Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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ELAC:
No doubt about it. But, knowledge of attitude instrument flying and maintaining minimum instrument altitudes and flying speed hasn't changed at all.
...over and out.
Perhaps though, as a guy who last flew the line 20 years ago you might accept that some things have changed since then in ways you may not have a full appreciation of, and that the perspectives of someone who spends each day up close and personal with the equipment we're discussing bears being considered a bit less dismissively.
...over and out.
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Hi,
Elac:
I don't like the idea to slice the pilot job in parts when it's matter of piloting.
You can have a pilot Nobel prize of flight automation ... but bad handflying pilot .. and when automation will fail .. the outcome is know ..
The inverse is also true.
So .. the "good" pilot must proficient in mixing of automatic and manual flying (mixing Nobel prize)
Elac:
Hand flying is only one part of the job
You can have a pilot Nobel prize of flight automation ... but bad handflying pilot .. and when automation will fail .. the outcome is know ..
The inverse is also true.
So .. the "good" pilot must proficient in mixing of automatic and manual flying (mixing Nobel prize)
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jcjeant,
I agree with you entirely. It's just a matter of whether there's a trend we need to correct right now, and if so what that correction should be.
Cheers,
ELAC
I don't like the idea to slice the pilot job in parts when it's matter of piloting.
You can have a pilot Nobel prize of flight automation ... but bad handflying pilot .. and when automation will fail .. the outcome is know ..
The inverse is also true.
So .. the "good" pilot must proficient in mixing of automatic and manual flying (mixing Nobel prize)
You can have a pilot Nobel prize of flight automation ... but bad handflying pilot .. and when automation will fail .. the outcome is know ..
The inverse is also true.
So .. the "good" pilot must proficient in mixing of automatic and manual flying (mixing Nobel prize)
Cheers,
ELAC
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Originally Posted by ELAC
All I'm saying is that; one, the evidence supporting that a lack of hand flying proficiency is a significant problem does not appear to exist; and two that increasing the frequency of manual flying as a cure for that supposed problem is not necessarily a solution that raises the overall safety of the operation.
Did you get the chance to read the following thread ELAC :
Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus
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CONF iture,
Actually, not quite the same case at all CONF iture.
From the article:
This relates to an issue specific to a subset of pilots who see a relatively low number of handling sectors per month/year. That's not the same as pilots as a whole, and the accidents we've been discussing haven't been the product of crews that fall into this category.
And as to recommendations, what Airbus suggested was:
So neither the same problem nor the same solution as is being advocated here.
Cheers,
ELAC
Quote:
Originally Posted by ELAC
All I'm saying is that; one, the evidence supporting that a lack of hand flying proficiency is a significant problem does not appear to exist; and two that increasing the frequency of manual flying as a cure for that supposed problem is not necessarily a solution that raises the overall safety of the operation.
Lately, even Airbus seems to think differently ...
Did you get the chance to read the following thread ELAC :
Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus
Originally Posted by ELAC
All I'm saying is that; one, the evidence supporting that a lack of hand flying proficiency is a significant problem does not appear to exist; and two that increasing the frequency of manual flying as a cure for that supposed problem is not necessarily a solution that raises the overall safety of the operation.
Lately, even Airbus seems to think differently ...
Did you get the chance to read the following thread ELAC :
Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus
From the article:
Airbus is urging the aviation industry to confront the issue of how to ensure long-haul airline pilots maintain basic flying skills in the face of ever-increasing aircraft reliability and cockpit automation.
And as to recommendations, what Airbus suggested was:
"I think that at a certain point in time we need to bring back a little bit of handling," said Drappier, adding that he advocates more simulator time for pilots to hone their basic skills. Meanwhile, he says, there are some elements of training that could be moved from the simulator to the classroom.
Cheers,
ELAC
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Elac,
I get what you are saying. I'm just saying (without dissertation, ain't going there) that there is a feeling out there that maybe, just maybe, that automation may be leading to a degradation of basic skills.
Look at hand writing. Since the PC took over the world, how many people are still proficient at writing legibly?
Could it be remotely possible, that aircraft having reached such a level of reliability, critical failures requiring full control of an aircraft by aircrew are almost non-existent and as such, poor skills are masked by the reliability of the aircraft?
That's a failure. What about having to fly an approach that's not "in the box"? Or doing ANYTHING that's not "in the box".
People today don't know their airplanes like they did in the past. The sorry question: "What's it doing now?" USED to be a joke.
I'm still a firm believer that the best computer out there is the one between your ears.
I'm no Luddite, just saying ya gotta be able to be flexible.
PB
I get what you are saying. I'm just saying (without dissertation, ain't going there) that there is a feeling out there that maybe, just maybe, that automation may be leading to a degradation of basic skills.
Look at hand writing. Since the PC took over the world, how many people are still proficient at writing legibly?
Could it be remotely possible, that aircraft having reached such a level of reliability, critical failures requiring full control of an aircraft by aircrew are almost non-existent and as such, poor skills are masked by the reliability of the aircraft?
That's a failure. What about having to fly an approach that's not "in the box"? Or doing ANYTHING that's not "in the box".
People today don't know their airplanes like they did in the past. The sorry question: "What's it doing now?" USED to be a joke.
I'm still a firm believer that the best computer out there is the one between your ears.
I'm no Luddite, just saying ya gotta be able to be flexible.
PB
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PB,
I get what you are saying too. But, we have the data available at various levels to determine whether those "feelings" are correct. Shouldn't we be using that to drive our conclusions and corrections instead of just leaving it to our feelings and hunches?
Cheers,
ELAC
I get what you are saying. I'm just saying (without dissertation, ain't going there) that there is a feeling out there that maybe, just maybe, that automation may be leading to a degradation of basic skills.
Cheers,
ELAC
ELAC, in your analytical approach to the matter of piloting skills, which are a combination of (among other things) systems knowledge, cognitive skills, eye hand coordination, and teamwork, are you counting the hits and overlooking, or blind to, the misses? I get leary of the dismissal of experiential input as "oh, that's just anecdotal ..." Such anecdotal input was often the red flag a CO needed to ground a pilot, or have him/her work with the Standardization board to correct a lack of proficiency or demonstrated shortcoming of one sort or another. Lack of, or dismissal of such anecdotal input was mentioned in far too many Class A mishap reports I read over a couple of decades.
From where you sit, I wish to ask: how do you intend to capture the level of a skill set, or capability, if you have no program to perform and measure the skill or performance set in a continuum? Day to day proficiency is the issue, be it hand flying, using the systems as designed, in full and degraded modes, and crew task achievement with few to no errors.
It is nice that one can measure (and even improve) the teamwork and systems knowledge skills in a simulator, given the quality of today's simulation. You can even use graduated task saturation to find the point of failure of a given crew. (One of my favorite parts about using sims was to see how far one can take a crew into a nightmare scanario, multiple systems failures, before an error, or stream of errors, was induced).
You have asked for evidence, but I don't see your arguments addressing the critical elements of daily proficiency and currency. Perhaps I am simply not understanding you.
Why does this concern me? Besides being generally interested in pilot issues, when I travel as a customer for any airline, I wish to be confident that the crew are current and proficient. Makes for a more enjoyable flight. Does the system support my confidence, or undermine it?
My points of reference are predominantly military flying and the training/currency/proficiency issues. What I learned about currency and proficiency may be only partly applicable to the commercial flying arena. But I think some overlaps.
That said, they didn't start calling some pilots "HUD cripples" (a less than complimentary term) for no good reason. There were observed changes in behavior by people who knew the difference. Even in that arena, there was a catch. At both the military and political (where money comes from) levels, the typical response was:
OK, you see a difference, what are you doing to fix it, at the operator training end? We have bought this magical device, it has mission advantages. Complaining or criticsing it makes us look bad, puts a new system at risk (and jobs). (We could waste some space on a host of negative, non-flying considerations then raised).
In the FWIW department: a few years ago, there was some evidence pointing towards the improvement of a metric richly desired -- boarding rate improvement (CV landings successfully achieved in initial jet training) which looked to correlate with the change to the T-45C from the T-45A, complete with glass cockpit, HUD, and more. The initial analysis had to account for some disparity of flight hours, numbers of FCLPs in syllabus, and landings of all sorts, and much else. I would love to have remained on that topic, but was assigned other tasks. The weighting of factors we needed done may or may not have happened as that assessment continued, my last touch point was a few years ago.
The outcome of that study was going to drive a resource decision, or inform it, while meeting frequency, currency, and proficiency requirements.
Proficiency is what you need (it appears over the course of this discussion) during unforecast events.
I understand that cost is a non-trivial variable. It was so even in the military environment: for example, does the PMR need to be 25-30 hours per month, can we focus the training so that proficiency and currency can be achieved in, say, 17-23? In 12-18? In some cases, the answer was "yes" in others it wasn't so clear. Use of simulation, which is also expensive, was most helpful in a lot of cases.
Having read any number of your posts on this topic, I appreciate your analytical bent, but wonder how and if you are capturing metrics that show, with fidelity to reality, where the proficiency of aircrews stand on the day to day contimuum of operations. Any number of practicing professional pilots (in this dialogue) have observed something less than proficiency on some flight decks. I don't think that input ought to be underweighted.
As I read this dialogue, proficiency is what the hand flying advocates are on about.
From where you sit, I wish to ask: how do you intend to capture the level of a skill set, or capability, if you have no program to perform and measure the skill or performance set in a continuum? Day to day proficiency is the issue, be it hand flying, using the systems as designed, in full and degraded modes, and crew task achievement with few to no errors.
It is nice that one can measure (and even improve) the teamwork and systems knowledge skills in a simulator, given the quality of today's simulation. You can even use graduated task saturation to find the point of failure of a given crew. (One of my favorite parts about using sims was to see how far one can take a crew into a nightmare scanario, multiple systems failures, before an error, or stream of errors, was induced).
You have asked for evidence, but I don't see your arguments addressing the critical elements of daily proficiency and currency. Perhaps I am simply not understanding you.
Why does this concern me? Besides being generally interested in pilot issues, when I travel as a customer for any airline, I wish to be confident that the crew are current and proficient. Makes for a more enjoyable flight. Does the system support my confidence, or undermine it? My points of reference are predominantly military flying and the training/currency/proficiency issues. What I learned about currency and proficiency may be only partly applicable to the commercial flying arena. But I think some overlaps.
That said, they didn't start calling some pilots "HUD cripples" (a less than complimentary term) for no good reason. There were observed changes in behavior by people who knew the difference. Even in that arena, there was a catch. At both the military and political (where money comes from) levels, the typical response was:
OK, you see a difference, what are you doing to fix it, at the operator training end? We have bought this magical device, it has mission advantages. Complaining or criticsing it makes us look bad, puts a new system at risk (and jobs). (We could waste some space on a host of negative, non-flying considerations then raised).
In the FWIW department: a few years ago, there was some evidence pointing towards the improvement of a metric richly desired -- boarding rate improvement (CV landings successfully achieved in initial jet training) which looked to correlate with the change to the T-45C from the T-45A, complete with glass cockpit, HUD, and more. The initial analysis had to account for some disparity of flight hours, numbers of FCLPs in syllabus, and landings of all sorts, and much else. I would love to have remained on that topic, but was assigned other tasks. The weighting of factors we needed done may or may not have happened as that assessment continued, my last touch point was a few years ago.
The outcome of that study was going to drive a resource decision, or inform it, while meeting frequency, currency, and proficiency requirements.
Proficiency is what you need (it appears over the course of this discussion) during unforecast events.
I understand that cost is a non-trivial variable. It was so even in the military environment: for example, does the PMR need to be 25-30 hours per month, can we focus the training so that proficiency and currency can be achieved in, say, 17-23? In 12-18? In some cases, the answer was "yes" in others it wasn't so clear. Use of simulation, which is also expensive, was most helpful in a lot of cases.
Having read any number of your posts on this topic, I appreciate your analytical bent, but wonder how and if you are capturing metrics that show, with fidelity to reality, where the proficiency of aircrews stand on the day to day contimuum of operations. Any number of practicing professional pilots (in this dialogue) have observed something less than proficiency on some flight decks. I don't think that input ought to be underweighted.
As I read this dialogue, proficiency is what the hand flying advocates are on about.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 24th Jun 2010 at 14:17.
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
I get leary of the dismissal of experiential input as "oh, that's just anecdotal ..." Such anecdotal input was often the red flag a CO needed to ground a pilot, or have him/her work with the Standardization board to correct a lack of proficiency or demonstrated shortcoming of one sort or another. Lack of, or dismissal of such anecdotal input was mentioned in far too many Class A mishap reports I read over a couple of decades.
I get what you are saying. I'm just saying (without dissertation, ain't going there) that there is a feeling out there that maybe, just maybe, that automation may be leading to a degradation of basic skills.
Look at hand writing. Since the PC took over the world, how many people are still proficient at writing legibly?
Look at hand writing. Since the PC took over the world, how many people are still proficient at writing legibly?
Similarly has the introduction of in-car GPS systems led to a reduction in map reading skills - yes - but there are fewer people lost!
Just as the introduction of the firearm relegated the archer to history...
We humans have a great ability to invent. The problem we are struggling with here is our ability to (apparently) relinquish direct control (hands on control column) to a computer.
Unfortunately when an aircraft crashes the results are terrible. But putting that into perspective, risk is part of all human activity. I haven't looked recently, but I am confident that the accident rate per million miles traveled per person is quite different today compared to, say, 30 years ago. Many, many more flights in the air....
So would we be better or worse off with or without the automation that seems to be the focus of so many on this board? Anyone want to surrender their in-car navi system for a paper map?
FWIW - I can still read a map, but have a GPS. I insist my kids work on their hand-writing skills, but they use PCs to produce reports for school. I don't have a firearm or a bow... I'd rather like the pilot on my next flight to be fully proficient and be able to hand-fly the entire flight if necessary, but I'd expect him/her to use the automation available to the full extent.
But there's the dilemma - using the automation, precludes honing those hand-flying skills. So is this a question of SOP and training?
- GY
Good point, Mike, CVR and FDR allow some data harvesting that I'd not have commonly seen in military experience. But there is a marked exception. Every CV approach and landing is debriefed, in detail, and also graded, by the LSO. I don't know if current software/hardware packages provide the LSO with a "last 5-10 minutes of the mission" read out of A/S, alt, power, etcetera, at CVR/FDR levels of granularity. I know some people were interested in such ...
Seems the last thirty (sixty?) minutes of any flight are in the approach and landing environment, which is a task area of interest, so crew performance trends could in fact be gathered over time.
Is that routinely done at most airlines?
Seems the last thirty (sixty?) minutes of any flight are in the approach and landing environment, which is a task area of interest, so crew performance trends could in fact be gathered over time.
Is that routinely done at most airlines?
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As a data point in the ability of computers to understand and react to novel situations I offer this "google ad" (automatically selected by web page context) that appeared under this thread:
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JustAnswer. com/ Stress
-----
Not sure what that is trying to tell us but....
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JustAnswer. com/ Stress
-----
Not sure what that is trying to tell us but....
Lonewolf_50;
Yes, it is.
Please read recent contributions. Most of the thinking described in your post would not apply and would not be suitable to airline work. I posted on this topic yesterday in response to ELAC's contributions especially his response to "TeeVee", and may have addressed your questions/suggestions here: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post5770385 .
From what I have seen, you do not see routine "data harvesting" for safety purposes in military work. Along with many civilian safety formats, I have attended MFOQA (Military FOQA) conferences and learned that flight data is used primarily to assure mission readiness, not to assure flight safety. Commercial carriers are obviously driven by different priorities and is the basis for my comment.
Routine flight data analysis is done at most airlines to a greater or lesser degree, with greater or lesser effectiveness. The granularity of such data is usually very high, with thousands of parameters available, many at very high sample rates. Such programs are complex and expensive not because the equipment is expensive but ensuring appropriate staffing of such programs and justifying the costs for same, is always a problem within a profit-driven enterprise.
Airline pilots do not debrief after every landing. Normally there is no need because we fly well within "normal". If there is an event on the flight, normally the carrier requires a safety report and a formal crew debriefing. If for example an approach was a mess, we would normally talk about it informally.
In addressing your suggestion concerning information sharing, like flight data analysis, the concept has been around for decades in civilian work. The concept was recently formalized in the US as a "Distributed National ASAP Archive" and "Distributed National FOQA Archive". I do not know its present status. Canada has no such concept in place. I am unsure whether the Europeans do this.
For a number of reasons, sharing safety information even within one carrier let alone across the industry is not an easy thing to implement. What is shared is mainly done through a very high-level approach, (meaning, specifics are never openly discussed, just the broad trends) through industry safety publications, (Flight Safety Foundation, etc).
There are contributors here who know far more about distributed archives than I but for the purposes of understanding the notion, 'distributed' and 'archive' here mean that safety reporting information and FOQA information from individual member airlines are distributed on servers but accessible through a single point that prevents identification of individual carriers, flights or personnel. The intent is to provide a broad data and information base so that the industry can see "over the fence" what other carriers are experiencing in terms of safety issues and FOQA events and compare with their own operation.
Clearly, the basis for such sharing intends to foster the ability of all carriers to address common safety matters and events. One question which might be asked of the distributed archive is, "Are B737's or A320's landing beyond the touchdown zone and if so how far past, and at what airports?", or, "What is the number and nature of industry TCAS or EGPWS events and where are they occurring?"
You may imagine the thousands of questions which may be asked of such an archive the study of which can provide a solid, data-driven basis for change rather than a mere anecdotal/opinion-based foundation which those who do safety work within an airline must wrestle.
That observed, the setting up of such a system is extremely complex. While providing sufficient detail for all safety report or FOQA event categories, carrier anonymity must be guaranteed.
There is an FAA paper here that may be of use in furthering understanding.
PJ2
Good point, Mike, CVR and FDR allow some data harvesting that I'd not have commonly seen in military experience. But there is a marked exception. Every CV approach and landing is debriefed, in detail, and also graded, by the LSO. I don't know if current software/hardware packages provide the LSO with a "last 5-10 minutes of the mission" read out of A/S, alt, power, etcetera, at CVR/FDR levels of granularity. I know some people were interested in such ...
Seems the last thirty (sixty?) minutes of any flight are in the approach and landing environment, which is a task area of interest, so crew performance trends could in fact be gathered over time.
Is that routinely done at most airlines?
Seems the last thirty (sixty?) minutes of any flight are in the approach and landing environment, which is a task area of interest, so crew performance trends could in fact be gathered over time.
Is that routinely done at most airlines?
Please read recent contributions. Most of the thinking described in your post would not apply and would not be suitable to airline work. I posted on this topic yesterday in response to ELAC's contributions especially his response to "TeeVee", and may have addressed your questions/suggestions here: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post5770385 .
From what I have seen, you do not see routine "data harvesting" for safety purposes in military work. Along with many civilian safety formats, I have attended MFOQA (Military FOQA) conferences and learned that flight data is used primarily to assure mission readiness, not to assure flight safety. Commercial carriers are obviously driven by different priorities and is the basis for my comment.
Routine flight data analysis is done at most airlines to a greater or lesser degree, with greater or lesser effectiveness. The granularity of such data is usually very high, with thousands of parameters available, many at very high sample rates. Such programs are complex and expensive not because the equipment is expensive but ensuring appropriate staffing of such programs and justifying the costs for same, is always a problem within a profit-driven enterprise.
Airline pilots do not debrief after every landing. Normally there is no need because we fly well within "normal". If there is an event on the flight, normally the carrier requires a safety report and a formal crew debriefing. If for example an approach was a mess, we would normally talk about it informally.
In addressing your suggestion concerning information sharing, like flight data analysis, the concept has been around for decades in civilian work. The concept was recently formalized in the US as a "Distributed National ASAP Archive" and "Distributed National FOQA Archive". I do not know its present status. Canada has no such concept in place. I am unsure whether the Europeans do this.
For a number of reasons, sharing safety information even within one carrier let alone across the industry is not an easy thing to implement. What is shared is mainly done through a very high-level approach, (meaning, specifics are never openly discussed, just the broad trends) through industry safety publications, (Flight Safety Foundation, etc).
There are contributors here who know far more about distributed archives than I but for the purposes of understanding the notion, 'distributed' and 'archive' here mean that safety reporting information and FOQA information from individual member airlines are distributed on servers but accessible through a single point that prevents identification of individual carriers, flights or personnel. The intent is to provide a broad data and information base so that the industry can see "over the fence" what other carriers are experiencing in terms of safety issues and FOQA events and compare with their own operation.
Clearly, the basis for such sharing intends to foster the ability of all carriers to address common safety matters and events. One question which might be asked of the distributed archive is, "Are B737's or A320's landing beyond the touchdown zone and if so how far past, and at what airports?", or, "What is the number and nature of industry TCAS or EGPWS events and where are they occurring?"
You may imagine the thousands of questions which may be asked of such an archive the study of which can provide a solid, data-driven basis for change rather than a mere anecdotal/opinion-based foundation which those who do safety work within an airline must wrestle.
That observed, the setting up of such a system is extremely complex. While providing sufficient detail for all safety report or FOQA event categories, carrier anonymity must be guaranteed.
There is an FAA paper here that may be of use in furthering understanding.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 24th Jun 2010 at 17:07.
PJ2: many thanks. Cleared up quite a bit. The informal debrief appears to translate very well. As to tailored proficiency metrics ... I'll do some more reading, appreciate the pointers.
You may be amused to note that I applied for a civil service MFOQA billet, but was not chosen, just under five years ago. The billet, I found out from my friend who had first alerted me, was suspended (for funding) for over a year. In the meantime, I found another job. When I found out the job was on again, I was late to the party with my package.
So it goes.
The informal debrief appears to translate very well. As to tailored proficiency metrics ... I'll do some more reading, appreciate the pointers. You may be amused to note that I applied for a civil service MFOQA billet, but was not chosen, just under five years ago. The billet, I found out from my friend who had first alerted me, was suspended (for funding) for over a year. In the meantime, I found another job. When I found out the job was on again, I was late to the party with my package.
So it goes.
Lonewolf_50;
You're welcome - This stuff should be used broadly but along with many understandable concerns, prosecution by the legal industry using safety information gathered purely for improving safety is at the top of the list of (I would say) all carriers. The data is protected in the US under the FAA's FOQA initiative, providing airlines can demonstrate that such data is being actively used. In Canada, once again, Transport Canada has no requirement for FOQA under their SMS initiative, does not protect in law the data that is gathered by airlines voluntarily doing FOQA and has otherwise not taken a leadership role in such safety work. Consequently, anecdotal information and opinion can carry as much weight as validated, hard data. Go figure.
Anyway, that's all I have to say here - thanks for the response. PJ2
You're welcome - This stuff should be used broadly but along with many understandable concerns, prosecution by the legal industry using safety information gathered purely for improving safety is at the top of the list of (I would say) all carriers. The data is protected in the US under the FAA's FOQA initiative, providing airlines can demonstrate that such data is being actively used. In Canada, once again, Transport Canada has no requirement for FOQA under their SMS initiative, does not protect in law the data that is gathered by airlines voluntarily doing FOQA and has otherwise not taken a leadership role in such safety work. Consequently, anecdotal information and opinion can carry as much weight as validated, hard data. Go figure.
Anyway, that's all I have to say here - thanks for the response. PJ2
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Lonewolf 50,
Thanks for your questions & contribution. As some others have already replied here, with the forebearance of the mods I'll do the same instead of switching this to another thread.
Actually, if you look back at where this discussion started it arose from what appeared to me an over willingness to count the misses, which are few, without considering the hits which are many. Regarding anecdotal evidence, I'm not suggesting that it be discounted in its entirety, but rather it be ascribed weight according to what it is intended to indicate or detect. Look at the examples you've provided. They involve specific performance of a single individual or small group or a specific task. There the anecdotal can be very relevant. But that approach loses a good deal of value as the population you are dealing with and the breadth of the task increases. Additionally, anecdotes, especially of aircraft accidents, suffer from a"vividness factor" which tends to skew the weight that's placed on that information. Some relevant thoughts on this can be found in the chapter on "Biases in the Evaluation of Evidence" from the work "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" by Richard Heuer. Particularly relevant is a section titled "The Vividness Criterion". Some excerpts that apply:
This is my point in counter to statements who cite the Turkish or Colgan accidents and then claim that as a result there is a consensus that "Far too many pilots are truly screwed when...", etc, etc. They are taking the atypical case and giving it great weight without any statistical underpinning.
We have a growing body of data that is available to us for use (in varying degrees for varying populations) in the form of FOQA programs. pj2 is the expert here and I'll defer to his explanations of the capabilities and limitations, but suffice it to say that if the issue is a pressing one we have the means of determining to what degree it is and to make some estimations of what different changes in policy might yield. While the data probably isn't sufficient to cover a "generational" change there's likely enough there to capture a rolling 5 year trend run out over the past 10 years. A step back from that approach, but more easy to accomplish over a broad worldwide group, would be a similar analysis of incident reports. The data is there, so instead of just allowing the vividness criterion to rule I suggest accessing it if that hasn't already been done by those who are paid to think deep on the issue.
Is something undermining your confidence regarding the critical elements of proficiency and currency today, versus the level of confidence you had in those elements 5 years ago, 10 years ago or 20 years ago? As already mentioned, at the coarsest level, accidents, the rate of occurrence has dropped by about 72.5% in the U.S. since the 1980s, so shouldn't whatever assured you then still be assuring you now? Is it a change in type of accidents occurring? Again as already discussed, we have had similar accidents in the past, and if we we're only just keeping even with traffic growth we'd be seeing more than double the number of them now as opposed to then. The accident data doesn't seem to support that suppositon except perhaps as relative to an even greater reduction in rates of accidents from other causes. Is it possible that any erosion in your confidence of the standards of critical elements in daily proficiency is a result of repetition of anecdotals such as "Accidents like that didn't happen back when ..."? I think that's in large part why I bothered to jump into this. Repeat something often enough and people start to believe it's true, whether or not it is founded in fact. Erroneous conclusions then lead to erroneous prescriptions to solve the assumed but not necessarily actual problem. The industry already addresses issues of currency and proficiency to a high degree, so before proposing a positive change I would need a better basis for the "why" and "too what net effect".
Yup, I agree that, that form of problem exists. Our job as an industry is to keep our focus on accurately measuring the results and then asking: Which modifications to equipment, process or philosophy will enhance the safety of the system and which ones won't? Some answers could include an increase in manual flying on the line, but again, quite possibly not. I think it's better to look carefully before leaping to that conclusion.
That sounds like the way I'm suggesting the issue should be broached. A shame you didn't get to stick with the project as I'm sure observations on how it evolved would be very relevant to this discussion.
No, I'm not capturing metrics with certain fidelity to reality, but at least I'm providing some that have relevance and give a starting point for a metrics driven discussion. Those advocating that there is a significant problem and that the solution to the problem is more hand flying, are not providing any metrics at all. As the ones proposing the theory I've asked what they can show that supports it. In return what is being provided is an amplification of the importance of the anecdotal, but without any analogous statistical support. That's a path to significant analytical error, as Heuer describes. Given that the problem, if it exists as proposed, and the solutions suggested are significant, I don't think the evidence being presented here is sufficient for the conclusions they state. And, the constant repetition of the position makes the perception of consensus illusory. By example, if you look back at the thread and remove all comments from those who do not have reasonably current, relevant experience, how many participants are you left with? Of those, how many make the claim that hand flying skill is a problem of the magnitude that it demands a significant reduction in the use of automation in response? I think the count on both parts would reduce well below the standard of "any number...", and yet that is the impression that many critical readers (in the sense of educated to the subject) like yourself, for example, may be forming from what they read. Eventually that can create a real consensus founded on the thinking "Well, eveyone else believes it, so it must be true that...". This isn't how I see us improving the safety of the system.
Cheers,
ELAC
Thanks for your questions & contribution. As some others have already replied here, with the forebearance of the mods I'll do the same instead of switching this to another thread.
ELAC, in your analytical approach to the matter of piloting skills, which are a combination of (among other things) systems knowledge, cognitive skills, eye hand coordination, and teamwork, are you counting the hits and overlooking, or blind to, the misses? I get leary of the dismissal of experiential input as "oh, that's just anecdotal ..." Such anecdotal input was often the red flag a CO needed to ground a pilot, or have him/her work with the Standardization board to correct a lack of proficiency or demonstrated shortcoming of one sort or another. Lack of, or dismissal of such anecdotal input was mentioned in far too many Class A mishap reports I read over a couple of decades.
The Vividness Criterion
The impact of information on the human mind is only imperfectly related to its true value as evidence.
Specifically, information that is vivid, concrete, and personal has a greater impact on our thinking than pallid, abstract information that may actually have substantially greater value as evidence. For example:
The most serious implication of vividness as a criterion that determines the impact of evidence is that certain kinds of very valuable evidence will have little influence simply because they are abstract. Statistical data, in particular, lack the rich and concrete detail to evoke vivid images, and they are often overlooked, ignored, or minimized.
Personal anecdotes, actual accounts of people’s responsiveness or indifference to information sources, and controlled experiments can all be cited ad infinitum “to illustrate the proposition that data summaries, despite their logically compelling implications, have less impact than does inferior but more vivid evidence.” It seems likely that intelligence analysts, too, assign insuffcient weight to statistical information.
Analysts should give little weight to anecdotes and personal case histories unless they are known to be typical, and perhaps no weight at all if aggregate data based on a more valid sample can be obtained.
The impact of information on the human mind is only imperfectly related to its true value as evidence.
Specifically, information that is vivid, concrete, and personal has a greater impact on our thinking than pallid, abstract information that may actually have substantially greater value as evidence. For example:
- Information that people perceive directly, that they hear with their own ears or see with their own eyes, is likely to have greater impact than information received secondhand that may have greater evidential value.
- Case histories and anecdotes will have greater impact than moreinformative but abstract aggregate or statistical data.
The most serious implication of vividness as a criterion that determines the impact of evidence is that certain kinds of very valuable evidence will have little influence simply because they are abstract. Statistical data, in particular, lack the rich and concrete detail to evoke vivid images, and they are often overlooked, ignored, or minimized.
Personal anecdotes, actual accounts of people’s responsiveness or indifference to information sources, and controlled experiments can all be cited ad infinitum “to illustrate the proposition that data summaries, despite their logically compelling implications, have less impact than does inferior but more vivid evidence.” It seems likely that intelligence analysts, too, assign insuffcient weight to statistical information.
Analysts should give little weight to anecdotes and personal case histories unless they are known to be typical, and perhaps no weight at all if aggregate data based on a more valid sample can be obtained.
From where you sit, I wish to ask: how do you intend to capture the level of a skill set, or capability, if you have no program to perform and measure the skill or performance set in a continuum? Day to day proficiency is the issue, be it hand flying, using the systems as designed, in full and degraded modes, and crew task achievement with few to no errors.
It is nice that one can measure (and even improve) the teamwork and systems knowledge skills in a simulator, given the quality of today's simulation. You can even use graduated task saturation to find the point of failure of a given crew. (One of my favorite parts about using sims was to see how far one can take a crew into a nightmare scanario, multiple systems failures, before an error, or stream of errors, was induced).
You have asked for evidence, but I don't see your arguments addressing the critical elements of daily proficiency and currency. Perhaps I am simply not understanding you. Why does this concern me? Besides being generally interested in pilot issues, when I travel as a customer for any airline, I wish to be confident that the crew are current and proficient. Makes for a more enjoyable flight. Does the system support my confidence, or undermine it?
You have asked for evidence, but I don't see your arguments addressing the critical elements of daily proficiency and currency. Perhaps I am simply not understanding you. Why does this concern me? Besides being generally interested in pilot issues, when I travel as a customer for any airline, I wish to be confident that the crew are current and proficient. Makes for a more enjoyable flight. Does the system support my confidence, or undermine it?
My points of reference are predominantly military flying and the training/currency/proficiency issues. What I learned about currency and proficiency may be only partly applicable to the commercial flying arena. But I think some overlaps.
That said, they didn't start calling some pilots "HUD cripples" (a less than complimentary term) for no good reason. There were observed changes in behavior by people who knew the difference. Even in that arena, there was a catch. At both the military and political (where money comes from) levels, the typical response was:
OK, you see a difference, what are you doing to fix it, at the operator training end? We have bought this magical device, it has mission advantages. Complaining or criticsing it makes us look bad, puts a new system at risk (and jobs). (We could waste some space on a host of negative, non-flying considerations then raised).
That said, they didn't start calling some pilots "HUD cripples" (a less than complimentary term) for no good reason. There were observed changes in behavior by people who knew the difference. Even in that arena, there was a catch. At both the military and political (where money comes from) levels, the typical response was:
OK, you see a difference, what are you doing to fix it, at the operator training end? We have bought this magical device, it has mission advantages. Complaining or criticsing it makes us look bad, puts a new system at risk (and jobs). (We could waste some space on a host of negative, non-flying considerations then raised).
In the FWIW department: a few years ago, there was some evidence pointing towards the improvement of a metric richly desired -- boarding rate improvement (CV landings successfully achieved in initial jet training) which looked to correlate with the change to the T-45C from the T-45A, complete with glass cockpit, HUD, and more. The initial analysis had to account for some disparity of flight hours, numbers of FCLPs in syllabus, and landings of all sorts, and much else. I would love to have remained on that topic, but was assigned other tasks. The weighting of factors we needed done may or may not have happened as that assessment continued, my last touch point was a few years ago.
The outcome of that study was going to drive a resource decision, or inform it, while meeting frequency, currency, and proficiency requirements.
Proficiency is what you need (it appears over the course of this discussion) during unforecast events.
I understand that cost is a non-trivial variable. It was so even in the military environment: for example, does the PMR need to be 25-30 hours per month, can we focus the training so that proficiency and currency can be achieved in, say, 17-23? In 12-18? In some cases, the answer was "yes" in others it wasn't so clear. Use of simulation, which is also expensive, was most helpful in a lot of cases.
The outcome of that study was going to drive a resource decision, or inform it, while meeting frequency, currency, and proficiency requirements.
Proficiency is what you need (it appears over the course of this discussion) during unforecast events.
I understand that cost is a non-trivial variable. It was so even in the military environment: for example, does the PMR need to be 25-30 hours per month, can we focus the training so that proficiency and currency can be achieved in, say, 17-23? In 12-18? In some cases, the answer was "yes" in others it wasn't so clear. Use of simulation, which is also expensive, was most helpful in a lot of cases.
Having read any number of your posts on this topic, I appreciate your analytical bent, but wonder how and if you are capturing metrics that show, with fidelity to reality, where the proficiency of aircrews stand on the day to day contimuum of operations. Any number of practicing professional pilots (in this dialogue) have observed something less than proficiency on some flight decks. I don't think that input ought to be underweighted.
As I read this dialogue, proficiency is what the hand flying advocates are on about.
As I read this dialogue, proficiency is what the hand flying advocates are on about.
Cheers,
ELAC
Last edited by ELAC; 25th Jun 2010 at 06:07.
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Hi,
Just a tought about accidents rates (or types) and any statistics related
It's indeed a fact (solid like a rock) that the rate of accidents is lower than in the past .. in relation with a greatest traffic than in the past.
Anyways (less the pilots and the experts in accident investigations or in statistics of all kinds ) the last judge is the customer.
And for the customer .. it's not important to know (or he don't bother) of such very good statistics.
The fact is (if the accidents rate stay at it is today) .. the number of accidents will go growing with growing traffic ..
So it will be feel by the public that is more accidents so .. less safety in the air....
And the public (customers) have a greatest weight than the other side (experts and statisticians)
Can the public accept (exagerated on purpose!) 1 accident by week with a average of 200 victims .. even though statistics indicate that everything is perfect and that the accident rate is stable or declining ?
Methink the traffic problem (like births worldwide) will be solved by itself in a natural way .. auto regulation ..
Just a tought about accidents rates (or types) and any statistics related
It's indeed a fact (solid like a rock) that the rate of accidents is lower than in the past .. in relation with a greatest traffic than in the past.
Anyways (less the pilots and the experts in accident investigations or in statistics of all kinds ) the last judge is the customer.
And for the customer .. it's not important to know (or he don't bother) of such very good statistics.
The fact is (if the accidents rate stay at it is today) .. the number of accidents will go growing with growing traffic ..
So it will be feel by the public that is more accidents so .. less safety in the air....
And the public (customers) have a greatest weight than the other side (experts and statisticians)
Can the public accept (exagerated on purpose!) 1 accident by week with a average of 200 victims .. even though statistics indicate that everything is perfect and that the accident rate is stable or declining ?
Methink the traffic problem (like births worldwide) will be solved by itself in a natural way .. auto regulation ..
Last edited by jcjeant; 25th Jun 2010 at 09:42.
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Originally Posted by ELAC
This relates to an issue specific to a subset of pilots who see a relatively low number of handling sectors per month/year. That's not the same as pilots as a whole, and the accidents we've been discussing haven't been the product of crews that fall into this category.
There is more than a Flightglobal article, there is a all thread Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus with some very interesting stuff to read, maybe you would like to participate.
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Guess the good ones know enough to know what they dont know and the bad ones simply dont know.
#1 Those who know, and know that they know, are the true pros *
#2 Those who know, and know not that they know, are prodigies or savants.
#3 Those who do not know, and know that they don't know, are wise and trainable.
#4 Those who do not know, and know NOT that they don't know, are dangerous.
* This can only come about via an honest external evaluation. A good pilot would be (my guess)
98% #1 and
2% #3
In other words, he knows what NOT to attempt - it's beyond his or the aeroplane's proven experience.
Incidentally, this matrix applies to most skills. I learned it in a musical context, and find it works almost everywhere.
In deference to what BOAC pointed out, we still await report from the investigators to confirm or render vacant the hypotheses under discussion here. Your matrix, barit, reminds me of how we used to identify plumbers in flight training ... 
Your matrix, barit, reminds me of how we used to identify plumbers in flight training ...