Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Actually, conf, my understanding is that the 9 deg G/S is the 'tertiary' G/S and is CORRECTLY sensed? For me the a/c would only be "looking for the moon" if it had passed through the 9 deg to the 6 deg, which begs the question...........??
Really not enough information here to decide WTF the autopilot was doing, and as for a crew using A/P in that situation - words fail me. AF - again! Where is this concept coming from that the a/c system is infallible and the A/P will sort it out? It needs stamping out pronto and ALL pilots told either g/a or take over manually until you are 'in the groove.' (No 1 in this case!) If lederhosen's figures are correct
"6. At 9 miles 4950' (1750' above glide)
7. At 2 miles still 1600' above path"
the LAST thing I would do is plug in the A/P in G/S capture.
and from AvHerald
" at 4nm before touchdown the aircraft was at 3700 feet MSL and 2100 feet above glideslope" and
"At about 2nm out, the aircraft descended through 2850 feet MSL 1600 feet above glide, the vertical channel of the autopilot mode change glideslope capture and autothrust changed to speed mode." - more confirmation (if needed) that AF have huge issues in crew standards to address, if Jaques and Pierre are confident it has captured the G/S...........
However - one re-assurance - at over 2300' ABOVE the threshold
"The pilot monitoring recognized the modes announciated were not suitable....."
Is the whole airline UNABLE to fly an aircraft?
Really not enough information here to decide WTF the autopilot was doing, and as for a crew using A/P in that situation - words fail me. AF - again! Where is this concept coming from that the a/c system is infallible and the A/P will sort it out? It needs stamping out pronto and ALL pilots told either g/a or take over manually until you are 'in the groove.' (No 1 in this case!) If lederhosen's figures are correct
"6. At 9 miles 4950' (1750' above glide)
7. At 2 miles still 1600' above path"
the LAST thing I would do is plug in the A/P in G/S capture.
and from AvHerald
" at 4nm before touchdown the aircraft was at 3700 feet MSL and 2100 feet above glideslope" and
"At about 2nm out, the aircraft descended through 2850 feet MSL 1600 feet above glide, the vertical channel of the autopilot mode change glideslope capture and autothrust changed to speed mode." - more confirmation (if needed) that AF have huge issues in crew standards to address, if Jaques and Pierre are confident it has captured the G/S...........
However - one re-assurance - at over 2300' ABOVE the threshold
"The pilot monitoring recognized the modes announciated were not suitable....."
Is the whole airline UNABLE to fly an aircraft?
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by BOAC
Actually, conf, my understanding is that the 9 deg G/S is the 'tertiary' G/S and is CORRECTLY sensed?
For me the a/c would only be "looking for the moon" if it had passed through the 9 deg to the 6 deg, which begs the question...........??
the LAST thing I would do is plug in the A/P in G/S capture.
The good thing is that the PF finally disconnected the APs before the STALL (?) and pushed all the way on the commands.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Well, conf, I have to say that BEA's opinion of false glideslope signals seems to differ from everyone else's - I have to say I have NEVER seen the animal, so cannot comment on how many and which 'polarity' they are but I have yet to see anyone OTHER than BEA claim no 'signals' at 6 deg and 'reversed' at 9.
However, "not really important right now" as the saying goes - a complete cluster *** whatever, but perhaps the expert clandestino can tell us exactly what happens to the lobes?
However, "not really important right now" as the saying goes - a complete cluster *** whatever, but perhaps the expert clandestino can tell us exactly what happens to the lobes?
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It seems that this crew has been into a wild territory where Airbus has never been before.
That possibility for such an aggressive pitch up at G/S* was probably unknown from Airbus.
The report just tells too little, I would like to know what would come next if the pilots are in a VERY bad day ... ?
That possibility for such an aggressive pitch up at G/S* was probably unknown from Airbus.
The report just tells too little, I would like to know what would come next if the pilots are in a VERY bad day ... ?
A rough and ready response to Gnadenburg's request for a translation, rather delayed due to a trip.
When pitch reaches 26° the crew disconnect both autopilots and pilot flying applies nearly full sidestick forward. The pitch and vertical velocity decrease. The crew close the airbrakes. The thrust levers are positioned to IDLE. Speed is 143 kt and ATHR disengages. About 30 seconds later autopilot 1 is engaged, thrust levers are set to climb and the auto thrust reengaged. The pilot flying said he selected autopilot 1 to make an automatic go-around.
Modes LOC and G / S are active and ATHR is in SPEED mode. Speed is 147 kt. The plane is over the runway threshold at an altitude of about 2700 ft. The pitch decreases by 2 ° to - 5 ° and the plane descends. The pilot flying (commander) said he realized that the modes displayed on the FMA were not suitable. The autopilot is disengaged 8 seconds after activation then a pitch of about 6 ° is achieved and the thrust levers are set to the TOGA detent at an altitude of about 2000 ft.
So in summary a bit of mode confusion in the go-around but they got there eventually.
When pitch reaches 26° the crew disconnect both autopilots and pilot flying applies nearly full sidestick forward. The pitch and vertical velocity decrease. The crew close the airbrakes. The thrust levers are positioned to IDLE. Speed is 143 kt and ATHR disengages. About 30 seconds later autopilot 1 is engaged, thrust levers are set to climb and the auto thrust reengaged. The pilot flying said he selected autopilot 1 to make an automatic go-around.
Modes LOC and G / S are active and ATHR is in SPEED mode. Speed is 147 kt. The plane is over the runway threshold at an altitude of about 2700 ft. The pitch decreases by 2 ° to - 5 ° and the plane descends. The pilot flying (commander) said he realized that the modes displayed on the FMA were not suitable. The autopilot is disengaged 8 seconds after activation then a pitch of about 6 ° is achieved and the thrust levers are set to the TOGA detent at an altitude of about 2000 ft.
So in summary a bit of mode confusion in the go-around but they got there eventually.
6 degree g/s
Seen and flown the beast.
1980 DC9 - 51 rwy 05 GVA.
First month of training.
Direct approach avoiding the proceedure let down in turbulence and occ icing.
Outer marker check didn't make sense and thought we had mis set altimeters.
Realised what I had done - switched off FD and closed throttles then intercepted 3 degree slope from above.
Besides ROD (which I didnt notice) and power setting? Everything else normal.
Neither skipper or SFO safety pilot realised.
1980 DC9 - 51 rwy 05 GVA.
First month of training.
Direct approach avoiding the proceedure let down in turbulence and occ icing.
Outer marker check didn't make sense and thought we had mis set altimeters.
Realised what I had done - switched off FD and closed throttles then intercepted 3 degree slope from above.
Besides ROD (which I didnt notice) and power setting? Everything else normal.
Neither skipper or SFO safety pilot realised.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,753
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Anyway did they close the thrust levers in order to help with lowering the pitch attitude I wonder? Or was it really mode confusion?
Last edited by 737Jock; 17th Mar 2013 at 17:53.
On the 737 that would certainly help in a high power situation. But in this case given the speed reducing to 130 knots it is not clear what the autothrottle was doing. The real mode confusion occurred when selecting the climb detent rather than TOGA. I seem to remember an A320 go-around at CDG where problems occurred when TOGA was not selected.
Last edited by lederhosen; 17th Mar 2013 at 18:34.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,753
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I fly a320 currently lederhosen. All underslung engine aircraft have pitch-up effect with large thrust increase. Autotrim can't keep up with that.
This is one of the reasons why the stall procedure changed on airbus aircraft, first break the stall with pitch, then slowly add power.
http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/medi..._600_Dec11.pdf
Page 3-5-0/1:
I imagine that typical a340 speeds are in the 135-145kts region. Its normally a CAT C approach category aircraft.
This is one of the reasons why the stall procedure changed on airbus aircraft, first break the stall with pitch, then slowly add power.
http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/medi..._600_Dec11.pdf
Page 3-5-0/1:
I imagine that typical a340 speeds are in the 135-145kts region. Its normally a CAT C approach category aircraft.
Last edited by 737Jock; 17th Mar 2013 at 19:10.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,753
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Stalling is wrong with that blind pew...
Stick and throttle forward can be wrong in some circumstances, engines at full power can prevent the pitch from coming down sufficiently to prevent a stall, or might even deepen the stall. You might want to read up on a 737 incident in the UK.
There is no single recipe for success in abnormal attitude situations. Fact is that stall procedures have changed all over the industry, to first break a stall with pitch, then to slowly add power to prevent secondary stalls as a result of pitch-up effects.
I'm not saying that their actions were correct, just providing an alternative to why they might have lowered the nose and simultaneously closed the thrust levers.
I once heard from an engineer that on an (A340 or maybe 330) during test flight, they deep stalled the aircraft and could not get out of it. Even with the engines at idle they had to shutdown one engine to allow enough pitch control to recover and counter the pitch effect. No reference unfortunately. So all hearsay really, anybody heard something like this?
The key is to not allow these situations to happen at all, but once they do there is no single recipe that will solve all problems.
Stick and throttle forward can be wrong in some circumstances, engines at full power can prevent the pitch from coming down sufficiently to prevent a stall, or might even deepen the stall. You might want to read up on a 737 incident in the UK.
There is no single recipe for success in abnormal attitude situations. Fact is that stall procedures have changed all over the industry, to first break a stall with pitch, then to slowly add power to prevent secondary stalls as a result of pitch-up effects.
I'm not saying that their actions were correct, just providing an alternative to why they might have lowered the nose and simultaneously closed the thrust levers.
I once heard from an engineer that on an (A340 or maybe 330) during test flight, they deep stalled the aircraft and could not get out of it. Even with the engines at idle they had to shutdown one engine to allow enough pitch control to recover and counter the pitch effect. No reference unfortunately. So all hearsay really, anybody heard something like this?
The key is to not allow these situations to happen at all, but once they do there is no single recipe that will solve all problems.
Last edited by 737Jock; 17th Mar 2013 at 19:09.
Always thought one initial proceedure is the way to go...then if the nose doesn't come down take some power off.
After all if it takes 8 secs from idle to get a decent amount of thrust then by trickling it on one could looking at twenty seconds which is an awful lot of altitude.
After all if it takes 8 secs from idle to get a decent amount of thrust then by trickling it on one could looking at twenty seconds which is an awful lot of altitude.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,753
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
blind pew... the new procedure on all airbus and boeing jets is to first lower the nose and break the stall. Only when out of the stall power gets slowly added, to prevent a secondary stall.
That is the manufacturer procedure! Or one initial procedure as you might like to call it!
Don't agree?.... go and talk to mr. Airbus and mr. Boeing!
The way to go is to get nowhere near a stall!
That is the manufacturer procedure! Or one initial procedure as you might like to call it!
Don't agree?.... go and talk to mr. Airbus and mr. Boeing!
The way to go is to get nowhere near a stall!
Last edited by 737Jock; 17th Mar 2013 at 21:45.
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: flying by night
Posts: 500
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FAA stall recovery template from AC 120-109 - Stall and Stick Pusher Training
1 Autopilot and autothrottle ..Disconnect
2 a) Nose down pitch control Apply until stall warning is eliminated
b) Nose down pitch trim . .. .As Needed
3 Bank .. .Wings Level
4 Thrust . .As Needed
5 Speed brakes/Spoilers . . ..Retract
6 Return to the desired flightpath.
rationale for each step - including 4) Thrust - is provided in the AC link above
I won't quote the entire document, but obviously some caveats... The manufacturers procedures take precedence; Manufacturers are expected to deviate from this template if the airplane operating characteristics require, and This AC does not provide guidance for full aerodynamic stall training (because more will be forthcoming...but the FAA emphasizes training should treat an approach-to-stall the same as a full stall).
1 Autopilot and autothrottle ..Disconnect
2 a) Nose down pitch control Apply until stall warning is eliminated
b) Nose down pitch trim . .. .As Needed
3 Bank .. .Wings Level
4 Thrust . .As Needed
5 Speed brakes/Spoilers . . ..Retract
6 Return to the desired flightpath.
rationale for each step - including 4) Thrust - is provided in the AC link above
I won't quote the entire document, but obviously some caveats... The manufacturers procedures take precedence; Manufacturers are expected to deviate from this template if the airplane operating characteristics require, and This AC does not provide guidance for full aerodynamic stall training (because more will be forthcoming...but the FAA emphasizes training should treat an approach-to-stall the same as a full stall).
Last edited by deptrai; 18th Mar 2013 at 07:07.
It is always interesting to compare notes on how critical situations are handled in different companies. As 737Jock has indicated the stall recovery has been changed to breaking the stall and then increasing power. However I can find no reference to selecting idle thrust (reducing thrust as necessary to get the nose down yes). The Airbus guys can no doubt confirm why you might do this. But if you have disconnected the autothrottle I cannot see the obvious reason for pulling the thrust levers all the way back with gear and flaps down, recovering from a low level approach to a stall.
Selecting the automatics on shortly after recovery to carry out the go-around while still in approach mode was clearly wrong and led to further gyrations. No set of procedures can cope with every eventuality and common sense is needed. I go back to the thought that for all its obvious strengths the Airbus way of flying can lead to the pilot being that much further outside the loop. When combined with fatigue and relative little hands on flying due to long haul this can be a problem. Do Air France do mixed fleet flying?
Selecting the automatics on shortly after recovery to carry out the go-around while still in approach mode was clearly wrong and led to further gyrations. No set of procedures can cope with every eventuality and common sense is needed. I go back to the thought that for all its obvious strengths the Airbus way of flying can lead to the pilot being that much further outside the loop. When combined with fatigue and relative little hands on flying due to long haul this can be a problem. Do Air France do mixed fleet flying?
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: flying by night
Posts: 500
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Written by non flying lawyers in the days after "airmanship"
Last edited by deptrai; 18th Mar 2013 at 07:51.
Obviously besides not being proper pilots they know nowt of history or training.
Stick fully forward.
Full power
Revert to fully manual control - ie dump auto pilot and auto trim.
Check configuration (gear, brakes, flaps and slats).
If stall persists then trim forward and consider approroate thrust reduction and configuration change.
Still no luck then apply bank whilst transmitting"what a heap of s@@t this Airbus or Boeing is" - delete where appropriate.
Scratch onto nav table suitable depleteives that blame the training/management dept.
(Ref. Staines inquiry 1972).
Stick fully forward.
Full power
Revert to fully manual control - ie dump auto pilot and auto trim.
Check configuration (gear, brakes, flaps and slats).
If stall persists then trim forward and consider approroate thrust reduction and configuration change.
Still no luck then apply bank whilst transmitting"what a heap of s@@t this Airbus or Boeing is" - delete where appropriate.
Scratch onto nav table suitable depleteives that blame the training/management dept.
(Ref. Staines inquiry 1972).
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Obviously besides not being proper pilots they know nowt of history or training.
Stick fully forward.
Full power
Revert to fully manual control - ie dump auto pilot and auto trim.
Check configuration (gear, brakes, flaps and slats).
If stall persists then trim forward and consider approroate thrust reduction and configuration change.
Scratch onto nav table suitable depleteives that blame the training/management dept.
(Ref. Staines inquiry 1972).
Stick fully forward.
Full power
Revert to fully manual control - ie dump auto pilot and auto trim.
Check configuration (gear, brakes, flaps and slats).
If stall persists then trim forward and consider approroate thrust reduction and configuration change.
Scratch onto nav table suitable depleteives that blame the training/management dept.
(Ref. Staines inquiry 1972).
deptrai listed the correct procedure.
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: flying by night
Posts: 500
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think blind pew posted some tongue-in-cheek comments that should be taken with a grain of salt At least it made me chuckle.
the FAA guidance is of course correct, and as misd-again points out, state-of -the-art, current wisdom. [drift] Which reminds me of this book I've been wanting to read "The Half-life of Facts: Why Everything We Know Has an Expiration Date". [/drift]
At least it made me chuckle.the FAA guidance is of course correct, and as misd-again points out, state-of -the-art, current wisdom. [drift] Which reminds me of this book I've been wanting to read "The Half-life of Facts: Why Everything We Know Has an Expiration Date". [/drift]