Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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Thx now I get it. So he touches down at 130 and lifts of a few seconds after that never gets to 400 ft.... I'm not that deep into engineering, but why would we talk about TO warnings? Oh wait, maybe he got one after the gear was out of the downlock with the thrust idle below 800 ft; have to try that out next time in the sim. He confused the poor airplane pretty good I think.....
Last edited by efatnas; 21st Sep 2016 at 18:53.
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Not withstanding some 'unusual' comments from '4468' your statements also give me pause KenV
Not sure what type you are flying but on a reasonably modern Boeing (757 and later)
while executing a coupled approach in low viz using a DH and not being able to see the runway at minimums I would most certainly fly the missed approach using the autopilot
one press of the TOGA switch will have the aircraft start climbing at 2000fpm and fly the entire MAP including entering the hold in LNAV in a very smooth, controlled maneuver.
That is the procedure at my Airline, why would you want to do this manually ? are you perhaps talking about a considerably older type ?
Of course if the automatics are not working correctly you disengage and fly manually,
as the EK crew should have done although the automatic functions appear to have been working as advertised in this case.
Not sure what type you are flying but on a reasonably modern Boeing (757 and later)
while executing a coupled approach in low viz using a DH and not being able to see the runway at minimums I would most certainly fly the missed approach using the autopilot
one press of the TOGA switch will have the aircraft start climbing at 2000fpm and fly the entire MAP including entering the hold in LNAV in a very smooth, controlled maneuver.
That is the procedure at my Airline, why would you want to do this manually ? are you perhaps talking about a considerably older type ?
Of course if the automatics are not working correctly you disengage and fly manually,
as the EK crew should have done although the automatic functions appear to have been working as advertised in this case.
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stilton
Exactly! That's what I meant by throwing the baby with bath water. It is not too much to expect a professional pilot to know how to take off, do an approach and land or go round.
That is the procedure at my Airline, why would you want to do this manually ?
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Stilton. Precisely!
As for:
Of course they already were flying 'manually'! (albeit they were already on the ground!) The autopilot had been taken out in preparation for landing, and auto thrust was deactivated.
All that was asked of them was to fly a take-off. It's a knowledge issue more than a skill issue.
As for:
Of course if the automatics are not working correctly you disengage and fly manually,
as the EK crew should have done although the automatic functions appear to have been working as advertised in this case.
as the EK crew should have done although the automatic functions appear to have been working as advertised in this case.
All that was asked of them was to fly a take-off. It's a knowledge issue more than a skill issue.
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http://www.beca.be/magazines/aero/Bo...RO-2014-Q3.pdf
Although little off topic, A good article by Boeing about GA intricacies clear indications of flydubai type of accident.
Although little off topic, A good article by Boeing about GA intricacies clear indications of flydubai type of accident.
Originally Posted by 4468
All that was asked of them was to fly a take-off. It's a knowledge issue more than a skill issue.
I recall a paper on skills retention (desperately attempting to locate it), which considerd the learning process.
Initial training develops the basic skills up to a 'novice' standard; the student is safe but requires more time to link the basic skills together for a situation. Knowing what to do, but not initially knowing when - situation assessment.
With continuing practice, expert behaviour emerges which links the skills together; the skill of choosing a skill set for a given situation. Know when; skills of situation assessment and skill selection. Experts require less deliberation and are able to quickly match skills to situations. Knowing both what to do and when to do.
Discussion re extensive automation use, reversed the learning process. Without manual flight practice pilots were still able able to maintain the basic flying skills (how to) but the 'when to skills', matching skill sets to scenarios degraded. The expert skills were lost first, lack of anticipation, longer to understand situations, and the ability to link basic skills with situations; but they could still 'fly' the aircraft.
The following is related:-
"Hand-eye skills (instrument scanning and manual control), if initially well learned, are reasonably well retained after prolonged use of automation.
Cognitive skills, such as navigation and failure recognition and diagnosis, are prone to forgetting and may depend on the extent to which pilots follow along when automation is used to fly the aircraft.". Sign In
Thus for a 'go-around on the ground' vs 'takeoff', the required behaviour might be obvious to an 'expert' pilot, but with degrading skills, it would be more difficult to relate the basic skills to the situation; even more so if the situation is surprising.
i.e. 'Automatic dependent' pilots may have difficulty in assessing the 'on ground go-around' situation as similar to a 'take off' situation, even though they have the basic skills for both.
Initial training develops the basic skills up to a 'novice' standard; the student is safe but requires more time to link the basic skills together for a situation. Knowing what to do, but not initially knowing when - situation assessment.
With continuing practice, expert behaviour emerges which links the skills together; the skill of choosing a skill set for a given situation. Know when; skills of situation assessment and skill selection. Experts require less deliberation and are able to quickly match skills to situations. Knowing both what to do and when to do.
Discussion re extensive automation use, reversed the learning process. Without manual flight practice pilots were still able able to maintain the basic flying skills (how to) but the 'when to skills', matching skill sets to scenarios degraded. The expert skills were lost first, lack of anticipation, longer to understand situations, and the ability to link basic skills with situations; but they could still 'fly' the aircraft.
The following is related:-
"Hand-eye skills (instrument scanning and manual control), if initially well learned, are reasonably well retained after prolonged use of automation.
Cognitive skills, such as navigation and failure recognition and diagnosis, are prone to forgetting and may depend on the extent to which pilots follow along when automation is used to fly the aircraft.". Sign In
Thus for a 'go-around on the ground' vs 'takeoff', the required behaviour might be obvious to an 'expert' pilot, but with degrading skills, it would be more difficult to relate the basic skills to the situation; even more so if the situation is surprising.
i.e. 'Automatic dependent' pilots may have difficulty in assessing the 'on ground go-around' situation as similar to a 'take off' situation, even though they have the basic skills for both.
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i.e. 'Automatic dependent' pilots may have difficulty in assessing the 'on ground go-around' situation as similar to a 'take off' situation, even though they have the basic skills for both.
Without manual flight practice pilots were still able able to maintain the basic flying skills (how to) but the 'when to skills', matching skill sets to scenarios degraded.
"Even on the ground, we can still go-around any time before we select reverse. To do that, the first thing we will do is firewall the thrust levers. After that, barring the valid t/o config warning, it's not going to be terribly different to a take off? A couple of seconds after airborne, we'll just run the usual go-around procedure. Questions?"
TICK!
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Originally Posted by Harry
As for all this nonsense about flying a Cessna around, give me a break. Perhaps the Captain of the QM2 should take his sail boat out on a Sunday afternoon jolly around the lake?
Highly recommended to rent a Cessna time to time. So nice to forget about strict SOP for the simple pleasure of flying.
At least, proceeding for a couple touch and go exercises leave no doubt in my mind how you need to get power first before you can even think about rotating ...
This discussion remonds me of something Captain Sullenberger said about the way he flies.
At any given point in a flight, he prepares a mental list of his options, should an emergency situation develop. I would imagine that said list expands with altitude; would this sort of approach have helped the crew of EK521?
At any given point in a flight, he prepares a mental list of his options, should an emergency situation develop. I would imagine that said list expands with altitude; would this sort of approach have helped the crew of EK521?
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At any given point in a flight, he prepares a mental list of his options, should an emergency situation develop.
Digressing from the topic, but you threw it out there:
I used to drop that in the lap of a 3000hr SFO soon to start the command upgrade process in todays fats track LoCo's during a TFS out over the sea with nothing to see but sea. The scenario was not necessarily an emergency, usually more subtle (as DXB was). Silence and somewhat surprise at the question. I encouraged some thinking by saying, "You expect to be sitting here in a few months. So what are you going to do to lead your a/c, crew & pax out of this situation?" The difference in interest was astonishing. Some were very smart and enthusiastic because it was rare to be challenged: others were WTF, I haven't started the course yet and I can fly the a/c as well as you.
I'll stick with the Sully philosophy. We ain't supposed to be up there. Man & machine versus gravity & mother nature. Always have an escape route. Identify one, every 30 mins, then read the paper.
Digressing from the topic, but you threw it out there:
I used to drop that in the lap of a 3000hr SFO soon to start the command upgrade process in todays fats track LoCo's during a TFS out over the sea with nothing to see but sea. The scenario was not necessarily an emergency, usually more subtle (as DXB was). Silence and somewhat surprise at the question. I encouraged some thinking by saying, "You expect to be sitting here in a few months. So what are you going to do to lead your a/c, crew & pax out of this situation?" The difference in interest was astonishing. Some were very smart and enthusiastic because it was rare to be challenged: others were WTF, I haven't started the course yet and I can fly the a/c as well as you.
I'll stick with the Sully philosophy. We ain't supposed to be up there. Man & machine versus gravity & mother nature. Always have an escape route. Identify one, every 30 mins, then read the paper.
I'll stick with the Sully philosophy. We ain't supposed to be up there. Man & machine versus gravity & mother nature. Always have an escape route. Identify one, every 30 mins, then read the paper.
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Question Re:UAE521 final report
Greetings.
I'm looking for insight from experienced 777 drivers who might be familiar with the final report for UAE521.
On page 93, the report mentions :
The 777 NNC I came across (MBF) doesn't include any instructions for an inop A/T situation other than to control the thrust manually.
Can anyone shed some light on what they are referring to in that paragraph?
Here's a link that should get you to the final report in question.
//reports.aviation-safety.net/2016/20160803-0_B773_A6-EMW.pdf
(you may have to add https ahead of the link)
I'm looking for insight from experienced 777 drivers who might be familiar with the final report for UAE521.
On page 93, the report mentions :
...., the FCOM non-normal checklist confirmation calls for a go-around with
an A/T inoperative, the pilot flying is required to call “Set go-around thrust”.
an A/T inoperative, the pilot flying is required to call “Set go-around thrust”.
Can anyone shed some light on what they are referring to in that paragraph?
Here's a link that should get you to the final report in question.
//reports.aviation-safety.net/2016/20160803-0_B773_A6-EMW.pdf
(you may have to add https ahead of the link)
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Greetings.
I'm looking for insight from experienced 777 drivers who might be familiar with the final report for UAE521.
On page 93, the report mentions :
The 777 NNC I came across (MBF) doesn't include any instructions for an inop A/T situation other than to control the thrust manually.
Can anyone shed some light on what they are referring to in that paragraph?
Here's a link that should get you to the final report in question.
//reports.aviation-safety.net/2016/20160803-0_B773_A6-EMW.pdf
(you may have to add https ahead of the link)
I'm looking for insight from experienced 777 drivers who might be familiar with the final report for UAE521.
On page 93, the report mentions :
The 777 NNC I came across (MBF) doesn't include any instructions for an inop A/T situation other than to control the thrust manually.
Can anyone shed some light on what they are referring to in that paragraph?
Here's a link that should get you to the final report in question.
//reports.aviation-safety.net/2016/20160803-0_B773_A6-EMW.pdf
(you may have to add https ahead of the link)
