Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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incident+incident =Accident
From Airbus safety magazine....December 2007 !
A prι-Afriqiyah ?
Reported event
The following was reported to Airbus:
This flight was uneventful until the approach phase that was a non precision approach performed in VMC conditions. Weather report indicated a partly cloudy sky with 10 miles visibility at destination, but, during the descent, ATC informed the crew about variable weather conditions due to banks
of fog closing and opening the station. On final approach, due to low visibility, the crew initiated a go-around and hit electrical lines. The crew then diverted to the scheduled alternate airport.
The investigation performed on site revealed that 25ft high electrical lines, located perpendicularly to the runway axis, at about 1100m from the runway threshold, were found sheared.
The aircraft was damaged subsequently to the impact with the electrical power lines. Damage was present all across the aircraft (fuselage, engine, wings) indicating that the aircraft impacted the lines head-on. Furthermore, some pieces of electrical lines were found in the area of the nose landing gear and it was concluded that the initial impact occurred at nose landing gear level.
With a mix of trust Levers not at TOGA incidents = .... ??? Tripoli accident?
A prι-Afriqiyah ?
Reported event
The following was reported to Airbus:
This flight was uneventful until the approach phase that was a non precision approach performed in VMC conditions. Weather report indicated a partly cloudy sky with 10 miles visibility at destination, but, during the descent, ATC informed the crew about variable weather conditions due to banks
of fog closing and opening the station. On final approach, due to low visibility, the crew initiated a go-around and hit electrical lines. The crew then diverted to the scheduled alternate airport.
The investigation performed on site revealed that 25ft high electrical lines, located perpendicularly to the runway axis, at about 1100m from the runway threshold, were found sheared.
The aircraft was damaged subsequently to the impact with the electrical power lines. Damage was present all across the aircraft (fuselage, engine, wings) indicating that the aircraft impacted the lines head-on. Furthermore, some pieces of electrical lines were found in the area of the nose landing gear and it was concluded that the initial impact occurred at nose landing gear level.
With a mix of trust Levers not at TOGA incidents = .... ??? Tripoli accident?
On final approach, due to low visibility, the crew initiated a go-around and hit electrical lines.
That would have stopped that crew descending below the MDA whilst still in Autoflight.
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erare humanum est, (but) perseverare diabolicum !!
The story in more details :
3 DFDR analysis Note: for de-identification reasons altitudes are
given in heights with reference to QFE.
This was a step-down VOR-DME approach conducted in daylight, early in the morning, autopilot engaged.
As a consequence, the approach was a succession of descent and level flight phases so that autopilot longitudinal modes were alternatively OP DES mode and ALT*/ALT modes, while the auto-thrust modes were respectively idle mode and speed mode (with speed managed by the FMS). The successive constraint altitudes were fully respected.
Shortly before over-flying the last altitude constraint P1 (859ft QFE situated at 3.7NM from the runway threshold) the aircraft was in level flight at 860ft QFE. The minimum descent height was 459ft.
The figure here below presents the descent profile from P1 This sequence can be detailed as follows:
Shortly before over-
flying P1, MDA altitude was selected on the FCU, and the OP DES longitudinal autopilot mode was selected so that a thrust reduction was progressively commanded to target idle thrust, while the autopilot pitch mode maintained the speed target.
At that stage the aircraft was in slats/flaps configuration 3, gear down, both flight directors engaged, autopilot N°2 engaged.
For the whole approach the autopilot lateral mode remained in NAV mode.
At 800ft QFE, 3NM from runway threshold, shortly after over-flying the last altitude constraint P1 full slats/flaps configuration was selected.
At 680ft QFE, 2.6NM from runway threshold, whereas the rate of descent was 1000ft/min, an altitude 300ft below MDA was selected on the FCU.
At 600ft QFE, 2.3NM from runway threshold, while the current rate of descent was -1400ft/min, the crew selected the autopilot V/S mode with initially a selected V/S of -700ft/min. From that time auto-thrust was therefore engaged in speed mode. Target speed was Vapp (VLS +5kts).
While descending below MDA about 2.1 NM from runway threshold, go-around altitude was selected on the FCU.
At 325ft QFE/ 1.54NM from runway threshold, the crew selected a vertical speed of - 800ft/min.
At 47ft RA at about 0.72NM from runway threshold the crew selected a vertical speed of
0ft/min.
At 35ft RA, at 0.70 NM from runway threshold,
the Pilot Flying applied 2/3 of full back stick input that disconnected immediately the autopilot.
Notes: 1/ As this approach was
performed in GPS primary (In this case only GPS and IRS data are used for the aircraft position computation) the accuracy of the recorded aircraft position is very good.
2/ In managed guidance only (FINAL APP mode engaged) when the aircraft reaches MDA (MDH) 50ft or 400ft (if no MDA/MDH entered) the autopilot automatically disengages.
3/ As noticeable on the figure here above, from MDA altitude this final descent was performed on a 3° slope.
The figure here below presents a zoom on the pilots take-over phase: The radio-altimeter parameters recorded in the
DFDR (here plotted in red ) indicate the distance between the lowest point of the main landing gear and the ground.
The initial PFs pitch-up stick input was followed by permanent pitch-up stick input (between 1/3 and full back stick input) applied for 6 seconds, so that the aircraft stopped descending and started to climb.
Minimum recorded altitude was 5ft RA reached at about 1100m from the runway threshold.
Zoom on pilots take-over phase
The estimation of the impact location indicates that, at that moment, the aircraft impacted the electrical lines.
At 10ft RA, 4.5 seconds after the initial PFs pitch- up stick input, thrust levers were moved forward to TOGA detent.
43 seconds after TOGA application, landing gears were selected up.
2 minutes after TOGA application, Slats/Flaps configuration 3 was selected.
The aircraft diverted to the scheduled alternate airport.
PS : this is NOT the Afriqiyah event, but a very similar event that occured in 2007
3 DFDR analysis Note: for de-identification reasons altitudes are
given in heights with reference to QFE.
This was a step-down VOR-DME approach conducted in daylight, early in the morning, autopilot engaged.
As a consequence, the approach was a succession of descent and level flight phases so that autopilot longitudinal modes were alternatively OP DES mode and ALT*/ALT modes, while the auto-thrust modes were respectively idle mode and speed mode (with speed managed by the FMS). The successive constraint altitudes were fully respected.
Shortly before over-flying the last altitude constraint P1 (859ft QFE situated at 3.7NM from the runway threshold) the aircraft was in level flight at 860ft QFE. The minimum descent height was 459ft.
The figure here below presents the descent profile from P1 This sequence can be detailed as follows:
Shortly before over-
flying P1, MDA altitude was selected on the FCU, and the OP DES longitudinal autopilot mode was selected so that a thrust reduction was progressively commanded to target idle thrust, while the autopilot pitch mode maintained the speed target.
At that stage the aircraft was in slats/flaps configuration 3, gear down, both flight directors engaged, autopilot N°2 engaged.
For the whole approach the autopilot lateral mode remained in NAV mode.
At 800ft QFE, 3NM from runway threshold, shortly after over-flying the last altitude constraint P1 full slats/flaps configuration was selected.
At 680ft QFE, 2.6NM from runway threshold, whereas the rate of descent was 1000ft/min, an altitude 300ft below MDA was selected on the FCU.
At 600ft QFE, 2.3NM from runway threshold, while the current rate of descent was -1400ft/min, the crew selected the autopilot V/S mode with initially a selected V/S of -700ft/min. From that time auto-thrust was therefore engaged in speed mode. Target speed was Vapp (VLS +5kts).
While descending below MDA about 2.1 NM from runway threshold, go-around altitude was selected on the FCU.
At 325ft QFE/ 1.54NM from runway threshold, the crew selected a vertical speed of - 800ft/min.
At 47ft RA at about 0.72NM from runway threshold the crew selected a vertical speed of
0ft/min.
At 35ft RA, at 0.70 NM from runway threshold,
the Pilot Flying applied 2/3 of full back stick input that disconnected immediately the autopilot.
Notes: 1/ As this approach was
performed in GPS primary (In this case only GPS and IRS data are used for the aircraft position computation) the accuracy of the recorded aircraft position is very good.
2/ In managed guidance only (FINAL APP mode engaged) when the aircraft reaches MDA (MDH) 50ft or 400ft (if no MDA/MDH entered) the autopilot automatically disengages.
3/ As noticeable on the figure here above, from MDA altitude this final descent was performed on a 3° slope.
The figure here below presents a zoom on the pilots take-over phase: The radio-altimeter parameters recorded in the
DFDR (here plotted in red ) indicate the distance between the lowest point of the main landing gear and the ground.
The initial PFs pitch-up stick input was followed by permanent pitch-up stick input (between 1/3 and full back stick input) applied for 6 seconds, so that the aircraft stopped descending and started to climb.
Minimum recorded altitude was 5ft RA reached at about 1100m from the runway threshold.
Zoom on pilots take-over phase
The estimation of the impact location indicates that, at that moment, the aircraft impacted the electrical lines.
At 10ft RA, 4.5 seconds after the initial PFs pitch- up stick input, thrust levers were moved forward to TOGA detent.
43 seconds after TOGA application, landing gears were selected up.
2 minutes after TOGA application, Slats/Flaps configuration 3 was selected.
The aircraft diverted to the scheduled alternate airport.
PS : this is NOT the Afriqiyah event, but a very similar event that occured in 2007
At 680ft QFE, 2.6NM from runway threshold, whereas the rate of descent was 1000ft/min, an altitude 300ft below MDA was selected on the FCU.
While descending below MDA about 2.1 NM from runway threshold, go-around altitude was selected on the FCU.
While descending below MDA about 2.1 NM from runway threshold, go-around altitude was selected on the FCU.
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Quote:
...the investigation performed on site revealed that 25ft high electrical lines, located perpendicularly to the runway axis, at about 1100m from the runway threshold, were found sheared...
... Furthermore, some pieces of electrical lines were found in the area of the nose landing gear and it was concluded that the initial impact occurred at nose landing gear level...
WOW! Still in a pitch or near down attitude! Little time and space left to find the way out!
... Furthermore, some pieces of electrical lines were found in the area of the nose landing gear and it was concluded that the initial impact occurred at nose landing gear level...
Ah ha. So even if they had followed Airbus recommendations, the 2007 incident could still/probably would have occurred.
I find it odd that Airbus worries about destabilising the approach by entering ALT* (I assume this is altitude capture) approaching the MDA (if it was set on the FCU). What's the issue? The aircraft is levelling at the MDA. You are not allowed below the MDA. Is Airbus suggesting you set the Go Around altitude at the FAF so that you can go below the MDA? Surely the idea is you don't go below the MDA unless Visual, in which case you just pickle off the AP and continue? If the autoflight has already started to flare at the MDA, tough. Go Around.
Although, I suppose setting the GA altitude at the FAF makes it easier to "cheat"... provided you don't hit the ground in the process.
I find it odd that Airbus worries about destabilising the approach by entering ALT* (I assume this is altitude capture) approaching the MDA (if it was set on the FCU). What's the issue? The aircraft is levelling at the MDA. You are not allowed below the MDA. Is Airbus suggesting you set the Go Around altitude at the FAF so that you can go below the MDA? Surely the idea is you don't go below the MDA unless Visual, in which case you just pickle off the AP and continue? If the autoflight has already started to flare at the MDA, tough. Go Around.
Although, I suppose setting the GA altitude at the FAF makes it easier to "cheat"... provided you don't hit the ground in the process.
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Capn Bloggs
On final approach, due to low visibility, the crew initiated a go-around and hit electrical lines. Do you Scarebus pilots set the MDA until commencing the Missed Approach?
That would have stopped that crew descending below the MDA whilst still in Autoflight.
That would have stopped that crew descending below the MDA whilst still in Autoflight.
MDA is selected on the FMGS's Approach Pag.
This is the way the system is conceived. You can bring down your aircraft with AP ON until MDA. If, and when you reach MDA -50ft, AP will disconnect and FD mode reverts to basic HDG/VS.
The ILS lookalike approach will bring you to a point where a pilot (does not need to level-off and) may continue the approach (if visual) or has to execute a GA.
Quote:
At 680ft QFE, 2.6NM from runway threshold, whereas the rate of descent was 1000ft/min, an altitude 300ft below MDA was selected on the FCU.
While descending below MDA about 2.1 NM from runway threshold, go-around altitude was selected on the FCU.
That answers my question (at least in that case). 
Aguadalte, thanks for that. Except that the AP will only disconnect at MDA -50 if in managed mode:
Except that they were in VS from 700ft down. They had no FCU altitude protection. If they been in managed mode initially, surely they would not have been 200ft below the 3° path when they went to VS?
2/ In managed guidance only (FINAL APP mode engaged) when the aircraft reaches MDA (MDH) 50ft or 400ft (if no MDA/MDH entered) the autopilot automatically disengages.
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CB
I agree with you.
I believe [that in this particular case] his intentions were to brake minimums, with AP ON...so he elected to fly "selected".
Some guys, never learn, or learn the hard way...
I believe [that in this particular case] his intentions were to brake minimums, with AP ON...so he elected to fly "selected".
Some guys, never learn, or learn the hard way...
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there is no info regarding the lateral mode used for the approach, hence it could have been NAV/VS or HDG/VS, (so either managed lateral/selected vertical, or selected lateral/selected vertical).
as the a/c was GPWS equipped, the NAV function should have been quite/very accurate. there is no mention about any lateral deviation.
On the other hand
and also
Not only the operator does not cares about Airbus recommendations but also it's CAA...
as the a/c was GPWS equipped, the NAV function should have been quite/very accurate. there is no mention about any lateral deviation.
On the other hand
and also
Not only the operator does not cares about Airbus recommendations but also it's CAA...
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misuse of autoflight systems
Here's another misled use of auto-flight systems. A Go-Around initiated without TO/GA selection, (FLEX/MCT selected instead) that could have gone very wrong:
Report: Air France A319 at Paris on Sep 23rd 2009, go-around .
Report: Air France A319 at Paris on Sep 23rd 2009, go-around .
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The difference is that the old airplanes required direct involvement, planning, and minute by minute awareness in marginal weather or operational challenges.
Wonderbus types.. th.note same, it would appear.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Indeed - and in fact it appears that this should (for Airbus) read -
. It all seems to be about 'mode confusion'.
planning, and even more minute by minute awareness in marginal weather or operational challenges.
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Another piece of the Jigsaw...
I wanted to commend C-SAR for his sterling efforts to get reliable data to this forum, it really is above and beyond, in the circumstances. Well done.
Whilst the official accident report is of course awaited, itself a melange of politics, facts and commerce, I would like to attach a fairly contemporaneous photo of the throttle quadrant. It makes for interesting viewing.
Trouble is, I cannot work out where the attachment icon is - I did try to copy and paste, but failed miserably. Help!
Whilst the official accident report is of course awaited, itself a melange of politics, facts and commerce, I would like to attach a fairly contemporaneous photo of the throttle quadrant. It makes for interesting viewing.
Trouble is, I cannot work out where the attachment icon is - I did try to copy and paste, but failed miserably. Help!
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Swiss Cheese
If (just if) you wish to save the effort and want someone to post your picture(s), may I suggest that you PM some PPRuNer (including me, if you wish), who would be happy to post them for you, in the interest of the thread.
If (just if) you wish to save the effort and want someone to post your picture(s), may I suggest that you PM some PPRuNer (including me, if you wish), who would be happy to post them for you, in the interest of the thread.