Looks like a few of the hamsterwheel sub-topics are spinning again. I'd not comment but I think a few points are being missed. At the risk of making this all worse ...
MickJoeBill
1. No, I don't think A330 needs another attitude indicator. There are already three. If the flying pilot had a scan breakdown with the attitude indicators already equipped, then adding another indicator that he won't scan fixes nothing.
2. There has been ample discussion in previous threads why Mr Robert and Mr Bonin didn't call out and execute the UAS procedures of the time. Training and malfunction recognition issue.
3. As to the other two pilots not knowing what Mr Bonin was doing:
I can see how Captain Dubois had quite the challenge with catching up to what his two FO's had wrought in his absence, but it does not make sense to blame the side stick for this. To assess what the aircraft is doing, he too has to scan the performance instruments and figure out what the aircraft is doing and then give commands to get the aircraft doing what it is supposed to be doing, or at least stop what it shouldn't be doing. (Falling versus flying).
From the CVR excerpt, in re "side stick is a problem" line of thinking:
early on in the event Mr Robert mentions more than once to Mr Bonin that he was going up, and that he needed to go down. He also made mention of "according to the three you are going up." He had something of a scan going at one point.
I thus answer in objection to those who assert that the other pilot didn't know what Bonin was doing. He saw something wrong, and made an initial effort to correct the error via voice input. For whatever CRM reason involved, he was unable to persuade Bonin to resolve the error by his input. (i.e.: get the nose back down and get back on altitude!)
As I mentioned a few years ago, I would hope that a pilot assisting a flying pilot get the scan back into gear and the plane back to its correct orientation would say things like
"Nose is 15 degrees up, lower your nose."
or
"You are climbing, Descend to FL350"
or some such parameter based corrective input.
That isn't what was presented in CVR extracts as the correction style provided.
The "call the Captain" move was good: Mr Robert realized that what they were doing wasn't working, but it also indicates to me that he ran out of SA and ideas early in the game.
The common thread in the above is CRM methods and training, and a core competency of professional pilots -- Instrument flying. Blaming the side stick seems to miss basic issues of flying at night on instruments.
What is the primary reference instrument when flying in Night IMC? Proceed from there.
With respect, glenbrook ... I EDIT to add this, maybe I should not have.
The other two professional pilots did not see what Bonin was doing because it was not obvious. As bubbers44 pointed out the deflections on small sidestick were essentially invisible to the other crew members.
That does not follow. The other two professional pilots know/knew how to interpret flight instruments. Where the nose was, per the FDR info we hashed over in numerous threads, was reflected by at least two primary attitude indicators. (And most likely all three). This from data provided by BEA.
If gums wants to explain, so much the better, but ...
How do you think, in a two seat F-16 trainer jet, the Instructor (who cannot see what the student is doing with his stick in the other part of the tandem cockpit, since it's FBW and not conventional controls), is able to correct a Student's flying errors.
He can't see the stick move, right?
But he can see what the aircraft if doing, on the performance instruments. Since he knows how to fly it, he can advise the student what to do correctly.
I'll STFU now.