Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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thinking of a L-188 military charter flight in the 60s in which the PF (also president of the airline) suffered a medical emergency on short final and fell over the control column, driving the aircraft into the ground.
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From the Dutch report, it seems to me there was a total disregard of procedures and no CRM. The FPA should have pulled at the "TW" FAF, not before as happened. No cross-checks either.
I would like to see a copy of the approach plate. What is the touchdown zone elevation for 09? I have noted some reference to a FPA of 2.5 degrees. Is this correct or should it be 3 degrees?
Some info please.
I would like to see a copy of the approach plate. What is the touchdown zone elevation for 09? I have noted some reference to a FPA of 2.5 degrees. Is this correct or should it be 3 degrees?
Some info please.
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Originally Posted by thermostat
Some info please.
The FPA should have pulled at the "TW" FAF, not before as happened.
Gnadenburg
Quote:
This seems to suggest another illusion at play to do with the aircraft's PFD speed tape presentation. To be focused on an overspeed, yet pushing nose down.
Or, focused on overspeed and Pull? In spite of Stall Warn? At cruise?
Hyper-focus...can happen to anyone. Anyone.
Quote:
This seems to suggest another illusion at play to do with the aircraft's PFD speed tape presentation. To be focused on an overspeed, yet pushing nose down.
Or, focused on overspeed and Pull? In spite of Stall Warn? At cruise?
Hyper-focus...can happen to anyone. Anyone.
Can anybody give an explanation as to why the crew are focused on the speed tape?
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 12th Mar 2013 at 05:35.
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Then how about the L1011 crew, staring at a bad 'bulb' into the swamp?
Preoccupation, distraction, hyperfocus, a family of bad and deadly habits.
Narrowmindedness? Losing the picture?
Preoccupation, distraction, hyperfocus, a family of bad and deadly habits.
Narrowmindedness? Losing the picture?
Last edited by Lyman; 12th Mar 2013 at 07:09.
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Hi,
DW
This is not about the situation ..
It's about distraction .. focusing .. forgetting all but one thing
That can happen in any situation .. and not only on a aircraft ...
DW
The EAL401 crew believed they were in AP altitude hold until the very last seconds - the situation doesn't compare.
It's about distraction .. focusing .. forgetting all but one thing
That can happen in any situation .. and not only on a aircraft ...
Avherald, but don't worry, we will soon have long and winded thread about it here, mostly with contribution coming from people very opinionated about Airbi being deathtraps by design, AF pilots being on par with Nigerian and BEA being part of masonic conspiracy including Airbus and Republique Francaise, yet they will display amusing inability to positively differentiate autopilot and flight controls.
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The PF on 771 may have been distracted in terms of his scan breaking down, but he knew he was in control. The crew of EAL401 were working on the assumption that the autopilot was in control - the PF's mistake there was using the autopilot function display in lieu of an instrument scan while they were troubleshooting the bulb. He didn't know that George (and by extension he) wasn't in control until it was too late.
Distraction or tunnel vision is in all likelihood a factor in both, but the difference in the nature and degree of distraction makes it a dicey comparison in my book.
For those unfamiliar with the french language the highlights:
1. Approach at 4.50 A.M. at Paris CDG exactly one year ago
2. Airbus A340 cleared for a CAT3 approach
3. 250 knots at FL90 at 30 miles
4. Cleared to intercept the localiser
5. Due to somewhat delayed clearances intercepted the glide from above
6. At 9 miles 4950' (1750' above glide)
7. At 2 miles still 1600' above path
8. The aircraft then did some interesting stuff which the Airbus experts can no doubt explain, but (at risk of a flaming) seems very strange
9. The crew eventually sorted out the modes went around and landed normally
Interesting comparisons with Afriqiyah would be the combination of possible fatigue, poor approach execution and confusion during go-around.
1. Approach at 4.50 A.M. at Paris CDG exactly one year ago
2. Airbus A340 cleared for a CAT3 approach
3. 250 knots at FL90 at 30 miles
4. Cleared to intercept the localiser
5. Due to somewhat delayed clearances intercepted the glide from above
6. At 9 miles 4950' (1750' above glide)
7. At 2 miles still 1600' above path
8. The aircraft then did some interesting stuff which the Airbus experts can no doubt explain, but (at risk of a flaming) seems very strange
9. The crew eventually sorted out the modes went around and landed normally
Interesting comparisons with Afriqiyah would be the combination of possible fatigue, poor approach execution and confusion during go-around.
There was not just confusion from the avionics. The aircraft pitched up to 26 degrees and the speed reduced to 130 knots going from 1600 feet per minute descent to 3300' feet per minute climb with the speedbrakes out? Thrust was then reduced to idle. I think an interesting point is that apparently experienced Airbus pilots can get so seriously out of the loop.
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AF pilots being on par with Nigerian and BEA being part of masonic conspiracy including Airbus and Republique Francaise, yet they will display amusing inability to positively differentiate autopilot and flight controls.
Why Air France should be banned from non-EU skies | Plane Talking
For an account of appalling flight safety standards in a major airline, a French air safety agency (BEA) report into a seriously botched approach to Paris Charles de Gaulle airport by an Air France A340 a year ago today is hard to beat.
A lay translation as to what happened would be that the crew persisted in making an unstable and excessively high and steep descent toward landing which caused the aircraft at one stage to risk stalling as the nose pitched up in an excessively steep attitude while the speed fell away.
A lay translation as to what happened would be that the crew persisted in making an unstable and excessively high and steep descent toward landing which caused the aircraft at one stage to risk stalling as the nose pitched up in an excessively steep attitude while the speed fell away.
There is no excuse for such a situation to have arisen. The report makes a lame attempt to put part of the blame on the controllers in the CDG tower, but the inescapable truth for Air France is that it is responsible for the flying culture and safety standards of its pilots and that this flight tells us this airline has hadn’t found in 2012 the plot it lost in 2009 when AF447 went down.
A starting point would be to insist that the French safety investigator, the BEA, reverse its refusal to release the full transcript of what was said between the three pilots in the cockpit of AF447 .
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2012/f-zu...f-zu120313.pdf
Last edited by jcjeant; 15th Mar 2013 at 08:50.
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The problem was not the GA.
As the crew was way above the normal 3 deg GS, the airplane tried to intercept what is called a secondary GS which is at 9 deg. This happened when the APPR was armed by the crew, and G/S* became the active vertical mode. The airplane was allowed to take an aggressive 26 deg pitch before the AP was disconnected.
I can see a similitude with the 330 accident in Toulouse when ALT* became the vertical active mode and the capture of the altitude became the priority whatever the speed.
They would have gone to the stall too in CDG.
The crew did not follow the recommended procedure to intercept the GS from above, they were behind their airplane and got caught by the automation.
As the crew was way above the normal 3 deg GS, the airplane tried to intercept what is called a secondary GS which is at 9 deg. This happened when the APPR was armed by the crew, and G/S* became the active vertical mode. The airplane was allowed to take an aggressive 26 deg pitch before the AP was disconnected.
I can see a similitude with the 330 accident in Toulouse when ALT* became the vertical active mode and the capture of the altitude became the priority whatever the speed.
They would have gone to the stall too in CDG.
The crew did not follow the recommended procedure to intercept the GS from above, they were behind their airplane and got caught by the automation.
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The airplane was interested in the secondary GS, the one at 9 deg.
And actually it was already above that 9 deg GS, but as that signal is inverted by conception, the airplane was looking for the moon.
It would be interesting to know if the protections would have intervened at some stage ... but the report is mute on that point.
I am also surprised by the agressivity of the G/S* ...
And actually it was already above that 9 deg GS, but as that signal is inverted by conception, the airplane was looking for the moon.
It would be interesting to know if the protections would have intervened at some stage ... but the report is mute on that point.
I am also surprised by the agressivity of the G/S* ...