Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
With three Airbii in the water after something resembling a "full aft stick stall" (T-38 stuff) and a Colgan Q400 crashing after a similar stunt; I am bugles by the pilot reaction to yank BACK. Where are they learning this?
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With three Airbii in the water after something resembling a "full aft stick stall" (T-38 stuff) and a Colgan Q400 crashing after a similar stunt; I am bugles by the pilot reaction to yank BACK. Where are they learning this?
AF447 was the first piloting failure where the guy flying lost control of pitch and spent a lot of time with too much aft stick.
QZ8501 is now the second of these strange aft stick events where the pilot flying lost the bubble and ended up holding in aft stick where it wasn't needed.
In both of these accidents, they started with a roll PIO which is an extremely concerning situation to the pilot. I cannot state that I know a reason that this would cause a pilot to pull full back stick, but we now have two Airbus instances of unexplained inappropriate aft stick plus the Colgan accident.
It could be something as simple as an inadvertent reaction by a pilot who's scan has broken completely and who is trying to hold his posterior in the seat in a manner to which he is accustomed.
Somebody had better be doing some basic research PDQ on human response to better understand the reasons for this "Pull the Stick" phenomena. Then we can actually fix the problem.
I have no gripe with Airbus Normal Law. What I have real problems with is the transition to Roll Direct as part of Alternate Law.
Letting an unsuspecting pilot start flying in Alternate law with Roll Direct before he understands fully the implications of that configuration, is asking for trouble. If a pilot is startled into making a large initial correction or if he naturally pilots with large stick motions, he is very likely to set up a roll PIO. Roll Direct requires gentle control motions for success, particularly at cruise altitude where damping is low. Roll PIO destroys the trust that a pilot has in his flight control system and (empirically) can fully saturate a weak pilot's scan in seconds.
There is a lot that can be done to make the transition to Alternate Law easier. I would hope that Airbus will give that area some study.
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It's called "normal human reaction".
Break it down to its elements.
What is the pilot reacting to that causes the "pull back" reflex?
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In normal flight, pull back stick == plane climbs up.
When plane plunges down, instinctive reaction == pull back stick (to make plane go back up).
All pilots do this almost sub-consciously. Feel plane sink a little? Pull back the stick a little to compensate. In 99.99999% of the cases this works out for the pilot, i.e., in normal flight with sufficient power and nominal AoA. (And especially with a working autothrottle).
Of course we all "know" that this "doesn't work" during a stall -- or even near a stall (area of reverse command).
Thus the problem with surprise stalls is that the pilot must overcome his/her instinctive reaction (which until this point has worked 100% of the time) and do the complete opposite: push the stick down when the plane is already going down.
To summarize:
There is a human-factor safety theory that says that if you have to "remember" to do something different (opposite) during an emergency vs. normal ops, then you will always have a high risk of failures.
Training does help, but only to a certain extent. Training happens at most a few times a year. Yet pilots "pull the stick back to climb" on every single flight. That's "training" as well (from a neuroscience perspective).
I'm sure every single pilot familiar with AF447 and QZ8501 has concluded that "this can NEVER happen to me!" but the truth is, when you are startled and confused, it's hard to fight instinct.
Imagine it's year 2100. AirBoeingBus 78320-ER somehow gets into a stall and starts losing altitude. The Pilot, last of her kind, pulls back the stick, to go back up. Autopilot-G (for George) recognizes the stall, automatically lowers the nose to reduce AoA, recovers from the stall, and then pitches up until the plane climbs -- as commanded. In this case, the pilot does nothing different between normal and stall condition. From a pure human-factors perspective, this is the preferable system behavior.
Edit: to add, even in the non-stall case, when a plane is rolled with nose down attitude, the instinctive (and incorrect) upset recovery action is for the pilot to simultaneously apply opposite roll and pull back on the stick. This is in part why UPRT training is being mandated.
When plane plunges down, instinctive reaction == pull back stick (to make plane go back up).
All pilots do this almost sub-consciously. Feel plane sink a little? Pull back the stick a little to compensate. In 99.99999% of the cases this works out for the pilot, i.e., in normal flight with sufficient power and nominal AoA. (And especially with a working autothrottle).
Of course we all "know" that this "doesn't work" during a stall -- or even near a stall (area of reverse command).
Thus the problem with surprise stalls is that the pilot must overcome his/her instinctive reaction (which until this point has worked 100% of the time) and do the complete opposite: push the stick down when the plane is already going down.
To summarize:
- Pushing the stick down is an "intellectual" reaction. It requires knowledge that the plane is in a stall, and recall of the correct stall recovery procedure.
- Pulling the stick back is a "instinctive" reaction. It is based on "muscle memory" from thousands of hours of normal operations.
There is a human-factor safety theory that says that if you have to "remember" to do something different (opposite) during an emergency vs. normal ops, then you will always have a high risk of failures.
Training does help, but only to a certain extent. Training happens at most a few times a year. Yet pilots "pull the stick back to climb" on every single flight. That's "training" as well (from a neuroscience perspective).
I'm sure every single pilot familiar with AF447 and QZ8501 has concluded that "this can NEVER happen to me!" but the truth is, when you are startled and confused, it's hard to fight instinct.
Imagine it's year 2100. AirBoeingBus 78320-ER somehow gets into a stall and starts losing altitude. The Pilot, last of her kind, pulls back the stick, to go back up. Autopilot-G (for George) recognizes the stall, automatically lowers the nose to reduce AoA, recovers from the stall, and then pitches up until the plane climbs -- as commanded. In this case, the pilot does nothing different between normal and stall condition. From a pure human-factors perspective, this is the preferable system behavior.
Edit: to add, even in the non-stall case, when a plane is rolled with nose down attitude, the instinctive (and incorrect) upset recovery action is for the pilot to simultaneously apply opposite roll and pull back on the stick. This is in part why UPRT training is being mandated.
Last edited by peekay4; 20th Dec 2015 at 07:14.
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From Gums:... but I am not convinced many of the nuggets have their basic skills burned-in by hours of practice and exposure to the dark side of things in their planes.
The practice of "engage otto" at 300 feet with gear up and the reverse when landing bugs me beyond anything. I don't feel all should be Chuck Yeager, but if we can't fly the profile without using otto, then we should not be flying at all. But I never flew a profile that I had to use otto versus my own skills/eperience, and remember that otto has ZERO experience.
I find it amusing that many interviews still include a sim check where it is common to fly a basic IR profile without FD or A/T. Then, in that same airline you are, near as damn it, forbidden do such such a dangerous thing again. Same goes for base training: a manually flown circuit with only Mk1 eyeball guidance, but don't let them catch you doing such a heinous thing on line. If you can't fly a procedural ILS raw data, including a hold and reversal turn to finals ILS and GA, you should not be there. Computers fail and must be able to maintain SA and cope with achieving a safe arrival.
Peekay4: some interesting observations and comments about human reactions. It is an old chestnut that to fly an a/c you "push on stick = houses get bigger: pull back on stick = houses get smaller: keep pulling back = houses get bigger again."
We all know that, but you went on to say that to do the opposite of what is instinctive you need to know e.g. you are in a stall. There has been much discussion about this on this thread and Tech Log (FD in a stall) thread. Is the stall warning on AB, or any a/c, sufficient to make your training kick in and combat the panic? I know nothing of AB warnings, but the Boeing Stick Shaker is unmissable.
In old tech a/c, at a stall there was often a stick shaker and a pusher/nudger. If you/A.P hadn't trimmed too much you could even just let go and the a/c would possibly lower the nose slightly by itself. What happens with FBW at the stall if you let go? Does it hold the attitude à la CWS?
From the human factors point of view what I think needs considering: in AF & QZ they had an enormous amount of air beneath them; perhaps time to let go and start analysing, but they didn't. (in my world of paragliders it is often the pilot, in a panic, who makes UAR worse. Often letting go allows the aerodynamics to start the recovery process.) In 'close to the ground stalls' the training has a much greater difficulty combating the panic of rapidly rising ground. Similarly it would be difficult, without extreme training and practice, to know when in a car incident it is better to use power rather than brakes.
However, one would hope, that an unmissable STALL visual AND audible warning + stick shaker (tactile) would not be ignored and training would kick in. That training involves use of stick, thrust levers, attention to instruments. We know that under stress your ears shut down, hence the addition of a powerful visual warning. Designers could also include that the a/c will attempt to recover if you just let go.
Those with more knowledge of current FBW actions and future designs could share it with us.
The practice of "engage otto" at 300 feet with gear up and the reverse when landing bugs me beyond anything. I don't feel all should be Chuck Yeager, but if we can't fly the profile without using otto, then we should not be flying at all. But I never flew a profile that I had to use otto versus my own skills/eperience, and remember that otto has ZERO experience.
I find it amusing that many interviews still include a sim check where it is common to fly a basic IR profile without FD or A/T. Then, in that same airline you are, near as damn it, forbidden do such such a dangerous thing again. Same goes for base training: a manually flown circuit with only Mk1 eyeball guidance, but don't let them catch you doing such a heinous thing on line. If you can't fly a procedural ILS raw data, including a hold and reversal turn to finals ILS and GA, you should not be there. Computers fail and must be able to maintain SA and cope with achieving a safe arrival.
Peekay4: some interesting observations and comments about human reactions. It is an old chestnut that to fly an a/c you "push on stick = houses get bigger: pull back on stick = houses get smaller: keep pulling back = houses get bigger again."
We all know that, but you went on to say that to do the opposite of what is instinctive you need to know e.g. you are in a stall. There has been much discussion about this on this thread and Tech Log (FD in a stall) thread. Is the stall warning on AB, or any a/c, sufficient to make your training kick in and combat the panic? I know nothing of AB warnings, but the Boeing Stick Shaker is unmissable.
In old tech a/c, at a stall there was often a stick shaker and a pusher/nudger. If you/A.P hadn't trimmed too much you could even just let go and the a/c would possibly lower the nose slightly by itself. What happens with FBW at the stall if you let go? Does it hold the attitude à la CWS?
From the human factors point of view what I think needs considering: in AF & QZ they had an enormous amount of air beneath them; perhaps time to let go and start analysing, but they didn't. (in my world of paragliders it is often the pilot, in a panic, who makes UAR worse. Often letting go allows the aerodynamics to start the recovery process.) In 'close to the ground stalls' the training has a much greater difficulty combating the panic of rapidly rising ground. Similarly it would be difficult, without extreme training and practice, to know when in a car incident it is better to use power rather than brakes.
However, one would hope, that an unmissable STALL visual AND audible warning + stick shaker (tactile) would not be ignored and training would kick in. That training involves use of stick, thrust levers, attention to instruments. We know that under stress your ears shut down, hence the addition of a powerful visual warning. Designers could also include that the a/c will attempt to recover if you just let go.
Those with more knowledge of current FBW actions and future designs could share it with us.
Last edited by RAT 5; 20th Dec 2015 at 18:55.
… ‘zero experience autopilots’.
One view of the problems being discussed is that the level of human experience is decreasing and the opportunities for gaining experience have significantly reduced.
Many accidents suggest ‘zero experience pilots’ in the specific conditions.
More manual flight might aid the physical skills, but without encountering demanding, rare situations, little or no cognitive experience is gained – that which helps understand a situation before acting.
A more beneficial approach to safety might be to consider the precursor situations to ‘those which have never been experienced’, where appropriate awareness and action might avoid the upsets.
Are the recent accidents also an indication that pilots’ experience levels of the precursor situations are also weak?
“What is the pilot reacting to that causes the "pull back" reflex?”
‘It’ would be based on whatever the pilot perceives, which with the experiences from memory, provide an awareness of the situation. Thus the actions would be ‘normal’ for what was perceived – doing what is always done or what is believed to be required in a situation which has never been encountered before
Many people present arguments for changing 'the aircraft', but these are based on probable and inconclusive evidence; the result is a weak argument particularly as it is impossible to determine what the pilots perceived.
The alternative argument – no change – based on what happens in every day operations, might be similarly hampered by not knowing. However, it is strengthened by the overwhelming numerical success of safe operation and some ability to enquire what pilots perceive. This should not be seen as a winning argument – complacency, but an opportunity to consider what is not known in both normal and accident scenarios.
We should not conclude that if every flight ends safely we are safe, but equally we should not label all accidents as being ‘unsafe’ because of … , because we just don’t know.
‘Unsafe’ is our judgement of the outcome; for the accident crews it’s quite possible that they believed what they were doing was ‘safe’, but … we don’t know.
The various arguments are presented on the basis of not knowing which is immensely frustrating both for debaters and audience.
One view of the problems being discussed is that the level of human experience is decreasing and the opportunities for gaining experience have significantly reduced.
Many accidents suggest ‘zero experience pilots’ in the specific conditions.
More manual flight might aid the physical skills, but without encountering demanding, rare situations, little or no cognitive experience is gained – that which helps understand a situation before acting.
A more beneficial approach to safety might be to consider the precursor situations to ‘those which have never been experienced’, where appropriate awareness and action might avoid the upsets.
Are the recent accidents also an indication that pilots’ experience levels of the precursor situations are also weak?
“What is the pilot reacting to that causes the "pull back" reflex?”
‘It’ would be based on whatever the pilot perceives, which with the experiences from memory, provide an awareness of the situation. Thus the actions would be ‘normal’ for what was perceived – doing what is always done or what is believed to be required in a situation which has never been encountered before
Many people present arguments for changing 'the aircraft', but these are based on probable and inconclusive evidence; the result is a weak argument particularly as it is impossible to determine what the pilots perceived.
The alternative argument – no change – based on what happens in every day operations, might be similarly hampered by not knowing. However, it is strengthened by the overwhelming numerical success of safe operation and some ability to enquire what pilots perceive. This should not be seen as a winning argument – complacency, but an opportunity to consider what is not known in both normal and accident scenarios.
We should not conclude that if every flight ends safely we are safe, but equally we should not label all accidents as being ‘unsafe’ because of … , because we just don’t know.
‘Unsafe’ is our judgement of the outcome; for the accident crews it’s quite possible that they believed what they were doing was ‘safe’, but … we don’t know.
The various arguments are presented on the basis of not knowing which is immensely frustrating both for debaters and audience.
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RAT 5;
It would take the knowledge of an aerodynamicist who knows C* laws to discuss the "letting go" scenario.
My thoughts as a former transport pilot are that in a fully-developed stall, (35°+ AoA, vertical speed > 10,000fpm), just releasing the controls to neutral would not recover the aircraft, FBW or no.
Bear in mind that all aircraft would have different responses; whether such differences make a difference in handling during a full-stall is one of many unanswered questions.
A full nose-down stick command, wings level, thrust at idle is almost certainly a recover strategy, but no one's done it in flight tests and the sim data, post-stall, is extrapolation from best-knowledge as there is no basis in testing - yet.
The flight control computers for the Airbus attempt to maintain 1g, (Nz, in relation to the longitudinal axis in Normal and Alternate I Laws) and the trim horizontal stabilizer, (THS) autotrim function attempts to unload the elevator, but the follow-up is not instantaneous.
In AF447, the THS was driven full NU and remained there because of full-up stick inputs. If the stick had been placed full-forward, the THS would follow-up and return close to a neutral setting.
From discussions with others here and elsewhere, it is likely the elevator retained sufficient effectiveness to get the nose down, unload the wing and recover.
Link: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9216057 "Those with more knowledge of current FBW actions and future designs could share it with us."
My thoughts as a former transport pilot are that in a fully-developed stall, (35°+ AoA, vertical speed > 10,000fpm), just releasing the controls to neutral would not recover the aircraft, FBW or no.
Bear in mind that all aircraft would have different responses; whether such differences make a difference in handling during a full-stall is one of many unanswered questions.
A full nose-down stick command, wings level, thrust at idle is almost certainly a recover strategy, but no one's done it in flight tests and the sim data, post-stall, is extrapolation from best-knowledge as there is no basis in testing - yet.
The flight control computers for the Airbus attempt to maintain 1g, (Nz, in relation to the longitudinal axis in Normal and Alternate I Laws) and the trim horizontal stabilizer, (THS) autotrim function attempts to unload the elevator, but the follow-up is not instantaneous.
In AF447, the THS was driven full NU and remained there because of full-up stick inputs. If the stick had been placed full-forward, the THS would follow-up and return close to a neutral setting.
From discussions with others here and elsewhere, it is likely the elevator retained sufficient effectiveness to get the nose down, unload the wing and recover.
Peekay,
The absolute last thought I'd have with a stall warning is to pull back! Unload the wing FIRST. This is pretty basic flying. Also, basic training is not panicking.
Then again, I have a couple of thousand hours of fast jet time.
GF
The absolute last thought I'd have with a stall warning is to pull back! Unload the wing FIRST. This is pretty basic flying. Also, basic training is not panicking.
Then again, I have a couple of thousand hours of fast jet time.
GF
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In normal flight, pull back stick == plane climbs up.
I graduated from the USN fast jet school of training where I learned to overcome the sensation of sitting in a waste basket while I flew instruments and to fly intellectually-because your physical sensations were not to be trusted. Later, as an instructor, I would have washed out any pilot that could not measure up to this basic standard. (They would only have gone on to kill themselves and others.)
If we cannot properly qualify pilots to actually take direct control of an aircraft, then we had darned well better not be putting those guys occupying the seats with the best view into that position. The airframe folks are going to have to ensure that their aircraft never gives up to the point where it has to pass highly degraded control to the "pilots". There is a body of evidence building to suggest that an improper transition to Airbus Alternate Law-Roll Direct can become a highly degraded condition. Do we need more accidents to prove the thesis?
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Do we need more accidents to prove the thesis?
At present there is almost no research available regarding human factors and the actual transition from 'normal', (which is a protected airplane), to Alternate I/II, and possibly to Direct Law depending upon system losses, (a conventional airplane in theory and, I have discovered, in practise).
Such absence in and of itself may speak to the question - it doesn't appear to constitute a primary problem, particularly for those experienced in manual flight. I've flown the aircraft at cruise altitudes many times - the A320, A330 & A340 fly just like any other transport, and as you'd know, you must absolutely be gentle with the controls.
However, inexperience, need-to-know knowledge levels, and low or absence of exposure (the case in both these accidents) to abnormal attitudes does not leave much 'resourcefulness-in-reserve' when faced with such circumstances, especially for those entering the profession now. I think there may be something to the apparent sensitivity of the controls which speaks to training issues regarding handling the stick.
Nor is there anything informal regarding the transition. Those who have trained-on / flown the Airbus do not seem to find the transition (from Normal to Alternate I/II / Direct) problematic, nor are two samples in millions of flights, statistically significant.
I think what alf5071h has to say under "zero-experience autopilots", above, would be a more rewarding area of examination.
Last edited by FDMII; 20th Dec 2015 at 19:24.
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I graduated from the USN fast jet school of training where I learned to overcome the sensation of sitting in a waste basket while I flew instruments and to fly intellectually-because your physical sensations were not to be trusted
Did you earn to fly limited panel IMC? Do students still at CPL still learn that skill? It certainly gave one an appreciation of what was going on and how to control it. It also taught you not to panic when you lost what had previously been perceived as a vital parameter. You calmly used other information to maintain control. If it has been removed from basic flying school IMC training then IMHO it should be re-introduced.
Has anyone attempted this in a modern jet? The worst I was ever given in recent recurrency was an FMC failure or flight on SBY (EFIS) display. Neither a big deal. An ILS with total unreliable airspeed is a good one, but rarely trained. As a trainer my dictated syllabus was very basic when displaying unreliable airspeed scenarios. A nice tick in the box for 3.4 system failures, but as a training exercise to 'save the day' when it happened for real, not so useful.
One of the best I had in a B757 sim was to fly an ILS on full old fashioned SBY displays. It became even better when the RMI went awol and we had to use the old fashioned compass. Again no big deal if you used the basics.
The absolute last thought I'd have with a stall warning is to pull back! Unload the wing FIRST. This is pretty basic flying.
I have to confess that when teaching stick shaker stall recovery I questioned the FCTM. It said "apply power & reduce attitude." It didn't say anything about minimum height loss. That was an exercise 'if ground contact was a factor'. I stressed to reverse the wording might be better, especially in underslung engines, to 'reduce attitude and increase thrust.' Split second, even both at the same time, but elevator leads the way. To me aerodynamics had not changed so why pretend it had. Beforehand I saw guys apply the thrust and then go closer to a full stall than they were. i.e. they made it worse before they made it better. After THY at AMS guess what happened. Aerodynamics and common sense won the day and FCTM was changed to UNSTALL the wing first.
One view of the problems being discussed is that the level of human experience is decreasing and the opportunities for gaining experience have significantly reduced.
Great comment, and then ask why & how? Let's get to the root cause of this demise and start to solve the problem there, not massage it and put a few sticking plasters on a gaping wound. It may need an operation or stitches, but there needs to be a serious reasoned debate from all parties. There appears to be a lack of leadership on that. Many interested parties are spouting words of wisdom, and some even showing disinterest. Will it be EASA, an XAA, ECA, IALPA, Boeing, AB, a government, an airline group, anybody, but it needs somebody to lead. There is a real problem and we are perhaps seeing the tip of an iceberg. A/C will evolve into more computerised sophisticated beasts; MPL cadets will be less experienced and thrust into RHS of said jets; companies will expand and give commands with less experience to meet that expansion; cadets will pay for their training and grab any job with any T's & C's they can find; rigid SOP's will evolve to reduce piloting skills. So how can the industry protect itself from a declining spiral of skills that could hurt it? We already know that there are airlines from certain regions that certain pax avoid due to suspicion of standards. We want to reverse that trend not allow it expand.
Did you earn to fly limited panel IMC? Do students still at CPL still learn that skill? It certainly gave one an appreciation of what was going on and how to control it. It also taught you not to panic when you lost what had previously been perceived as a vital parameter. You calmly used other information to maintain control. If it has been removed from basic flying school IMC training then IMHO it should be re-introduced.
Has anyone attempted this in a modern jet? The worst I was ever given in recent recurrency was an FMC failure or flight on SBY (EFIS) display. Neither a big deal. An ILS with total unreliable airspeed is a good one, but rarely trained. As a trainer my dictated syllabus was very basic when displaying unreliable airspeed scenarios. A nice tick in the box for 3.4 system failures, but as a training exercise to 'save the day' when it happened for real, not so useful.
One of the best I had in a B757 sim was to fly an ILS on full old fashioned SBY displays. It became even better when the RMI went awol and we had to use the old fashioned compass. Again no big deal if you used the basics.
The absolute last thought I'd have with a stall warning is to pull back! Unload the wing FIRST. This is pretty basic flying.
I have to confess that when teaching stick shaker stall recovery I questioned the FCTM. It said "apply power & reduce attitude." It didn't say anything about minimum height loss. That was an exercise 'if ground contact was a factor'. I stressed to reverse the wording might be better, especially in underslung engines, to 'reduce attitude and increase thrust.' Split second, even both at the same time, but elevator leads the way. To me aerodynamics had not changed so why pretend it had. Beforehand I saw guys apply the thrust and then go closer to a full stall than they were. i.e. they made it worse before they made it better. After THY at AMS guess what happened. Aerodynamics and common sense won the day and FCTM was changed to UNSTALL the wing first.
One view of the problems being discussed is that the level of human experience is decreasing and the opportunities for gaining experience have significantly reduced.
Great comment, and then ask why & how? Let's get to the root cause of this demise and start to solve the problem there, not massage it and put a few sticking plasters on a gaping wound. It may need an operation or stitches, but there needs to be a serious reasoned debate from all parties. There appears to be a lack of leadership on that. Many interested parties are spouting words of wisdom, and some even showing disinterest. Will it be EASA, an XAA, ECA, IALPA, Boeing, AB, a government, an airline group, anybody, but it needs somebody to lead. There is a real problem and we are perhaps seeing the tip of an iceberg. A/C will evolve into more computerised sophisticated beasts; MPL cadets will be less experienced and thrust into RHS of said jets; companies will expand and give commands with less experience to meet that expansion; cadets will pay for their training and grab any job with any T's & C's they can find; rigid SOP's will evolve to reduce piloting skills. So how can the industry protect itself from a declining spiral of skills that could hurt it? We already know that there are airlines from certain regions that certain pax avoid due to suspicion of standards. We want to reverse that trend not allow it expand.
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I graduated from the USN fast jet school of training where I learned to overcome the sensation of sitting in a waste basket while I flew instruments and to fly intellectually-because your physical sensations were not to be trusted
Originally Posted by Rat 5
Did you earn to fly limited panel IMC?
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The practice of "engage otto" at 300 feet with gear up and the reverse when landing bugs me beyond anything. I don't feel all should be Chuck Yeager, but if we can't fly the profile without using otto, then we should not be flying at all. I used and expounded otto for a few thousand hours in single-seaters to reduce workload when wx or other problems arose. But I never flew a profile that I had to use otto versus my own skills/eperience, and remember that otto has ZERO experience.
And that is the route cause of those disasters. It does not matter if your flying a Boeing with jokes that move in unison or an Airbus with sidesticks. What you practice is what you get good at, and if you never practice manual flying skills (by that I mean Stick (yoke), rudder and throttle, and not just dialing a heading and VVI rate on the panel upfront while using auto-throttle), you are gonna suck at it the one time you really need it.
Practice as you fly - fly as you practice, and not only once a year in the sim.
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Originally Posted by FDMII
Nor is there anything informal regarding the transition [to Alternate Law-Roll Direct] Those who have trained-on / flown the Airbus do not seem to find the transition (from Normal to Alternate I/II / Direct) problematic, nor are two samples in millions of flights, statistically significant.
As long as one knows he is dealing with Alternate Law and approaches with careful control inputs, I have no doubt that control is like any other aircraft.
Now take that same alternate law aircraft and start with near full deflection roll inputs in cruise and tell me what happens. That is what happened with AF447 and QZ8501. In both cases, it not clear that either PF knew from the outset he was in Alternate Law. That is a setup for roll PIO. Do you understand the hazard that roll PIO presents?
First let me make clear that Alternate Law-Roll Direct is a specific type of Alternate Law where pitch is a C* law with reduced or no protections and roll is a direct law where aileron deflection is proportional to stick deflection.
As long as one knows he is dealing with Alternate Law and approaches with careful control inputs, I have no doubt that control is like any other aircraft.
As long as one knows he is dealing with Alternate Law and approaches with careful control inputs, I have no doubt that control is like any other aircraft.
Back in the day ( a long time back) I got a Physics degree with a handful of Fortran 4 thrown in. .......yet when I moved on to greater things and learnt to fly I never ever recall my QFI's mentioning C laws , algorithms and the like.....just that regardless of what you're in at high level it's an aircraft so be gentle with ( then again my basic was on jet provost and hawk with a suitable system of levers, etc). Now I thought the idea was that even on a bad day a 'bus or even 777/787 should not be any more difficult to handle than a 70's steam driven type. . Make it any more difficult than that and on a bad night you're going to loose people ...did I miss something,?
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The absolute last thought I'd have with a stall warning is to pull back! Unload the wing FIRST. This is pretty basic flying. Also, basic training is not panicking.
Then again, I have a couple of thousand hours of fast jet time.
Then again, I have a couple of thousand hours of fast jet time.
Peekay, If we have pilots flying who when stressed, revert to that simplistic mode of thinking, then we have unqualified pilots flying aircraft! Period.
Each of us like to think that we are above average and will not make the same mistakes, but in reality few of us have experienced real-life startle + upset + disorientation situations, outside of training environments.
Being a basic human reaction, this "hold the stick back until crash" phenomenon is not limited to the civilian world, but affect highly-trained military pilots as well.
E.g., the C-17 Globemaster crash at Elmendorf in 2010 during practice for an airshow. The commander-pilot, contrary to SOP, aggressively maneuvered the C-17 in a low-energy state and subsequently entered an accelerated stall.
With the stall warning blaring, the Angle of Attack Limiter System (ALS) activated. During the stall, the co-pilot and an onboard Safety Officer warned the pilot four separate times. The stick shaker was also activated.
The pilot attempted stall recovery by rolling the plane level and holding aft stick pressure. (Sound familiar?)
Aft stick pressure was maintained throughout the stall until the C-17 struck the ground, fully 12 seconds since the stall warning + stick-shaker activated.
Even without the startle factor (or even a stall), experienced pilots have failed to recover from spatial disorientation, and even when they recognize the condition.
A recent example is the fatal USAF F-16CM crash into the Adriatic sea two years ago.
During a night training mission out of Aviano, wearing NVG, the F-16 pilot became disorientated at over 20,000ft (which was plenty for recovery). He was confused and did not apply any control input for 8 seconds. By that time the F-16 was in a high speed dive.
The pilot attempted to level the wings but ended up inverted. He then rolled right-side up, and pulled the nose towards the horizon to successfully recover.
With the F-16 no longer in danger of crashing, the pilot -- still spatially disoriented -- decided to eject at 7,000ft and nearly 600 kts, and was killed instantly.
This pilot was rated top 10% of his squadron officers, had received many commendations and had well over 2,000 fast jet hrs including over 400 combat hours. He was just selected to be a Flight Commander and slated to receive promotion to Major.
Yet he decided to eject out of a perfectly flyable plane at Mach 0.96, with lots of altitude to spare and in no danger of crashing.
It's a reminder that no matter how well trained a pilot may be, when he/she is spatially disoriented (as the AirAsia FO apparently was), anything can happen.
Last edited by peekay4; 21st Dec 2015 at 00:27.
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Originally Posted by wiggy
Back in the day ( a long time back) I got a Physics degree with a handful of Fortran 4 thrown in. .......yet when I moved on to greater things and learnt to fly I never ever recall my QFI's mentioning C laws , algorithms and the like.
on a bad day a 'bus or even 777/787 should not be any more difficult to handle than a 70's steam driven type. . Make it any more difficult than that and on a bad night you're going to loose people ...did I miss something,?
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It's a reminder that no matter how well trained a pilot may be, when he/she is spatially disoriented (as the AirAsia FO apparently was), anything can happen.