AF 447 report out
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fl
Posts: 2,525
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, seeing a Boeing with the control wheel full back would alert any pilot at high altitude that we can't fly this way is not available on an invisible Airbus side stick. The only real pilot, the captain, came up too late to save it because he didn't see a wheel in the FO's chest because it was hidden. The PF had it full back for several minutes because he wasn't a real hands on pilot. He expected the automation to take care of him and it didn't.
Join Date: May 2003
Location: 'round here
Posts: 394
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Unlike the Boeing, the FMC on the 330 gives you (solely) GPS derived Altitude and groundspeed, Boeing only gives Altitude (777). In amongst all the goings on, why didn't they look at the GPS derived figures on the FMC? The Alt would have been counting down rapidly and the groundspeed would have shown 80ish knots.
Would have solved the 'are we climbing or descending?' questions the PF was asking........................
Would have solved the 'are we climbing or descending?' questions the PF was asking........................
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Melbourne
Posts: 704
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
People who do not have an ATPL and who do not fly the Airbus should keep their petty thoughts to themselves.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: NNW of Antipodes
Age: 81
Posts: 1,330
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Supercooled water droplets exceed the capability of the older Pitots and may also exceed the new ones too....
Your previous comments re your experiences of UAS are well remembered.
Surely it is possible to use an independent instrument to indicate pitch?
Wings level a $10 spirit level bolted horizontally to the side of the cockpit would do the job...like a slip and turn indicator?
Would it be a good idea to have a simple graphical display of the position of the stick in plain sight, as a means of cross reference between pilots in an emergency?
Wings level a $10 spirit level bolted horizontally to the side of the cockpit would do the job...like a slip and turn indicator?
Would it be a good idea to have a simple graphical display of the position of the stick in plain sight, as a means of cross reference between pilots in an emergency?
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Aus
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hmm so is the answer more automation ? should the GPS be added to the logic with airspeed disagree ?
Could the RAT be deployed as another possible speed indicator(assuming it has some sort of RPM display)? or would if just turn into a large block of ice, in this case with the freezing rain etc.
Could the RAT be deployed as another possible speed indicator(assuming it has some sort of RPM display)? or would if just turn into a large block of ice, in this case with the freezing rain etc.
Unlike the Boeing, the FMC on the 330 gives you (solely) GPS derived Altitude and groundspeed, Boeing only gives Altitude (777). In amongst all the goings on, why didn't they look at the GPS derived figures on the FMC? The Alt would have been counting down rapidly and the groundspeed would have shown 80ish knots.
Would have solved the 'are we climbing or descending?' questions the PF was asking........................
Would have solved the 'are we climbing or descending?' questions the PF was asking........................
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Cork, Ireland
Age: 55
Posts: 54
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure!
I have had the stick fully back all the time!
I have had the stick fully back all the time!
Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non.
no, no, no .. don't climb..
no, no, no .. don't climb..
Last edited by glenbrook; 14th May 2013 at 10:33.
Join Date: Nov 2012
Location: Planet Claire
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Glenbrook.
You're so correct- and it's so bloody obvious to anyone with a brain- that no-one realised PF was holding full nose up on his sidestick.
I've nothing against the sidestick or FBW- but they should be linked.
That way, at least the pilots could monitor each others inputs.
Aside from the cost of so linking the sidesticks, I can think of no dis-benefits. Maybe someone else can though....?
You're so correct- and it's so bloody obvious to anyone with a brain- that no-one realised PF was holding full nose up on his sidestick.
I've nothing against the sidestick or FBW- but they should be linked.
That way, at least the pilots could monitor each others inputs.
Aside from the cost of so linking the sidesticks, I can think of no dis-benefits. Maybe someone else can though....?
Join Date: Nov 2012
Location: Planet Claire
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Further.
Is it not true that the correct response to stall in a bus is full power and full aft stick?
PF was 'doing the right thing' for a normal stall. He just didn't twig they were in an abnormal law stall.
How many aircraft have TWO stalls and those two stalls have 180 degree difference vital actions?
1. Normal stall- 'full aft stick'.
2. Alternative law stall- 'full fwd stick'.
No wonder the poor bugger was confused!
Is it not true that the correct response to stall in a bus is full power and full aft stick?
PF was 'doing the right thing' for a normal stall. He just didn't twig they were in an abnormal law stall.
How many aircraft have TWO stalls and those two stalls have 180 degree difference vital actions?
1. Normal stall- 'full aft stick'.
2. Alternative law stall- 'full fwd stick'.
No wonder the poor bugger was confused!
I'd like to know why the report uses illogical conventions when labelling various parameters:
Pitch command, elevator position and stab position are all positive when down. I think they'd more logical with up/back being positive.
Re full back stick, there wasn't actually much full back stick-and-hold.
Pitch command, elevator position and stab position are all positive when down. I think they'd more logical with up/back being positive.
Re full back stick, there wasn't actually much full back stick-and-hold.
Looks like a few of the hamsterwheel sub-topics are spinning again. I'd not comment but I think a few points are being missed. At the risk of making this all worse ...
MickJoeBill
1. No, I don't think A330 needs another attitude indicator. There are already three. If the flying pilot had a scan breakdown with the attitude indicators already equipped, then adding another indicator that he won't scan fixes nothing.
2. There has been ample discussion in previous threads why Mr Robert and Mr Bonin didn't call out and execute the UAS procedures of the time. Training and malfunction recognition issue.
3. As to the other two pilots not knowing what Mr Bonin was doing:
I can see how Captain Dubois had quite the challenge with catching up to what his two FO's had wrought in his absence, but it does not make sense to blame the side stick for this. To assess what the aircraft is doing, he too has to scan the performance instruments and figure out what the aircraft is doing and then give commands to get the aircraft doing what it is supposed to be doing, or at least stop what it shouldn't be doing. (Falling versus flying).
From the CVR excerpt, in re "side stick is a problem" line of thinking:
early on in the event Mr Robert mentions more than once to Mr Bonin that he was going up, and that he needed to go down. He also made mention of "according to the three you are going up." He had something of a scan going at one point.
I thus answer in objection to those who assert that the other pilot didn't know what Bonin was doing. He saw something wrong, and made an initial effort to correct the error via voice input. For whatever CRM reason involved, he was unable to persuade Bonin to resolve the error by his input. (i.e.: get the nose back down and get back on altitude!)
As I mentioned a few years ago, I would hope that a pilot assisting a flying pilot get the scan back into gear and the plane back to its correct orientation would say things like
"Nose is 15 degrees up, lower your nose."
or
"You are climbing, Descend to FL350"
or some such parameter based corrective input.
That isn't what was presented in CVR extracts as the correction style provided.
The "call the Captain" move was good: Mr Robert realized that what they were doing wasn't working, but it also indicates to me that he ran out of SA and ideas early in the game.
The common thread in the above is CRM methods and training, and a core competency of professional pilots -- Instrument flying. Blaming the side stick seems to miss basic issues of flying at night on instruments.
What is the primary reference instrument when flying in Night IMC? Proceed from there.
With respect, glenbrook ... I EDIT to add this, maybe I should not have.
That does not follow. The other two professional pilots know/knew how to interpret flight instruments. Where the nose was, per the FDR info we hashed over in numerous threads, was reflected by at least two primary attitude indicators. (And most likely all three). This from data provided by BEA.
If gums wants to explain, so much the better, but ...
How do you think, in a two seat F-16 trainer jet, the Instructor (who cannot see what the student is doing with his stick in the other part of the tandem cockpit, since it's FBW and not conventional controls), is able to correct a Student's flying errors.
He can't see the stick move, right?
But he can see what the aircraft if doing, on the performance instruments. Since he knows how to fly it, he can advise the student what to do correctly.
I'll STFU now.
MickJoeBill
1. No, I don't think A330 needs another attitude indicator. There are already three. If the flying pilot had a scan breakdown with the attitude indicators already equipped, then adding another indicator that he won't scan fixes nothing.
2. There has been ample discussion in previous threads why Mr Robert and Mr Bonin didn't call out and execute the UAS procedures of the time. Training and malfunction recognition issue.
3. As to the other two pilots not knowing what Mr Bonin was doing:
I can see how Captain Dubois had quite the challenge with catching up to what his two FO's had wrought in his absence, but it does not make sense to blame the side stick for this. To assess what the aircraft is doing, he too has to scan the performance instruments and figure out what the aircraft is doing and then give commands to get the aircraft doing what it is supposed to be doing, or at least stop what it shouldn't be doing. (Falling versus flying).
From the CVR excerpt, in re "side stick is a problem" line of thinking:
early on in the event Mr Robert mentions more than once to Mr Bonin that he was going up, and that he needed to go down. He also made mention of "according to the three you are going up." He had something of a scan going at one point.
I thus answer in objection to those who assert that the other pilot didn't know what Bonin was doing. He saw something wrong, and made an initial effort to correct the error via voice input. For whatever CRM reason involved, he was unable to persuade Bonin to resolve the error by his input. (i.e.: get the nose back down and get back on altitude!)
As I mentioned a few years ago, I would hope that a pilot assisting a flying pilot get the scan back into gear and the plane back to its correct orientation would say things like
"Nose is 15 degrees up, lower your nose."
or
"You are climbing, Descend to FL350"
or some such parameter based corrective input.
That isn't what was presented in CVR extracts as the correction style provided.
The "call the Captain" move was good: Mr Robert realized that what they were doing wasn't working, but it also indicates to me that he ran out of SA and ideas early in the game.
The common thread in the above is CRM methods and training, and a core competency of professional pilots -- Instrument flying. Blaming the side stick seems to miss basic issues of flying at night on instruments.
What is the primary reference instrument when flying in Night IMC? Proceed from there.
With respect, glenbrook ... I EDIT to add this, maybe I should not have.
The other two professional pilots did not see what Bonin was doing because it was not obvious. As bubbers44 pointed out the deflections on small sidestick were essentially invisible to the other crew members.
If gums wants to explain, so much the better, but ...
How do you think, in a two seat F-16 trainer jet, the Instructor (who cannot see what the student is doing with his stick in the other part of the tandem cockpit, since it's FBW and not conventional controls), is able to correct a Student's flying errors.
He can't see the stick move, right?
But he can see what the aircraft if doing, on the performance instruments. Since he knows how to fly it, he can advise the student what to do correctly.
I'll STFU now.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 14th May 2013 at 21:34.
The loss of airspeed indications or disagreement event due to icing in the tops of cumulonimbus clouds in the tropics was very common in the Airbus A330 and A340 series prior to this accident, as many reported and many more unreported events, have shown. But why in this instance did it lead to a crash?
In essence:
1. In response to the loss of airspeed indication the RH pilot pulled the aircraft nose up...why?
2. The aircraft then zoom climbed some thousands of feet and lost flying speed to the point of stall.
3. The LH pilot did not identify this critical pitch attitude change with the consequent performance loss or correctly call or otherwise respond to it.
4. Approximately half way through the recorder trace shown above (Capn Bloggs), the Stabilizer auto-trimmed to full nose up in response to the RH pilot's aft stick commands.
5. With the subsequent control law reversion, the aircraft was then doomed to a no-stall-recovery situation with the Stabilizer stuck full up (as the Stab autotrim feature was lost with control law reversion). One of the pilots should have re-trimmed the Stabilizer sufficiently nose down with manual inputs using the pitch trim wheel to allow recovery. This did not happen...why?
I have seen similar situations many times during simulator training when teaching high-altitude jet-upset and unusual attitude recovery training modules on the Airbus series. Sometimes, intervention by the simulator instructor is required to grab the PF's hand and place it on the trim wheel to reveal (voila!) the ever so simple solution to manually retrim the stabilizer enough to to enable sufficient elevator authority for stall recovery. The trainee never forgets this lesson.
Putting aside the problems of stabilizers vs elevator authority (incidentally, problems that affect most airliners) for a moment...
...what troubles me is the question...What is deficient in Air France's Cadet and FO pilot training that allowed this situation to develop without recognition by at least one of the pilots of the power/attitude/performance incompatibility event that was consequent to the initial loss of airspeed fault?
A very sad situation and one that I hope Air France and possibly other affected Airlines will rectify...
In essence:
1. In response to the loss of airspeed indication the RH pilot pulled the aircraft nose up...why?
2. The aircraft then zoom climbed some thousands of feet and lost flying speed to the point of stall.
3. The LH pilot did not identify this critical pitch attitude change with the consequent performance loss or correctly call or otherwise respond to it.
4. Approximately half way through the recorder trace shown above (Capn Bloggs), the Stabilizer auto-trimmed to full nose up in response to the RH pilot's aft stick commands.
5. With the subsequent control law reversion, the aircraft was then doomed to a no-stall-recovery situation with the Stabilizer stuck full up (as the Stab autotrim feature was lost with control law reversion). One of the pilots should have re-trimmed the Stabilizer sufficiently nose down with manual inputs using the pitch trim wheel to allow recovery. This did not happen...why?
I have seen similar situations many times during simulator training when teaching high-altitude jet-upset and unusual attitude recovery training modules on the Airbus series. Sometimes, intervention by the simulator instructor is required to grab the PF's hand and place it on the trim wheel to reveal (voila!) the ever so simple solution to manually retrim the stabilizer enough to to enable sufficient elevator authority for stall recovery. The trainee never forgets this lesson.
Putting aside the problems of stabilizers vs elevator authority (incidentally, problems that affect most airliners) for a moment...
...what troubles me is the question...What is deficient in Air France's Cadet and FO pilot training that allowed this situation to develop without recognition by at least one of the pilots of the power/attitude/performance incompatibility event that was consequent to the initial loss of airspeed fault?
A very sad situation and one that I hope Air France and possibly other affected Airlines will rectify...
Last edited by FlexibleResponse; 14th May 2013 at 14:53.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can see how Captain Dubois had quite the challenge with catching up to what his two FO's had wrought in his absence, but it does not make sense to blame the side stick for this. To assess what the aircraft is doing, he too has to scan the performance instruments and figure out what the aircraft is doing and then give commands to get the aircraft doing what it is supposed to be doing, or at least stop what it shouldn't be doing. (Falling versus flying).
The "call the Captain" move was good: Mr Robert realized that what they were doing wasn't working, but it also indicates to me that he ran out of SA and ideas early in the game.
(as the Stab autotrim feature was lost with control law reversion).
...what troubles me is the question...What is deficient in Air France's Cadet and FO pilot training that allowed this situation to develop without recognition by at least one of the pilots of the power/attitude/performance incompatibility event that was consequent to the initial loss of airspeed fault?
Even with that new training, I believe the wildcard is recognising and countering the phenomenon known as "Startle Response"
Hm...ten threads on AF447 in Tech Log, every question asked and point made known to man covered ad infinitum by known experts and punters alike and this is still being argued with the self-same questions and points?
If all this is about researching, learning and understanding what really happened in this tragic accident, there are ten threads, plus an excellent search tool created by one of the known experts who has contributed greatly to these threads from the beginning. At the beginning of each of the threads here, there is placed by John Tullamarine a thorough summary with links to all threads, to various documents including the 4 BEA Reports and to other bits of value).
Rather than reiterate, re-argue or regurgitate old work and old theory that has been thoroughly discussed, may I respectfully suggest that this treasure-trove of discussions be reviewed which may then trigger new insights and imaginative theories which in turn may truly shed real light on why this accident occurred and why it continues to haunt and otherwise re-inform our imaginations.
These guys didn't set out to have an accident so what explains this in a way that helps others come to terms with the very real, and tragic aspect of the human factors involved? What is the pattern that connects?
If all this is about researching, learning and understanding what really happened in this tragic accident, there are ten threads, plus an excellent search tool created by one of the known experts who has contributed greatly to these threads from the beginning. At the beginning of each of the threads here, there is placed by John Tullamarine a thorough summary with links to all threads, to various documents including the 4 BEA Reports and to other bits of value).
Rather than reiterate, re-argue or regurgitate old work and old theory that has been thoroughly discussed, may I respectfully suggest that this treasure-trove of discussions be reviewed which may then trigger new insights and imaginative theories which in turn may truly shed real light on why this accident occurred and why it continues to haunt and otherwise re-inform our imaginations.
These guys didn't set out to have an accident so what explains this in a way that helps others come to terms with the very real, and tragic aspect of the human factors involved? What is the pattern that connects?
Last edited by PJ2; 14th May 2013 at 18:03.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@PJ2:
Agreed. I think (at least I'm hoping) that the recent posts are simply an attempt to summarise things rather than get the hamster-wheel spinning again. I know that's the case for me!
Agreed. I think (at least I'm hoping) that the recent posts are simply an attempt to summarise things rather than get the hamster-wheel spinning again. I know that's the case for me!