AF 447 report out
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Post stall high speed dive recovery.
I think D P Davies got it. Inter-alia, pull up until the nose gets to the horizon then push forward to level off and let the speed stabilize so you don't run out of ideas once again.
Click, click, click.
I think D P Davies got it. Inter-alia, pull up until the nose gets to the horizon then push forward to level off and let the speed stabilize so you don't run out of ideas once again.
Click, click, click.
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I don't think you could say that this crew of AF447 , were ever in danger of performing a near optimal manoeuvre.
The sim tests in a 320 mentioned earlier give 18000 as an achievable figure, my fudge factor of 50% I think would be reasonable netting a cool 27000!!
So somewhere between 11000 to 27000, I can guarantee you these numbers would be known by very very few line drivers(or senior management )
The sim tests in a 320 mentioned earlier give 18000 as an achievable figure, my fudge factor of 50% I think would be reasonable netting a cool 27000!!
So somewhere between 11000 to 27000, I can guarantee you these numbers would be known by very very few line drivers(or senior management )
Or at least how to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist when they had unreliable airspeed?
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STALL recovery
Airbus has to take responsibility for indoctrinating pilots that the Airbus could not be stalled.
The Stall recovery in the QRH coming out just afterwards, shall matter in court.
Right?
The Stall recovery in the QRH coming out just afterwards, shall matter in court.
Right?
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Additionally, the idea that the PF was pulling up to engage protection from stall ignores the fact that neither PF nor PNF ever acknowledged that they were either approaching stall or stalled.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 6th Jun 2013 at 20:41.
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I do not know why people still want to reopen this "stall" debate.
From the published reports and the briefings given by the BEA (i.e. by people who have listened to the CVR , just not read partial edited transcripts ) :
a) the 3 crew never realized they were in a stall.
b) we will never know what they really saw on the displays.
c) the audio and visual warnings were multiple and confusing.
How would some of you have reacted in similar circumstances ? Easy at home in front of a PC.
There are lots of lessons to be learned from AF447, one of them is interface between automated systems and humans. That is worth spending a lot of energy.
For the rest .. leave the guys alone I would say.
From the published reports and the briefings given by the BEA (i.e. by people who have listened to the CVR , just not read partial edited transcripts ) :
a) the 3 crew never realized they were in a stall.
b) we will never know what they really saw on the displays.
c) the audio and visual warnings were multiple and confusing.
How would some of you have reacted in similar circumstances ? Easy at home in front of a PC.
There are lots of lessons to be learned from AF447, one of them is interface between automated systems and humans. That is worth spending a lot of energy.
For the rest .. leave the guys alone I would say.
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 7th Jun 2013 at 03:58.
Airbus has to take responsibility for indoctrinating pilots that the Airbus could not be stalled.
I do not know why people still want to reopen this "stall" debate.
the 3 crew never realized they were in a stall.
we will never know what they really saw on the displays.
the audio and visual warnings were multiple and confusing.
How would some of you have reacted in similar circumstances ?
There are lots of lessons to be learned from AF447, one of them is interface between automated systems and humans. That is worth spending a lot of energy.
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Well, to be more precise we can assume with a great degree of certainty what the MFDs for the left-hand seat were displaying, because the DFDR takes its information from the same feeds. I think it's also safe to assume that there were no obvious discrepancies between the LH and RH displays because there is no reference to any kind of discrepancy on the CVR.
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
Notion that Airbus indoctrinates pilots that its aeroplanes can not be stalled is misinformed at the best and libelous at the worst.
BTW, captain of West Carribean 708, MD-80 that was lost after high altitude stall manually trimmed stab to full nose up position in desperate attempt to keep the nose up. So much for the evils of autotrim.
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Clandestino : I respect you a lot, as 90% of what you write is educated and constructive .
but when you answer :
this belongs to the 10%.
Many of us who have been around a bit , start to believe strongly that HF issues are getting beyond the " James Reason-Sidney Dekker" lines of thought.
Accidents such as AF447 or TK1951 to take 2 recent ones, but also the incidents we see in ATC today,( especially those involving STCA and TCAS) strongly point out to a discrepancy between humans operators and automated systems, also programmed by humans, and how both interact with one another.
Also I am getting tired to see our own kind so keen to blame their own people for their mistakes. The very easy way out: the buck stop with the first one responsible. the ideal Fuse ( le fusible ideal , not sure if that translate well..)
,
but when you answer :
Quote:
me : There are lots of lessons to be learned from AF447, one of them is interface between automated systems and humans. That is worth spending a lot of energy.
you : Only on internet discussion sites.
me : There are lots of lessons to be learned from AF447, one of them is interface between automated systems and humans. That is worth spending a lot of energy.
you : Only on internet discussion sites.
Many of us who have been around a bit , start to believe strongly that HF issues are getting beyond the " James Reason-Sidney Dekker" lines of thought.
Accidents such as AF447 or TK1951 to take 2 recent ones, but also the incidents we see in ATC today,( especially those involving STCA and TCAS) strongly point out to a discrepancy between humans operators and automated systems, also programmed by humans, and how both interact with one another.
Also I am getting tired to see our own kind so keen to blame their own people for their mistakes. The very easy way out: the buck stop with the first one responsible. the ideal Fuse ( le fusible ideal , not sure if that translate well..)
,
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Originally Posted by NOLAND3
So, would you mind telling me when Airbus stated that you cannot stall in Alt or direct law?
Were they confident or arrogant enough to not leave normal law ... ?
Re,
and,
Sigh. You just never give up.
Anyone who thought that the Airbus A320/A330/A340 would be "protected" from the stall in all conditions wasn't paying attention and shouldn't have passed the course. From a 1992 CBT (computer based training) lesson...
Only in your mind ... Already in 85 the message from Airbus was "Elimination of stall"
Ask Airbus, the statement is from their own publication.
Were they confident or arrogant enough to not leave normal law ... ?
Were they confident or arrogant enough to not leave normal law ... ?
Anyone who thought that the Airbus A320/A330/A340 would be "protected" from the stall in all conditions wasn't paying attention and shouldn't have passed the course. From a 1992 CBT (computer based training) lesson...
Last edited by PJ2; 10th Jun 2013 at 05:55.
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Airbus has to take responsibility for indoctrinating pilots that the Airbus could not be stalled
Last edited by EiffelTower; 10th Jun 2013 at 06:08.
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OK, next question. Is there any indication that the flight crew on AF447 aware that they were in alternate law? Perhaps they missed that in the confusion & thought they had stall protection.
Oakape;
Re, "Is there any indication that the flight crew on AF447 aware that they were in alternate law? Perhaps they missed that in the confusion & thought they had stall protection."
That question has been dealt with extensively in many locations among the ten threads dealing with this accident.
If they missed it "in the confusion", that is an indication of incompetence, not "mode confusion" - recognition of Alternate Law and what to do about it is a fundamental training objective in any Airbus transition course, and, if you'll pardon the observation, this has been stated dozens of times over the past four years.
Re, "Is there any indication that the flight crew on AF447 aware that they were in alternate law? Perhaps they missed that in the confusion & thought they had stall protection."
That question has been dealt with extensively in many locations among the ten threads dealing with this accident.
If they missed it "in the confusion", that is an indication of incompetence, not "mode confusion" - recognition of Alternate Law and what to do about it is a fundamental training objective in any Airbus transition course, and, if you'll pardon the observation, this has been stated dozens of times over the past four years.
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Hey, steady guys.
I'm not defending the flight crew or bagging Airbus. I missed that point in the volumes of information on this accident that I have read over the months & didn't want to assume anything. I am simply trying to have those on this thread who feel that the crew were competent understand why they may not have realised they were in a stall.
My personal opinion is much harsher than that. I believe that the crew were of below average flying ability, were inadequately trained & had no business being in the flightdeck of a jet transport aircraft. I also believe that this situation has become more prevalent in recent years, as a large number of the accidents over the last few years has shown.
I also believe that this situation is the single largest latent failure in the industry today & will continue to be in evidence in accidents over the years to come.
I'm not defending the flight crew or bagging Airbus. I missed that point in the volumes of information on this accident that I have read over the months & didn't want to assume anything. I am simply trying to have those on this thread who feel that the crew were competent understand why they may not have realised they were in a stall.
My personal opinion is much harsher than that. I believe that the crew were of below average flying ability, were inadequately trained & had no business being in the flightdeck of a jet transport aircraft. I also believe that this situation has become more prevalent in recent years, as a large number of the accidents over the last few years has shown.
I also believe that this situation is the single largest latent failure in the industry today & will continue to be in evidence in accidents over the years to come.
Last edited by Oakape; 10th Jun 2013 at 09:50.
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Take a look at the picture a few post above. The PFD displays amber crosses showing that protections have been lost.
On the ECAM they will also see ALTN LAW (PROT LOST) If they did manage to remain in control and divert they would have seen DIRECT LAW use MAN pitch trim on the PFD & ECAM when they lowered the gear for landing.
On the ECAM they will also see ALTN LAW (PROT LOST) If they did manage to remain in control and divert they would have seen DIRECT LAW use MAN pitch trim on the PFD & ECAM when they lowered the gear for landing.
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I concur completely with Oakape's post #1314 and his grim conclusion.
At the risk of clapping my hands and setting Mr Oozlum off on yet another circuit, forgetting all the 'wizardry' of the machine, amber crosses, ECAM messages, whatever, I suspect yes, they knew they were in Alternate Law but did not know what it meant and I'm sure had the 'AB will look after you if you just pull back' message running through their heads.
Diverting to a larger issue, I return to my proposal some years ago now that autotrim should have some sensible limit, beyond which Hal can say "David- this is a really unusual tail trim setting you have here - please press TRIM OVERRIDE if you wish to continue trimming nose-up".
I am hopeful that such a call would have alerted both this crew, the PGF AB crew and the AMS Turkish crew to the problem. In all three accidents Autotrim contributed greatly to the event. Even if the crews miss the 'call' in the rush of sensory input, the tail would stop trimming into the ridiculous.
At the risk of clapping my hands and setting Mr Oozlum off on yet another circuit, forgetting all the 'wizardry' of the machine, amber crosses, ECAM messages, whatever, I suspect yes, they knew they were in Alternate Law but did not know what it meant and I'm sure had the 'AB will look after you if you just pull back' message running through their heads.
Diverting to a larger issue, I return to my proposal some years ago now that autotrim should have some sensible limit, beyond which Hal can say "David- this is a really unusual tail trim setting you have here - please press TRIM OVERRIDE if you wish to continue trimming nose-up".
I am hopeful that such a call would have alerted both this crew, the PGF AB crew and the AMS Turkish crew to the problem. In all three accidents Autotrim contributed greatly to the event. Even if the crews miss the 'call' in the rush of sensory input, the tail would stop trimming into the ridiculous.
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Sorry but I have to disagree, to suggest the flight crew did not understand Alternate law is ridiculous.
Both pilots would have most certainly flown in Alternate & direct law in the sim. If any misunderstanding did exist it would likely be down to the autorim in Alt2b, however I see no evidence that they tried to manually trim the aircraft.
Both pilots would have most certainly flown in Alternate & direct law in the sim. If any misunderstanding did exist it would likely be down to the autorim in Alt2b, however I see no evidence that they tried to manually trim the aircraft.