Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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What would you do?
What would you do, in the second part of this video?
https://youtu.be/MbiVuPWX5K8
https://youtu.be/MbiVuPWX5K8
Move the thrust levers to idle and disconnect the A/T. (A/C is over speed);
Then aliviate the angle of attack (zero G, if needed);
Bring the nose to the horizon and wings to level;
Adjust Thrust as necessary;
Confirm speed brakes in;
Return to the desired flight path.
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aguadalte:
Given all the performance parameters displayed your summation seems reasonable. Can someone explain why there was the 'stall' audio warning going off? I wonder if that seemingly conflicting warning was behind the question? Would your ears override your eyes and make you do something different?
Given all the performance parameters displayed your summation seems reasonable. Can someone explain why there was the 'stall' audio warning going off? I wonder if that seemingly conflicting warning was behind the question? Would your ears override your eyes and make you do something different?
Only half a speed-brake
I'd assume because it stalled in overspeed condition. Caution advised, it is a SIM not a plane, still it looks controllable, but without seeing the pilot's commands dangerous to draw conclusions.
Proffesional observation at 1:33
The aircraft will guard/safely take care of itself, if it was not for the pilot standing in the way.
Proffesional observation at 1:33
Samolot uratuje sie sam, beleby mu pilot nie przeskadzal
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What would you do?
..Move the thrust levers to idle and disconnect the A/T. (A/C is over speed);
Then alleviate the angle of attack (zero G, if needed);
Bring the nose to the horizon and wings to level;....
Can someone explain why there was the 'stall' audio warning going off? I wonder if that seemingly conflicting warning was behind the question? Would your ears override your eyes and make you do something different?
I'd assume because it stalled in overspeed condition.
..Move the thrust levers to idle and disconnect the A/T. (A/C is over speed);
Then alleviate the angle of attack (zero G, if needed);
Bring the nose to the horizon and wings to level;....
Can someone explain why there was the 'stall' audio warning going off? I wonder if that seemingly conflicting warning was behind the question? Would your ears override your eyes and make you do something different?
I'd assume because it stalled in overspeed condition.
->from both french FOsWhat are the similarities between overspeed and stall?
- Buffet, impressive aerodynamic noise, bells and whistle sounds, pitch down, high descent rate, altimeter indication, FD (pull up!).
What is different:
- Airspeed indication
But from report (page 185, comments 39):
...the airspeed from ADRIU was unavailable... (showed unreasonable values)
See Figure 28: stall warning on! airspeed - red SPD! - This upset would initiate overspeed scenario.
The red SPD indication remained until switch to CAPT 3 when FO released SS after 2.5 min of pulling... At that time everything was too late, with AOA over 40 deg
So we all would be dead... by watching again the video at 1:10, substitute the speed indication with red - SPD
Last edited by _Phoenix; 12th Dec 2015 at 16:33. Reason: clarification
Can someone explain why there was the 'stall' audio warning going off?
I'd assume because it stalled in overspeed condition.
Would you be so kind to provide page reference, sır?
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Clandestino,
Stall and overspeed warnings together happen in real life too:
Incident: LOT B763 near Toronto on Jun 19th 2009, unreliable airspeed, simultaneous overspeed and stall warning
Just imagine the AOA of a bird while flapping the wings.
Stall and overspeed warnings together happen in real life too:
Incident: LOT B763 near Toronto on Jun 19th 2009, unreliable airspeed, simultaneous overspeed and stall warning
Just imagine the AOA of a bird while flapping the wings.
...which doesn't change the fact that video posted has nothing to do with either QZ8501/AF447 and was probably made by overdubbing stall warning or that 767s don't flap their wings to fly.
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This is another lack-of-knowledge-discussion, the possibility that the crew was thinking to be overspeeding. If they really were thinking that and reacted like that it would be again meaning not being up to the task to hold a seat upfront.
Although overspeed is not desirable in a modern transport jet, it is much less harmful than stalling it.
Talk to test pilots and certifying engineers. Modern transport jets are deliberately flown into heavy overspeed situations, and they are just fine compared to being in a fully developed stall with 40° AOA and falling like a stone.
If I could pick 50kt overspeed or 40° AOA I would always choose overspeed.
As vilas rightly said, fully pulling the stick / yoke is never ever a wise thing except when you are low and approaching cumulus granitus. If you think you are too fast, gently fly your plane out of it, may be by help of the speedbrake. For sure you are not supposed to violently react.
Although overspeed is not desirable in a modern transport jet, it is much less harmful than stalling it.
Talk to test pilots and certifying engineers. Modern transport jets are deliberately flown into heavy overspeed situations, and they are just fine compared to being in a fully developed stall with 40° AOA and falling like a stone.
If I could pick 50kt overspeed or 40° AOA I would always choose overspeed.
As vilas rightly said, fully pulling the stick / yoke is never ever a wise thing except when you are low and approaching cumulus granitus. If you think you are too fast, gently fly your plane out of it, may be by help of the speedbrake. For sure you are not supposed to violently react.
Thank you, Cland
Many here should wade thru the thoudands of posts we had concerning AF447. Points/counterpoints and many volumes of 'bus manuals and procedures.
I feel most of us from those discussions thot we had enuf new training as a result of that tragedy to prevent another duplicate. Sheesh.
I must remind all that when you see the FDR numbers from AF447 and the "airshow demo" crash by a "test pilot", that the 'bus seems to have very benign stall buffet/burble and such. So you can fly into the stall regime and not realize it. Then there's the problem of control law reversion that still seems to be a problem that the crews do not understand.
"You can't stall this plane", huh? YES YOU CAN!!!
Besides the crew coordination and the "I got it", "You got it" and such, I still see a lack of understanding about how the 'bus works when not in the NORMAL law. I also see a need for some warning that clearly lets the crew know they are in ALTERNATE or DIRECT.
Lastly, I go with the philosophy expressed by a few here, which says, "Don't do something, just sit there". There are a very few problems that require a reaction within a second or so ( however, the 9 second reaction by the PF in this tragedy puzzles me). If the warning lights come on and the jet is not pitching or rolling violently, than don't screw the pooch.
Many here should wade thru the thoudands of posts we had concerning AF447. Points/counterpoints and many volumes of 'bus manuals and procedures.
I feel most of us from those discussions thot we had enuf new training as a result of that tragedy to prevent another duplicate. Sheesh.
I must remind all that when you see the FDR numbers from AF447 and the "airshow demo" crash by a "test pilot", that the 'bus seems to have very benign stall buffet/burble and such. So you can fly into the stall regime and not realize it. Then there's the problem of control law reversion that still seems to be a problem that the crews do not understand.
"You can't stall this plane", huh? YES YOU CAN!!!
Besides the crew coordination and the "I got it", "You got it" and such, I still see a lack of understanding about how the 'bus works when not in the NORMAL law. I also see a need for some warning that clearly lets the crew know they are in ALTERNATE or DIRECT.
Lastly, I go with the philosophy expressed by a few here, which says, "Don't do something, just sit there". There are a very few problems that require a reaction within a second or so ( however, the 9 second reaction by the PF in this tragedy puzzles me). If the warning lights come on and the jet is not pitching or rolling violently, than don't screw the pooch.
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Then, what happened?
First, no comments whatsoever (or even questions) will be found in this post about comparisons of control yokes and sidesticks, and also nothing about control inputs or piloting techniques.
But what I do want to comment on, or ask about, is: what is the next level of authority, above the level of a given country's air accident investigatory outfit? I know already that there is nothing actually above the particular country's investigation board - that's just the point. It's up to "the industry" or some rudely conceptual agglomeration of constituents such as pilots (professional or otherwise), manufacturers, regulators, and so on.
What can happen and where?; specifically, where can the multiplicity of factors about avoiding or preventing the "next AF447" incident get sorted out? Maybe the answer is, there is no such thing. Which means, the sorting out of what to do to fix the problem or problems, preceded by the analysis of the cause or causes, defaults to . . . legal processes and the less-than-binding methods of the status quo. The efficacy of which speaks for itself, in this occurrence (and others).
But what I do want to comment on, or ask about, is: what is the next level of authority, above the level of a given country's air accident investigatory outfit? I know already that there is nothing actually above the particular country's investigation board - that's just the point. It's up to "the industry" or some rudely conceptual agglomeration of constituents such as pilots (professional or otherwise), manufacturers, regulators, and so on.
What can happen and where?; specifically, where can the multiplicity of factors about avoiding or preventing the "next AF447" incident get sorted out? Maybe the answer is, there is no such thing. Which means, the sorting out of what to do to fix the problem or problems, preceded by the analysis of the cause or causes, defaults to . . . legal processes and the less-than-binding methods of the status quo. The efficacy of which speaks for itself, in this occurrence (and others).
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 12th Dec 2015 at 21:15. Reason: a word had been omitted
WillowRun, the investigation board typically has no rule making authority - however it can issue 'recommendations'. The regulatory authority then reviews those recommendations and determines what (if any) action to be taken based on those recommendations.
So, in the US, the NTSB makes recommendations and the FAA determines what action to take as a result. This has sometimes resulted in considerable friction between the NTSB and FAA when the FAA determined the NTSB recommended action was not justified.
So, in the US, the NTSB makes recommendations and the FAA determines what action to take as a result. This has sometimes resulted in considerable friction between the NTSB and FAA when the FAA determined the NTSB recommended action was not justified.
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- The SIC was pulling more that the PIC was pushing but the PIC could not see it so was not able to understand the situation.
- Initially the SIC responded correctly to the first STALL warning but not to the second one ... Was he preoccupied by the bank angle, was he trying to follow that "pull down" ambiguous directive from the PIC or was he chasing unrealistic FD Indications ... ?
- How was doing the THS ?
This time at least the STALL warning never quit ... The conditions were not met or the program was modified ... ?
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What happens next?
@tdracer: I appreciate your reiteration of the relationship, in terms of authority, between the FAA and NTSB. And I regret if my prior post lacked clarity.
The point I was reaching for is: when a given investigatory authority in a single country reaches conclusions (whether in the form of just recommendations or any other form presently in use by the various investigatory authorities around the world), and those conclusions relate to a problem or a set of problems which cut across national boundaries and implicate major components of the worldwide civil aviation system as a whole, what is the mechanism, the forum (no irony intended), for progress on solutions? There isn't, in the realm of civil aviation accident investigation boards or agencies, any umbrella group, or something akin to a "court of appeals", so, where can the multi-national problem-solving take place? Even if ICAO SARPs and other programming were implicated in how the AF447 and this incident unfolded (and no one is claiming they were implicated, as far as I recall), there isn't such a process in place at the Organization, as far as I know.
What I am trying to stir up, in terms of discussion, is the idea that in order to attack and redress problems like low-hours aviators who may be too reliant on automation generally, or too unfamiliar with recognition of imminent stall and recovery from stall, or the problem of airline management too cheapskate to allow for hand-flying to be experienced more extensively, the first action seems to be to create a forum (again, no irony intended) where the major constituents of, and participants in, what I will dare to call "the safety community" can conduct a broader problem-solving process than the country-by-country process as reflected in the interactions of FAA with NTSB, as noted by tdracer's post.
The point I was reaching for is: when a given investigatory authority in a single country reaches conclusions (whether in the form of just recommendations or any other form presently in use by the various investigatory authorities around the world), and those conclusions relate to a problem or a set of problems which cut across national boundaries and implicate major components of the worldwide civil aviation system as a whole, what is the mechanism, the forum (no irony intended), for progress on solutions? There isn't, in the realm of civil aviation accident investigation boards or agencies, any umbrella group, or something akin to a "court of appeals", so, where can the multi-national problem-solving take place? Even if ICAO SARPs and other programming were implicated in how the AF447 and this incident unfolded (and no one is claiming they were implicated, as far as I recall), there isn't such a process in place at the Organization, as far as I know.
What I am trying to stir up, in terms of discussion, is the idea that in order to attack and redress problems like low-hours aviators who may be too reliant on automation generally, or too unfamiliar with recognition of imminent stall and recovery from stall, or the problem of airline management too cheapskate to allow for hand-flying to be experienced more extensively, the first action seems to be to create a forum (again, no irony intended) where the major constituents of, and participants in, what I will dare to call "the safety community" can conduct a broader problem-solving process than the country-by-country process as reflected in the interactions of FAA with NTSB, as noted by tdracer's post.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 13th Dec 2015 at 09:17. Reason: correcting a typographical error
xcitation, #3771, thanks.
Situate, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
These concepts offer the potential for the most significant change in Human Factors / Airmanship training and operation in recent years.
The problem (not as a naysayer) is how to achieve this change. As much as we have difficulty in teaching the wide ranging aspects of ‘Aviate’ (flying as an art and skill), then ‘Situate’ appears even more obscure.
Many people are taught Situation Awareness by definition or level (text book), but without assurance of achievement; neither are we encouraged to practice what is a skill – that of thinking; the process of how to think, not what to think.
This problem could be the difference between implicit knowledge and tacit knowledge, e.g. we can be told how to ride a bike, but we learn how to ride a bike by doing it, … and once done never forgot, and with continual practice improved.
A view of training which might help. http://high-reliability.org/vanstral...ementation.pdf
Situate, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
These concepts offer the potential for the most significant change in Human Factors / Airmanship training and operation in recent years.
The problem (not as a naysayer) is how to achieve this change. As much as we have difficulty in teaching the wide ranging aspects of ‘Aviate’ (flying as an art and skill), then ‘Situate’ appears even more obscure.
Many people are taught Situation Awareness by definition or level (text book), but without assurance of achievement; neither are we encouraged to practice what is a skill – that of thinking; the process of how to think, not what to think.
This problem could be the difference between implicit knowledge and tacit knowledge, e.g. we can be told how to ride a bike, but we learn how to ride a bike by doing it, … and once done never forgot, and with continual practice improved.
A view of training which might help. http://high-reliability.org/vanstral...ementation.pdf
@WillowRun, as you may be aware that the investigative process is overseen by ICAO; in this instance via the internationally agreed Annex 13 (not every State, and some have opt out clauses). There are also associated safety processes (forums) which include continued airworthiness (aircraft) and flight operations. Generally ICAO recommends, States implement, Authorities and Operators act.
In today’s complex operations the ICAO guidelines (even more so State / National interpretations) may hinder accident investigation, e.g. difficulties arising from the need to identify ‘probable cause’ and with the consideration of human factors.
Many, most accidents do not fit the old model of ‘cause and effect’; they are better represented with a systems view where outcomes emerge from ‘the seemingly random conjunction of many factors, each necessary, but in isolation not sufficient’ (James Reason, et al).
Therefore to improve safety it is necessary to encourage a systematic view, which currently is not at the forefront of safety activity, and international changes are slow. Fortunately several national investigators do venture into supposition and conjecture to provide more relevant understandings of the accident, but according to international agreements insufficient to recommend change.
An investigator can make recommendations to another State for action by a National Authority (more often operational issues); also recommend changes via the State of aircraft certification to a Manufacturer (technical issues). (ICAO Annex 13. 6.8 - 6.10)
Fortunately many National Authorities, Manufactures, and Operators will consider safety enhancements based on the subjective discussion, but this requires a ‘good’ report. IMHO this report is ‘fair to good’ given the circumstances.
Thus because more ‘worldly’ safety activity still requires factual arguments (evidence), the complexity and incredibility of modern accidents leads to frustration in judging how to manage the different points of view of safety actions, particularly where influenced by inherent human bias.
Even your examples reflect bias, suggesting that these points are known ‘causes’ (fact), whereas from a systems view they may only be contributions in a process applicable to a particular situation (probably never to be encountered again).
From the theories of high reliability organisations (the current level of safety qualifies aviation as such); it is difficult if not impossible to identify the mechanism of the next accident. It’s equally difficult to make effective recommendations from past accidents unless there is a change in safety views and processes.
Such changes take time, willingness, and understanding.
A lesson from quantum mechanics, first accept that nothing is certain.
We live and operate in an uncertain world, thus our safety activity must involve managing uncertainty, particularly where changes could be applied to aspects which were previously assumed to be satisfactory.
What was uncertain in this accident?
From a systems view, the industry’s problem is that we may not know what the problem is.
In ‘problem situations’ the human can be an asset in resolving the issue, but with ‘messy situations’ the problem is often the human.
How complex systems fail.
Systems Thinking.
In today’s complex operations the ICAO guidelines (even more so State / National interpretations) may hinder accident investigation, e.g. difficulties arising from the need to identify ‘probable cause’ and with the consideration of human factors.
Many, most accidents do not fit the old model of ‘cause and effect’; they are better represented with a systems view where outcomes emerge from ‘the seemingly random conjunction of many factors, each necessary, but in isolation not sufficient’ (James Reason, et al).
Therefore to improve safety it is necessary to encourage a systematic view, which currently is not at the forefront of safety activity, and international changes are slow. Fortunately several national investigators do venture into supposition and conjecture to provide more relevant understandings of the accident, but according to international agreements insufficient to recommend change.
An investigator can make recommendations to another State for action by a National Authority (more often operational issues); also recommend changes via the State of aircraft certification to a Manufacturer (technical issues). (ICAO Annex 13. 6.8 - 6.10)
Fortunately many National Authorities, Manufactures, and Operators will consider safety enhancements based on the subjective discussion, but this requires a ‘good’ report. IMHO this report is ‘fair to good’ given the circumstances.
Thus because more ‘worldly’ safety activity still requires factual arguments (evidence), the complexity and incredibility of modern accidents leads to frustration in judging how to manage the different points of view of safety actions, particularly where influenced by inherent human bias.
Even your examples reflect bias, suggesting that these points are known ‘causes’ (fact), whereas from a systems view they may only be contributions in a process applicable to a particular situation (probably never to be encountered again).
From the theories of high reliability organisations (the current level of safety qualifies aviation as such); it is difficult if not impossible to identify the mechanism of the next accident. It’s equally difficult to make effective recommendations from past accidents unless there is a change in safety views and processes.
Such changes take time, willingness, and understanding.
A lesson from quantum mechanics, first accept that nothing is certain.
We live and operate in an uncertain world, thus our safety activity must involve managing uncertainty, particularly where changes could be applied to aspects which were previously assumed to be satisfactory.
What was uncertain in this accident?
From a systems view, the industry’s problem is that we may not know what the problem is.
In ‘problem situations’ the human can be an asset in resolving the issue, but with ‘messy situations’ the problem is often the human.
How complex systems fail.
Systems Thinking.
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We are not flying in quantum mechanics ! That is for very small scale.
We are not flying in general relativity ! That is for very high speeds.
We are not flying in the neuroscience bigdata and complexity.
We are flying in the Newton world, and are able to be aware quickly of simple situations with KISS design, maintenance, teaching, training.
We are not flying in general relativity ! That is for very high speeds
.We are not flying in the neuroscience bigdata and complexity.
We are flying in the Newton world, and are able to be aware quickly of simple situations with KISS design, maintenance, teaching, training.
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We are flying in the Newton world, and are able to be aware quickly of simple situations with KISS design, maintenance, teaching, training
Moreover, regarding KISS design, in my previous posts my intention is to show the necessity to clearly distinguish between overspeed vs stall, at high altitude, then the importance of having the AOA indicator or the bird (FPV) on PFD.
Another point is to clearly identify who does what, PIC, SIC or automation.
A more philosophical issue is the complexity of LAWs, especially the Alternate in combination with incipient stall condition when g is below 1.0 then a pitch input close to neural, i.e. 0.9g to 1.1g > 0.5g, for computers that is a Pull Up command that will bring THS at max NU. I think a simpler design would imply two laws Normal(all protections) and Direct(conventional), similar to Bombardier philosophy. All these changes should not imply a huge amount of money and it can be done quietly just by a simple software update, by bring the bird on PFD and revise the FCOM
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roulis, I think most can agree that Quantum Mechanics may not apply directly but, if I may, that is not what is being suggested.
I interpret Safetypee's remarks as the recognition and acknowledgement of both complexity and uncertainty that requires a change in approach concerning the question, Why do "accidents" still occur?
Safetypee is seeking a model for understanding why accidents occur which may be more successful than the present Newtonian (Cartesian) model of classical physics.
Rather than wagging a finger, shouldn't we take our lessons from where we find them when confronted with aviation's Gordian Knot, human factors?
We must examine experience in other, perhaps-unfamiliar ways because, as SP has pointed out, the old interpretations of how accidents happen are showing themselves as no longer able to carry the potential for strong change and improvement. What imagination as much as we need knowledge.
Cartesian approach has largely resolved, (we cannot quite say eliminated) the old problems of mechanical failure, weather, navigation, communication, CFIT and mid-air collision. That is, aviation has resolved these direct causes through changes in technology.
Despite coming to terms with direct causes, accidents continue to occur is a result of human frailties - errors in perception, comprehension, or other "normal", human incapacities in complex, rapidly-changing systems and environments in which accidents presently seem to unfold.
I interpret Safetypee's remarks as the recognition and acknowledgement of both complexity and uncertainty that requires a change in approach concerning the question, Why do "accidents" still occur?
Safetypee is seeking a model for understanding why accidents occur which may be more successful than the present Newtonian (Cartesian) model of classical physics.
Rather than wagging a finger, shouldn't we take our lessons from where we find them when confronted with aviation's Gordian Knot, human factors?
We must examine experience in other, perhaps-unfamiliar ways because, as SP has pointed out, the old interpretations of how accidents happen are showing themselves as no longer able to carry the potential for strong change and improvement. What imagination as much as we need knowledge.
Cartesian approach has largely resolved, (we cannot quite say eliminated) the old problems of mechanical failure, weather, navigation, communication, CFIT and mid-air collision. That is, aviation has resolved these direct causes through changes in technology.
Despite coming to terms with direct causes, accidents continue to occur is a result of human frailties - errors in perception, comprehension, or other "normal", human incapacities in complex, rapidly-changing systems and environments in which accidents presently seem to unfold.
We are moving back to the discussions several of us here had at length concerning AF447 on the Tech Log.
I disagree about going directly from "you can't stall or over-gee this plane" to "a pure stick displacement equals corresponding control surface movement". Several considerations regarding that implementation.
The whine I have is two ALTERNATE laws and a lack of training as to how the plane flies in either or both. Secondly, some things may be lost from the primary NORMAL law, but seems a few simple things could still be in play such as over-gee, as that can be derived from within the flight control computers themselves. Ditto for some of rates and pitch/roll limits. Finally, loss of air data should be no biggie, as several 'bus crews have demonstrated before and since AF447 - "standby gains" for many functions and basic "keep doing what you were doing" training.
I disagree about going directly from "you can't stall or over-gee this plane" to "a pure stick displacement equals corresponding control surface movement". Several considerations regarding that implementation.
The whine I have is two ALTERNATE laws and a lack of training as to how the plane flies in either or both. Secondly, some things may be lost from the primary NORMAL law, but seems a few simple things could still be in play such as over-gee, as that can be derived from within the flight control computers themselves. Ditto for some of rates and pitch/roll limits. Finally, loss of air data should be no biggie, as several 'bus crews have demonstrated before and since AF447 - "standby gains" for many functions and basic "keep doing what you were doing" training.
Last edited by gums; 13th Dec 2015 at 14:31. Reason: grammar
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I disagree about going directly from "you can't stall or over-gee this plane" to "a pure stick displacement equals corresponding control surface movement".
Details about soft stop in video below at 0:54
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=QN0qQrMaLYw
The direct law should not be spooky, but just a reversion to conventional flying. Many of Cseries tests were performed in direct:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=OghtdzFXFoo