Originally Posted by
bubbers44
Yes, seeing a Boeing with the control wheel full back would alert any pilot at high altitude that we can't fly this way...
Birgenair 301 and Northwest 6231 show that's not true.
Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
I can see how Captain Dubois had quite the challenge with catching up to what his two FO's had wrought in his absence, but it does not make sense to blame the side stick for this. To assess what the aircraft is doing, he too has to scan the performance instruments and figure out what the aircraft is doing and then give commands to get the aircraft doing what it is supposed to be doing, or at least stop what it shouldn't be doing. (Falling versus flying).
Agreed, and nicely put.
The "call the Captain" move was good: Mr Robert realized that what they were doing wasn't working, but it also indicates to me that he ran out of SA and ideas early in the game.
Actually I'd say his SA always appeared pretty good, at least at first - I've always had a suspicion that like the Birgenair case, he was hesitant to intervene directly because he was unsure of his remit to do so (Dubois having left the command gradient somewhat vague). Unfortunately it's a human trait to start second-guessing yourself and allow doubt to creep in the longer one has to wait.
Originally Posted by
FlexibleResponse
The loss of airspeed indications or disagreement event due to icing in the tops of cumulonimbus clouds in the tropics was very common in the Airbus A330 and A340 series prior to this accident...
Well, to be more precise it was somewhat common in those airframes which had the optional Thales AA pitot tube fit (the default was still Goodrich).
(as the Stab autotrim feature was lost with control law reversion).
No it wasn't - autotrim is still active in Alternate (2B) control law.
...what troubles me is the question...What is deficient in Air France's Cadet and FO pilot training that allowed this situation to develop without recognition by at least one of the pilots of the power/attitude/performance incompatibility event that was consequent to the initial loss of airspeed fault?
What came out of the industry discussion was that it wasn't just AF. The industry as a whole had become fixated on Stall Avoidance training at the expense of recognition and recovery. That's why Boeing and Airbus collaborated on new guidelines for recurrent stall training at ATPL level.
Even with that new training, I believe the wildcard is recognising and countering the phenomenon known as "Startle Response"