Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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Originally Posted by TyroPicard
If no visual reference at DA you need to make the a/c go up - in the A330 the AP will only do that if you select TOGA thrust. If you "nearly" select TOGA it keeps going down, while accelerating.
Manual flight - you still need to go up to avoid busting MDA - and the FD is switched to G/A mode by selection of TOGA.
So you cannot add power gradually in this instance.
Manual flight - you still need to go up to avoid busting MDA - and the FD is switched to G/A mode by selection of TOGA.
So you cannot add power gradually in this instance.
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aterpster,
Unfortunately the data doesn't support either of your hypotheses.
The only "consensus" on the forum is a simplistic one that comes from a group of mostly retired types who seem to long for the good ole days of DC-8's and gooneybirds. Beyond that group there's a discussion about risk factors and how they change or recurr as the industry evolves.
Some here say that succumbing to a somatogravic illusion (if that is what happened) is simply indicative of poor scan or instrument flying abilities and then condemn both the individual and the entire generation of "button pushing bus drivers" for the failure. Frankly that's facile. SI has been an issue for a long time and has caused a significant number of accidents over the years, most particularly with higher performance military aircraft. It's probably less of a risk for commercial operations because power to weight ratios are generally lower and the frequency of exposure to the triggering conditions is also substantially less, but still we've seen instances of it at work here as well.
What this accident may be suggesting to us is that our training on how to recognize and combat perceptive illusions is lacking. This is a matter that is distinct from simple good instrument flying skills. You can be a real pro at reading the dials and fly on them like an ace, but if you havn't had exposure to convincing illusions and are unable to identify when you are experiencing one then it becomes much more difficult to make the cognitive choice to ignore the illusory perception. Manual skill in the absence of appropriate training won't save you from your instincts.
Since the trigger conditions for a SI are ones that a commercial instrument pilot is only very infrequently exposed to more practice at normal procedures is of only limited use when faced with a mentally abnormal experience. And just telling a pilot he needs to trust the dials isn't necessarily enough to arm him against what can be a powerful sensory illusion if he hasn't experienced it before first hand.
Points to consider for discussion would be when, for most of us, did we receive our last training or exposure to potential illusory conditions? When was it discussed in terms of where the high risk points during a flight would be? What training do we do relative to illusions in the sim? As others have pointed out the sim itself is an illusion and the means by which it functions may make it difficult to create a situation where a trainee experiences a deliberately induced illusion that he can identify as such. There's also the individuality of it in that, like hypoxia, not everyone experiences the same result in the same circumstances. How do we cater for this in respect to the changing background experience of those we are hiring into the right seat of our aircraft? In many countries there is neither a civil or military pipeline of experienced pilots for the airlines to draw from, so the baseline experience with such conditions is likely dropping significantly. Is it possible that this will be a factor in this accident? If so, where does the fault that needs correction lie, and what can be done about it?
These would be far more valuable discussions than a simplistic diatribe such as "far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad" which seems to ignore the fact that accident and incident rates for this generation of button pushing bus drivers are an order of magnitude lower than they were a generation ago.
They must be doing an awful lot of things right the vast majority of the time, including managing degradations in the automation when they occur, for that to be the case. How about giving them their due as professionals along with the wisdom of your experience, instead of just pontificating about what you consider their failings to be in the same fashion as a more distantly past generation did about you?
ELAC
I believe there is a consensus on this forum that far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad (Turkish Air) and they have to (horrors) actually hand-fly the airplane and be able to accomplish a basic critical flight instrument scan on a continuing basis. Oh, and actually use the throttles to control airspeed? Wow, what a quaint concept.
Unfortunately the data doesn't support either of your hypotheses.
The only "consensus" on the forum is a simplistic one that comes from a group of mostly retired types who seem to long for the good ole days of DC-8's and gooneybirds. Beyond that group there's a discussion about risk factors and how they change or recurr as the industry evolves.
Some here say that succumbing to a somatogravic illusion (if that is what happened) is simply indicative of poor scan or instrument flying abilities and then condemn both the individual and the entire generation of "button pushing bus drivers" for the failure. Frankly that's facile. SI has been an issue for a long time and has caused a significant number of accidents over the years, most particularly with higher performance military aircraft. It's probably less of a risk for commercial operations because power to weight ratios are generally lower and the frequency of exposure to the triggering conditions is also substantially less, but still we've seen instances of it at work here as well.
What this accident may be suggesting to us is that our training on how to recognize and combat perceptive illusions is lacking. This is a matter that is distinct from simple good instrument flying skills. You can be a real pro at reading the dials and fly on them like an ace, but if you havn't had exposure to convincing illusions and are unable to identify when you are experiencing one then it becomes much more difficult to make the cognitive choice to ignore the illusory perception. Manual skill in the absence of appropriate training won't save you from your instincts.
Since the trigger conditions for a SI are ones that a commercial instrument pilot is only very infrequently exposed to more practice at normal procedures is of only limited use when faced with a mentally abnormal experience. And just telling a pilot he needs to trust the dials isn't necessarily enough to arm him against what can be a powerful sensory illusion if he hasn't experienced it before first hand.
Points to consider for discussion would be when, for most of us, did we receive our last training or exposure to potential illusory conditions? When was it discussed in terms of where the high risk points during a flight would be? What training do we do relative to illusions in the sim? As others have pointed out the sim itself is an illusion and the means by which it functions may make it difficult to create a situation where a trainee experiences a deliberately induced illusion that he can identify as such. There's also the individuality of it in that, like hypoxia, not everyone experiences the same result in the same circumstances. How do we cater for this in respect to the changing background experience of those we are hiring into the right seat of our aircraft? In many countries there is neither a civil or military pipeline of experienced pilots for the airlines to draw from, so the baseline experience with such conditions is likely dropping significantly. Is it possible that this will be a factor in this accident? If so, where does the fault that needs correction lie, and what can be done about it?
These would be far more valuable discussions than a simplistic diatribe such as "far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad" which seems to ignore the fact that accident and incident rates for this generation of button pushing bus drivers are an order of magnitude lower than they were a generation ago.
They must be doing an awful lot of things right the vast majority of the time, including managing degradations in the automation when they occur, for that to be the case. How about giving them their due as professionals along with the wisdom of your experience, instead of just pontificating about what you consider their failings to be in the same fashion as a more distantly past generation did about you?
ELAC
Last edited by ELAC; 20th Jun 2010 at 21:01.
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TOGA tap & probabilities
I fully recognize the necessity of the TOGA tap to reset the Airbus aircraft logic on GA. My question relates to the sensing of the throttles in the TOGA position. How reliable of a mechanism is the sensing element? If a mechanical switch, those can get bound up by cockpit dirt and "cookie crumbs." If a hall effect switch, perhaps part of the switch could detach from the moving element (The Throttle levers).
Suppose the failure probability of TOGA position sensing is 1 failure in 10,000 attempts, or 1 in 100,000 attempts. The consequences could be ugly (accelerating down the glide slope) and at those probability levels, bad things will eventually happen. For that matter, what percentage of the time will an Airbus PF miss hitting the TOGA stop when doing a TOGA tap?
So as Smilin Ed said earlier,
[quote][Maybe that needs to change. /QUOTE] meaning (I believe) that perhaps there is a better, more positive way to select a go around.
I'm quite sure that on a waveoff at the boat, Ed got the power up smartly (but smoothly) and "retracted the boards" as he rotated the aircraft.
ELAC, Nice job! Bullseye.
Suppose the failure probability of TOGA position sensing is 1 failure in 10,000 attempts, or 1 in 100,000 attempts. The consequences could be ugly (accelerating down the glide slope) and at those probability levels, bad things will eventually happen. For that matter, what percentage of the time will an Airbus PF miss hitting the TOGA stop when doing a TOGA tap?
So as Smilin Ed said earlier,
[quote][Maybe that needs to change. /QUOTE] meaning (I believe) that perhaps there is a better, more positive way to select a go around.
I'm quite sure that on a waveoff at the boat, Ed got the power up smartly (but smoothly) and "retracted the boards" as he rotated the aircraft.
ELAC, Nice job! Bullseye.
Last edited by Machinbird; 20th Jun 2010 at 20:22. Reason: Add reference to new prior posting.
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Originally Posted by Machinbird
"cookie crumbs."
In general the design is arranged in a way that assures that no one failure can be catastrophic. For example a mechanical switch is electrically sensed on two poles and each pole is sensed on the normally-open and the normally-closed side. This gives a four-way check on the switch position and there is a hardware (not software) diagnosis of which section has failed and is to be ignored.
In a failure-critical application like Toga Tap there would I am sure be more than one mechanical switch or other position transducer and the hardware would diagnose any malfunction so as to go on operating whilst at the same time logging the failure (in software to nvram) as a maintenance issue.
I have no direct experience of the Airbus engine control system but I would expect that there are rotational position transducers on both throttles and that the toga signal is deduced from these without the use of a separate mechanical switch.
Hope this is helpful.
Last edited by mike-wsm; 20th Jun 2010 at 21:03. Reason: clarity
Let me say first, that i accept and apreciate your position. Being retired and not having flown the new gadgets does´t mean a position against automation. I would have been glad if our "George" would have 10% of the features available to a pilot today.
Your statement here is a simplistic one as well. This generation might have not that expierience with automation, but the expierience with flying was definitly more intense one. It´s not the fault of the pilots, it´s the fault of the management that the piloting skills rely only on automation and the handflying skills are deteriorating.
It is, it was before without automation and it still is. Because the ADI in our days or the Attitude information in the glass cockpit is not affected by SI. It shows the correct values. If you follow it, you will not crash.
and then condemn both the individual and the entire generation of "button pushing bus drivers" for the failure.
Nobody is condemning the pilots. How should they train, when it is not allowed? How should they know from flying in the box? The bloody who is the management.
That is true. A lot higher percentage of the missiontime is flown under conditions and with maneuvers, which bear a high SI potential.
Due to the fact, as you describe it very well, that only minimal exposure to SI is to be expected in cammercial flying, there are too much happenings and accidents documented.
When the Instruments tell you that you are in a ten degree climb and you feel like being in a 45 degree climb, to what information do you follow? The autopilot will do it on its own, it doesn´t fall for SI, the human does. You only need to reed the instruments correct, that´s the only way to avoid mistakes by SI. There is no thinking "its SI, the instruments are correct" versus "its not SI, the intruments are wrong". That might have been a problem with our old ADI or with the standby ADI.
Trainng however is essential to know that it exists and be prepared to get that feeling, when you follow the instruments. It comforts. But it does not prevent it. Basic instrument flying with a sound instrument crosscheck does, as well as crew coordination.
Appropriate training without the manual skill will do it neither.
Excellent. As i mentioned before, management failure.
Its stating a fact, you yourself confirm it with your posting. But again, its not the pilots fault, its a management problem.
The reason being not better pilots today, but better equipment, more failsafe, better tested, lot of lessons learned out of the accidents our generation had to suffer. The weather was 40 years ago as good or as bad as today, but the approach aids inside and outside of the cockpit made an immense progress as did flightcontrolsystems, ATC and procedures. Take the human out of the equation and weigh the improvement. If the generation you named would have been trained like some of the new generation, the accident rates would have been a lot higher. But again, it´s a management problem.
Imho they do the job within their cababilities. Good friend of mine liked to keep proficient in his abilities of handflying as a captain A320 (aquired before his comercial career, ), it was not liked by his FO´s and he had to give it up due to company procedure. Its a difference wether you monitor the autopilot flying the aircraft or wether you have to fly it alone when the time comes. And the box might be of some help, but it´s not the real thing and it never will be. They could do the job a lot better, but management doesn´t allow it.
It would be wrong to judge the critique of the old grandpa´s on the present system as a personal pilots issue. Its´s the system which has to improve and we have the guts to name it. We are unemployed anyway.
There´s probably one thing the pilots themselves have to think about:
Do the new generation of young pilots really feel safe and proficient enough to take the jet from the autopilot in any kind of situation or wouldn´t they appreciate some more realistic training in that area? Would it be bad to have more training or would it improve self confidence and therfore also safety? What can they do to get more training out of their management?
Never mind, i know that it is not my sandbox anymore, however as long as my family members and myself fly as paying guests, i have an interest in the matter.
franzl
ELAC
The only "consensus" on the forum is a simplistic one that comes from a group of mostly retired types who seem to long for the good ole days of DC-8's and gooneybirds.
The only "consensus" on the forum is a simplistic one that comes from a group of mostly retired types who seem to long for the good ole days of DC-8's and gooneybirds.
Some here say that succumbing to a somatogravic illusion (if that is what happened) is simply indicative of poor scan or instrument flying abilities
and then condemn both the individual and the entire generation of "button pushing bus drivers" for the failure.
SI has been an issue for a long time and has caused a significant number of accidents over the years, most particularly with higher performance military aircraft.
It's probably less of a risk for commercial operations because power to weight ratios are generally lower and the frequency of exposure to the triggering conditions is also substantially less, but still we've seen instances of it at work here as well.
What this accident may be suggesting to us is that our training on how to recognize and combat perceptive illusions is lacking. This is a matter that is distinct from simple good instrument flying skills. You can be a real pro at reading the dials and fly on them like an ace, but if you havn't had exposure to convincing illusions and are unable to identify when you are experiencing one then it becomes much more difficult to make the cognitive choice to ignore the illusory perception.
Trainng however is essential to know that it exists and be prepared to get that feeling, when you follow the instruments. It comforts. But it does not prevent it. Basic instrument flying with a sound instrument crosscheck does, as well as crew coordination.
Manual skill in the absence of appropriate training won't save you from your instincts.
Points to consider for discussion would be when, for most of us, did we receive our last training or exposure to potential illusory conditions? When was it discussed in terms of where the high risk points during a flight would be? What training do we do relative to illusions in the sim? As others have pointed out the sim itself is an illusion and the means by which it functions may make it difficult to create a situation where a trainee experiences a deliberately induced illusion that he can identify as such. There's also the individuality of it in that, like hypoxia, not everyone experiences the same result in the same circumstances. How do we cater for this in respect to the changing background experience of those we are hiring into the right seat of our aircraft? In many countries there is neither a civil or military pipeline of experienced pilots for the airlines to draw from, so the baseline experience with such conditions is likely dropping significantly. Is it possible that this will be a factor in this accident? If so, where does the fault that needs correction lie, and what can be done about it?
These would be a far more valuable discussions than a simplistic diatribe such as "far too many of today's pilots are button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad"
which seems to ignore the fact that accident and incident rates for this generation of button pushing bus drivers are an order of magnitude lower than they were a generation ago.
They must be doing an awful lot of things right the vast majority of the time, including managing degradations in the automation when they occur, for that to be the case. How about giving them their due as professionals along with the wisdom of your experience, instead of just pontificating about what you consider their failings to be in the same fashion as a more distantly past generation did about you?
It would be wrong to judge the critique of the old grandpa´s on the present system as a personal pilots issue. Its´s the system which has to improve and we have the guts to name it. We are unemployed anyway.
There´s probably one thing the pilots themselves have to think about:
Do the new generation of young pilots really feel safe and proficient enough to take the jet from the autopilot in any kind of situation or wouldn´t they appreciate some more realistic training in that area? Would it be bad to have more training or would it improve self confidence and therfore also safety? What can they do to get more training out of their management?
Never mind, i know that it is not my sandbox anymore, however as long as my family members and myself fly as paying guests, i have an interest in the matter.
franzl
Last edited by RetiredF4; 20th Jun 2010 at 22:53.
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We need to realize that it is not sufficient to blame dirty rotten managers for today's problems. Hopefully some of those key managers were once stick and throttle guys who understand how important it is that their crews are fully competent. And to the ones who were only accountants and bean counters-we need to make arguments and show the way that they can have their cake and eat it too.
The problem is that our airline system is exploring new territory and needs to better manage the transition. I'm a great believer in education and communication as a problem solving technique. To villainize any particular group is to interfere with good communication.
Rather than agonize over what we are allowed to do, management needs to be told (diplomatically) what it would be smart for them to do to better manage the transition to lesser qualified pilot input in an environment of decreased hand flying. If we handle this as a partnership, all will benefit. If we handle the issues in a strictly adversarial manner-positions will harden and progress will slow to a halt. Just human nature.
The problem is that our airline system is exploring new territory and needs to better manage the transition. I'm a great believer in education and communication as a problem solving technique. To villainize any particular group is to interfere with good communication.
Rather than agonize over what we are allowed to do, management needs to be told (diplomatically) what it would be smart for them to do to better manage the transition to lesser qualified pilot input in an environment of decreased hand flying. If we handle this as a partnership, all will benefit. If we handle the issues in a strictly adversarial manner-positions will harden and progress will slow to a halt. Just human nature.
Going Around
[QUOTE]
The change I have in mind is to change the software (or whatever) so that you don't have to select TOGA to go around. You should only have to add as much power as necessary to expeditiously stop the descent, not bust minimums, and start climbing. Slamming on a fist full of power and then immediately pulling it off seems like a recipe for disorientation and confusion. As a graduate of the Navy's Test Pilot School and two subsequent testing assignments, if asked to evaluate such a system, I would have had to object strenuously. Two recent accidents, Buffalo and Amsterdam, have shown us that at least some line pilots have a hard time coping with the dramatic pitch-up brought about by a sudden application of a lot of power in some aircraft. Comments on this board also lead me to think that the typical line pilot is very uncomfortable with actually flying an airplane. Certainly improved training would help to counter this but I'm suggesting that a system modification is also in order. System design has to be aimed at, if not below, the typical pilot.
As far as a waveoff at the ship, you ALWAYS slam the power all the way forward, simultaneously bringing in the boards and hitting the burner (if you have one). Carrier based planes do not dramatically pitch up with power the way transports, especially lightly loaded transports, with under-slung engines do. The thrust line is very close to the center of gravity even for the A-3 and S-3.
[Maybe that needs to change. /QUOTE] meaning (I believe) that perhaps there is a better, more positive way to select a go around.
I'm quite sure that on a waveoff at the boat, Ed got the power up smartly (but smoothly) and "retracted the boards" as he rotated the aircraft.
I'm quite sure that on a waveoff at the boat, Ed got the power up smartly (but smoothly) and "retracted the boards" as he rotated the aircraft.
As far as a waveoff at the ship, you ALWAYS slam the power all the way forward, simultaneously bringing in the boards and hitting the burner (if you have one). Carrier based planes do not dramatically pitch up with power the way transports, especially lightly loaded transports, with under-slung engines do. The thrust line is very close to the center of gravity even for the A-3 and S-3.
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I appreciate the FMEA discussion, and have participated in some of that work.
I'd like to point out, however, that if the FMEA is done by a separate working group, there is risk of the resulting analysis being "lightweight" and incomplete. One FMEA I "gigged" analyzed the failure of a speed sensor on a high-speed rotor; it correctly identified loss of a tachometer indication, but failed to recognize it was part of a servomechanism control loop, and that its failure would cause a rotor overspeed.
Another FMEA had to do with loss of prop blade position feedback in beta mode. The FMEA writer showed the blades slewing toward coarse pitch, a benign condition that the pilot could manage. In fact, the writer overlooked many decades of experience that showed blades slewing to fine pitch, creating much drag and possible overspeed. Several recoverable incidents had occurred before this fatal accident.
I'd like to point out, however, that if the FMEA is done by a separate working group, there is risk of the resulting analysis being "lightweight" and incomplete. One FMEA I "gigged" analyzed the failure of a speed sensor on a high-speed rotor; it correctly identified loss of a tachometer indication, but failed to recognize it was part of a servomechanism control loop, and that its failure would cause a rotor overspeed.
Another FMEA had to do with loss of prop blade position feedback in beta mode. The FMEA writer showed the blades slewing toward coarse pitch, a benign condition that the pilot could manage. In fact, the writer overlooked many decades of experience that showed blades slewing to fine pitch, creating much drag and possible overspeed. Several recoverable incidents had occurred before this fatal accident.
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franzl,
Sorry franzl, while I can agree with many of your points I reject the "This [i.e. past] generation might have not that expieience with automation, but the expierience with flying was definitly more intense one.", theory of relative safety. They (the past generation) were experts at operating the equipment of their generation in the environment of their generation. Both the equipment and the environment have changed, and along with that there has been a necessary change in the expertise required to operate safely. Those doing the job today take it on with the same dedication as yourselves, but they do so with a skill set that is developing differently in order to meet different demands than those that presented themselves to you or to the industry 20 or 40 years ago.
We say that hand flying skill is decreasing with increased use of automation and there's a point in that, but the truth is that the overall safety gain from "expert" hand flying skill versus "adequate" hand flying skill becomes more marginal as the aircraft evolve. On the other hand, the potential losses to the net safety of the operation by allowing an overemphasis on correcting the perceived wrongs of diminshing hand flying skill to result in wholesale changes in our normal methods of operation could be significant.
What needs adaption is how we train the manual skills and prepare the pilot for the appropriate instances for their use, as opposed to how we fly the aircraft day-to-day, or as some would suggest applying an overall reduction in the use of automation in design in favour of a more manual flying oriented machine. I agree completely with you on the need to train proficiency in handling the aircraft in all situations, but this neither advocates an over reliance on automation to the exclusion of manual flying or the reverse. What is required is further development of training on the appropriate judgement of when to use either along with the skills to do so in those instances. And, we need to recognize that the evolutions in aircraft design will change what we decide is the acceptable skill level for some tasks.
In terms of who to "blame" for diminished hand flying skill I think it's too simple to just say "management" is to blame when there's still serious disagreement in the industry on what the nature of the problem really is or what the best process for creating a net increase in safety in the use of hand flying should be. For example, if improved hand flying training resulted in a net 1% improvement in safety, but a similar investment in another area could produce a 10% improvement, which would you opt for if your resources were limited as is the case for most commercial entities? If increasing the amount of hand flying on the line resulted in a 5% increase in net pilot errors due to decreased attention to other operational tasks is that a worthwhile trade for an improvement in a hand flying skill when the degree of improvement has a very low percentage probablility of being decisive in a critical event?
Sorry again franzl, I disagree with you here as well. While pilots today may not get the same degree of "stick & rudder" exposure as in the past, there have been improvements over the previous generation in a number of areas due to advances we've made both in training processes and our understanding of human dynamics, as well as those hard lessons learned from each accident that occurs. You suggest that had the past generation trained like the current generation that accident rates would be a lot higher, but come on, what do you think of the likliehood that a repeat of Staines could happen to BA today, or Tenerife to KLM? Not impossible, but pretty unlikely to happen again now as opposed to then because we've learned from and adapted to our failings and improved our training in those areas and in doing so improved the pilot. It's an ongoing process, and not without its flaws, so not everything is always an immediate step forward. This is what we need to have in mind in assessing the nature of the problem and what resources and changes need to be put to it.
A fair statement would be that training in hand flying skills has to adapt to the changing nature of the aircraft and environment. An unfair statement would be the suggestion that pilots (or aircraft) of a past generation were inherently safer because hand flying was more frequent and pilots had a resulting higher base level in that skill. While they may have been more proficient at that it does not follow that they were thus overall more safe operators within their environment than the pilot of today is within his.
Cheers,
ELAC
Your statement here is a simplistic one as well. This generation might have not that expieience with automation, but the expierience with flying was definitly more intense one. It´s not the fault of the pilots, it´s the fault of the management that the piloting skills rely only on automation and the handflying skills are deteriorating.
We say that hand flying skill is decreasing with increased use of automation and there's a point in that, but the truth is that the overall safety gain from "expert" hand flying skill versus "adequate" hand flying skill becomes more marginal as the aircraft evolve. On the other hand, the potential losses to the net safety of the operation by allowing an overemphasis on correcting the perceived wrongs of diminshing hand flying skill to result in wholesale changes in our normal methods of operation could be significant.
What needs adaption is how we train the manual skills and prepare the pilot for the appropriate instances for their use, as opposed to how we fly the aircraft day-to-day, or as some would suggest applying an overall reduction in the use of automation in design in favour of a more manual flying oriented machine. I agree completely with you on the need to train proficiency in handling the aircraft in all situations, but this neither advocates an over reliance on automation to the exclusion of manual flying or the reverse. What is required is further development of training on the appropriate judgement of when to use either along with the skills to do so in those instances. And, we need to recognize that the evolutions in aircraft design will change what we decide is the acceptable skill level for some tasks.
In terms of who to "blame" for diminished hand flying skill I think it's too simple to just say "management" is to blame when there's still serious disagreement in the industry on what the nature of the problem really is or what the best process for creating a net increase in safety in the use of hand flying should be. For example, if improved hand flying training resulted in a net 1% improvement in safety, but a similar investment in another area could produce a 10% improvement, which would you opt for if your resources were limited as is the case for most commercial entities? If increasing the amount of hand flying on the line resulted in a 5% increase in net pilot errors due to decreased attention to other operational tasks is that a worthwhile trade for an improvement in a hand flying skill when the degree of improvement has a very low percentage probablility of being decisive in a critical event?
The reason being not better pilots today, but better equipment, more failsafe, better tested, lot of lessons learned out of the accidents our generation had to suffer. The weather was 40 years ago as good or as bad as today, but the approach aids inside and outside of the cockpit made an immense progress as did flightcontrolsystems, ATC and procedures. Take the human out of the equation and weigh the improvement. If the generation you named would have been trained like some of the new generation, the accident rates would have been a lot higher. But again, it´s a management problem.
A fair statement would be that training in hand flying skills has to adapt to the changing nature of the aircraft and environment. An unfair statement would be the suggestion that pilots (or aircraft) of a past generation were inherently safer because hand flying was more frequent and pilots had a resulting higher base level in that skill. While they may have been more proficient at that it does not follow that they were thus overall more safe operators within their environment than the pilot of today is within his.
Cheers,
ELAC
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ELAC:
The Turkish Air crash fits quite nicely.
I've worked my share of accidents. Some pilots have always done really careless or downright dumb things. That isn't the exclusive domain of today's younger pilots.
But, the majority before automation knew how to fly the airplane and how to stay ahead of it. And, I don't recall a jet transport accident with a U.S. carrier where visual illusions overtook trust and proper use of attitude instruments.
I was fortunate in that I flew both low-tech and high tech aircraft. We were trained to fly the high-tech airplanes with and without automation, and did a fair amount of both. That seems to not be the case any longer.
I currently deal extensively with all the nuances of RNP AR, which is a quantum advance in instrument approach procedures. At some locations there is virtually no margin for error, thus the proper use of the automatics is essential. But, equally essential is a plan to escape in the event the automatics and flight path guidance fail at the worst possible time. I have no doubt that pilots will handle terrain-critical RNP AR IAPs just fine so long as nothing critical fails.
Unfortunately the data doesn't support either of your hypotheses.
I've worked my share of accidents. Some pilots have always done really careless or downright dumb things. That isn't the exclusive domain of today's younger pilots.
But, the majority before automation knew how to fly the airplane and how to stay ahead of it. And, I don't recall a jet transport accident with a U.S. carrier where visual illusions overtook trust and proper use of attitude instruments.
I was fortunate in that I flew both low-tech and high tech aircraft. We were trained to fly the high-tech airplanes with and without automation, and did a fair amount of both. That seems to not be the case any longer.
I currently deal extensively with all the nuances of RNP AR, which is a quantum advance in instrument approach procedures. At some locations there is virtually no margin for error, thus the proper use of the automatics is essential. But, equally essential is a plan to escape in the event the automatics and flight path guidance fail at the worst possible time. I have no doubt that pilots will handle terrain-critical RNP AR IAPs just fine so long as nothing critical fails.
Last edited by aterpster; 20th Jun 2010 at 23:51.
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aterpster,
If you choose to form your conclusions and draw your hypotheses from single instances then I think we've discovered the source of the problem.
ELAC
The Turkish Air crash fits quite nicely.
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Originally Posted by Smilin_Ed
Slamming on a fist full of power and then immediately pulling it off seems like a recipe for disorientation and confusion.
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Comments on this board also lead me to think that the typical line pilot is very uncomfortable with actually flying an airplane.
As a typical line pilot I am very comfortable flying (Hand flying) the airplane.
So is 95% of my co-workers.
The pilots you mentioned, the ones that are not comfortable flying an airplane, are probably the guys you see on the CNN evening news..Buffalo, Amsterdam, Tripoli..
You don't have to be a Navy test pilot to safely fly a Boeing or a Bus.
ELAC,
I disagree with both of those statements. Handflying skills are exactly the same as they were years ago, and the hand-flyers of old are better at it on automated aircraft, if for no other reason than they appreciate the need to stay current doing it, regardless of what the Magenta-Line brigade think. And yes, years of more hand flying does make one better able to cope when forced into it.
A fair statement would be that training in hand flying skills has to adapt to the changing nature of the aircraft and environment.
An unfair statement would be the suggestion that pilots (or aircraft) of a past generation were inherently safer because hand flying was more frequent and pilots had a resulting higher base level in that skill.
An unfair statement would be the suggestion that pilots (or aircraft) of a past generation were inherently safer because hand flying was more frequent and pilots had a resulting higher base level in that skill.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 21st Jun 2010 at 03:12. Reason: Fixed grammar error.
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Hi,
Elac:
Seem's it's space for more improvement as this crash seem's to be a very good aircraft (with no technical failures discovered so far) slam to the ground by the improved ? pilots
And methink it's not the first case it's happened .. so where are the "learn" and adaptation to the "failing" ?
Sure you can have again "Tenerife to KLM" .. it's just a matter of time
Elac:
that a repeat of Staines could happen to BA today, or Tenerife to KLM? Not impossible, but pretty unlikely to happen again now as opposed to then because we've learned from and adapted to our failings and improved our training in those areas and in doing so improved the pilot
And methink it's not the first case it's happened .. so where are the "learn" and adaptation to the "failing" ?
Sure you can have again "Tenerife to KLM" .. it's just a matter of time
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jcjeant,
There is always room for improvement. That should be a never ending process in aviation. And there will always be accidents that result from exceptions to the overall level of proficiency that is normal within the industry, but an accident is by nature an exceptional event, and one needs to be careful what conclusions one infers from exceptional events.
I think the problem here is that some are suffering from a very selective view (or review) of the data. Perfectly good aircraft slammed into the ground for exactly the same reason in past generations, and they slammed into the ground for all sorts of pilot related issues at an even greater rate than is the case today.
In the past, however, we didn't have these convenient little targets of "too much automation" or "too little hand flying" to pin cause on. Real thought had to be put into finding out the roots of error and the means of correcting and improving overall flight safety. Now however, on this forum at least, some seem content to fall into a form of reductionist logic where every accident is the result of either a failure of automation or a failure of the pilot operate effectively without automation.
After wading through nostalgia for the good old days, the curative prescriptions are always the same: Less automation and more hand flying. But, where is the data that supports the idea that these prescriptions will actually enhance overall safety?
I say it isn't there. Certainly there's nothing in historical statistics of accidents and incidents to suggest that greater hand flying of aircraft with lesser degrees of automation will result in lower rates of accidents/incidents. It's pretty much the reverse on that score. Aircraft that have lower levels of automation and/or that demand higher amounts of hand flying seem to have higher accident rates than those of the current generation.
Automation and hand flying are just tools to get a job done, and using these tools, as well as others, today's pilots a key component of a safety system that, while still imperfect, delivers a lower error rate than that of any past generation. So before we go about thrashing this generation as being "button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad" as aterpster so quaintly puts it, let's put these individual events into the bigger picture and see whether that analysis really stands up.
And when it comes to solutions intended to reduce the errors, I'm open to them all, but only once it can be demonstated that a proposed change in philosophy or process will actually deliver a net gain to the safety of the system. I see no profit in reducing automation and increasing hand flying only to generate a more skilled hand flyer who commits a greater number of errors with safety implications in other aspects of the operation.
Cheers,
ELAC
Seem's it's space for more improvement as this crash seem's to be a very good aircraft (with no technical failures discovered so far) slam to the ground by the improved ? pilots
I think the problem here is that some are suffering from a very selective view (or review) of the data. Perfectly good aircraft slammed into the ground for exactly the same reason in past generations, and they slammed into the ground for all sorts of pilot related issues at an even greater rate than is the case today.
In the past, however, we didn't have these convenient little targets of "too much automation" or "too little hand flying" to pin cause on. Real thought had to be put into finding out the roots of error and the means of correcting and improving overall flight safety. Now however, on this forum at least, some seem content to fall into a form of reductionist logic where every accident is the result of either a failure of automation or a failure of the pilot operate effectively without automation.
After wading through nostalgia for the good old days, the curative prescriptions are always the same: Less automation and more hand flying. But, where is the data that supports the idea that these prescriptions will actually enhance overall safety?
I say it isn't there. Certainly there's nothing in historical statistics of accidents and incidents to suggest that greater hand flying of aircraft with lesser degrees of automation will result in lower rates of accidents/incidents. It's pretty much the reverse on that score. Aircraft that have lower levels of automation and/or that demand higher amounts of hand flying seem to have higher accident rates than those of the current generation.
Automation and hand flying are just tools to get a job done, and using these tools, as well as others, today's pilots a key component of a safety system that, while still imperfect, delivers a lower error rate than that of any past generation. So before we go about thrashing this generation as being "button-pushing bus drivers, who are truly screwed if the automatics go bad" as aterpster so quaintly puts it, let's put these individual events into the bigger picture and see whether that analysis really stands up.
And when it comes to solutions intended to reduce the errors, I'm open to them all, but only once it can be demonstated that a proposed change in philosophy or process will actually deliver a net gain to the safety of the system. I see no profit in reducing automation and increasing hand flying only to generate a more skilled hand flyer who commits a greater number of errors with safety implications in other aspects of the operation.
Cheers,
ELAC
ELAC,
Nobody is suggesting that handflying in the old days produced better safety outcomes. What is being said is that accidents are now occurring regularly in which the basic flying skills of the crew are a factor. There is only one way to keep up your basic flying skills - practice handflying. Good IF cross-reference is the key and in my experience the only way that skill can be maintained is by handflying.
After wading through nostalgia for the good old days, the curative prescriptions are always the same: Less automation and more hand flying. But, where is the data that supports the idea that these prescriptions will actually enhance overall safety?
I say it isn't there. Certainly there's nothing in historical statistics of accidents and incidents to suggest that greater hand flying of aircraft with lesser degrees of automation will result in lower rates of accidents/incidents. It's pretty much the reverse on that score. Aircraft that have lower levels of automation and/or that demand higher amounts of hand flying seem to have higher accident rates than those of the current generation.
I say it isn't there. Certainly there's nothing in historical statistics of accidents and incidents to suggest that greater hand flying of aircraft with lesser degrees of automation will result in lower rates of accidents/incidents. It's pretty much the reverse on that score. Aircraft that have lower levels of automation and/or that demand higher amounts of hand flying seem to have higher accident rates than those of the current generation.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 21st Jun 2010 at 05:56. Reason: Bad grammar again!
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The general level has been decreasing for years pushed by the global administration trying to solve the up and down pilot demand in the special market of aviation.
Once upon a time ATPL was a real licence hard to get and the reward of a happy few due to high knowledge and skill requirements but also long to get.
Administrations and manufacturers on Airlines demand worked on a new licencing system enableing the product of new pilots at a higher rate than previous in the double aim of avoiding pilot gap and of reducing payscale as a result of less offer than demand.
Financial results have allways been inversely proportional to the labor cost as good management is judged by investors on the ability of managers to reduce workforce cost and enhance productivity.
These two principles cannot apply to aviation as they do not deserve safety.
Eventhough manufacturers have work to make their airplanes easier to use the specificity of the pilot's job is to be minded in the special way enabling to react quickly but safely and in the correct way to a problem that happens.
The need of being an experienced handler and a well qualified high level knowledged pilot will always be necessary to comply with the minimum safety level required to transport passangers safely to their destination in all situations.
Fatigue due to enhancement of productivity and poor knowledge and handling due to new licencing system (not the fault of new joiners who also have to pay for their ratings) will undoubtedly lead to a decrease of safety records.
What's the best.
- Good maintenance (less failures)
- Adapted productivity and real fatigue management
-Not the least, good formation and high level required to work as a pilot and of course high management skills to work as a captain (This you can not learn even with CRM training and all these bull****s).
This is not a message to relate to the present subject but an experience return to answer to a few messages above and dedicated to all financials and administration manufacturers or airline's managers...
Once upon a time ATPL was a real licence hard to get and the reward of a happy few due to high knowledge and skill requirements but also long to get.
Administrations and manufacturers on Airlines demand worked on a new licencing system enableing the product of new pilots at a higher rate than previous in the double aim of avoiding pilot gap and of reducing payscale as a result of less offer than demand.
Financial results have allways been inversely proportional to the labor cost as good management is judged by investors on the ability of managers to reduce workforce cost and enhance productivity.
These two principles cannot apply to aviation as they do not deserve safety.
Eventhough manufacturers have work to make their airplanes easier to use the specificity of the pilot's job is to be minded in the special way enabling to react quickly but safely and in the correct way to a problem that happens.
The need of being an experienced handler and a well qualified high level knowledged pilot will always be necessary to comply with the minimum safety level required to transport passangers safely to their destination in all situations.
Fatigue due to enhancement of productivity and poor knowledge and handling due to new licencing system (not the fault of new joiners who also have to pay for their ratings) will undoubtedly lead to a decrease of safety records.
What's the best.
- Good maintenance (less failures)
- Adapted productivity and real fatigue management
-Not the least, good formation and high level required to work as a pilot and of course high management skills to work as a captain (This you can not learn even with CRM training and all these bull****s).
This is not a message to relate to the present subject but an experience return to answer to a few messages above and dedicated to all financials and administration manufacturers or airline's managers...
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Capn Bloggs,
"accidents are now occurring regularly in which the basic flying skills of the crew are a factor" To me that appears to be an exaggeration. We have had several accidents recently where basic flying skills/awareness have been a factor, but "regularly" is a leap too far. Additionally I'm sure I could point to any number of other periods in the last 20-40 years where a similar number of accidents of a similar sort occured during a similar time frame, and that would be against a background of significantly fewer total aircraft cycles.
What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.
I agree with you that continuous hand flying practice is the best way to keep basic stick and rudder skills at their highest. Where I would disagree with some is on whether changing our approach to the use of automation to enable more hand flying practice during line operations would actually produce a net positive for the overall safety of flight operations. As you may recall when sims were less capable we used to practice things like double engine failures in the real aircraft. Looking back, history shows us that we lost more jet transports practicing that skill than we did to actual double engine failures. While there's a scale difference between normal operation hand flying and abnormal operation double engine failures the point is that practicing a skill with the intention of improving handling ability doesn't always come for free, and before advocating more hand flying on the line we should give better consideration as to what other risk factors we might be letting into the operation. If the trade-off is not a net gain, then we'd be doing the wrong thing.
Along this line it's worth considering that modern aircraft have a good number of capabilities and crew tasks that older generation aircraft did not have, and in many cases fewer crew to accomplish/monitor those tasks than in the past. The entire "system", not just the pilot or the aircraft, are adapting to make use of these capabilities with attendant changes in what is required of the pilot. One of the basic purposes of automation is to free up more of the physical and mental capacity of the pilots to concentrate better on those tasks and how they relate to the big picture with less conscious effort being required for the manual task of keeping the aircraft on the straight and level. This is how these aircraft are designed to be used and this is why I suggest that some folks like aterpster are perhaps not giving due credit to today's pilots for understanding how their machine is meant to be operated and using its systems accordingly. Overall they do the job with a very high degree of safety, and while it is right to focus on anything that's a perceived weak link in the safety chain and look for means of improvement, doing so without acknowledging the greater context is disingenuous.
So by all means let's talk of how we can improve handling skills, but let's do it without hyperbole and with a clear eye on the fact that if we aren't improving the overall safety of the system in the process what we may end up with is pilots who hand fly better but who end up having accidents more frequently.
Cheers,
ELAC
Nobody is suggesting that handflying in the old days produced better safety outcomes. What is being said is that accidents are now occurring regularly in which the basic flying skills of the crew are a factor. There is only one way to keep up your basic flying skills - practice handflying. Good IF cross-reference is the key and in my experience the only way that skill can be maintained is by handflying.
What may be occurring is that the diminshment of accidents caused by other factors leaves the ones caused by this factor more readily apparent to us, and that's a good thing, but this does not justify the degree of hue and cry about the failings of the modern pilot that some like to put forward, nor does it suggest that radical changes in the approach we have to the use of automation are necessary or beneficial.
I agree with you that continuous hand flying practice is the best way to keep basic stick and rudder skills at their highest. Where I would disagree with some is on whether changing our approach to the use of automation to enable more hand flying practice during line operations would actually produce a net positive for the overall safety of flight operations. As you may recall when sims were less capable we used to practice things like double engine failures in the real aircraft. Looking back, history shows us that we lost more jet transports practicing that skill than we did to actual double engine failures. While there's a scale difference between normal operation hand flying and abnormal operation double engine failures the point is that practicing a skill with the intention of improving handling ability doesn't always come for free, and before advocating more hand flying on the line we should give better consideration as to what other risk factors we might be letting into the operation. If the trade-off is not a net gain, then we'd be doing the wrong thing.
Along this line it's worth considering that modern aircraft have a good number of capabilities and crew tasks that older generation aircraft did not have, and in many cases fewer crew to accomplish/monitor those tasks than in the past. The entire "system", not just the pilot or the aircraft, are adapting to make use of these capabilities with attendant changes in what is required of the pilot. One of the basic purposes of automation is to free up more of the physical and mental capacity of the pilots to concentrate better on those tasks and how they relate to the big picture with less conscious effort being required for the manual task of keeping the aircraft on the straight and level. This is how these aircraft are designed to be used and this is why I suggest that some folks like aterpster are perhaps not giving due credit to today's pilots for understanding how their machine is meant to be operated and using its systems accordingly. Overall they do the job with a very high degree of safety, and while it is right to focus on anything that's a perceived weak link in the safety chain and look for means of improvement, doing so without acknowledging the greater context is disingenuous.
So by all means let's talk of how we can improve handling skills, but let's do it without hyperbole and with a clear eye on the fact that if we aren't improving the overall safety of the system in the process what we may end up with is pilots who hand fly better but who end up having accidents more frequently.
Cheers,
ELAC
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In my opinion ELAC is spot on here. As 'automation' becomes better and better, we finish up with crashes caused ONLY by the inability of a crew to 'salvage' a flight where something went wrong with the 'perfect' automatic system. We may well arrive at the point where the failure rate is so low that the loss of an airframe every now and then is acceptable statistically, so do then the crews NEED to be able to use 'stick and rudder'? Personally I hope I am into 'daisy pushing' before then.
I think now this thread has gone too far away form the topic. May I invite continued discussion on this particular topic on my year old thread here ? Somewhat spookily the topic of 'disorientation' came up there too...............................
I think now this thread has gone too far away form the topic. May I invite continued discussion on this particular topic on my year old thread here ? Somewhat spookily the topic of 'disorientation' came up there too...............................