Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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The Raas alert is supposed to occur before touchdown to give time to GA. Did not happen here. Was that due to operator's preference? On reflection although presumably it is possible to bounce 300 tonnes or so if you really try, it must be rare for it to happen. 300 tonnes usually arrives on terra firma so sweetly you dont notice or with such force it rattles your teeth, but always sticks. As SLF these days I stand to be corrected.
Up linker said
One of those crashes involved a Capt converting from an Airbus. He didn't even bother doing anything with the thrust levers. Admittedly Autothrottle makes you lazy if you let it.
I think an issue we have these days is pilots who rely on protections or the automation to get them out of trouble. Most people I know that had flown aircraft that were totally manual or had only basic automation never get anywhere near a flight regime that will trigger a protection unless they have severely cocked it up. Recent accidents and incidents suggest that pilots who have only flown fly-by wire aircraft are allowing themselves to get into undesirable states knowing the protection is there to save them..... Until it doesn't.
At the end of the day the automation may or may not be intuitive, but the pilot certainly needs to be.
Two big bad crashes have happened relatively recently to modern Boeings when the moving thrust levers did not move, and the crews apparently did not realise it and take appropriate action?
Perhaps the Airbus designers got it right after all when they made the thrust levers non-moving?
Perhaps the Airbus designers got it right after all when they made the thrust levers non-moving?
I think an issue we have these days is pilots who rely on protections or the automation to get them out of trouble. Most people I know that had flown aircraft that were totally manual or had only basic automation never get anywhere near a flight regime that will trigger a protection unless they have severely cocked it up. Recent accidents and incidents suggest that pilots who have only flown fly-by wire aircraft are allowing themselves to get into undesirable states knowing the protection is there to save them..... Until it doesn't.
At the end of the day the automation may or may not be intuitive, but the pilot certainly needs to be.
Last edited by flyhardmo; 19th Sep 2016 at 15:59. Reason: Hiding from the grammar police
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This was a case of treating it like a touch and go but delaying the flaps until a safe rotation was made with sufficient thrust to safely climb away.
Harry; I assume you meant they should have treated it like a touch & go---but they didn't. Is it the B777 technique to make a touch & go with landing flap? On my types it is: select GA flap, thrust, trim, accelerate, rotate.
Off course you follow them in any aircraft TL's.
Vilas: I agree with you, of course. The reason I ask, and it's no guarantee to be true, but the Air Crash Investigation of B777 at SFX showed PF flying 2 handed during the visual with nothing on TL's.
However. I have watched cadets in the sim flying A/P A/T approaches hands off everything; until my rolled up newspaper made contact with their dome. Those telescopic pointer thingies are great too.
Harry; I assume you meant they should have treated it like a touch & go---but they didn't. Is it the B777 technique to make a touch & go with landing flap? On my types it is: select GA flap, thrust, trim, accelerate, rotate.
Off course you follow them in any aircraft TL's.
Vilas: I agree with you, of course. The reason I ask, and it's no guarantee to be true, but the Air Crash Investigation of B777 at SFX showed PF flying 2 handed during the visual with nothing on TL's.
However. I have watched cadets in the sim flying A/P A/T approaches hands off everything; until my rolled up newspaper made contact with their dome. Those telescopic pointer thingies are great too.
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Ken, I agree with your post, but check the sequence again, there are only 6 sec between initial touch down and airborne status.
3 sec: L/H Main gear touches down
5 sec: RAAS alert
9 sec: Aircraft airborne
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The Raas alert is supposed to occur before touchdown to give time to GA.
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"Can we prevent pilots from failing to add thrust during a go around? Absolutely yes."
I disagree; but we might reduce the probability, by reducing surprise, workload, systems complexity, and the proliferation of SOPs.
Help pilots detect and correct any oversight, to do what they already do well, but better.
I disagree; but we might reduce the probability, by reducing surprise, workload, systems complexity, and the proliferation of SOPs.
Help pilots detect and correct any oversight, to do what they already do well, but better.
On the other hand I cannot conceive of a pilot doing an approach/landing on authothrust with his hand not on the thrust levers in the event of a go around or rejected landing. It simply flies in the face of all the training I have ever had. Yet the pilots of some (many?) airlines apparently do the latter routinely. Do those same pilots also do takeoffs with one hand in their lap? I really don't know.
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I beg to agree and disagree - because the chimp inside us can be very different, depending upon our upbringing. Having served my apprentiship on basic aircraft that have no FMC, my 'chimp' never forgets the thrust levers, but it does have a tendancy to forget the toga button. So I am a reverse chimp, and need to practice other aspects of this scenario.
There is also a problem in that some will vehemently disagree that there is any trace of a chimp in any of us, for cultural reasons. And that leads to what one might call 'overconfidence'.
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This pilot shouldn't have pushed the TOGA buttons on the ground AT ALL! The chimp had instantly selected the WRONG motor program!
So from my perspective, doing the manual stuff instinctively will keep you alive and then you rationally ask the automatics to help you out to make you look like a good pilot. But instinctively asking the automatics to help you look good AND keep you alive seems like a recipe for disaster.
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Now I'm getting confused Ken.
I clearly said "he shouldn't have pushed the TOGA buttons on the ground AT ALL!"
I thought your entire point was that he pushed the buttons and expected the automatics to do the rest?
What you have just described is precisely what we all know he SHOULD have done, but didn't! Because he wasn't sufficiently familiar with this particular manouvre to instantly select the correct actions! (They would NOT have been the correct actions for most other GAs!) This has no bearing whatsoever on how many manual approaches he chooses to fly. Which in any event, would ALWAYS have been flown with auto thrust in! As is the wisdom of 'the manufacturer'!
You are of course correct that shortly after airborne, pushing TOGA THEN produces valid FD and auto thrust modes
I clearly said "he shouldn't have pushed the TOGA buttons on the ground AT ALL!"
I thought your entire point was that he pushed the buttons and expected the automatics to do the rest?
What you have just described is precisely what we all know he SHOULD have done, but didn't! Because he wasn't sufficiently familiar with this particular manouvre to instantly select the correct actions! (They would NOT have been the correct actions for most other GAs!) This has no bearing whatsoever on how many manual approaches he chooses to fly. Which in any event, would ALWAYS have been flown with auto thrust in! As is the wisdom of 'the manufacturer'!
You are of course correct that shortly after airborne, pushing TOGA THEN produces valid FD and auto thrust modes
Last edited by 4468; 19th Sep 2016 at 18:27.
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All aside the initial factor in this accident was the touch down 1100 meters beyond the threshold. Two seconds after that came the second factor, the smart cockpit RAAS annunciator with its "LONG LANDING" call. The well drilled crew immediately reacted to it.
To me this is yet another case of unquestioning submission to and total dependence on automation and abandonment of an important human sense of intuition and instinct. Not even flying by numbers but flying by on/off electronic signals.
Would this accident have occurred if there was no RAAS.
To me this is yet another case of unquestioning submission to and total dependence on automation and abandonment of an important human sense of intuition and instinct. Not even flying by numbers but flying by on/off electronic signals.
Would this accident have occurred if there was no RAAS.
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Now I'm getting confused Ken.....What you have just described is precisely what we all know he SHOULD have done, but didn't! Because he wasn't sufficiently familiar with this particular manouvre to instantly select the correct actions!
1. A pilot can be trained to perform different "correct" actions for different scenarios, based on system logic of the specific aircraft he's flying.
2. A pilot can be trained to perform the same basic action regardless of the scenario and independent of system logic of any aircraft he's flying.
In this case the pilot was expected to know the details of the RAAS activation logic and the details of the TOGA switch inhibition logic and take the "correct" action based on his knowledge of the automatic system's logic. He failed.
I believe that pilots should be trained that EVERY time he wants increased airspeed and/or altitude that he ALWAYS pushes the thrust levers forward and manually establish the acceleration/climb and THEN pushes the TOGA button to assist him to establish the optimum acceleration/climb rate. Thus in an unusual situation such as this one, he instinctively performs the correct action (manually push the levers forward) and he would not have to know (and under great stress remember) the details of either the RAAS or the TOGA logic to take the correct action. The correct action (push the levers forward) is always instinctive and the automatics are only used to finesse the pilot's already correct action. To me, the worst thing that would result from such training is a short term overtemp or overspeed of the engine (and with modern fadec engines that is unlikely) resulting from moving the levers too aggressively. And this instinctive action will get him (and his passengers) safely away from the ground independent of system logic. Once he is away from the ground and his airspeed is up he can figure out the system logic that's preventing him from getting FD bars and/or autothrottle. Expecting him to figure that out very close to the ground and at very low airspeed is in my mind a recipe for disaster.
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ken, conf iture has gone to the bathroom....
37:17 rh gear down
:19 raas alert
:20 lh gear down
:23 airborne.
37:17 rh gear down
:19 raas alert
:20 lh gear down
:23 airborne.
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RAT 5
That's probably the same on most, if not all commercial jet aircraft, including the B777. However, doing 'circuits' is one thing, recovering from a baulked landing is quite another. In the case of the latter, keeping landing flap is preferable as it's unplanned and the priority is to get the aircraft airborne again. This is in effect an undesired state whereas a touch and go is a stable approach and landing, with a planned ground flap retraction and trim. The config warning will be present, on the ground, but the flap can be selected to the G/A setting once safely established in the climb. Higher than usual control forces may be required as the aircraft is trimmed for landing, not take off.
Then can begin the sequence of a 'normal' go around. Hope that clarifies?
Harry
That's probably the same on most, if not all commercial jet aircraft, including the B777. However, doing 'circuits' is one thing, recovering from a baulked landing is quite another. In the case of the latter, keeping landing flap is preferable as it's unplanned and the priority is to get the aircraft airborne again. This is in effect an undesired state whereas a touch and go is a stable approach and landing, with a planned ground flap retraction and trim. The config warning will be present, on the ground, but the flap can be selected to the G/A setting once safely established in the climb. Higher than usual control forces may be required as the aircraft is trimmed for landing, not take off.
Then can begin the sequence of a 'normal' go around. Hope that clarifies?
Harry
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Ken
I'm afraid we will have to disagree.
On a Boeing, simply pushing the thrust levers forward is absolutely NOT always correct, or advisable! (Though it is on an Airbus, that so many seem to decry!)
Try doing that on a coupled approach, with a decision height below 50R and see what happens.
That's because the TOGA switches don't merely control the thrust levers. They also signal the autopilot and/or flight directors to immediately commence pitch and roll manoeuvres. Or do you advocate simoultaneously selecting the autopilot out too, and looking through the flight directors on every go-around?
Oh and you'll have to continuously push the thrust levers too, because if you don't, auto thrust will be trying to close them! Unless you take that out as well!
As I said in an earlier post, you need to think what other traps your 'solutions' create, and understand why it's not how we do things in modern machinery.
The solution here is more familiarity with this simple manouvre. That's all.
Not simple, this flying business, is it?
I believe that pilots should be trained that EVERY time he wants increased airspeed and/or altitude that he ALWAYS pushes the thrust levers forward and manually establish the acceleration/climb and THEN pushes the TOGA button to assist him to establish the optimum acceleration/climb rate. Thus in an unusual situation such as this one, he instinctively performs the correct action (manually push the levers forward) and he would not have to know (and under great stress remember) the details of either the RAAS or the TOGA logic to take the correct action. The correct action (push the levers forward) is always instinctive and the automatics are only used to finesse the pilot's already correct action. To me, the worst thing that would result from such training is a short term overtemp or overspeed of the engine (and with modern fadec engines that is unlikely) resulting from moving the levers too aggressively. And this instinctive action will get him (and his passengers) safely away from the ground independent of system logic. Once he is away from the ground and his airspeed is up he can figure out the system logic that's preventing him from getting FD bars and/or autothrottle. Expecting him to figure that out very close to the ground and at very low airspeed is in my mind a recipe for disaster.
On a Boeing, simply pushing the thrust levers forward is absolutely NOT always correct, or advisable! (Though it is on an Airbus, that so many seem to decry!)
Try doing that on a coupled approach, with a decision height below 50R and see what happens.
That's because the TOGA switches don't merely control the thrust levers. They also signal the autopilot and/or flight directors to immediately commence pitch and roll manoeuvres. Or do you advocate simoultaneously selecting the autopilot out too, and looking through the flight directors on every go-around?
Oh and you'll have to continuously push the thrust levers too, because if you don't, auto thrust will be trying to close them! Unless you take that out as well!
As I said in an earlier post, you need to think what other traps your 'solutions' create, and understand why it's not how we do things in modern machinery.
The solution here is more familiarity with this simple manouvre. That's all.
Not simple, this flying business, is it?
Last edited by 4468; 19th Sep 2016 at 23:25.
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The Crew made a massive cockup BOTH OF THEM this is not in question.They crashed/destroyed their lovely 777 because they completely screwed up from an unstable condition on or near the ground (failed to ensure enough power was applied regardless of automation status) this is without question.There is not much doubt that the cabin crew did a great job with the evacuation but the PRIMARY reason for this and a lack of injuries was the very fortunate fact that due to the gear being retracted, the doors were very very close to the ground, you could basically just walk off the 777 before it exploded.What a stroke of luck, which got EK off the casualty hook.Peter.
To me this is yet another case of unquestioning submission to and total dependence on automation and abandonment of an important human sense of intuition and instinct.
There is not much doubt that the cabin crew did a great job with the evacuation but the PRIMARY reason for this and a lack of injuries was the very fortunate fact that due to the gear being retracted, the doors were very very close to the ground, you could basically just walk off the 777 before it exploded.What a stroke of luck, which got EK off the casualty hook.Peter.