long runway and be perfectly safe.
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Although not ideal, one can land 4000' down a long runway and be perfectly safe.
- Safe from what? What does your Go Around requirements state in your ops manual? Continue a landing after touching down at 4000ft in my outfit and very pointed questions will be asked!
- Safe from what? What does your Go Around requirements state in your ops manual? Continue a landing after touching down at 4000ft in my outfit and very pointed questions will be asked!
Our Ops manual has this:
The Commander...................shall, in an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action, take any action he considers necessary under the circumstances. In such cases he may deviate from rules, operational procedures and methods in the interest of safety
The Commander...................shall, in an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action, take any action he considers necessary under the circumstances. In such cases he may deviate from rules, operational procedures and methods in the interest of safety
Originally Posted by 4468
efatnas
You clearly don't spend enough time (correctly) briefing, or practicing this manouvre.
You clearly don't spend enough time (correctly) briefing, or practicing this manouvre.
Less verbal diarrhoea and more sim training/practice, and more basic IF so when things go crazy, the basics kick in: power + attitude.
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Less verbal diarrhoea and more sim training/practice, and more basic IF so when things go crazy, the basics kick in: power + attitude.
I also explained, at the top of this page, why simple "power + attitude" can on occasion be a pretty stupid (because it's less safe!) way of operating a modern jet!
It's familiarity with this particular manouvre that would have allowed him to preserve life. Nothing else.
That means a training program from the operator that is fit for purpose, and regularly refreshing the neural pathways whilst on the line.
As for "verbal diahorrea", perhaps you don't brief anything at all? (Some captains are like that!) I personally have always briefed go-around after landing actions moderately frequently. For 3 reasons:
A) Because I operate to fairly short runways from time to time, so on those occasions it's a favourite briefing point of mine.
B) Because it's a very easy manouvre to get wrong.
C) Because in my advancing years, I am no longer that sharp, and I need all the prior preparation I can get!
Of course, briefing it when it's appropriate does mean that it probably won't have been too long since I briefed it last. So if I get it totally by surprise, I just might stand a chance of getting it right!
Does that help?
Last edited by 4468; 20th Sep 2016 at 12:53.
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Exactly. It is not mandatory to go around - merely an alert. To continue with landing or go-around is a judgement call. Although not ideal, one can land 4000' down a long runway and be perfectly safe.
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In my view, that is nonsense
Coincidentally, since this FBW a/c is flown with a/t in for manual flight, he selected exactly the same procedure as he would have used during any manual go around!!!
It was the wrong procedure!!
As you say, it's your view that flying more approaches would have prevented him selecting the wrong technique.
It's not my view.
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4468
Most of what you've said is nonsense. Thrust and attitude even when the A/THR is in IDLE mode will get you out of trouble. Any manual input on the A/THR when they are in IDLE Will DISCONNECT them Genius. But keep going round and round with your Automation BS.
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I'm afraid we will have to disagree.
On a Boeing, simply pushing the thrust levers forward is absolutely NOT always correct, or advisable! (Though it is on an Airbus, that so many seem to decry!)
Try doing that on a coupled approach, with a decision height below 50R and see what happens.
On a Boeing, simply pushing the thrust levers forward is absolutely NOT always correct, or advisable! (Though it is on an Airbus, that so many seem to decry!)
Try doing that on a coupled approach, with a decision height below 50R and see what happens.
I believe pilots should be trained to always manually establish the climb by pulling on the yoke and pushing on the thrust levers while pressing the TOGA switch when doing Go Arounds/Rejected Landings in Boeing products. It does not matter what the autopilot and/or autothrottle mode is, what the protection modes is, what functions are inhibited, or anything else; the result is the same: you go up, away from the ground, and you accelerate. Once it is established the aircraft is climbing and accelerating the pilot can clean up the configuration (raise flaps/gear). Only at that point should he allow the automatics to take over to finesse the climb. Again, this is for Boeing products only. This will not work for Airbus products. (And again, this is not necessarily "bad" and I am not "decrying" anything. This is "different". I'm old school and personally like that Boeing difference because it meshes with my military training. Others may prefer the Airbus difference.) So my point is that if your operation is using Boeing products, I believe you should train your pilots to be old school and fly the airplane like a pilot, and not like a system operator keeping track of modes and inhibition logic for every possible combination of events and scenarios.)
KenV, "... cannot conceive of a pilot doing a take off on autothrust .... or go-around ... etc" (#1671)
Disagreements, opinions are influenced by differing abilities to imagine* situations and understand that some 'unimaginable' ones, against all our beliefs and experiences will be encountered. This is a common problem in safety thinking which is influenced by hindsight, outcome bias, or misconceptions about error.
Humans are fallible, we will suffer error, but if we cannot imagine this - that we won't make mistake, whatever the training - then inappropriate conclusions can focus on solutions involving even more knowledge and training - blame.
It is a misguided belief that we can prevent all accidents or that we can foresee every eventuality, however improbable.
In a highly reliable, safe industry, the ability to increase knowledge, ensuring appropriate situational recall, and training, is approaching a limit of effectiveness. This is not to say that we should not continue to teach and train, but that alternative approaches to help human reliability are required.
"Even the best pilots can make the worst mistake," J. Reason.
"It's difficult to change the human condition, but you can change the situation in which s/he works." J. Reason.
* Requisite imagination : the fine art of anticipating what might go wrong.
Disagreements, opinions are influenced by differing abilities to imagine* situations and understand that some 'unimaginable' ones, against all our beliefs and experiences will be encountered. This is a common problem in safety thinking which is influenced by hindsight, outcome bias, or misconceptions about error.
Humans are fallible, we will suffer error, but if we cannot imagine this - that we won't make mistake, whatever the training - then inappropriate conclusions can focus on solutions involving even more knowledge and training - blame.
It is a misguided belief that we can prevent all accidents or that we can foresee every eventuality, however improbable.
In a highly reliable, safe industry, the ability to increase knowledge, ensuring appropriate situational recall, and training, is approaching a limit of effectiveness. This is not to say that we should not continue to teach and train, but that alternative approaches to help human reliability are required.
"Even the best pilots can make the worst mistake," J. Reason.
"It's difficult to change the human condition, but you can change the situation in which s/he works." J. Reason.
* Requisite imagination : the fine art of anticipating what might go wrong.
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Apparently company SOP was that the pilots abort/reject the landing when getting a RAAS alert. No option.
If that is indeed the case, AND they had not been trained and had recurrency on this, then that is a contributory factor here. It is one thing to write an SOP for an unexpected manoeuvre, but it is incumbent on the training dept to train that SOP, just because it is different to the normal GA.
I believe pilots should be trained to always manually establish the climb by pulling on the yoke and pushing on the thrust levers while pressing the TOGA switch when doing Go Arounds/Rejected Landings in Boeing products.
I would add takeoffs as well, and add thrust a split second before pulling.
It had been said many posts ago that hands on TL's during large thrust changes, and on approach, and a follow through after TOGA is pressed AT ANY TIME, the PF will realise PDQ if the TL's do not give advanced thrust. Select the auto-system but use tactile & visual senses to confirm it is doing what you want it to do.
It seems we have arrived back where we were.
If that is indeed the case, AND they had not been trained and had recurrency on this, then that is a contributory factor here. It is one thing to write an SOP for an unexpected manoeuvre, but it is incumbent on the training dept to train that SOP, just because it is different to the normal GA.
I believe pilots should be trained to always manually establish the climb by pulling on the yoke and pushing on the thrust levers while pressing the TOGA switch when doing Go Arounds/Rejected Landings in Boeing products.
I would add takeoffs as well, and add thrust a split second before pulling.
It had been said many posts ago that hands on TL's during large thrust changes, and on approach, and a follow through after TOGA is pressed AT ANY TIME, the PF will realise PDQ if the TL's do not give advanced thrust. Select the auto-system but use tactile & visual senses to confirm it is doing what you want it to do.
It seems we have arrived back where we were.