Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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Lederhosen... The Perpignan was a return to lessor flight. Not a test flight as such. The aircraft was certainly considered ready for line operations.
Anyway it is not something that could not happen on an aircraft in line operations, mistakes are made in engineering.
We haven't even touched the subject of engines spooling up at a different rate during a stall recovery, which could also happen. Not sure how controllable that would be during a stall. Even with features such as approach idle.
The certifying authorities haven't covered every single mishap that may happen. Tails of modern aircraft are optimized to reduce drag as much as possible. They don't leave a lot of control margin outside their design.
That the current training on jets is abysmal is correct, checking the trim during a stall recovery on an airbus because you might just have reverted into direct law. Never heard of it until I read the Perpignan accident report!
But to suggest that there is 1 recipe for every stall situation? The initial action to lower the nose maybe. But from there on... closing the thrust might be step 2 if needed.
I strongly doubt lawyers will have their ass covered as you can see from the airbus QRH.
I imagine the AF pilots have had quite a bit of stall traing since AF447, which is why I could see this as a reason for these guys closing the thrust levers. Not saying that it was correct. Which is the point where blind pew started to declare his superiority in all things aviation.
Frankly I don't care who many books blind pew wrote on aircraft that have been out of service for years. It hardly relates to the issues pilots face in modern jets that they are supposed to fly on automatics, but save with superior handling skills, they never get to practice, when those automatics give up.
Anyway it is not something that could not happen on an aircraft in line operations, mistakes are made in engineering.
We haven't even touched the subject of engines spooling up at a different rate during a stall recovery, which could also happen. Not sure how controllable that would be during a stall. Even with features such as approach idle.
The certifying authorities haven't covered every single mishap that may happen. Tails of modern aircraft are optimized to reduce drag as much as possible. They don't leave a lot of control margin outside their design.
That the current training on jets is abysmal is correct, checking the trim during a stall recovery on an airbus because you might just have reverted into direct law. Never heard of it until I read the Perpignan accident report!
But to suggest that there is 1 recipe for every stall situation? The initial action to lower the nose maybe. But from there on... closing the thrust might be step 2 if needed.
I strongly doubt lawyers will have their ass covered as you can see from the airbus QRH.
I imagine the AF pilots have had quite a bit of stall traing since AF447, which is why I could see this as a reason for these guys closing the thrust levers. Not saying that it was correct. Which is the point where blind pew started to declare his superiority in all things aviation.
Frankly I don't care who many books blind pew wrote on aircraft that have been out of service for years. It hardly relates to the issues pilots face in modern jets that they are supposed to fly on automatics, but save with superior handling skills, they never get to practice, when those automatics give up.
Last edited by 737Jock; 20th Mar 2013 at 15:32.
During my 45 years in aviation I have had the dubious pleasure of a lot of changes in philosophy - mostly after an accident or a promotion of a new boy.
With hindsight many of these wonderful ideas were eventually binned and generally replaced by something that other pilots had been doing for aeons.
Good ones included the wind shear at low level, being nice to cabin crew and staying on the runway to evaluate the situation - this was six years before Airtours Man. disaster - flying with a track offset over Africa and listening to ATC.
Not forgetting the old pneumonic FTFAS.....
Bad ones - which I still find difficult to believe are cross feeding using the jettison pumps, splitting the manufactures on ground emergency checklist so that the tank fuel shut offs don't close, braking as late as possible to save pad wear and having a stall procedure to cater for the "I have got this completely wrong because I don't understand the aircraft and I am stupid" which leads to the enevitable question is how do you judge what is a reasonable amount of thrust if you are in unknown territory?
The answer which jock will no doubt pooh pooh is as much as I can and still retain control of the aircraft.
And for jock - how do I find this levels quickly as possible? Open the taps fully and slowly close them if the beast doesnt do what you want it to.
Hopefully you don't fly for one of the LoCo carriers as I use them often.
(and if you are perhaps you was the first officer who had verbal diarrhoea into EGSS last week then did the classic death grip over controlling once the autopilot had been taken out followed by a tent peg landing).
Been there and got the tea shirt
With hindsight many of these wonderful ideas were eventually binned and generally replaced by something that other pilots had been doing for aeons.
Good ones included the wind shear at low level, being nice to cabin crew and staying on the runway to evaluate the situation - this was six years before Airtours Man. disaster - flying with a track offset over Africa and listening to ATC.
Not forgetting the old pneumonic FTFAS.....
Bad ones - which I still find difficult to believe are cross feeding using the jettison pumps, splitting the manufactures on ground emergency checklist so that the tank fuel shut offs don't close, braking as late as possible to save pad wear and having a stall procedure to cater for the "I have got this completely wrong because I don't understand the aircraft and I am stupid" which leads to the enevitable question is how do you judge what is a reasonable amount of thrust if you are in unknown territory?
The answer which jock will no doubt pooh pooh is as much as I can and still retain control of the aircraft.
And for jock - how do I find this levels quickly as possible? Open the taps fully and slowly close them if the beast doesnt do what you want it to.
Hopefully you don't fly for one of the LoCo carriers as I use them often.
(and if you are perhaps you was the first officer who had verbal diarrhoea into EGSS last week then did the classic death grip over controlling once the autopilot had been taken out followed by a tent peg landing).
Been there and got the tea shirt
Originally Posted by BOAC
but perhaps the expert clandestino can tell us exactly what happens to the lobes?
Originally Posted by CONFiture
It seems that this crew has been into a wild territory where Airbus has never been before.
Originally Posted by CONFiture
That possibility for such an aggressive pitch up at G/S* was probably unknown from Airbus.
Originally Posted by CONFiture
I would like to know what would come next if the pilots are in a VERY bad day ... ?
Originally Posted by 737jock
No reference unfortunately. So all hearsay really, anybody heard something like this?
Originally Posted by ledrhosen
the Airbus way of flying can lead to the pilot being that much further outside the loop.
Originally Posted by 737jock
But due to the aerodynamic build of the aircraft the horizontal tail of the aircraft is actually a bit too small.
Originally Posted by 737jock
The Perpignan was a return to lessor flight. Not a test flight as such. The aircraft was certainly considered ready for line operations.
lederhosen:
clandestino
Isn't that the issue at hand in a number of these incidents?
"that" = pilot - machine interface
the Airbus way of flying can lead to the pilot being that much further outside the loop.
Not the official one but the one oft found in cockpits surely can.
"that" = pilot - machine interface
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 20th Mar 2013 at 22:29.
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
Smoking hole. Point is?
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And for jock - how do I find this levels quickly as possible? Open the taps fully and slowly close them if the beast doesnt do what you want it to.
Hopefully you don't fly for one of the LoCo carriers as I use them often.
Hopefully you don't fly for one of the LoCo carriers as I use them often.
Take it up with the manufacturers if you are so passionate about stalls. Until that time the authorities, manufacturers and pilot bodies are quite clear on the topic.
Oh and you better stop flying loco... and I'm not an FO either...
In the meantime I will just avoid stalling alltogether. Such a change...
Last edited by 737Jock; 20th Mar 2013 at 23:57.
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[QUOTE][Absolutely not! It was test flight to confirm whether it would be returned to lessor as sound as leased out. That it was severely improvised with stall protection system being tested on base leg was the final link in accident chain./QUOTE]
Sure but maintenance considered the aircraft fit for passenger flights. The defects that were present could be present on an aicraft carrying passengers, with a stall leading to a similar result.
It's not a test flight in terms of certifying an aircraft through the authorities.
Sure but maintenance considered the aircraft fit for passenger flights. The defects that were present could be present on an aicraft carrying passengers, with a stall leading to a similar result.
It's not a test flight in terms of certifying an aircraft through the authorities.
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checking the trim during a stall recovery on an airbus because you might just have reverted into direct law. Never heard of it until I read the Perpignan accident report!
Frankly I don't care who many books blind pew wrote on aircraft that have been out of service for years. It hardly relates to the issues pilots face in modern jets that they are supposed to fly on automatics...
Would it tamp down your ire somewhat to understand that the aircraft he is referring to was probably the most advanced jetliner (in avionics terms) of its day? It was the in-service pioneer of autoland, had the most comprehensive navigation equipment available (almost a decade ahead of what the US were offering) and the airline that was the primary customer used that as an excuse to put inexperienced pilots in the right-hand seat. This was in the early '70s.
Look - this accident seems fairly straightforward in terms of explanation. If people must ride their hobby horses this isn't the one to get involved in.
Dozy I see from your profile that you are not a pilot. But from your posts you obviously know a lot about aviation. I am a Boeing pilot, so it could be argued that my hands on experience of Airbus flying is also limited. But I will try and answer your question as best I can. Although your statement that Airbus procedures are no more automation dependent than any other manufacturer suggests you already have pretty firm views.
I know a lot of Airbus pilots and most are extremely positive. What they say is that their aircraft are on a day to day basis very agreeable to fly. However when something abnormal happens they can be more complicated than a Boeing. The sheer amount of information available and the different levels of automation, for example control laws makes them that much more complex. A sim session involves endless reading. On a 737 you can switch off all the automatics and mostly you know what you have. On an Airbus in normal operation manual flight is actually still through the computer with auto trim and with the autothrottle engaged. It does not have to be that way. But it is often so.
The Airbus guys will jump up and down and say that they often fly autothrottle off and practice real raw data flying all the time. The fact is that it seems that there are some long haul guys at least, who have very little opportunity and possibly inclination to practice. If you get one or two landings a month often at five in the morning are you really going to be as current as an Easyjet captain doing ten times as many landings a month?
The man machine interface is the critical issue here. There is no doubt what Airbus intended and there are doubtless countless lives saved we will never know about because of all the safety features that Airbus have built in. However the issue of manual flying currency is one that Airbus is aware of as other threads such as the one about the A350 demonstrate.
So in summary what I mean by way of flying is not just the manufacturer's procedures. Individual companies can significantly further influence what really happens on the line, for example by discouraging autothrottle off flying or manual flight over flight level 100. The end result is a risk of automation dependancy. The Air France captain's desire to reengage the automatics so soon after an unusual attitude recovery could certainly be interpreted that way. The Afriqiyah crew flying a serviceable aeroplane into the ground clearly demonstrates they were not fully in control or as I put it in my earlier post they were outside the loop.
I know a lot of Airbus pilots and most are extremely positive. What they say is that their aircraft are on a day to day basis very agreeable to fly. However when something abnormal happens they can be more complicated than a Boeing. The sheer amount of information available and the different levels of automation, for example control laws makes them that much more complex. A sim session involves endless reading. On a 737 you can switch off all the automatics and mostly you know what you have. On an Airbus in normal operation manual flight is actually still through the computer with auto trim and with the autothrottle engaged. It does not have to be that way. But it is often so.
The Airbus guys will jump up and down and say that they often fly autothrottle off and practice real raw data flying all the time. The fact is that it seems that there are some long haul guys at least, who have very little opportunity and possibly inclination to practice. If you get one or two landings a month often at five in the morning are you really going to be as current as an Easyjet captain doing ten times as many landings a month?
The man machine interface is the critical issue here. There is no doubt what Airbus intended and there are doubtless countless lives saved we will never know about because of all the safety features that Airbus have built in. However the issue of manual flying currency is one that Airbus is aware of as other threads such as the one about the A350 demonstrate.
So in summary what I mean by way of flying is not just the manufacturer's procedures. Individual companies can significantly further influence what really happens on the line, for example by discouraging autothrottle off flying or manual flight over flight level 100. The end result is a risk of automation dependancy. The Air France captain's desire to reengage the automatics so soon after an unusual attitude recovery could certainly be interpreted that way. The Afriqiyah crew flying a serviceable aeroplane into the ground clearly demonstrates they were not fully in control or as I put it in my earlier post they were outside the loop.
Last edited by lederhosen; 21st Mar 2013 at 09:46.
Originally Posted by Dozy
Airbus's procedures are no more automation-dependent than those of any other manufacturer.
the automatic trim system, which relieves the pilot of any actions to trim the aeroplane, was no longer available. In the absence of preparation and anticipation of the phenomenon, the habit of having the automatic trim system available made it difficult to return to flying with manual trimming of the aeroplane.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf50
Isn't that the issue at hand in a number of these incidents?
"that" = pilot - machine interface
"that" = pilot - machine interface
Originally Posted by 737jock
Sure but maintenance considered the aircraft fit for passenger flights. The defects that were present could be present on an aicraft carrying passengers, with a stall leading to a similar result.
Originally Posted by 737jock
It's not a test flight in terms of certifying an aircraft through the authorities.
Originally Posted by lederhosen
Although your statement that Airbus procedures are no more automation dependent than any other manufacturer suggests you already have pretty firm views.
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
Just when you need it most, the aeroplane behaves totally differently to normal.
In the meantime I will just avoid stalling alltogether. Such a change...
Since the Air Afriqiyah flight in question in this thread does not appear to have stalled on its way to the crash, it's been interesting to watch the thread drift, beginning in about page 74, into discussions of stall, engine influence on stall, trim, trim rates, and pilot response to aircraft inputs from the systems designed to help the pilot fly.
What appears to be going on in the crash this thread was initially covering strikes me as germane to a fairly recent post about Flight Directors. (Handy tools when used, though there is some thought that the man flying the go around wan't using his ... )
The very nature of flight directors require the pilot to concentrate squarely on the FD needles and normal flight instrument scan becomes practically non-existent. It is no wonder pilots instrument scan on the airspeed indicator and other flight instruments are "disorganised" when 99 percent of an airline pilot's flying in his career will be with reference to the flight director. That is dictated by company policy and recommended by the manufacturer.
A few pages ago, before the great drift, we got an anecdote from someone who knows the fellow who failed this crew on a check ride of some sort. Not sure if the results of that will mesh with the post on FD's but what appears to be evident in this crash is the problem of establishing good instrument scan, good VFR scan, and good "inside outside" scans when in the approach and landing phase.
One of the things I used to teach in our CRM flights in multi crewed aircraft, as part of our CRM baseline, was that of one pilot scanning inside and one outside when on final for an instrument approach. However, you could argue that if you aren't in IMC conditions, that isn't as hard a requrement as when one guy is on the gages and the other is looking for the runway.
This brings us to restricted visibility of other sorts, causing me to ponder the numerous observations in this thread about flying into bright sunrise. If your visual scan is interfered with, and you go from approach to go around, do you do it on the gages or visually, and why? Do you report rates of climb?
Worth discussing in crew rooms as an element of CRM.
Put another way, regardless of how professional or sloppy this crew might have been, was this crash a "there but for the grace of God go I" depending on how well honed your team skills are for the approach/landing phase of your mission?
PPMFJI, Lonewolf_50 but re your question, "was this crash a "there but for the grace of God go I" depending on how well honed your team skills are for the approach/landing phase of your mission?", while there are CRM aspects to the Afrikiyah accident, I think that once again this is a performance-based accident.
In other words, if at least one pilot was competent at both his instrument scan and handling / flying the airplane as well as knowing both the A330 systems and specifically how to do a non-precision approach in the A330, the accident (assuming that pilot took over control and kept it), would likely not have occurred. CRM is a foundational safety tool and required kit but as we all know, at some point the airplane just has to be flown. Why and how this state of affairs occurred both in the short term and overall, was up to the Report to determine.
BTW, I concur with Clandestino's views on Perpignan.
In other words, if at least one pilot was competent at both his instrument scan and handling / flying the airplane as well as knowing both the A330 systems and specifically how to do a non-precision approach in the A330, the accident (assuming that pilot took over control and kept it), would likely not have occurred. CRM is a foundational safety tool and required kit but as we all know, at some point the airplane just has to be flown. Why and how this state of affairs occurred both in the short term and overall, was up to the Report to determine.
BTW, I concur with Clandestino's views on Perpignan.
Last edited by PJ2; 21st Mar 2013 at 22:55.
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I will never understand how some people just don't understand the concept of "Auto Trim". Why not learn about it? I found it to be very helpful when I piloted the A320. Never had a problem with it. Is that because I understood how it worked? I think so. Knowledge is power.
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FBW is essentially the electronic equivalent of the electro-mechanical linkages between the controls and the flight surfaces on non-FBW aircraft, and like those linkages, is in operation whether the aircraft is flown manually or under automation. Conversely, automation implementations are by-and-large the same whether an aircraft is FBW or not. For example, both Airbus and Boeing buy their modern FMS/FMC systems from Honeywell.
FMS/autopilot systems are by their very nature complex whereas FBW systems are designed to be as simple and transparent as possible in order to keep the risk of error to a minimum. So whenever you hear about a "What's it doing now?" situation, it's almost always in reference to a misunderstanding with the FMS/autopilot.
The only thing one needs to keep in mind regarding the Airbus control laws is that outside of Normal Law the aircraft is no longer subject to the hard protections, and the systems will follow the inputs they are given even if those inputs are dangerous (i.e. you can stall it and put it into a spiral dive as with aircraft without the protections).
Autotrim is a very simple aspect of the Airbus FBW system in technical terms. A good layman's analogy would be an automatic gearbox on a car. Just as with an automatic gearbox, the driver or pilot does not need to manually select the setting appropriate for the conditions, however this does not mean that the driver or pilot should not pay attention to what the device is doing, nor does it mean they should not be prepared to assess the situation and take over manually should it be required. Autotrim is *not* automation in the traditional sense of aviation terminology because it does not in and of itself make and effect flightpath decisions.
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The little (but important) difference between "moderns" and "old" aircraft is the amount of surface of the elevators and trims movable surfaces
Before the trim surface was small .. now it's big .. it's just the inverse of the "old" system
I see there not really a technical reason .. but a economic reason ..
I can be wrong
Before the trim surface was small .. now it's big .. it's just the inverse of the "old" system
I see there not really a technical reason .. but a economic reason ..
I can be wrong
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What economical reason can you see? A trimmable stabiliser is a much more involved engineering proposition than a trim tab!
To my mind the advantage of a trimmable stabiliser over tabs in a technical sense has to do with command authority - a trimmable flight surface can potentially have a far greater degree of pitch authority in the event of an elevator system failure or jam than a trim tab on the elevator itself. I don't think any airliner has used tabs over surfaces for trim since the days of the B707 and DC-8.
To my mind the advantage of a trimmable stabiliser over tabs in a technical sense has to do with command authority - a trimmable flight surface can potentially have a far greater degree of pitch authority in the event of an elevator system failure or jam than a trim tab on the elevator itself. I don't think any airliner has used tabs over surfaces for trim since the days of the B707 and DC-8.