Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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I as SLF don't want anyone in the cockpit to be 'shocked to the core'. I want them to be sufficiently trained and resilient not to be shocked.
Is it too much to expect pilots to expect the unexpected and be able to deal with it?
Is it too much to expect pilots to expect the unexpected and be able to deal with it?
There is nobody, i repeat, nobody else who has the power to change things.
The industry needs bums on cockpit seats, but only cheap bums.
The passengers want cheap tickets and cheap pilots, but only expert ones. They won't change a thing and this paradox, accidents or not.
The regulators want comfy salaries payed by the taxpayer and some nice goodies from the industry who then dictate the t&c's. They won't change a thing as long as they don't get pressure from their bosses.
Pilots can bring up all the shortcomings of the industry, the lack of training, the poor t&c's that do not attract the right applicants, the fatigue hurting safety due to understaffing, nobody will listen, everybody continues to treat us as 'spoilt brats', we are at the end of the food chain and have become powerless.
Your expectations above however need a change of paradigma.
If you want them met, you have to demand them.
Glofish you are so right. John Marsh years ago your wish was the norm and if a pilot was unable to comply after a "little" training he/she was let go. Unfortunately SLF want the cheapest seats so your wish is no longer affordable. I should also point out that aircraft maintenance is not what it was either, so again your wish is just that a wish.
Trouble is humans make mistakes & some sympathy should be awarded to this crew. But if a "little" training does not have the desired affect they should be let go. Unfortunately the non flying managers have ensured that only weak & complient flying managers are appointed so flight safety is no longer a priority. Whilst low cost is. ( you reap what you sow)
Trouble is humans make mistakes & some sympathy should be awarded to this crew. But if a "little" training does not have the desired affect they should be let go. Unfortunately the non flying managers have ensured that only weak & complient flying managers are appointed so flight safety is no longer a priority. Whilst low cost is. ( you reap what you sow)
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John Marsh, so there you have it with both barrels...
"No bounce" was confirmed after my post and FCeng 84 explained how the aircraft got to 85 ft.
Flying is still safest form of travel with 0.07 deaths per one billion passenger miles compared with motorcycling; 212 deaths per bpm. Captain Speaking says relax and enjoy your flight.
"No bounce" was confirmed after my post and FCeng 84 explained how the aircraft got to 85 ft.
Flying is still safest form of travel with 0.07 deaths per one billion passenger miles compared with motorcycling; 212 deaths per bpm. Captain Speaking says relax and enjoy your flight.
Having read the entire thread, I'm rather shocked and alarmed by the attitude that a go-around is in anyway an unusual or difficult maneuver.
As I've noted previously, I've been on the flight deck for dozens of "simulated" go-arounds - a go-around at 250 ft. AGL is a standard part of my flight test profile. But, as SLF, I've experienced at least 3 go-arounds in the 'real world'. Apparently two were due to the preceding aircraft slow to clear the runway (something I don't consider to be rare), one was for a snowplow on the runway (hopefully that is rare).
In my not so humble opinion, any pilot who considers a go-around to be an unusual or stressful maneuver has no business in the pointy end of the aircraft.
As I've noted previously, I've been on the flight deck for dozens of "simulated" go-arounds - a go-around at 250 ft. AGL is a standard part of my flight test profile. But, as SLF, I've experienced at least 3 go-arounds in the 'real world'. Apparently two were due to the preceding aircraft slow to clear the runway (something I don't consider to be rare), one was for a snowplow on the runway (hopefully that is rare).
In my not so humble opinion, any pilot who considers a go-around to be an unusual or stressful maneuver has no business in the pointy end of the aircraft.
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Baulked landing
A go-around should not be a difficult or unusual manoeuvre but a BAULKED LANDING is! In the former the donks are spooled up ready to go whereas in the latter they may in flight idle , or even worse, ground idle. Even if the shiny levers have been pushed forward it can seem like an eternity before any useful thrust is produced. Different ball game altogether.
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tdracer - not defending lousy flying but in typical line operations I've experienced about one go-around for every 2-3,000 hrs.
I'd guess that the initial, 100% procedural correct, G/A is maybe 50%. Between two of us the rate rapidly becomes close to 100%.
I'd guess that the initial, 100% procedural correct, G/A is maybe 50%. Between two of us the rate rapidly becomes close to 100%.
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Both pilot and copilot executed the go around badly, This should have been a fairly routine maneuver using well rehearsed procedures.
Was this in fact a GA?or was it more a Touch & Go or Roller? That is not a trained line pilot manoeuvre. I do base training and it needs the correct sequence; it is a high speed rolling takeoff with some flap retraction and engine spool up + acceleration BEFORE rotating. If executed as such, and NOT as a GA then it would have worked fine.
Was this in fact a GA?or was it more a Touch & Go or Roller? That is not a trained line pilot manoeuvre. I do base training and it needs the correct sequence; it is a high speed rolling takeoff with some flap retraction and engine spool up + acceleration BEFORE rotating. If executed as such, and NOT as a GA then it would have worked fine.
Only half a speed-brake
tdr: For a seasoned industry insider such as you are, you should not really be shocked. Or, it is just a choice of words - unusual, difficult, I see your point there. I think the logic is crudely simple.
G/A is a dynamic manouevre, requiring just the usual amount of focused coordination. But in a slightly different workflow pattern. As a EU short haul pilot, I experienced 2 for every three years on the line and that seems to be pretty much the average of my peers too.
Your esteemed test pilot colleagues have GAs as a daily bread, and yet every mission profile I suppose had been polished first in the SIM. A weekly bread to me is G/S intercept from above to 7 miles in busy airfield when people, me included, sometimes try to overachieve. But not a G/A, that just does not happen often enough.
The devil in the detail lies inside the words "slightly different workflow pattern". Us average line Joes cannot rely on any seat of the pants or motoric action for croschecking nothing went amiss. Every item requires cognitive processing, even the FMA modes read different and your mouth would not spell them out automatically as it would for take-off.
The drill is just not there, and the typical amount of SIM G/As, that are mostly OEI requiring yet another slightly different pattern, is not enough to build one.
G/A is a dynamic manouevre, requiring just the usual amount of focused coordination. But in a slightly different workflow pattern. As a EU short haul pilot, I experienced 2 for every three years on the line and that seems to be pretty much the average of my peers too.
Your esteemed test pilot colleagues have GAs as a daily bread, and yet every mission profile I suppose had been polished first in the SIM. A weekly bread to me is G/S intercept from above to 7 miles in busy airfield when people, me included, sometimes try to overachieve. But not a G/A, that just does not happen often enough.
The devil in the detail lies inside the words "slightly different workflow pattern". Us average line Joes cannot rely on any seat of the pants or motoric action for croschecking nothing went amiss. Every item requires cognitive processing, even the FMA modes read different and your mouth would not spell them out automatically as it would for take-off.
The drill is just not there, and the typical amount of SIM G/As, that are mostly OEI requiring yet another slightly different pattern, is not enough to build one.
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I did approx. 10000hrs on widebody Aircraft. In this time we flew 4-5 Go Arounds.
All were completely safe, no stress on the flight deck.
What I start thinking is that the Autothrust System of Boeing Aircraft seems to be too complex for todays pilots.
Airbus A/T seems much simpler.
All were completely safe, no stress on the flight deck.
What I start thinking is that the Autothrust System of Boeing Aircraft seems to be too complex for todays pilots.
Airbus A/T seems much simpler.
Controversial, moi?
What I start thinking is that the Autothrust System of Boeing Aircraft seems to be too complex for todays pilots.
HFP
Chaps, Ladies....
It's funny that some have criticised their reaction as unskilful. The contrary is evident. They were very skilful. Years of training worked and they retracted the FLAPS to 20 as required, they pressed the TOGA buttons, they pitched to up, they retracted the Gear as required and the PM even had the presence of mind to call Speed as he is required to do.
No one teaches or requires the PM to look at engine thrust during a go-around and good luck to all of us if we think that the solution is to include one more item in the process during a high task load event.
Chaps, Ladies....
It's funny that some have criticised their reaction as unskilful. The contrary is evident. They were very skilful. Years of training worked and they retracted the FLAPS to 20 as required, they pressed the TOGA buttons, they pitched to up, they retracted the Gear as required and the PM even had the presence of mind to call Speed as he is required to do.
No one teaches or requires the PM to look at engine thrust during a go-around and good luck to all of us if we think that the solution is to include one more item in the process during a high task load event.
Boeing's FCOM and SOP's direct the PM to VERIFY proper engine thrust application, that G/A thrust is sufficient, and to adjust if necessary. Verification is a cognitive act and is a matter of primary importance for the procedure, as written by Boeing. Here, they adhere to the principle of Aviate first by clearly spelling-out that BOTH pilots are supposed to focus/be in the loop of VERIFYING that both correct G/A pitch attitude and Thrust setting are achieved. This act verification/cognitive act precedes moving on to other tasks (monitoring and calling out "positive rate", setting up navs, radio calls, etc.). That is basic airmanship, and the FCOM/SOPs reflects this level of importance and priority.
In fact, the importance of thrust when it comes to making an aircraft go up instead of down is so axiomatic that most well-developed SOPs regardless of type, manufacturer, or Company reflect it with some sort of audible call-out referencing thrust or power. Whether it's a "Check", "Set", or something else, the entire idea for it's inclusion is to reinforce it's necessity and drive awareness straight to it it.
The PM checking the engine instruments after initiating a G/A is most certainly NOT, as you say, "adding an extra step that increases workload, good luck to us all if they try that". On the contrary, the step is already there for supremely obvious reasons, and at that moment during the procedure the required act of verifying G/A thrust has been applied by the PF and sufficient power output has been achieved is a prime responsibility of the PM..it's not dividing attention away from something more important or delaying more critical duties. Engine instruments are the primary indicator of thrust being produced, levers moving or advancing to the stops is feedback of engine control input. There's a difference.
I would be highly interested to hear how you as a PM (or PF) would verify sufficient thrust setting without looking at the engine instruments. Why would it differ from how it's done during a T/O?
To assert that both pilots skipping the simple yet supremely essential and explicitly required, cognitive act of verifying GA thrust represents "very skilful" execution of the maneuver is ridiculous. You may as well say the same re a crew that flew an aircraft straight into the ground with correct G/A thrust and flaps set but neglected to change and/or verify correct pitch. At anything close to professional level proficiency and developed skill in any type of jet aircraft, correct applications of pitch and power are reflex actions. To imply that the Pilot Monitoring has better things to monitor than achieving G/A thrust (and pitch) at that point during this very critical phase of flight is completely at odds with what is clearly spelled-out in the FCOM, airmanship, and common sense as it relates to duties and responsibilities in a multi-crew aircraft. If the PM isn't monitoring those exact things (pitch and thrust) and/or verified them as directed before moving on, he's stepping outside the loop and not doing his job in support of the PF.
My question to you would be, if indeed you are a pilot in a multi-crew aircraft, as PM just what are you doing and focusing on over in the other seat as after the PF called for and initiates a G/A? I'm asking because your statements make it sound like you think it's overloading you to do anything more than slap a flap handle and immediately put on blinders to anything outside climb rate, the radio, and airspeed after it has decayed.
As the PM, if an engine were only developing partial thrust on the G/A or was even experiencing a roll-back would you be oblivious to it? Do you expect it's the PF's responsibility to notice and alert you to the fact?
Are you one of those who believe radio calls need to be immediately answered during a high-workload environment where transitioning to another phase of flight requires almost simultaneous pitch, power, and config changes and the necessary focus and back-up on all 3 of these critical items by both crew?
Last edited by PukinDog; 10th Sep 2016 at 01:18.
OK, I obviously did a lousy job of making my point, so I'll try again. Let's postulate that go-arounds occur every 2000 flying hours (my SLF experience suggests it's more frequent, but perhaps I've just been unlucky). Although it hasn't always been this way, today engine failures occur less than once per 100,000 hours, yet pilots spend countless hours learning how to deal with them. It's been a long time since we lost a multi-engine commercial airliner due to a single engine failure. That's because the aircraft is designed for it and the flight crews train for it.
We've had at least two major crashes this year due to botched go-arounds. It's been suggested here that having to do a go-around is a white knuckle experience - my point is it shouldn't be. Perhaps the reason for the go-around is white knuckle, but past the startle factor doing a go around should be routine. Unlike an engine failure, it's pretty much a given that a professional pilot is going to have to perform many go-arounds during their flying career, and getting just one wrong could make for a really bad day.
Maybe it means more simulator time doing go-arounds - with some failures thrown in (such as the TOGA switch not working). I'll leave that to the crew training experts. But we do need to figure this out - we can't let botched go-arounds become a leading cause of air disasters.
As a designer, I worry about failures that may occur once every 10 million or even 100 million hours - and one part of the safety analysis is to take credit for the pilot being able to successfully perform a go-around if needed. It never entered the equation that the go-around itself could cause a crash...
We've had at least two major crashes this year due to botched go-arounds. It's been suggested here that having to do a go-around is a white knuckle experience - my point is it shouldn't be. Perhaps the reason for the go-around is white knuckle, but past the startle factor doing a go around should be routine. Unlike an engine failure, it's pretty much a given that a professional pilot is going to have to perform many go-arounds during their flying career, and getting just one wrong could make for a really bad day.
Maybe it means more simulator time doing go-arounds - with some failures thrown in (such as the TOGA switch not working). I'll leave that to the crew training experts. But we do need to figure this out - we can't let botched go-arounds become a leading cause of air disasters.
As a designer, I worry about failures that may occur once every 10 million or even 100 million hours - and one part of the safety analysis is to take credit for the pilot being able to successfully perform a go-around if needed. It never entered the equation that the go-around itself could cause a crash...
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Jesus Christ! There is a lot of "technical" discussion and advice going on in this thread.My personal concern is that there is a lot of BS being dished out as "good advice" and some of our less experienced fellow pilots might actually believe/follow it.
Im not going to promote my own "superior" knowledge, HOWEVER I have been privileged to be an instructor on big jets for a long time and I spend a lot of time when in the SIM using my discretion to let the guys practice the things that we hardly do on the line and the various GO-AROUND types, especially the all-engine one is a favourite.Errors are common, but can be trained out.I have to say that the particular event that the EK crew faced would most likely have a high degree of "startle" factor and would cause at least initially some confusion as it is a very rare event.Im now getting trainees to practice it in the SIM and the results are very surprising indeed.Peter.
Im not going to promote my own "superior" knowledge, HOWEVER I have been privileged to be an instructor on big jets for a long time and I spend a lot of time when in the SIM using my discretion to let the guys practice the things that we hardly do on the line and the various GO-AROUND types, especially the all-engine one is a favourite.Errors are common, but can be trained out.I have to say that the particular event that the EK crew faced would most likely have a high degree of "startle" factor and would cause at least initially some confusion as it is a very rare event.Im now getting trainees to practice it in the SIM and the results are very surprising indeed.Peter.
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One thing that hasn't been mentioned is time, confusion & disorder.
If everything is done SOP, the PM knows exactly what is going on, and what the PF will likely lead to a predictable and safe outcome.
I've been doing a lot of reading about the fighter pilot John Boyd and his OODA loop (an absolutely fascinating topic in itself PM if you want some links). The core of this loop is to create confusion in an opponent by compressing his timescale. Time is the key element causing mis-perception, confusion and defeat.
Exactly the same thing occurs close to the ground, our timescale is compressed. We no longer have the luxury of time to sort out a mistake or a system misunderstanding either within ourselves or between pilots. This can leads to confusing events and misunderstanding, and sometimes an accident.
If I read the preliminary report correctly, the PF applied SOP's right up to the point where the aircraft thrust levers failed to advance in response to his pushing TOGA. At that point, because the thrust levers didn't advance, the confusion, or perception of what was actually happening began diverged from reality. However, it takes time for the consequences of mismatch to become apparent, it didn't appear straight away.
It is also likely that the ATC call, PM's "positive rate" likely all reinforced the crew's perception that things were going just as they expected, just as their training had taught them. However, by the time they realised the error, that the system had not responded as expected, there was insufficient time to recover despite attempting to do so.
A question then is what is the EK SOP for hand on the thust levers? Is it SOP to press TOGA and then place back on the control column or leave it on the thrust levers? If it is, then this increases the risk that error of the thrust levers failing to advance would have been delayed. If every single time that you press TOGA, the thrust levers advance (normal takeoff & Go-Around prior to touchdown) during training and line ops, why won't it do it today? My airline doesn't train for GA from on the runway after touchdown, but our SOP for GA is hand on thrust, stiff arm of thrust , this is just an intuitive response. Pressing TOGA is icing on the cake and for some time was a cognitive effort to remember for me personally.
So to all who say that any standard manoeuvre should "just happen" put yourself in a situation where you think you are doing everything is going SOP, but you fail to get the expected response, now, you are confused. How quickly you can resolve the confusion will determine how it ends up.
Alternatively, imagine yourself as PM, when the PF makes make one single unexpected selection or action, you now end up with confusion that takes a finite amount of time to resolve. Normally the time taken to resolve the confusion is very quick & we get away with it because we likely have previous memory of a similar scenario (experience) and we aren't close to the ground.
Everyone needs to think about how they would handle an unexpected system response by the aircraft or mistake by someone else at a time critical point, leading to your own confusion and how you will resolve that confusion. How you would communicate the resolution to the other pilot? Not so easy is it? We are all vulnerable to the unexpected at just the wrong time.
Confusion is a feature of system of our perception & the fact that we can never have a complete understanding of the world around us. There is always a mismatch between what we think is happening and what is actually happening. In aviation, we spend large sums of money to train & build aircraft & systems to make that mismatch as small as possoble. However, it is there, and sometimes it leads to an accident. Boyd demonstrated this from first principles using universal laws of maths, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. He also demonstrated that attempts to increase our own knowledge about the state of a system can actually leads to greater confusion & disorder.
Highly recommended reading is his 1976 paper Destruction and Creation for a much deeper explanation of how and why this process of confusion occurs.
If everything is done SOP, the PM knows exactly what is going on, and what the PF will likely lead to a predictable and safe outcome.
I've been doing a lot of reading about the fighter pilot John Boyd and his OODA loop (an absolutely fascinating topic in itself PM if you want some links). The core of this loop is to create confusion in an opponent by compressing his timescale. Time is the key element causing mis-perception, confusion and defeat.
Exactly the same thing occurs close to the ground, our timescale is compressed. We no longer have the luxury of time to sort out a mistake or a system misunderstanding either within ourselves or between pilots. This can leads to confusing events and misunderstanding, and sometimes an accident.
If I read the preliminary report correctly, the PF applied SOP's right up to the point where the aircraft thrust levers failed to advance in response to his pushing TOGA. At that point, because the thrust levers didn't advance, the confusion, or perception of what was actually happening began diverged from reality. However, it takes time for the consequences of mismatch to become apparent, it didn't appear straight away.
It is also likely that the ATC call, PM's "positive rate" likely all reinforced the crew's perception that things were going just as they expected, just as their training had taught them. However, by the time they realised the error, that the system had not responded as expected, there was insufficient time to recover despite attempting to do so.
A question then is what is the EK SOP for hand on the thust levers? Is it SOP to press TOGA and then place back on the control column or leave it on the thrust levers? If it is, then this increases the risk that error of the thrust levers failing to advance would have been delayed. If every single time that you press TOGA, the thrust levers advance (normal takeoff & Go-Around prior to touchdown) during training and line ops, why won't it do it today? My airline doesn't train for GA from on the runway after touchdown, but our SOP for GA is hand on thrust, stiff arm of thrust , this is just an intuitive response. Pressing TOGA is icing on the cake and for some time was a cognitive effort to remember for me personally.
So to all who say that any standard manoeuvre should "just happen" put yourself in a situation where you think you are doing everything is going SOP, but you fail to get the expected response, now, you are confused. How quickly you can resolve the confusion will determine how it ends up.
Alternatively, imagine yourself as PM, when the PF makes make one single unexpected selection or action, you now end up with confusion that takes a finite amount of time to resolve. Normally the time taken to resolve the confusion is very quick & we get away with it because we likely have previous memory of a similar scenario (experience) and we aren't close to the ground.
Everyone needs to think about how they would handle an unexpected system response by the aircraft or mistake by someone else at a time critical point, leading to your own confusion and how you will resolve that confusion. How you would communicate the resolution to the other pilot? Not so easy is it? We are all vulnerable to the unexpected at just the wrong time.
Confusion is a feature of system of our perception & the fact that we can never have a complete understanding of the world around us. There is always a mismatch between what we think is happening and what is actually happening. In aviation, we spend large sums of money to train & build aircraft & systems to make that mismatch as small as possoble. However, it is there, and sometimes it leads to an accident. Boyd demonstrated this from first principles using universal laws of maths, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. He also demonstrated that attempts to increase our own knowledge about the state of a system can actually leads to greater confusion & disorder.
Highly recommended reading is his 1976 paper Destruction and Creation for a much deeper explanation of how and why this process of confusion occurs.
Originally posted by tdracer
...we can't let botched go-arounds become a leading cause of air disasters.
...we can't let botched go-arounds become a leading cause of air disasters.
Automation isn't going away any time soon, so there should also be an emphasis on how to use the automation properly and what to do if something unexpected occurs. On Boeing aircraft such as the B777, there is a subtle difference in the handling of the automation if a go-around is required after touchdown (ie a rejected landing). That difference needs to be taught and practiced. Some airlines already do that, but it seems that most do not.
Good point well made CT.
This in particular goes to the heart of the matter. Its not as simple as "Well they should've just pushed the thrust levers up at the start!" By the time they worked through their own confusion as to what was going on, time and gravity had taken over.
Everyone needs to think about how they would handle an unexpected system response by the aircraft or mistake by someone else at a time critical point, leading to your own confusion and how you will resolve that confusion. How you would communicate the resolution to the other pilot? Not so easy is it? We are all vulnerable to the unexpected at just the wrong time.
Training training training practice practice practice: the only defence against the Startle Effect. You have to be so familiar (developed muscle-memory) with doing "similar" things that when the unexpected occurs, you'll have enough spare brain space to think outside the square and realise in time that something isn't right.
We can't train for every specific eventuality, but we sure can do much more training in the groups of events that could cause us grief, GAs being one of them. IMO it is not acceptable to merely have one go at an exercise and say OK, you're good with that or "there's a procedure for that in the FCOM, therefore box ticked". It has to be more than that. Currently, it's not.
We can't train for every specific eventuality, but we sure can do much more training in the groups of events that could cause us grief, GAs being one of them. IMO it is not acceptable to merely have one go at an exercise and say OK, you're good with that or "there's a procedure for that in the FCOM, therefore box ticked". It has to be more than that. Currently, it's not.
Its not as simple as "Well they should've just pushed the thrust levers up at the start!" By the time they worked through their own confusion as to what was going on, time and gravity had taken overt
I think the answer is not so much to do with the individual pilots involved in this incident, but more to do with how all of our brains learn and behave. For the two brains there on the day, the auto thrust had been doing it's job so reliably and so consistently in all phases of flight for so long that the sub conscious motor skill of manipulating the levers to get what is desired had eroded, conscious thought and processing was required.
This requirement for processing came at a moment in time where several other things were competing for processing bandwidth; processing the "long landing long landing" audio, processing the ATC instruction to climb straight ahead to 4000ft, processing the calls from the PM , processing what step comes next regarding flap and gear etc etc. There is a limit to how much an individual can process in a finite period of time.
The pitch and thrust should not require significant conscious thought for a professional Airline pilot. We have automated the thrust to the point where it now requires conscious effort to manipulate it because there is so rarely a requirement to do it. That is the heart of the problem IMO.