Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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ELAC:
That's quite an assumption on your part.
If you choose to form your conclusions and draw your hypotheses from single instances then I think we've discovered the source of the problem.
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ELAC said
I don't find this to be true at all. I've studied hundreds of accident reports and it has been very rare in the past to see gross flying errors leading to deaths. Of course one has any number of CFIT crashes, and while that does represent a gross error, it's not of the same sort as flying a perfectly good airplane straight into the ground on finals. I really do see a trend toward accidents resulting from basic flying mistakes that practically represent a new category.
I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.
-drl
What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.
I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.
-drl
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Some (OK, quite a few) years ago I was flying with a high hours, ex military pilot in the left seat. He was in the habit of not flying with the auto throttle engaged, because he did not trust it.
It worked well until we got a level off in a very busy situation, and he simply forgot the throttles. We nearly ended up in a stall.
Yes, we need to be able to hand fly the aircraft, but it is equally important to understand how the auto systems work.
It doesn't really matter if you auto fly or hand fly the aircraft into the ground, the result will be the same.
Confusion on "what it is doing now" can be as deadly as lousy hand flying.
The worst will be a combination of both.
No, everything was not better before.
It worked well until we got a level off in a very busy situation, and he simply forgot the throttles. We nearly ended up in a stall.
Yes, we need to be able to hand fly the aircraft, but it is equally important to understand how the auto systems work.
It doesn't really matter if you auto fly or hand fly the aircraft into the ground, the result will be the same.
Confusion on "what it is doing now" can be as deadly as lousy hand flying.
The worst will be a combination of both.
No, everything was not better before.
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ELAC said
Quote:
What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.
I don't find this to be true at all. I've studied hundreds of accident reports and it has been very rare in the past to see gross flying errors leading to deaths. Of course one has any number of CFIT crashes, and while that does represent a gross error, it's not of the same sort as flying a perfectly good airplane straight into the ground on finals. I really do see a trend toward accidents resulting from basic flying mistakes that practically represent a new category.
I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.
-drl
Quote:
What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.
I don't find this to be true at all. I've studied hundreds of accident reports and it has been very rare in the past to see gross flying errors leading to deaths. Of course one has any number of CFIT crashes, and while that does represent a gross error, it's not of the same sort as flying a perfectly good airplane straight into the ground on finals. I really do see a trend toward accidents resulting from basic flying mistakes that practically represent a new category.
I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.
-drl
One thing in common to either path is many hours in multiple aircraft types and conditions.
Monitoring and recovering from student errors is probably very relevant to flying modern automation, - many hours of boredom interupt by the occasional "what the F***"
It may be more than lack of ex-military, another trend is "direct to Jet" training options that sidestep the other traditional path to ATPL, PPL > instrucotr - bank check runs etc.
Talk about direct-to-jet.
- GY
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aterpster,
All right.
Let's not forget that it is you who has made the claim: "that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad"
So, prove it. Provide a data set that proves your hypothesis.
And, please come up with something more than just one off anecdotals that don't provide any statistical significance or a basis for comparison.
ELAC
ELAC:
Quote:
If you choose to form your conclusions and draw your hypotheses from single instances then I think we've discovered the source of the problem.
That's quite an assumption on your part.
Quote:
If you choose to form your conclusions and draw your hypotheses from single instances then I think we've discovered the source of the problem.
That's quite an assumption on your part.
Let's not forget that it is you who has made the claim: "that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad"
So, prove it. Provide a data set that proves your hypothesis.
And, please come up with something more than just one off anecdotals that don't provide any statistical significance or a basis for comparison.
ELAC
I presume the (relatively) recently introduced Multi-crew Pilot License (MPL) requirements are common knowledge on this board...? I'm sure you're all very capable of Googling "MPL", but the hard fact is that a MPL-trained pilot can be sitting in the right-hand set of a commercial flight (cabin full of passengers) with a minimum of 6 (yes, SIX) take-off and landings in a 'real' aircraft (with an additional 6 in a Level D full-flight sim). What could possibly go wrong...
Talk about direct-to-jet.
- GY
Talk about direct-to-jet.
- GY
If i go to the garage to have my car repaired, i can check on the expierience of the guy i hand the keys.
If your above statement is true, i hope i´m able to check the qualification of the crew who i hand over the live of the loved ones as well.
franzl
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deSitter,
Perhaps you should look again. There are plenty of past accidents that fit into the same categories. By example, the following very similar accidents are drawn from the NTSB database for the period of 1980-1990.
If you consider the growth in volume of flights over the past 20 years and the fact that these reports are drawn from the records of just one nation (where the current accidents we are considering are global), you may also want to review your conclusions of the relative rate of incidence of such accidents now vs. then.
Adjusted to remove terrorist events there were 36 fatal accidents for Part 121 carriers between 1980 and 1990. For the period 2000-2010 the number was 18, a 50% reduction. During similar periods the the number of system departures in the U.S. increased from 55,269,988 (1977-1987) to 100,302,134 (1997-2007, the last year available for annual statistics). So, as a rough measure, there were 3.63 (36/55,269,988) / (18/100,302,134) accidents then for every one we experience now.
If the quality of our pilot's handling skills (use of the entire aircraft system, manual or automatic) only remained constant, then with the pace of traffic growth we should be seeing 3-4 of each of these types of accidents now for each 1 that occurred during the 80's. If overall aircraft handling ability was getting worse due to badly designed automation or poor manual skills the number would be even higher. But, while we do see 1 or 2 of some of these accident types, and these are what's drawing our attention, overall we are experiencing a reduction in the number of accidents of this nature per X departures versus the past. Despite what some insist, the data suggests that this generation of pilots has a lower level of total accident causing handling errors than their predecessors. By no means perfect, and certainly with areas where improvement can take place, but better than the supposed "consensus" on this forum.
So, before we start talking about chucking out our philosophies and processes for pilot use of automation and hand flying, maybe we should look closer at what the nature of the problems really are and whether there really would be a net benefit to safety in making broad changes to operational processes that have so far proven effective in reducing accident rates. And maybe we could let up a bit on the "button pushing bus drivers who would be truly screwed if ..." characterizations while we're at it.
Cheers,
ELAC
Loss of Control During Mismanaged Approach (similar [but not SI] to what's assumed for Afriqiyah):
Overrun Accident Resulting From Inattention to Autothrust & Airspeed on Approach (similar to THY 737 but overspeed not under):
Loss of Control Due to Over Reliance on Automation (as some posit for AF447):
Terrain Impact Due to Poor Instrument Scan/Loss of Control (similar to Colgan Air Q400):
Accident Due to Stall Resulting From Failure to Confirm flap Position (same as Spanair):
Terrain Impact Due to Poor IFR Procedure (similar in some respects to Yemenia A310):
I don't find this to be true at all. I've studied hundreds of accident reports and it has been very rare in the past to see gross flying errors leading to deaths. Of course one has any number of CFIT crashes, and while that does represent a gross error, it's not of the same sort as flying a perfectly good airplane straight into the ground on finals. I really do see a trend toward accidents resulting from basic flying mistakes that practically represent a new category.
I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.
I often wonder if this trend originates is the relative dearth of high-hours ex-military pilots in the game now.
If you consider the growth in volume of flights over the past 20 years and the fact that these reports are drawn from the records of just one nation (where the current accidents we are considering are global), you may also want to review your conclusions of the relative rate of incidence of such accidents now vs. then.
Adjusted to remove terrorist events there were 36 fatal accidents for Part 121 carriers between 1980 and 1990. For the period 2000-2010 the number was 18, a 50% reduction. During similar periods the the number of system departures in the U.S. increased from 55,269,988 (1977-1987) to 100,302,134 (1997-2007, the last year available for annual statistics). So, as a rough measure, there were 3.63 (36/55,269,988) / (18/100,302,134) accidents then for every one we experience now.
If the quality of our pilot's handling skills (use of the entire aircraft system, manual or automatic) only remained constant, then with the pace of traffic growth we should be seeing 3-4 of each of these types of accidents now for each 1 that occurred during the 80's. If overall aircraft handling ability was getting worse due to badly designed automation or poor manual skills the number would be even higher. But, while we do see 1 or 2 of some of these accident types, and these are what's drawing our attention, overall we are experiencing a reduction in the number of accidents of this nature per X departures versus the past. Despite what some insist, the data suggests that this generation of pilots has a lower level of total accident causing handling errors than their predecessors. By no means perfect, and certainly with areas where improvement can take place, but better than the supposed "consensus" on this forum.
So, before we start talking about chucking out our philosophies and processes for pilot use of automation and hand flying, maybe we should look closer at what the nature of the problems really are and whether there really would be a net benefit to safety in making broad changes to operational processes that have so far proven effective in reducing accident rates. And maybe we could let up a bit on the "button pushing bus drivers who would be truly screwed if ..." characterizations while we're at it.
Cheers,
ELAC
Loss of Control During Mismanaged Approach (similar [but not SI] to what's assumed for Afriqiyah):
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 09, 1985 in KANSAS CITY, KS
Aircraft: LOCKHEED 188A, registration: N357Q
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
DURING ARRIVAL TO THE KANSAS CITY DOWNTOWN ARPT, THE FLT WAS VECTORED FOR A VOR RWY 3 APCH, THEN WAS CLEARED FOR THE APCH & TO CIRCLE & LAND ON RWY 36. ON FINAL APCH, THE ACFT WAS HI & WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO LAND, SO THE FLT WAS CLEARED TO CIRCLE LEFT FOR ANOTHER APCH TO LAND. THE AIRCREW ACKNOWLEDGED & BEGAN CIRCLING LEFT WHICH TOOK THEM IN THE VICINITY OF THE FAIRFAX ARPT. A SHORT TIME LATER, THE ATC CONTROLLER CAUTIONED THAT THE FLT MIGHT BE LINING UP FOR THE FAIRFAX ARPT. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CREW INITIATED A MISSED APCH & WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO 360 DEG & CLIMB TO 3000 FT. THE ACFT BEGAN A STEEP CLIMB TO 3100 FT, STALLED & ENTERED A STEEP DESCENT. BEFORE THE DESCENT WAS ARRESTED, THE ACFT IMPACTED IN A PUBLIC WATER TREATMENT PLANT. CVR RECORDINGS INDICATED THAT THE 1ST OFFICER WAS FLYING THE ACFT DURING THEEN ROUTE DESCENT, VOR APCH & CIRCLING APCH, THEN THE CAPTAIN TOOK CONTROL DURING THE MISSED APCH. AN EXAM OF THE WRECK- AGE REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF AN AIRFRAME OR POWERPLANT PROBLEM. ALSO, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CARGO HAD SHIFTED.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
AIRSPEED..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
STALL..INADVERTENT..PILOT IN COMMAND
Contributing Factors
WEATHER CONDITION..LOW CEILING
WEATHER CONDITION..FOG
LIGHT CONDITION..DAWN
IFR PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
SUPERVISION..INADEQUATE..PILOT IN COMMAND
BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED..INADVERTENT..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED..INADVERTENT..PILOT IN COMMAND
Aircraft: LOCKHEED 188A, registration: N357Q
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
DURING ARRIVAL TO THE KANSAS CITY DOWNTOWN ARPT, THE FLT WAS VECTORED FOR A VOR RWY 3 APCH, THEN WAS CLEARED FOR THE APCH & TO CIRCLE & LAND ON RWY 36. ON FINAL APCH, THE ACFT WAS HI & WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO LAND, SO THE FLT WAS CLEARED TO CIRCLE LEFT FOR ANOTHER APCH TO LAND. THE AIRCREW ACKNOWLEDGED & BEGAN CIRCLING LEFT WHICH TOOK THEM IN THE VICINITY OF THE FAIRFAX ARPT. A SHORT TIME LATER, THE ATC CONTROLLER CAUTIONED THAT THE FLT MIGHT BE LINING UP FOR THE FAIRFAX ARPT. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CREW INITIATED A MISSED APCH & WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO 360 DEG & CLIMB TO 3000 FT. THE ACFT BEGAN A STEEP CLIMB TO 3100 FT, STALLED & ENTERED A STEEP DESCENT. BEFORE THE DESCENT WAS ARRESTED, THE ACFT IMPACTED IN A PUBLIC WATER TREATMENT PLANT. CVR RECORDINGS INDICATED THAT THE 1ST OFFICER WAS FLYING THE ACFT DURING THEEN ROUTE DESCENT, VOR APCH & CIRCLING APCH, THEN THE CAPTAIN TOOK CONTROL DURING THE MISSED APCH. AN EXAM OF THE WRECK- AGE REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF AN AIRFRAME OR POWERPLANT PROBLEM. ALSO, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CARGO HAD SHIFTED.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
AIRSPEED..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
STALL..INADVERTENT..PILOT IN COMMAND
Contributing Factors
WEATHER CONDITION..LOW CEILING
WEATHER CONDITION..FOG
LIGHT CONDITION..DAWN
IFR PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
SUPERVISION..INADEQUATE..PILOT IN COMMAND
BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED..INADVERTENT..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED..INADVERTENT..PILOT IN COMMAND
Accident occurred Tuesday, February 28, 1984 in JAMAICA, NY
Aircraft: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-30, registration: LNRKB
Injuries: 1 Serious, 11 Minor, 165 Uninjured.
DURING AN ILS APCH TO RWY 4R WITH A TAILWIND, THE ACFT (SCANDINAVIAN FLT 901) WAS BEING FLOWN BY THE COPLT. THE ACFT WAS FAST ON FINAL APCH & WAS LANDED APRX 4700 FT BEYOND THE APCH END OF THE RWY AT 36 KTS ABOVE THE PROGRAMMED TOUCHDOWN SPEED. THE AIRCREW MEMBERS WERE UNABLE TO STOP ON THE REMAINING 3700 FT OF RWY. THE CAPT STEERED THE ACFT TO THE RGT OF THE RWY CENTERLINE TO AVOID A HEAD-ON COLLISION WITH THE APCH LGT PIER AT THE DEPT END. THE LEFT WING HIT THE PIER & THE ACFT CAME TO REST IN A TIDAL WATERWAY. THE OCCUPANTS WERE EVACUATED WITH ONLY MINOR INJURIES TO SOME, BUT 1 PAX WITH A CARDIAC CONDITION WAS HOSPITALIZED FOR OVER 48 HRS. A SMALL FIRE WAS CONFINED TO SOME ELECTRIC WIRING & SELF EXTINGUISHED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE AUTOTHROTTLE HAD MALFUNCTIONED DURING THE OCCURRENCE. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THRUST HAD INCREASED ON FINAL APCH WHEN IT WAS NOT NEEDED. ALSO. THE CREW DID NOT USE THE AIRSPEED 'BUGS' & CALLOUTS DURING THE APCH. THE AUTOTHROTTLE HAD A HISTORY OF MALFUNCTIONS.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES..DISREGARDED
THROTTLE/POWER CONTROL..NOT CORRECTED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
OVERCONFIDENCE IN AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
SUPERVISION..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
IMPROPER USE OF PROCEDURE..PILOT IN COMMAND
GO-AROUND..NOT PERFORMED
Contributing Factors
WEATHER CONDITION..TAILWIND
OBJECT..APPROACH LIGHT/NAVAID
AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR,AUTO THROTTLE..ERRATIC
AIRSPEED..EXCESSIVE..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
Aircraft: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-30, registration: LNRKB
Injuries: 1 Serious, 11 Minor, 165 Uninjured.
DURING AN ILS APCH TO RWY 4R WITH A TAILWIND, THE ACFT (SCANDINAVIAN FLT 901) WAS BEING FLOWN BY THE COPLT. THE ACFT WAS FAST ON FINAL APCH & WAS LANDED APRX 4700 FT BEYOND THE APCH END OF THE RWY AT 36 KTS ABOVE THE PROGRAMMED TOUCHDOWN SPEED. THE AIRCREW MEMBERS WERE UNABLE TO STOP ON THE REMAINING 3700 FT OF RWY. THE CAPT STEERED THE ACFT TO THE RGT OF THE RWY CENTERLINE TO AVOID A HEAD-ON COLLISION WITH THE APCH LGT PIER AT THE DEPT END. THE LEFT WING HIT THE PIER & THE ACFT CAME TO REST IN A TIDAL WATERWAY. THE OCCUPANTS WERE EVACUATED WITH ONLY MINOR INJURIES TO SOME, BUT 1 PAX WITH A CARDIAC CONDITION WAS HOSPITALIZED FOR OVER 48 HRS. A SMALL FIRE WAS CONFINED TO SOME ELECTRIC WIRING & SELF EXTINGUISHED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE AUTOTHROTTLE HAD MALFUNCTIONED DURING THE OCCURRENCE. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THRUST HAD INCREASED ON FINAL APCH WHEN IT WAS NOT NEEDED. ALSO. THE CREW DID NOT USE THE AIRSPEED 'BUGS' & CALLOUTS DURING THE APCH. THE AUTOTHROTTLE HAD A HISTORY OF MALFUNCTIONS.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES..DISREGARDED
THROTTLE/POWER CONTROL..NOT CORRECTED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
OVERCONFIDENCE IN AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
SUPERVISION..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
IMPROPER USE OF PROCEDURE..PILOT IN COMMAND
GO-AROUND..NOT PERFORMED
Contributing Factors
WEATHER CONDITION..TAILWIND
OBJECT..APPROACH LIGHT/NAVAID
AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR,AUTO THROTTLE..ERRATIC
AIRSPEED..EXCESSIVE..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
Accident occurred Tuesday, February 19, 1985 in SAN FRANCISCO, CA
Aircraft: BOEING 747 SP-09, registration: N4522V
Injuries: 2 Serious, 271 Uninjured.
WHILE ABV A CLOUD LAYER (TOP AT FL 370) NR THE JET STREAM, AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED & WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE MNGMNT SYS (PMS)MODE. THE PMS PROVIDED PITCH GUIDANCE TO HOLD FL 410, ROLL GUIDANCE TO AILERONS & SPOILERS FOR ROLL CTL & AUTOTHROTTLE TO MAINT .85 MACH (254 KIAS). ACFT ENCOUNTERED CLR AIR TURBC & AIRSPEED BGN TO VARY BTN .84 & .88 MACH. PMS BGN MOVING THROTTLES FORE & AFT TO HOLD .85 MACH. DRG AUTOTHROTTLE ADJUSTMENTS, #4 ENG THRUST DECREASED & 'HUNG' AT APRX 1.0 EPR & AIRSPEED BGN DECREASING. FLT ENGINEER ATMTD TO MANUALLY RCVR THE #4 ENG THRUST, BUT DID NOT CLOSE THE BLEED AIR VLV BFR ADJUSTING THE #4 THROTTLE. THE #4 ENG REMAINED AT APRX 1.0 EPR. AS THE ACFT SLOWED, AUTOPLT TRIMMED TO HOLD ALT & HDG TIL THE PLT DISENGAGED IT. AT THAT TIME, ACFT ROLLED/YAWED RGT & ENTERED AN UNCTLD DSCNT INTO THE CLOUDS. AS IT BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT 11,000', CREW RCVRD & LVLD AT 9500'. DRG DSCNT/RCVRY, ACFT WAS DMGD BY ACCELLERATION FORCES & HI SPEED. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THE PLT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH ENG PRBLM, DIDN'T MONITOR INSTRUMENTS & OVER-RELIED ON AUTOPLT.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
FLIGHT/NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT(S)..INATTENTIVE..PILOT IN COMMAND
DIVERTED ATTENTION..PILOT IN COMMAND
AIRSPEED..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
FLIGHT CONTROLS..IMPROPER USE OF..PILOT IN COMMAND
AIRCRAFT HANDLING..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
DESIGN STRESS LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT..EXCEEDED..PILOT IN COMMAND
Contributing Factors
WEATHER CONDITION..UNFAVORABLE WIND
WEATHER CONDITION..WINDSHEAR
WEATHER CONDITION..TURBULENCE,CLEAR AIR
OVERCONFIDENCE IN AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY..PILOT IN COMMAND
Aircraft: BOEING 747 SP-09, registration: N4522V
Injuries: 2 Serious, 271 Uninjured.
WHILE ABV A CLOUD LAYER (TOP AT FL 370) NR THE JET STREAM, AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED & WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE MNGMNT SYS (PMS)MODE. THE PMS PROVIDED PITCH GUIDANCE TO HOLD FL 410, ROLL GUIDANCE TO AILERONS & SPOILERS FOR ROLL CTL & AUTOTHROTTLE TO MAINT .85 MACH (254 KIAS). ACFT ENCOUNTERED CLR AIR TURBC & AIRSPEED BGN TO VARY BTN .84 & .88 MACH. PMS BGN MOVING THROTTLES FORE & AFT TO HOLD .85 MACH. DRG AUTOTHROTTLE ADJUSTMENTS, #4 ENG THRUST DECREASED & 'HUNG' AT APRX 1.0 EPR & AIRSPEED BGN DECREASING. FLT ENGINEER ATMTD TO MANUALLY RCVR THE #4 ENG THRUST, BUT DID NOT CLOSE THE BLEED AIR VLV BFR ADJUSTING THE #4 THROTTLE. THE #4 ENG REMAINED AT APRX 1.0 EPR. AS THE ACFT SLOWED, AUTOPLT TRIMMED TO HOLD ALT & HDG TIL THE PLT DISENGAGED IT. AT THAT TIME, ACFT ROLLED/YAWED RGT & ENTERED AN UNCTLD DSCNT INTO THE CLOUDS. AS IT BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT 11,000', CREW RCVRD & LVLD AT 9500'. DRG DSCNT/RCVRY, ACFT WAS DMGD BY ACCELLERATION FORCES & HI SPEED. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THE PLT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH ENG PRBLM, DIDN'T MONITOR INSTRUMENTS & OVER-RELIED ON AUTOPLT.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
FLIGHT/NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT(S)..INATTENTIVE..PILOT IN COMMAND
DIVERTED ATTENTION..PILOT IN COMMAND
AIRSPEED..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
FLIGHT CONTROLS..IMPROPER USE OF..PILOT IN COMMAND
AIRCRAFT HANDLING..NOT MAINTAINED..PILOT IN COMMAND
DESIGN STRESS LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT..EXCEEDED..PILOT IN COMMAND
Contributing Factors
WEATHER CONDITION..UNFAVORABLE WIND
WEATHER CONDITION..WINDSHEAR
WEATHER CONDITION..TURBULENCE,CLEAR AIR
OVERCONFIDENCE IN AIRCRAFT'S ABILITY..PILOT IN COMMAND
Accident occurred Thursday, January 12, 1989 in TIPP CITY, OH
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/10/1990
Aircraft: HAWKER SIDDELEY HS.748 SERIES 2A, registration: CGDOV
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
DRG NGT CARGO OPN, CHECK CAPT (RGT SEAT) WAS EVALUATING THE 1ST OFFICER (F/O, LEFT SEAT) FOR PSBL UPGRADE TO CAPT. BFR DEPG, FLT WAS CLRD FOR RGT TURN AFTER TKOF TO 020 DEG. TKOF BGN AT 0441:11. WTR/METHANOL INJECTION WAS USED (TO 1ST PWR RDCN). AT 0441:49, LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED; 8 SEC LTR 1ST PWR RDCN WAS MADE, THEN A FREQ CHG WAS APPROVED. CAPT NOTED THEY SHLD CLB TO 1500' MSL (APRX 500' AGL) BFR TURNING. AT ABT 300' AGL, ACFT ENTERED OVC & BGN A STEEP RGT TURN. CVR INDCD CAPT WAS PERFORMING COCKPIT DUTIES AT THIS TIME & GIVING INFO TO F/O ABT THE DEP. FDR SHOWED ACFT RCHD MAX ALT OF 423' AGL & BGN DSCNDG. AT 0442:22, CAPT REMARKED TO F/O, 'DON'T GO DOWN . . . GET UP . . . UP UP UP . . . UP, OH!' AT ABT THAT TIME, ACFT HIT IN AN OPEN FLD, BUT CONTD FLYING FOR APRX 3/4 MI. IT THEN HIT A TREE & CRASHED IN A WOODED AREA.INV REVEALED THAT DRG SVRL TRNG FLTS & 2 CHECK FLTS, THE F/O DEMONSTRATED DIFFICULTY IN PERFORMING INSTRUMENT FLT DUE TODISORIENTATION, NARROW FOCUS OF ATTENTION, OR LACK OF INSTRUMENT SCAN (INST FIXATION), ESPECIALLY DRG HI TASK WORK LOAD.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
IMPROPER IFR PROCEDURE BY THE FIRST OFFICER (COPILOT) DURING TAKEOFF, HIS LACK OF INSTRUMENT SCAN (IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT/NAVIGATION INSTRUMENTS), HIS FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A POSITIVE RATE OF CLIMB OR TO IDENTIFY THE RESULTANT DESCENT, AND THE CAPTAIN'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF THE FLIGHT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: DARK NIGHT, LOW CEILING, DRIZZLE, THE FIRST OFFICER'S LACK OF TOTAL EXPERIENCE IN THE TYPE OF OPERATION, AND POSSIBLE SPATIAL DISORIENTATION OF THE FIRST OFFICER.
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/10/1990
Aircraft: HAWKER SIDDELEY HS.748 SERIES 2A, registration: CGDOV
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
DRG NGT CARGO OPN, CHECK CAPT (RGT SEAT) WAS EVALUATING THE 1ST OFFICER (F/O, LEFT SEAT) FOR PSBL UPGRADE TO CAPT. BFR DEPG, FLT WAS CLRD FOR RGT TURN AFTER TKOF TO 020 DEG. TKOF BGN AT 0441:11. WTR/METHANOL INJECTION WAS USED (TO 1ST PWR RDCN). AT 0441:49, LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED; 8 SEC LTR 1ST PWR RDCN WAS MADE, THEN A FREQ CHG WAS APPROVED. CAPT NOTED THEY SHLD CLB TO 1500' MSL (APRX 500' AGL) BFR TURNING. AT ABT 300' AGL, ACFT ENTERED OVC & BGN A STEEP RGT TURN. CVR INDCD CAPT WAS PERFORMING COCKPIT DUTIES AT THIS TIME & GIVING INFO TO F/O ABT THE DEP. FDR SHOWED ACFT RCHD MAX ALT OF 423' AGL & BGN DSCNDG. AT 0442:22, CAPT REMARKED TO F/O, 'DON'T GO DOWN . . . GET UP . . . UP UP UP . . . UP, OH!' AT ABT THAT TIME, ACFT HIT IN AN OPEN FLD, BUT CONTD FLYING FOR APRX 3/4 MI. IT THEN HIT A TREE & CRASHED IN A WOODED AREA.INV REVEALED THAT DRG SVRL TRNG FLTS & 2 CHECK FLTS, THE F/O DEMONSTRATED DIFFICULTY IN PERFORMING INSTRUMENT FLT DUE TODISORIENTATION, NARROW FOCUS OF ATTENTION, OR LACK OF INSTRUMENT SCAN (INST FIXATION), ESPECIALLY DRG HI TASK WORK LOAD.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
IMPROPER IFR PROCEDURE BY THE FIRST OFFICER (COPILOT) DURING TAKEOFF, HIS LACK OF INSTRUMENT SCAN (IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT/NAVIGATION INSTRUMENTS), HIS FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A POSITIVE RATE OF CLIMB OR TO IDENTIFY THE RESULTANT DESCENT, AND THE CAPTAIN'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISION OF THE FLIGHT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: DARK NIGHT, LOW CEILING, DRIZZLE, THE FIRST OFFICER'S LACK OF TOTAL EXPERIENCE IN THE TYPE OF OPERATION, AND POSSIBLE SPATIAL DISORIENTATION OF THE FIRST OFFICER.
Accident Due to Stall Resulting From Failure to Confirm flap Position (same as Spanair):
Accident occurred Sunday, August 16, 1987 in ROMULUS, MI
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/28/1989
Aircraft: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-82, registration: N312RC
Injuries: 156 Fatal, 2 Serious, 4 Minor.
NORTHWEST FLT 255 (NW255) CRASHED AFTER TAKEOFF FM RWY 3C AT DETROIT METRO AIRPORT. WITNESSES SAID NW255 ROTATED FOR TAKEOFF 1200-1500 FT FROM THE END AND LIFTED OFF NR THE END OF THE 8500 FT RWY. AFTER LIFTOFF, THE WINGS ROCKED LT AND RT AND THE ACFT FAILED TO CLIMB NORMALLY. 18 FEET OF THE LT WING SEPARATED WHEN THE WING CONTACTED A LIGHT POLE 2760 FT BEYOND THE RWY END. THE ACFT ROLLED STEEPLY TO THE LEFT AND STRUCK POLES, A BLDG, AND AUTOMOBILES BEFORE CRASHING INTO A RAILROAD EMBANKMENT. THE ACFT WAS DESTROYED. THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THE FLAPS AND SLATS WERE IN THE UP/RETRACT POSITION AND HAD NOT BEEN DEPLOYED FOR TKOF. NEITHER PLT RECITED THE ITEMS OF THE TAXI CKLIST. STALL WARNINGS WERE ANNUNCIATED BUT AN AURAL TKOF WARNING WAS NOT ANNUNCIATED BY THE CENTRAL AURAL WARNING SYSTEM (CAWS). IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT 28 VOLT DC PWR WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE CAWS PWR SUPPLY #2. THE REASON FOR THE LOSS OF ELECTRICAL PWR WAS TRACED TO A CIRCUIT BRKR BUT NO MALF OF THE CB WAS FND. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, SEE NTSB/AAR-88/05.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
CHECKLIST..NOT PERFORMED..PILOT IN COMMAND
LOWERING OF FLAPS..NOT PERFORMED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
LOWERING OF SLATS..NOT PERFORMED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
Contributing Factors
WARNING SYSTEM(OTHER)..DISABLED
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/28/1989
Aircraft: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-82, registration: N312RC
Injuries: 156 Fatal, 2 Serious, 4 Minor.
NORTHWEST FLT 255 (NW255) CRASHED AFTER TAKEOFF FM RWY 3C AT DETROIT METRO AIRPORT. WITNESSES SAID NW255 ROTATED FOR TAKEOFF 1200-1500 FT FROM THE END AND LIFTED OFF NR THE END OF THE 8500 FT RWY. AFTER LIFTOFF, THE WINGS ROCKED LT AND RT AND THE ACFT FAILED TO CLIMB NORMALLY. 18 FEET OF THE LT WING SEPARATED WHEN THE WING CONTACTED A LIGHT POLE 2760 FT BEYOND THE RWY END. THE ACFT ROLLED STEEPLY TO THE LEFT AND STRUCK POLES, A BLDG, AND AUTOMOBILES BEFORE CRASHING INTO A RAILROAD EMBANKMENT. THE ACFT WAS DESTROYED. THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THE FLAPS AND SLATS WERE IN THE UP/RETRACT POSITION AND HAD NOT BEEN DEPLOYED FOR TKOF. NEITHER PLT RECITED THE ITEMS OF THE TAXI CKLIST. STALL WARNINGS WERE ANNUNCIATED BUT AN AURAL TKOF WARNING WAS NOT ANNUNCIATED BY THE CENTRAL AURAL WARNING SYSTEM (CAWS). IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT 28 VOLT DC PWR WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE CAWS PWR SUPPLY #2. THE REASON FOR THE LOSS OF ELECTRICAL PWR WAS TRACED TO A CIRCUIT BRKR BUT NO MALF OF THE CB WAS FND. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, SEE NTSB/AAR-88/05.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
CHECKLIST..NOT PERFORMED..PILOT IN COMMAND
LOWERING OF FLAPS..NOT PERFORMED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
LOWERING OF SLATS..NOT PERFORMED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT
Contributing Factors
WARNING SYSTEM(OTHER)..DISABLED
Terrain Impact Due to Poor IFR Procedure (similar in some respects to Yemenia A310):
Accident occurred Monday, April 13, 1987 in KANSAS CITY, MO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/6/1989
Aircraft: BOEING 707-351C, registration: N144SP
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
DRG ARR, BUFFALO AIRWAYS FLT 721 WAS VECTORED FOR AN ILS RWY 1 APCH. EXCEPT FOR DEVIATIONS TO AVOID TSTMS, DSCNT TO THE TERMINAL AREA WAS ROUTINE. AT 2151:01, THE FLT WAS ADZD IT WAS 5 MI FM THE OUTER MARKER (OM), WAS GIVEN A FINAL VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE ILS LOCALIZER (LOC) AT 2400' & WAS CLRD FOR THE APCH. AT 2153:07, THE FLT RPRTD OVR THE OM 'INBOUND.' AT THAT TIME, THE LCL CTLR (LC) WARNED THE FLT TO 'CHECK ALT IMMEDIATELY,' & THAT IT WAS SUPPOSE TO BE AT 2400'. SHORTLYTHEREAFTER, AN MSAW (MIN SAFE ALT WARNING) ALERT WAS ACTIVATED. THE LC WARNED FLT 721 THAT HE HAD RCVD AN MSAW ALERT & ADZD IT TO CLB TO 2400'. FLT 721 DID NOT RESPOND BY RADIO TO EITHER SAFETY ADZY. THE ACFT CRASHED APRX 3 MI SHORT OF RWY 1. THE OM ALT WAS 2400'; DECISION HGT (DH) FOR APCH WAS 1211'. FDR & RADAR DATA SHOWED THE ACFT PASSED THE OM AT 1700'. THE CVR REVEALED THE FO GAVE ALT INFO IN 100' INCREMENTS DWN TO THE DH, BUT DID NOT ADZ THE CAPT OF THE ALT ERRORAT THE OM OR RPRT THE RWY NOT IN SIGHT AT THE DH. THE GND PROXIMITY WARNING SYS (GPWS) DID NOT WARN THE CREW.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
IFR PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
DECISION HEIGHT..DISREGARDED..PILOT IN COMMAND
UNSAFE/HAZARDOUS CONDITION WARNING..DISREGARDED..PILOT IN COMMAND
Contributing Factors
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM..FAILURE,TOTAL
CREW/GROUP COORDINATION..INADEQUATE
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/6/1989
Aircraft: BOEING 707-351C, registration: N144SP
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
DRG ARR, BUFFALO AIRWAYS FLT 721 WAS VECTORED FOR AN ILS RWY 1 APCH. EXCEPT FOR DEVIATIONS TO AVOID TSTMS, DSCNT TO THE TERMINAL AREA WAS ROUTINE. AT 2151:01, THE FLT WAS ADZD IT WAS 5 MI FM THE OUTER MARKER (OM), WAS GIVEN A FINAL VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE ILS LOCALIZER (LOC) AT 2400' & WAS CLRD FOR THE APCH. AT 2153:07, THE FLT RPRTD OVR THE OM 'INBOUND.' AT THAT TIME, THE LCL CTLR (LC) WARNED THE FLT TO 'CHECK ALT IMMEDIATELY,' & THAT IT WAS SUPPOSE TO BE AT 2400'. SHORTLYTHEREAFTER, AN MSAW (MIN SAFE ALT WARNING) ALERT WAS ACTIVATED. THE LC WARNED FLT 721 THAT HE HAD RCVD AN MSAW ALERT & ADZD IT TO CLB TO 2400'. FLT 721 DID NOT RESPOND BY RADIO TO EITHER SAFETY ADZY. THE ACFT CRASHED APRX 3 MI SHORT OF RWY 1. THE OM ALT WAS 2400'; DECISION HGT (DH) FOR APCH WAS 1211'. FDR & RADAR DATA SHOWED THE ACFT PASSED THE OM AT 1700'. THE CVR REVEALED THE FO GAVE ALT INFO IN 100' INCREMENTS DWN TO THE DH, BUT DID NOT ADZ THE CAPT OF THE ALT ERRORAT THE OM OR RPRT THE RWY NOT IN SIGHT AT THE DH. THE GND PROXIMITY WARNING SYS (GPWS) DID NOT WARN THE CREW.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
IFR PROCEDURE..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
DECISION HEIGHT..DISREGARDED..PILOT IN COMMAND
UNSAFE/HAZARDOUS CONDITION WARNING..DISREGARDED..PILOT IN COMMAND
Contributing Factors
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM..FAILURE,TOTAL
CREW/GROUP COORDINATION..INADEQUATE
Automation; Stick and Rudder skills; Disorientation.
Many people cite automation and the lack of stick and rudder skills as being a major contribution in ‘modern’ accidents.
If, in this case disorientation is a major factor, then it’s the interaction with instruments and displays which should be considered – an aspect seen in other accidents.
Flying a manual visual approach does little to enhance instrument flying skills and currency. Similarly, much of the current automation training overlooks the mechanism of monitoring the aircraft by scanning all of the flight instruments – how to check the output of automation; understand what the aircraft is actually doing, as opposed to what it might do.
Instead, there is focus on input selection and mode annunciation, and monitoring via the FD (probably the same source of computation as the autos).
Instrument flying is an interactive skill between a depiction of the real world and aircraft control, one of situation awareness, and a need to balance differing and occasionally erroneous sensory inputs – you have to believe the instruments.
The use of automation weakens the interaction as the pilot does not have to make the control inputs and also does not have this movement as a datum, although hands-on monitoring of those controls which do have feedback will provide some information.
Thus, inappropriate use of automation (poor monitoring) can erode instrument flying skills.
There are risks of reduced situation awareness due to lack of scanning, leading to unwanted maneuver (loss of control), and loss of the key defenses against disorientation.
If, in this case disorientation is a major factor, then it’s the interaction with instruments and displays which should be considered – an aspect seen in other accidents.
Flying a manual visual approach does little to enhance instrument flying skills and currency. Similarly, much of the current automation training overlooks the mechanism of monitoring the aircraft by scanning all of the flight instruments – how to check the output of automation; understand what the aircraft is actually doing, as opposed to what it might do.
Instead, there is focus on input selection and mode annunciation, and monitoring via the FD (probably the same source of computation as the autos).
Instrument flying is an interactive skill between a depiction of the real world and aircraft control, one of situation awareness, and a need to balance differing and occasionally erroneous sensory inputs – you have to believe the instruments.
The use of automation weakens the interaction as the pilot does not have to make the control inputs and also does not have this movement as a datum, although hands-on monitoring of those controls which do have feedback will provide some information.
Thus, inappropriate use of automation (poor monitoring) can erode instrument flying skills.
There are risks of reduced situation awareness due to lack of scanning, leading to unwanted maneuver (loss of control), and loss of the key defenses against disorientation.
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There has been some very interesting discussion about hand flying versus automation, disorientation or “somatographic illusion”, and many other topics.
The experts on this thread are very good at describing , from a cockpit perspective, how a pilot can go wrong and crash an airplane on approach or go around. TOGA tap, how engine power can overcome the pilot’s ability/training/awareness/confidence/composure, and all that.
The elephant in the room is the physical evidence of the wreckage, and I would like to hear from the experts who can readily come up with a scenario of how to crash an airplane from the perspective of the cockpit and pilot, and connect those scenarios with the wreckage on the ground, because there is no way I visualize the scenarios discussed creating the results on the ground. The airplane is shredded and scattered over more than 800 meters. What is the explanation for where the wings ended up
?
Is there an expert out there who can connect the dots? ?? ??
The experts on this thread are very good at describing , from a cockpit perspective, how a pilot can go wrong and crash an airplane on approach or go around. TOGA tap, how engine power can overcome the pilot’s ability/training/awareness/confidence/composure, and all that.
The elephant in the room is the physical evidence of the wreckage, and I would like to hear from the experts who can readily come up with a scenario of how to crash an airplane from the perspective of the cockpit and pilot, and connect those scenarios with the wreckage on the ground, because there is no way I visualize the scenarios discussed creating the results on the ground. The airplane is shredded and scattered over more than 800 meters. What is the explanation for where the wings ended up
?
Is there an expert out there who can connect the dots? ?? ??
Safetypee, I agree, and I would go further and say that without hands-on manual flying, one's instrument scan WILL degrade and the chance of disorientation will increase, as will the inability to manually fly when the chips are down. The physical interaction between hand (and feet) movements and resulting changes in attitude as observed by the eyes/brain is critical in maintaining IF skills. One will never get any benefit from simply watching, even intently, what the aircraft does on the automatics, regardless of how long you do it.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 22nd Jun 2010 at 02:30.
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stepwilk,
The six pack is more like a box lunch these days. The same stuff, but all on one or two plates now instead of sperate tins if you will. Overall better, but the eyes don't move quite the same way they used to.
ELAC
Whatever happened to the "Sacred Six"?
Depending on how many readers have no idea what I'm talking about, there's your answer.
Depending on how many readers have no idea what I'm talking about, there's your answer.
The six pack is more like a box lunch these days. The same stuff, but all on one or two plates now instead of sperate tins if you will. Overall better, but the eyes don't move quite the same way they used to.
ELAC
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Safetypee,
I agree, and I would go further and say that without hands-on manual flying, one's instrument scan WILL degrade and the chance of disorientation will increase, as will the inability to manually fly when the chips are down.
The physical interaction between hand (and feet) movements and resulting changes in attitude as observed by the eyes/brain is critical in maintaining IF skills. One will never get any benefit from simply watching, even intently, what the aircraft does on the automatics, regardless of how long you do it.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs : Yesterday at 22:30.
I agree, and I would go further and say that without hands-on manual flying, one's instrument scan WILL degrade and the chance of disorientation will increase, as will the inability to manually fly when the chips are down.
The physical interaction between hand (and feet) movements and resulting changes in attitude as observed by the eyes/brain is critical in maintaining IF skills. One will never get any benefit from simply watching, even intently, what the aircraft does on the automatics, regardless of how long you do it.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs : Yesterday at 22:30.
Within that box the pilot would be in control of the aircraft, yet the overall safety gains (perceived or real
)from automation would be preserved. I have no idea if this is realistic from either a techical or regulatory view.
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ELAC:
When I flew the line I was a ALPA technical safety representative for most of my line carrer. I am still quite active in that arena and have been so since I retired. So, I am not exactly sitting around fishing. I interface with those active in the industry on an almost daily basis. (I've even flow a flew RNP AR approaches in a 737-800 simulator with all the latest and greatest stuff.)
A whole lot came out of Colgan 3407. It was a very extensive investigation. I personally worked on the Comair 5191 "constant chatter" wrong runway crash.
This is a link to a relevant article in the current issue of the ALPA Magazine. Note in particular "Talking Points" on the second page:
http://www.terps.com/safety/alpa.pdf
So, prove it. Provide a data set that proves your hypothesis.
And, please come up with something more than just one off anecdotals that don't provide any statistical significance or a basis for comparison.
And, please come up with something more than just one off anecdotals that don't provide any statistical significance or a basis for comparison.
A whole lot came out of Colgan 3407. It was a very extensive investigation. I personally worked on the Comair 5191 "constant chatter" wrong runway crash.
This is a link to a relevant article in the current issue of the ALPA Magazine. Note in particular "Talking Points" on the second page:
http://www.terps.com/safety/alpa.pdf
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ELAC:
All the same information is there as in a "steam guage" airplane. Only with electronics and optimal symbology it is presented far better in the current generation airplanes.
Any skilled attitude instrument pilot has an easier time hand-flying a state-of-the-art presentation than with the old "T."
The six pack is more like a box lunch these days. The same stuff, but all on one or two plates now instead of sperate tins if you will. Overall better, but the eyes don't move quite the same way they used to.
Any skilled attitude instrument pilot has an easier time hand-flying a state-of-the-art presentation than with the old "T."
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"All the same information is there as in a "steam gauge" airplane. Only with electronics and optimal symbology it is presented far better in the current generation airplanes."
I've spent minimal time in glass-cockpit airplanes--a few business jets, Cirrus lightplanes--and of course I agree that the presentation is far better, but I wonder...there's -more- information presented than with the old analog AH/DG/airspeed/altimeter/RoC/T&B array, which for some might be challenging, particularly Cirrus-type pilots. I also wonder if there's more opportunity for fixation on one or another parameter than there was with the constant scan that used to be the basic Sacred Six technique.
Admittedly, I write as a 3,000-hour GA pilot with a Citation type rating, so any "opinion" I might have is pretty useless in this forum. Here to learn.
I've spent minimal time in glass-cockpit airplanes--a few business jets, Cirrus lightplanes--and of course I agree that the presentation is far better, but I wonder...there's -more- information presented than with the old analog AH/DG/airspeed/altimeter/RoC/T&B array, which for some might be challenging, particularly Cirrus-type pilots. I also wonder if there's more opportunity for fixation on one or another parameter than there was with the constant scan that used to be the basic Sacred Six technique.
Admittedly, I write as a 3,000-hour GA pilot with a Citation type rating, so any "opinion" I might have is pretty useless in this forum. Here to learn.
- ELAC, the problem is not only the lack of ‘a six pack’ or using the two plates; these have been replaced by a ‘straw’ – the FD – everything being sucked up via a single cue.
- Murphy, I don’t think that it necessary to design something new to hone skills. Pilots have to be willing to improve existing skills; this requires commitment, discipline, professionalism, pride. Many of these attributes are seen as ‘old fashioned’, but they are still essential for airmanship.
- aterpster, I would not necessarily agree that modern EFIS formats are easier to use when flying raw instrument procedures.
Yes, all of the information is there – and more (consider why). The display formats can differ, which often requires a change in the mechanism of extracting information from an instrument, e.g. compare the awareness of airspeed with respect to high / low limits; a dial shows the limits with numeric and angular relationship to them, a strip display may not show any limit and has no angular quality.
Often modern instrument training overlooks the subtitles of using new displays, particularly as there are more varying and complex situations, some of which cannot be flown with raw instruments.
Pilots have to know when and how to use instruments in context, and then how to manage a situation.
During a GA, attitude (as ever) is paramount – a target, a datum for further adjustment, and a stability reference both for the maneuver and the mental picture.
Instrument flying is based on this latter feature – the mental model, and this also provides the basis of negating disorientating effects.
Instead of forming an mental model by mixing what is seen on the flight instruments with body sensed information, pilots have to be prepared (practiced) in downgrading the (often very compelling) body sensed information and concentrating almost entirely on the visual input.
Furthermore, both pilots have to be aware of this need, as disorientation is one of the few hazards which can affect both pilots at the same time, and not necessarily be obvious to either one.
- Murphy, I don’t think that it necessary to design something new to hone skills. Pilots have to be willing to improve existing skills; this requires commitment, discipline, professionalism, pride. Many of these attributes are seen as ‘old fashioned’, but they are still essential for airmanship.
- aterpster, I would not necessarily agree that modern EFIS formats are easier to use when flying raw instrument procedures.
Yes, all of the information is there – and more (consider why). The display formats can differ, which often requires a change in the mechanism of extracting information from an instrument, e.g. compare the awareness of airspeed with respect to high / low limits; a dial shows the limits with numeric and angular relationship to them, a strip display may not show any limit and has no angular quality.
Often modern instrument training overlooks the subtitles of using new displays, particularly as there are more varying and complex situations, some of which cannot be flown with raw instruments.
Pilots have to know when and how to use instruments in context, and then how to manage a situation.
During a GA, attitude (as ever) is paramount – a target, a datum for further adjustment, and a stability reference both for the maneuver and the mental picture.
Instrument flying is based on this latter feature – the mental model, and this also provides the basis of negating disorientating effects.
Instead of forming an mental model by mixing what is seen on the flight instruments with body sensed information, pilots have to be prepared (practiced) in downgrading the (often very compelling) body sensed information and concentrating almost entirely on the visual input.
Furthermore, both pilots have to be aware of this need, as disorientation is one of the few hazards which can affect both pilots at the same time, and not necessarily be obvious to either one.