Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: Not lost, but slightly uncertain of position.
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CurtainTwitcher,
Funny you bring up John Boyd, as his other big contribution beside the OODA loop, is Energy Management Theory. To this day you will still find a hardcopy of his book in most fighter squadrons, and it is considered as a mandatory read item for any fighter pilot who wants to become an ace (who wouldn’t) and be able to master his jet in a dynamic environment.
Highlights from his EM theory are as follows: Potential energy, Kinetic energy, Losing or gaining energy, where is the jet going and where is the jet in relation to other objects (the opponent).
IMHO OODA loop and EM is something that is very useful in all kinds of aviation.
Capn Bloggs,
So right you are. Training training training and practice practice practice is what makes you cope when the **** hits the fan. Sure, you might get startled, but having your muscle memory react in response to a bad situation will free up brain bits to handle the rest of the situation in a safe manner.
There is no replacement for proper and repeated training of basic skills.
Funny you bring up John Boyd, as his other big contribution beside the OODA loop, is Energy Management Theory. To this day you will still find a hardcopy of his book in most fighter squadrons, and it is considered as a mandatory read item for any fighter pilot who wants to become an ace (who wouldn’t) and be able to master his jet in a dynamic environment.
Highlights from his EM theory are as follows: Potential energy, Kinetic energy, Losing or gaining energy, where is the jet going and where is the jet in relation to other objects (the opponent).
IMHO OODA loop and EM is something that is very useful in all kinds of aviation.
Capn Bloggs,
So right you are. Training training training and practice practice practice is what makes you cope when the **** hits the fan. Sure, you might get startled, but having your muscle memory react in response to a bad situation will free up brain bits to handle the rest of the situation in a safe manner.
There is no replacement for proper and repeated training of basic skills.
Training and practice are only effective if the procedure is executed correctly to develop not only muscle memory but also develop cognitive focus on certain critical items where and when it's called for. But it doesn't take training and practice in a sim to KNOW the procedure, and KNOW where these cognitive focal points are. If they are spelled out in the AFM/FCOM/SOPs, it's our responsibility to know them even if common sense and experience don't tell one so. Knowing the procedure is essential to our duties in whichever role we are in for that sector, every time we fly.
Verifying G/A thrust setting is a cognitive act to be performed as one of the first steps in the procedure whether it be using the automatics, manually flown, has touched down, or not. It is no different than verifying pitch, and checking the thrust is supposed to occur for every T/O or M/A as well. If muscle memory pushes the thrust levers forward, it still doesn't do away with the procedural and common aviation sense item to verify thrust is being produced.
It's the procedural focus on verification and where it falls where it does in the procedure that acts as a backstop for flaws in automatics and/or muscle memory because it will expose something is amiss and will elicit a immediate response by either pilot. Mental discipline to do those 2 things (verify pitch and thrust) is the weapon against fixation and distraction, and every professional has the responsibility to maintain their own mental discipline and not lapse into bad or incomplete cognitive habits.
If either pilot had accomplished this initial, fundamental step in the procedure that is based on putting primacy of cognitive action and focus on aviating, nobody here would be talking about re-designing every aircraft system that can lead to confusion for those not willing study, or designing fancy wind sensors because someone might build a hangar within 1 mile of a runway. The idle power would have been immediately noted, fuel would have been manually stuffed into the situation within a second by either pilot without having to think, and the non-event hiccup de-briefed at a later time.
Verifying G/A thrust setting is a cognitive act to be performed as one of the first steps in the procedure whether it be using the automatics, manually flown, has touched down, or not. It is no different than verifying pitch, and checking the thrust is supposed to occur for every T/O or M/A as well. If muscle memory pushes the thrust levers forward, it still doesn't do away with the procedural and common aviation sense item to verify thrust is being produced.
It's the procedural focus on verification and where it falls where it does in the procedure that acts as a backstop for flaws in automatics and/or muscle memory because it will expose something is amiss and will elicit a immediate response by either pilot. Mental discipline to do those 2 things (verify pitch and thrust) is the weapon against fixation and distraction, and every professional has the responsibility to maintain their own mental discipline and not lapse into bad or incomplete cognitive habits.
If either pilot had accomplished this initial, fundamental step in the procedure that is based on putting primacy of cognitive action and focus on aviating, nobody here would be talking about re-designing every aircraft system that can lead to confusion for those not willing study, or designing fancy wind sensors because someone might build a hangar within 1 mile of a runway. The idle power would have been immediately noted, fuel would have been manually stuffed into the situation within a second by either pilot without having to think, and the non-event hiccup de-briefed at a later time.
Last edited by PukinDog; 10th Sep 2016 at 07:09.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: nowhere
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There is no explicit mention of the bounce but the initial 'touch down' caused one of the FA's seat to collapse, all the blinds in one of the cabins dropped closed and some of the cabin oxygen masks dropped.
The subsequent gear up touch down seems to have been more gentle.
The subsequent gear up touch down seems to have been more gentle.
Join Date: Jan 2000
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A cognitive act followed by positive reinforcement would be better still.... Which is why I think any G/A Baulked landing should be announced and commanded by "G/A check thrust"!
The problem with "G/A Flap xxx" is that the PM's attention could be directed away from the position of the T/L's and the EPR's / N1's because he has heard a Flap xxx command.
It's also for this reason that I would say it's quite reasonable for the PF to remove his hand from the T/L's after he has commanded Check Thrust as it allows a positive reinforcement to be followed by a confirming action, the PM can adjust/check/verify thrust.
Not all aircraft are FBW so the aircraft will be out of trim for the G/A and that may just require 2 hands to control the aircraft's out of trim state for a short period of time...
Which would also allow the PM to verify and then state "Thrust Set"
You now have everyone on the same page and bernoulis being generated so can call for the required config changes and continue the procedure.
Anyway. I just think that putting in the notes at the bottom of a page, something like... "The PM will very thrust increase" is just plain ridiculous. It should be part of the procedure, not a footnote!
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: Not lost, but slightly uncertain of position.
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
PukinDog,
Agree, but would like to ad that muscle memory is a way to reduce the startle effect, thereby freeing up brain power to deal with the cognitive challanges.
Agree, but would like to ad that muscle memory is a way to reduce the startle effect, thereby freeing up brain power to deal with the cognitive challanges.
I never operated modern highly automated aircraft and thus am not qualified to comment on the way in which airline crews interact with these aircraft (my last aircraft was the 747-200). However:-
1. Everyone has cocked up a landing at one time or another, particularly in rapidly changing wind conditions on final approach and has had to go-around; even from touchdown. Every landing should be planned with the pilot remaining ready for a go-around right up until the point that reverse is selected.
2. They landed 1,100 mtrs deep and 10kts too fast on a 4,050 mtrs long runway. Even allowing for the displaced threshold, that leaves (at the worst) some 2500 mtrs of runway remaining. What is the landing distance required for a 777 at this landing weight? Was a go-around really necessary? I doubt it, but SOPs probably said yes.
3. The thrust levers were advanced 12 seconds after initiating the go-around. This is incredible - 12 seconds is an awfully long time to sit there with no power applied. Some have mentioned the startle effect but, if the pilot has planned the go-around as well as the landing as part of his normal mindset there should be no startle effect.
4. There is no doubt that a go-around can be initiated after touch down, and even if the auto-thrust did not activate. a mighty push on the thrust levers would have achieved the desired result. Therefore did the pilots think the auto-thrust system had applied go-around power when it hadn't? Did the handling pilot forget to push the TOGA button? Did he take his hands off the thrust levers? Is there some peculiar interaction between the weight switches and the auto-thrust system I do not know about? I think not.
5. But what I do know is that you only have to press the red buttons (auto-pilot and auto-thrust disconnect) and you have a perfectly normal aircraft to fly. It seems to me that too many pilots are forgetting this simple fact on highly automated aircraft.
1. Everyone has cocked up a landing at one time or another, particularly in rapidly changing wind conditions on final approach and has had to go-around; even from touchdown. Every landing should be planned with the pilot remaining ready for a go-around right up until the point that reverse is selected.
2. They landed 1,100 mtrs deep and 10kts too fast on a 4,050 mtrs long runway. Even allowing for the displaced threshold, that leaves (at the worst) some 2500 mtrs of runway remaining. What is the landing distance required for a 777 at this landing weight? Was a go-around really necessary? I doubt it, but SOPs probably said yes.
3. The thrust levers were advanced 12 seconds after initiating the go-around. This is incredible - 12 seconds is an awfully long time to sit there with no power applied. Some have mentioned the startle effect but, if the pilot has planned the go-around as well as the landing as part of his normal mindset there should be no startle effect.
4. There is no doubt that a go-around can be initiated after touch down, and even if the auto-thrust did not activate. a mighty push on the thrust levers would have achieved the desired result. Therefore did the pilots think the auto-thrust system had applied go-around power when it hadn't? Did the handling pilot forget to push the TOGA button? Did he take his hands off the thrust levers? Is there some peculiar interaction between the weight switches and the auto-thrust system I do not know about? I think not.
5. But what I do know is that you only have to press the red buttons (auto-pilot and auto-thrust disconnect) and you have a perfectly normal aircraft to fly. It seems to me that too many pilots are forgetting this simple fact on highly automated aircraft.
Last edited by Bergerie1; 10th Sep 2016 at 09:46.
Join Date: Jul 2014
Location: Harbour Master Place
Posts: 662
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The following is a direct cut and paste from the preliminary report, rewritten in chronological form (calculated times in RED)
There is a lot happening to process in a very short space of time. There would have also been the cross flight deck commands as well as the ATC instructions /readback.
The report doesn't include anything about TOGA during the factual sequence, however, it get special emphasis in the Go-Around section (1.17.2)
F16-GUY, I wondered if you would drop in with your handle being Boyd's design. My understanding is his EM-Theory was to find a way to enable incredibly high turn rates, and high rates of acceleration and deceleration (fast transients) to confuse an opponent.
What is even more interesting is how he took this concept, and adapted it to the more general case of timescales & confusion (Destruction and Creation) applicable to almost all human activity. His thinking can be applied to the civilian aviation world by knowing what to avoid, that is, things that cause confusion. Keep safe by avoiding trying to do many complex things too quickly too close to something hard.
0837:17 As recorded by the Aircraft flight data recorder, the weight-on-wheels sensors indicated that the right main landing gear touched down
0837:19 the Aircraft runway awareness advisory system (RAAS) aural message “LONG LANDING, LONG LANDING” was annunciated.
0837:20 [touchdown] by the left main landing gear. The nose landing gear remained in the air.
0837:23 the Aircraft became airborne in an attempt to go-around and was subjected to a headwind component until impact
0837:27 the flap lever was moved to the 20 position
0837:28 the air traffic control tower issued a clearance to continue straight ahead and climb to 4,000 feet. The clearance was read back correctly.
0837:29 the landing gear lever was selected to the UP position. Subsequently, the landing gear unlocked and began to retract.
0837:35 both thrust levers were moved from the idle position to full forward.
0837:36 both engines started to respond to the thrust lever movement showing an increase in related parameters.
0837:38 the Aircraft aft fuselage impacted the runway
0837:19 the Aircraft runway awareness advisory system (RAAS) aural message “LONG LANDING, LONG LANDING” was annunciated.
0837:20 [touchdown] by the left main landing gear. The nose landing gear remained in the air.
0837:23 the Aircraft became airborne in an attempt to go-around and was subjected to a headwind component until impact
0837:27 the flap lever was moved to the 20 position
0837:28 the air traffic control tower issued a clearance to continue straight ahead and climb to 4,000 feet. The clearance was read back correctly.
0837:29 the landing gear lever was selected to the UP position. Subsequently, the landing gear unlocked and began to retract.
0837:35 both thrust levers were moved from the idle position to full forward.
0837:36 both engines started to respond to the thrust lever movement showing an increase in related parameters.
0837:38 the Aircraft aft fuselage impacted the runway
The report doesn't include anything about TOGA during the factual sequence, however, it get special emphasis in the Go-Around section (1.17.2)
F16-GUY, I wondered if you would drop in with your handle being Boyd's design. My understanding is his EM-Theory was to find a way to enable incredibly high turn rates, and high rates of acceleration and deceleration (fast transients) to confuse an opponent.
What is even more interesting is how he took this concept, and adapted it to the more general case of timescales & confusion (Destruction and Creation) applicable to almost all human activity. His thinking can be applied to the civilian aviation world by knowing what to avoid, that is, things that cause confusion. Keep safe by avoiding trying to do many complex things too quickly too close to something hard.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 1,501
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The captain stuffed up. The first officer failed to notice.
You flight instructors can write page after page of "Airplanes for dummies" but it boils down to:
Thrust and pitch
Can we discuss why four slides were blown out of position in what appears to be light to moderate wind conditions?
You flight instructors can write page after page of "Airplanes for dummies" but it boils down to:
Thrust and pitch
Can we discuss why four slides were blown out of position in what appears to be light to moderate wind conditions?
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My airline doesn't train for GA from on the runway after touchdown
My point, a few posts earlier, precisely; was this manoeuvre really a GA? It has been stated that EK's SOP calls for a GA if landing beyond the TDZ zone. I can understand the thinking behind that SOP, and it makes good sense on limiting runways; but is it s one size fits all edict? It might be true for a 2500m runway if you are 500m too long. Is it still necessary if 600m too long on a 3300m runway?
However, the SOP demands the crew executes a GA. The decision to GA would be made hopefully above the runway as you realised you were landing long. The engines might be at idle or not, depending on the circumstances. There is one procedure for an all engine GA. It has always been practiced in the sim, or for real, with the engines above idle and the a/c above the ground. This was a new area and the standard GA procedure is not appropriate. IMHO this was a touch & go, untrained and a modification of a GA.
If EK have their SOP, and therefore it is highly likely that a floating aeroplane making a long landing will have the engines at idle, then this should have been a trained manoeuvre. Local crews can tell us if it is.
My point, a few posts earlier, precisely; was this manoeuvre really a GA? It has been stated that EK's SOP calls for a GA if landing beyond the TDZ zone. I can understand the thinking behind that SOP, and it makes good sense on limiting runways; but is it s one size fits all edict? It might be true for a 2500m runway if you are 500m too long. Is it still necessary if 600m too long on a 3300m runway?
However, the SOP demands the crew executes a GA. The decision to GA would be made hopefully above the runway as you realised you were landing long. The engines might be at idle or not, depending on the circumstances. There is one procedure for an all engine GA. It has always been practiced in the sim, or for real, with the engines above idle and the a/c above the ground. This was a new area and the standard GA procedure is not appropriate. IMHO this was a touch & go, untrained and a modification of a GA.
If EK have their SOP, and therefore it is highly likely that a floating aeroplane making a long landing will have the engines at idle, then this should have been a trained manoeuvre. Local crews can tell us if it is.
seeing the prelim report above cut n paste
i assume the thrust levers should have been put into full from idle at around 08.37.20 to 23secs and not 08.37.35 secs
flaps 20 and then followed by gear up were initiated some 12 secs before TO/GA engine thrust was spooling up
surely to get yourself out of trouble you want some power PDQ?
I am sure this will point to the interface of reliance on AT and wheels on the ground sensors whereby AT is inhibited for some seconds unless you shove the throttles yourself in a TOGA situation - which is flawed automation in my limited brain - it leaves open as it did in other accidents the crew thinking everything will be done for them and the plane will not crash
i assume the thrust levers should have been put into full from idle at around 08.37.20 to 23secs and not 08.37.35 secs
flaps 20 and then followed by gear up were initiated some 12 secs before TO/GA engine thrust was spooling up
surely to get yourself out of trouble you want some power PDQ?
I am sure this will point to the interface of reliance on AT and wheels on the ground sensors whereby AT is inhibited for some seconds unless you shove the throttles yourself in a TOGA situation - which is flawed automation in my limited brain - it leaves open as it did in other accidents the crew thinking everything will be done for them and the plane will not crash
I had an open mind about the ME until two very brief transits in Dubai airport.
Not for me, and my wife was exceedingly unimpressed.
Never again.
Not for me, and my wife was exceedingly unimpressed.
Never again.
I am not a pilot but have read almost every post on here on a daily basis since 1999, especially those involving accidents and incidents.
Here would be my line of thinking as a pilot, given what I have read here about SOPs and whether a situation is trained for or not:
I am a pilot responsible for 400+ lives every time I go to work.
On top of this I would quite like to come home in one piece after my next trip.
Just seen an accident on the news about an airliner crashing in Dubai (or wherever)
Right - my next task is to find out every scrap of information about this - this is part of my job.
Is there anything I can learn from this? Ok, so they got into an unusual situation which they didn't get out of. Could this happen to me?
Yes, we don't train for a go-around from after touchdown.
Am I 100% sure I could get out of this situation?
If not, I am going of my own initiative to book a 4 hour session on a simulator and practice this situation until I am completely happy.
I am also going to raise the issue via my training department, but even if they don't listen I am going to make sure that I am ok.
Here would be my line of thinking as a pilot, given what I have read here about SOPs and whether a situation is trained for or not:
I am a pilot responsible for 400+ lives every time I go to work.
On top of this I would quite like to come home in one piece after my next trip.
Just seen an accident on the news about an airliner crashing in Dubai (or wherever)
Right - my next task is to find out every scrap of information about this - this is part of my job.
Is there anything I can learn from this? Ok, so they got into an unusual situation which they didn't get out of. Could this happen to me?
Yes, we don't train for a go-around from after touchdown.
Am I 100% sure I could get out of this situation?
If not, I am going of my own initiative to book a 4 hour session on a simulator and practice this situation until I am completely happy.
I am also going to raise the issue via my training department, but even if they don't listen I am going to make sure that I am ok.
Controversial, moi?
In the Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) in Chapter 5 under the heading 'Go-Around and Missed Approach - All Engines Operating' there is just this single line about the behaviour of the automatics
Further on in the same chapter under the heading 'Go-Around after Touchdown' there is the single sentence:
In the FCOM Chapter 4, Section 20 under the heading 'Automatic Flight - Go-Around' there is one line:
I have always felt there are many items in the Boeing manuals which have cursory or vague explanations of various systems or scenarios. Given the importance of understanding the inhibition of the Autothrottle system in the event of a rejected landing and especially in light of this accident the explanation in the Boeing manuals of this particular quirk of the system seems woefully inadequate.
Note: An automatic go-around cannot be initiated after touchdown.
The F/D go-around mode will not be available until go-around is selected after becoming airborne.
The TO/GA switches are inhibited when on the ground and enabled again when in the air for a go–around or touch and go.
M.Mouse,
I agree, absolutely. The standard manuals ARE vague and there is no specific 'Rejected landing' procedure in the standard FCOM. Indeed, the standard FCOM says to perform a 'normal' go-around in the event of a rejected landing. We can argue all day about a 'normal' go-around requiring the correct attitude and thrust, but there is also a subtle difference in the actions required in the event of a rejected landing and most airlines don't train for it. The airline where I work recognised the problem many years ago and modified their FCOM to include a 'Rejected landing' procedure, with no objection from Boeing. The procedure is trained during the conversion course and is also practiced during our cyclic training.
I agree, absolutely. The standard manuals ARE vague and there is no specific 'Rejected landing' procedure in the standard FCOM. Indeed, the standard FCOM says to perform a 'normal' go-around in the event of a rejected landing. We can argue all day about a 'normal' go-around requiring the correct attitude and thrust, but there is also a subtle difference in the actions required in the event of a rejected landing and most airlines don't train for it. The airline where I work recognised the problem many years ago and modified their FCOM to include a 'Rejected landing' procedure, with no objection from Boeing. The procedure is trained during the conversion course and is also practiced during our cyclic training.
The captain stuffed up. The first officer failed to notice.
You flight instructors can write page after page of "Airplanes for dummies" but it boils down to:
Thrust and pitch
Can we discuss why four slides were blown out of position in what appears to be light to moderate wind conditions?
You flight instructors can write page after page of "Airplanes for dummies" but it boils down to:
Thrust and pitch
Can we discuss why four slides were blown out of position in what appears to be light to moderate wind conditions?
Site ....... Dir ...... Speed ....... Gusts
Tower ... 340 ..... 11.0kt
12L ....... 315 ....... 9.1kts ..... 29.2kts
30R ....... 118 ..... 15.6kts ..... 21.4kts
12R ....... 131 ..... 13.0kts .... 22.2kts
30L ....... 117 ..... 17.5kts .... 23.5kts
South .... 115 ..... 21.2kts .... 22.0kts
There is a 2004 study done by the National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands on the performance of slides in real emergencies. They looked at 150 survivable aircraft accidents during the period 1970–2003 in which slides were used, in 89 cases (59%) one or more slides did not function properly. Of those 89 cases, 11 (12.4%) were wind affected - winds ranged from as light as 6 knots up to 32 knots, gusting 42 knots (average of 18 knots gusting 32 knots). To quote the report "wind direction relative to the aircraft’s position/attitude played a key role."
Join Date: Jan 2000
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DtA
This has been hinted at before. But the question is... did they REALLY get into an unusual situation... or did the fact that the powers that be that write SOP's that do their utmost to remove airmanship from any equation, cause this to become an "unusual situation". They had more runway in front of them than the total length of some other runways they regularly operate into.
Sims are quite busy with Pilots ticking boxes, you might have to wait a long time.
Having said that, when you create an SOP that says a Pilot must do something and then don't train him in the thing he should be doing... well... Some might call it negligent.
You could start a whole new thread on this topic... But sadly it should probably reside in the Jet Blast forum, as I'm sure it would get quite colourful.
Ok, so they got into an unusual situation which they didn't get out of. Could this happen to me?
If not, I am going of my own initiative to book a 4 hour session on a simulator and practice this situation until I am completely happy.
Having said that, when you create an SOP that says a Pilot must do something and then don't train him in the thing he should be doing... well... Some might call it negligent.
I am also going to raise the issue via my training department, but even if they don't listen I am going to make sure that I am ok.
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: Dubai
Posts: 768
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@ManaAdaSystem, spot on
The captain stuffed up. The first officer failed to notice.
You flight instructors can write page after page of "Airplanes for dummies" but it boils down to:
Thrust and pitch
You flight instructors can write page after page of "Airplanes for dummies" but it boils down to:
Thrust and pitch