HFP
Chaps, Ladies....
It's funny that some have criticised their reaction as unskilful. The contrary is evident. They were very skilful. Years of training worked and they retracted the FLAPS to 20 as required, they pressed the TOGA buttons, they pitched to up, they retracted the Gear as required and the PM even had the presence of mind to call Speed as he is required to do.
No one teaches or requires the PM to look at engine thrust during a go-around and good luck to all of us if we think that the solution is to include one more item in the process during a high task load event.
Nonsense.
Boeing's FCOM and SOP's
direct the PM to VERIFY proper engine thrust application, that G/A thrust is sufficient,
and to adjust if necessary. Verification is a
cognitive act and is a matter of primary importance for the procedure, as written by Boeing. Here, they adhere to the principle of Aviate first by clearly spelling-out that BOTH pilots are supposed to focus/be in the loop of VERIFYING that both correct G/A pitch attitude and Thrust setting are achieved. This act verification/cognitive act precedes moving on to other tasks (monitoring and calling out "positive rate", setting up navs, radio calls, etc.). That is basic airmanship, and the FCOM/SOPs reflects this level of importance and priority.
In fact, the importance of thrust when it comes to making an aircraft go up instead of down is so axiomatic that most well-developed SOPs regardless of type, manufacturer, or Company reflect it with some sort of audible call-out referencing thrust or power. Whether it's a "Check", "Set", or something else, the entire idea for it's inclusion is to reinforce it's necessity and drive awareness straight to it it.
The PM checking the engine instruments after initiating a G/A is most certainly NOT, as you say, "adding an extra step that increases workload, good luck to us all if they try that". On the contrary, the step is already there for supremely obvious reasons, and at that moment during the procedure the required act of verifying G/A thrust has been applied by the PF and sufficient power output has been achieved is a prime responsibility of the PM..it's not dividing attention away from something more important or delaying more critical duties. Engine instruments are the primary indicator of thrust being produced, levers moving or advancing to the stops is feedback of engine control input. There's a difference.
I would be highly interested to hear how you as a PM (or PF) would verify sufficient thrust setting without looking at the engine instruments. Why would it differ from how it's done during a T/O?
To assert that both pilots skipping the simple yet supremely essential and explicitly required, cognitive act of verifying GA thrust represents "very skilful" execution of the maneuver is ridiculous. You may as well say the same re a crew that flew an aircraft straight into the ground with correct G/A thrust and flaps set but neglected to change and/or verify correct pitch. At anything close to professional level proficiency and developed skill in any type of jet aircraft, correct applications of pitch and power are reflex actions. To imply that the Pilot Monitoring has better things to monitor than achieving G/A thrust (and pitch) at that point during this very critical phase of flight is completely at odds with what is clearly spelled-out in the FCOM, airmanship, and common sense as it relates to duties and responsibilities in a multi-crew aircraft. If the PM isn't monitoring those exact things (pitch and thrust) and/or verified them as directed before moving on, he's stepping outside the loop and not doing his job in support of the PF.
My question to you would be, if indeed you are a pilot in a multi-crew aircraft, as PM just what are you doing and focusing on over in the other seat as after the PF called for and initiates a G/A? I'm asking because your statements make it sound like you think it's overloading you to do anything more than slap a flap handle and immediately put on blinders to anything outside climb rate, the radio, and airspeed after it has decayed.
As the PM, if an engine were only developing partial thrust on the G/A or was even experiencing a roll-back would you be oblivious to it? Do you expect it's the PF's responsibility to notice and alert you to the fact?
Are you one of those who believe radio calls need to be immediately answered during a high-workload environment where transitioning to another phase of flight requires almost simultaneous pitch, power, and config changes and the necessary focus and back-up on all 3 of these critical items by both crew?