Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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Originally Posted by ADM
He said the Libyan pilots, particularly the FOs, were idle layabouts who made no effort to improve their professional knowledge
As a crew, on their own initiative, did they review what they did at the time and what they should have done ?
I doubt it or they would have been much more prepared to execute what has been their last approach.
An FDM program is excellent, but no pilot should wait to proceed to his own auto critics.
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Dive Dive
The Co-pilot initiated the GA, climbed to 600' and that seemed to be going OK until suddenly the Captain took over and dived. Did he see the runway then and dive for it? (Had he just realised they made the same early descent as last time they were together, and all they had to do was get down again, fast now?) Very interesting other posts about training, competence and loss of face. Especially at one's home airport after being on the aligned approach, when after all "the runway is down there ahead somewhere - we just have to get low enough to see it". How tragic this crew had screwed up before - did this contribute to the captain's actions? Can't this be a lesson to us all - minimums are minimums for a good reason. If you can't see the runway, perhaps there is a good reason for that. Go around. Once you are going around, go around!
I don't think putting up the gear, cleaning up and accelerating to 250 knots while descending at 4000 feet per minute is compatible with trying to continue to a landing. They plain and simple lost control. The report makes the valid point that two engine go arounds do not appear to have been practised much during their training. However they do not seem to have absorbed very much of their training, so whether it would have made much difference is not clear.
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Why did the FO quit the MANAGED approach that was by far the easiest to proceed with ?
They had already FINAL APP on the PFD and probably the blue arrow somewhere 1/2 a NM after TW NDB to indicate the start of the -3 degrees slope from 1400 ft.
The SELECTED approach needed more thinking and about -2.5 degrees FPA from TW if level at 1400 ft.
The report does not say how often the 330 guys at AFRIQIYAH Airways are used to proceed for non precision approaches on their network ...
Those non precision approaches on the Airbus are nice to fly but do need regular practice to adequately master them.
They had already FINAL APP on the PFD and probably the blue arrow somewhere 1/2 a NM after TW NDB to indicate the start of the -3 degrees slope from 1400 ft.
The SELECTED approach needed more thinking and about -2.5 degrees FPA from TW if level at 1400 ft.
The report does not say how often the 330 guys at AFRIQIYAH Airways are used to proceed for non precision approaches on their network ...
Those non precision approaches on the Airbus are nice to fly but do need regular practice to adequately master them.
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First the F/O then, when the pitch was already ~3° nose down, the CPT took priority and "dived more" at a time when the F/O changed his mind and began to pull his stick nose up.
Why? Perhaps...
Originally Posted by Report
As part of the investigation, the model for estimating the perceived orientation was used with SSFDR parameters. The figure below shows that at the time of the missed approach, the attitude perceived by a pilot, provided that his perception is based exclusively on the interpretation of vestibular inputs (without external visual reference and without monitoring the artificial horizon), is initially close to the real attitude. It then deviates from the actual attitude from about 11 degrees to increase and remain between 15 and 22 degrees nose up. The first nose-down inputs recorded for the co-pilot's side stick occur at a moment corresponding to this deviation. The difference observed between the actual attitude and estimation of the perceived attitude may be related to the occurrence of a somatogravic perceptual illusion.
the attitude perceived by a pilot, provided that his perception is based exclusively on the interpretation of vestibular inputs
Sometimes you need to be on the instruments in legal VFR.
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The barely disguised sarcastic undertones in the Dutch response to the draft report suggests they believe the Libyan crew in question would have had difficulties putting a Tiger Moth down in one piece. The mind boggles......
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In my experience, as a simulator instructor, the most accidents occur with an all engine GA. With lower power, ie one engine failed, most problems are sorted.
Last edited by rogerg; 4th Mar 2013 at 17:36.
Originally Posted by Octane
The barely disguised sarcastic undertones in the Dutch response to the draft report suggests they believe the Libyan crew in question would have had difficulties putting a Tiger Moth down in one piece. The mind boggles...... 3rd Mar 2013 20:00
If questions are raised in the Dutch response they are not about just one crew, they concern Afrikiyah's capacity to prevent another accident.
In this the Dutch are doing Afrikiyah an enormous favour by helping them learn from what occurred.
A Libyan response to the Dutch Safety Board is not only warranted, it is the only thing that will permit the airline to learn and therefore become safer.
Last edited by PJ2; 4th Mar 2013 at 18:38.
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Originally Posted by rogerg
In my experience, as a simulator instructor, the most accidents occur with an all engine GA.
IMO the main thing with GA in simulator, is that a simulator cannot render that tricky somatogravic perceptual illusion, which is the strongest when all engines are pushing. Should we go once in a while practice a real GA under the cap to realize what is behind that illusion ... ?
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What kind of 'accident' do you have in mind ?
IMO the main thing with GA in simulator, is that a simulator cannot render that tricky somatogravic perceptual illusion, which is the strongest when all engines are pushing. Should we go once in a while practice a real GA under the cap to realize what is behind that illusion ... ?
IMO the main thing with GA in simulator, is that a simulator cannot render that tricky somatogravic perceptual illusion, which is the strongest when all engines are pushing. Should we go once in a while practice a real GA under the cap to realize what is behind that illusion ... ?
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Originally Posted by A-FLOOR
If you think for a minute, you will realize a simulator's motion system actually does this very thing: it uses the principle of somatogravic illusion to simulate sustained longitudinal acceleration or deceleration while standing still.
As a matter of fact how often a crew in the sim will succumb to the illusion during a GA practice to the point to hit the ground at the Afriqiyah's way ?
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The "surprise" factor should
If suddenly a wing snap off .. we can indeed consider that there will be a surprise
Last edited by jcjeant; 5th Mar 2013 at 01:10.
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Intensity perhaps, but duration, no. This is my point: while all other accelerations (linear and rotational) are time limited depending on the stroke of the motion system, this is the one thing simulators are able to simulate indefinitely just by changing the gravity vector, using the somatogravic illusion in reverse and rotating the cab around an axis which is aligned with the flight crew's inner ears. I don't have the data handy how quickly an A330-200 will accelerate in a normal GA, but I'm fairly sure this figure is well within what the X-axis low-pass motion filter can produce, with room to spare for pitch changes. Besides, isn't the fact that crews in the sim will succumb to the same illusion in itself a testament to the sim's fidelity in this particular situation?
IMHO all that happened is that PF decided to pre - select his FPA and pulled in error (got confused with the automatics) after that no one monitored anything.
From the vid the PF pulled the gear so time capt caught up he was also in the wrong place in his mind. Lots will say we'll I wouldn't have done that. That is until something similar happens to you. I was watching a training capt debriefing a cadet a while ago saying he had never done a rushed approach. I resisted the urge to but in and ask if that was apart from the one he did with me when he was a first officer. Please remember we are all human. Good training is the key & I expect this crew did not get a lot of that.
From the vid the PF pulled the gear so time capt caught up he was also in the wrong place in his mind. Lots will say we'll I wouldn't have done that. That is until something similar happens to you. I was watching a training capt debriefing a cadet a while ago saying he had never done a rushed approach. I resisted the urge to but in and ask if that was apart from the one he did with me when he was a first officer. Please remember we are all human. Good training is the key & I expect this crew did not get a lot of that.
Pitch-down inputs were applied for 21s, causing the A330's pitch attitude to reduce to 3.5° nose-down. The inquiry suggests the co-pilot was focused on the aircraft's speed, rather than its attitude, following an incident 14 days earlier when an overspeed warning activated during a go-around.
As the aircraft lost height the terrain-awareness system issued a succession of sink and ground-proximity warnings. But the captain responded with a "sharp" nose-down input, says the inquiry, adding that he might have been subject to somatogravic illusion or was similarly focused on the A330's speed.
This seems to suggest another illusion at play to do with the aircraft's PFD speed tape presentation. To be focused on an overspeed, yet pushing nose down.
Does anyone have anything further on this?
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Gnadenburg
Or, focused on overspeed and Pull? In spite of Stall Warn? At cruise?
Hyper-focus...can happen to anyone. Anyone.
This seems to suggest another illusion at play to do with the aircraft's PFD speed tape presentation. To be focused on an overspeed, yet pushing nose down.
Hyper-focus...can happen to anyone. Anyone.
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I haven't read the report - what were the autopsy results?
I'm thinking of a L-188 military charter flight in the 60s in which the PF (also president of the airline) suffered a medical emergency on short final and fell over the control column, driving the aircraft into the ground.
I'm thinking of a L-188 military charter flight in the 60s in which the PF (also president of the airline) suffered a medical emergency on short final and fell over the control column, driving the aircraft into the ground.