Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Fair enough but...
If you write using standard terminology then nobody has to "deduce" anything! That makes the exchange of information and views much easier and more accurate.
I do not have a strong background in the sciences, I have to confess, having studied liberal arts instead, so that a term such as -W loses me completely. ROD or VS, on the other hand, all of us who are airmen know about, since they are really self-explanatory terms when practicing good airmanship is not for the intellectual among us or so it seems to me. Not that being brainy is an automatic barrier to that, just that many very fine pilots just use common sense and dedication to the task at hand rather than a deep grounding in and necessary use of the higher sciences.
Many people cannot explain the physics of riding a bicycle yet a child can master that. "Gyroscopic stability," what might that mean? No idea, actually; the kid just leans the thing to go around a curve without falling over. You want to tell him he's moving in the Y axis there with a factor of -V?
"Winning through intimidation" is a very fine thing, if you even can pull that off before a serious, professional audience but it is anti-safety; you only succeed in getting someone else to just shut up, fearing being shown up as ignorant when they might just have that missing piece of the puzzle you need, as in that CRM exercise, building the "Green Obelisk."
To use obscure, non-intuitive, nonstandard terms such as "-W" or "Vz" just comes across to me as bluffing, dressing up a possibly weak presentation with some pointless "insider knowledge." That might just be my notion alone but there you are...
Yes, I think we are all basically interested in learning what went on to cause this crash. Meanwhile though, I would like to see less jumping to this or that hasty conclusion on little evidence, with all that dressed up with obscure terminology.
I do not have a strong background in the sciences, I have to confess, having studied liberal arts instead, so that a term such as -W loses me completely. ROD or VS, on the other hand, all of us who are airmen know about, since they are really self-explanatory terms when practicing good airmanship is not for the intellectual among us or so it seems to me. Not that being brainy is an automatic barrier to that, just that many very fine pilots just use common sense and dedication to the task at hand rather than a deep grounding in and necessary use of the higher sciences.
Many people cannot explain the physics of riding a bicycle yet a child can master that. "Gyroscopic stability," what might that mean? No idea, actually; the kid just leans the thing to go around a curve without falling over. You want to tell him he's moving in the Y axis there with a factor of -V?
"Winning through intimidation" is a very fine thing, if you even can pull that off before a serious, professional audience but it is anti-safety; you only succeed in getting someone else to just shut up, fearing being shown up as ignorant when they might just have that missing piece of the puzzle you need, as in that CRM exercise, building the "Green Obelisk."
To use obscure, non-intuitive, nonstandard terms such as "-W" or "Vz" just comes across to me as bluffing, dressing up a possibly weak presentation with some pointless "insider knowledge." That might just be my notion alone but there you are...
Yes, I think we are all basically interested in learning what went on to cause this crash. Meanwhile though, I would like to see less jumping to this or that hasty conclusion on little evidence, with all that dressed up with obscure terminology.
As I pointed out nearly a year ago there is a well accepted concept which could have avoided this accident happening. It is called the stabilised approach. For non experts it means the aircraft is on the correct flight path, properly configured and with appropriate thrust by 1000 feet in IMC conditions as described in the Boeing flight crew training manual. For many airlines it is a mandatory / no questions asked go around if the approach is unstable. The need for this concept is perfectly demonstrated by this accident.
Last edited by lederhosen; 1st Feb 2010 at 14:11.
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I'm not disputing the wisdom of your post, but not knowing the THY SOPs at the time, it is possible they had a 'stable/final' gate of 500' as did several airlines.
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I hope we can at least all agree that this demonstrates why 1000 feet is a sensible gate in instrument conditions.
The gate is definitely a good safety check while other filters could be added.
Feedback from thrust levers, trim/pitch efforts appear to be critical in order to get a consistent awareness, more specifically during automated flights, allowing quick and appropriate recovery. The question is how to enforce/improve it.
The common point between all the mentioned accidents is the limited time to recognize, analyze and accept the situation in order to rapidly react with the most appropriate actions. Any delay to "accept" the situation or any inappropriate recovery actions can severely compromise the outcome.
Sully was definitely close to a 100% score of reactivity and efficiency, while the Turkish, Thomson, PPG A320 or BA038 crews had perfectible reactions with outcomes ranging from 0% to 100% of aircraft damages/casualties.
It is very interesting to understand the human parameters affecting the quality of the crew's reactivity and efficiency. This is precisely what I'd be pleased to discuss...
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S.F.L.Y. -Sully was definitely close to a 100% score of reactivity and efficiency, while the Turkish, Thomson, PPG A320 or BA038 crews had perfectible reactions with outcomes ranging from 0% to 100% of aircraft damages/casualties.
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Just an observation about loss of engines and L/D.
Sully lost 34 KIAS, then reaccelerated 19 KIAS.
219 KIAS to 185KIAS to 204KIAS, before slowing for the landing.
Anyone know what green dot was for the a/c?
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Just an observation about loss of engines and L/D.
Sully lost 34 KIAS, then reaccelerated 19 KIAS.
219 KIAS to 185KIAS to 204KIAS, before slowing for the landing.
Anyone know what green dot was for the a/c?
Last edited by misd-agin; 1st Feb 2010 at 16:10. Reason: additional comment
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It is very interesting to understand the human parameters affecting the quality of the crew's reactivity and efficiency. This is precisely what I'd be pleased to discuss...
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Sully lost 34 KIAS, then reaccelerated 19 KIAS.
219 KIAS to 185KIAS to 204KIAS, before slowing for the landing.
Anyone know what green dot was for the a/c?
219 KIAS to 185KIAS to 204KIAS, before slowing for the landing.
Anyone know what green dot was for the a/c?
Last edited by S.F.L.Y; 1st Feb 2010 at 17:44.
The discussion on approach gates is incomplete. The concept of a gate defines a position during the approach where specific conditions should be met, e.g. flight path accuracy, speed, configuration, power.
An industry standard is that the maximum speed deviation is Vref +15 (FSF ALAR Tool Kit), aiming for the target approach speed (Vref + additions). Boeing recommendations appear to differ form this norm, most documents quote Vref+20.
Thus, operators following this advice might be expected to decelerate during the approach – the crew expect to see speed decreasing and the thrust levers moving aft under autothrottle control; in this accident to a degree, normal indications.
So suggesting that use of an approach gate might have prevented this accident might not be so certain. Indeed if the crew had met a ‘perfect’ gate check, the RA malfunction, the human weaknesses, and subsequent events could still have progressed to an accident.
An industry standard is that the maximum speed deviation is Vref +15 (FSF ALAR Tool Kit), aiming for the target approach speed (Vref + additions). Boeing recommendations appear to differ form this norm, most documents quote Vref+20.
Thus, operators following this advice might be expected to decelerate during the approach – the crew expect to see speed decreasing and the thrust levers moving aft under autothrottle control; in this accident to a degree, normal indications.
So suggesting that use of an approach gate might have prevented this accident might not be so certain. Indeed if the crew had met a ‘perfect’ gate check, the RA malfunction, the human weaknesses, and subsequent events could still have progressed to an accident.
PJ, re #2613, you imply that the responsibilities of higher management are placed (unfairly) on the front line operational staff … I agree.
Too often accidents like this enable the industry via formal investigations, or this forum with considered debate, to identify reoccurring problems (patterns of failure), but rarely do we see implementation or even proposals for viable solutions.
Some might debate the necessity for better system warnings. It’s most probable that recent certifications would require a RA comparator during an approach; then why not retrofit all aircraft.
Grandfather rights provide a commercial balance – for older aircraft the risk is as low as reasonably possible in proportion to the cost.
Yet why should problems identified on older 737s be perpetuated in the latest variants? Does the manufacturer offer any advice in lieu of modification? The industry has accepted the status quo, again operating closer to the edge of safety; more often the defence is placed with the crew – be vigilant.
Yet the human does not (cannot) change (perhaps the greatest grandfather rights of all) and behaviour cannot be ‘certificated’, thus the system, in and with which the human operates, must accommodate less than optimum performance.
An operational view of the problem - operating too close to the edge of safety – suggests that it is extremely complex, one which might not respond to a big initiative; instead requiring a range of small efforts to improve the situation.
Perhaps ATM need not be so ‘helpful’ with continuous descents, high speed arrivals, or direct routings; yet they too have commercial pressures for traffic capacity and environmental niceties.
Operators could schedule training fights with a fully qualified jump seat ‘assistant’, yet this creates additional expense and crewing pressure.
Operators shouldn’t schedule training at busy international destinations, but without this how do new pilots learn; simulation is far from perfect in operational scenarios, or gaining the experience after qualification in line operations would unfairly pressure line captains with a ‘training’ task – again a risk to safety.
The operator, and the ‘players’ in the wider system have to recognise the risks, and on occasions expect that a training flight might require a bit more time, will slow down earlier, perhaps miss an approach. In other words the system has to have greater flexibility to accommodate a training flight. The training captain would have to plan and brief the approach with the risks in mind, the crew will have to communicate their intentions / requests, and the infrastructure will have to respond. All of these aspects require optimum human performance – a wiliness to help, not as a commercial necessity, but for safety.
Yet on occasions this even this panacea is untenable; there will be circumstances where the system cannot deliver and the risk remains high. The counter is to demand the highest levels of professionalism in every aspect from design to certification, from management to operations – a tall order, but necessary if the industry is to learn from these accidents and maintain a good safety record.
Too often accidents like this enable the industry via formal investigations, or this forum with considered debate, to identify reoccurring problems (patterns of failure), but rarely do we see implementation or even proposals for viable solutions.
Some might debate the necessity for better system warnings. It’s most probable that recent certifications would require a RA comparator during an approach; then why not retrofit all aircraft.
Grandfather rights provide a commercial balance – for older aircraft the risk is as low as reasonably possible in proportion to the cost.
Yet why should problems identified on older 737s be perpetuated in the latest variants? Does the manufacturer offer any advice in lieu of modification? The industry has accepted the status quo, again operating closer to the edge of safety; more often the defence is placed with the crew – be vigilant.
Yet the human does not (cannot) change (perhaps the greatest grandfather rights of all) and behaviour cannot be ‘certificated’, thus the system, in and with which the human operates, must accommodate less than optimum performance.
An operational view of the problem - operating too close to the edge of safety – suggests that it is extremely complex, one which might not respond to a big initiative; instead requiring a range of small efforts to improve the situation.
Perhaps ATM need not be so ‘helpful’ with continuous descents, high speed arrivals, or direct routings; yet they too have commercial pressures for traffic capacity and environmental niceties.
Operators could schedule training fights with a fully qualified jump seat ‘assistant’, yet this creates additional expense and crewing pressure.
Operators shouldn’t schedule training at busy international destinations, but without this how do new pilots learn; simulation is far from perfect in operational scenarios, or gaining the experience after qualification in line operations would unfairly pressure line captains with a ‘training’ task – again a risk to safety.
The operator, and the ‘players’ in the wider system have to recognise the risks, and on occasions expect that a training flight might require a bit more time, will slow down earlier, perhaps miss an approach. In other words the system has to have greater flexibility to accommodate a training flight. The training captain would have to plan and brief the approach with the risks in mind, the crew will have to communicate their intentions / requests, and the infrastructure will have to respond. All of these aspects require optimum human performance – a wiliness to help, not as a commercial necessity, but for safety.
Yet on occasions this even this panacea is untenable; there will be circumstances where the system cannot deliver and the risk remains high. The counter is to demand the highest levels of professionalism in every aspect from design to certification, from management to operations – a tall order, but necessary if the industry is to learn from these accidents and maintain a good safety record.
PEI3721 I will bow to your superior knowledge of other aircraft. But on the 737 at 1000 feet in IMC, if the throttles are in idle, have not moved for a long time and show no signs of moving, then you are not stable. This is real basic stuff. These guys got well behind the aircraft. Sure there are contributory factors. But you will have a hard job convincing me, if they had started the go-around at a sensible point, that the outcome would have been the same.
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Stability criteria usually include something about spooled up engines, complete checklists etc. In the companies i have flown in on the 737 it was allways at least 40% N1, on speed, on final configuration, checklist complete. That is not only expected during training flights but during normal line operation as well. However during training flights it would be expected to be even more go-around minded than usual, nothing is worse than showing busted limits during training as the trainee usually gets the impression that there are differences between book limits and "real" limits used on the line. A very dangerous thing in any airline.
I'm really looking forward to the final report and hope it was completed as free of any political pressure as possible.
I'm really looking forward to the final report and hope it was completed as free of any political pressure as possible.
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Adding gates for crews on final is one thing but ATC should in the first lieu apply some fundamentals. I'm really appalled to see that professional ATCs are still pushing aircraft to intercept ILS from above. ATC's mission is to facilitate traffic in safety and too many death have already demonstrated the risks of such interceptions, especially in IMC.
The most surprising thing in such circumstances is that some ATCs do not understand why some crews are refusing to perform such interceptions. Really amazing.
The most surprising thing in such circumstances is that some ATCs do not understand why some crews are refusing to perform such interceptions. Really amazing.
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Adding 'Must' and 'Should be' gates is a poor substitute for good airmanship.
A good pilot never needed these and never will.
They are put in place in an attempt to formalise a low quality crews' awareness of what is actually happening, which they should really be aware of anyway!
A good pilot never needed these and never will.
They are put in place in an attempt to formalise a low quality crews' awareness of what is actually happening, which they should really be aware of anyway!
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Barbie Boy
Good pilots aren't good 100% of the time. Nobody mentioned the term substitute. Gates and checklists are made to protect you in these moments where you're not as good as you would expect...
You're point of view and confidence is quite worrying to be honest. I don't consider myself as a low quality crew while I'm far from being perfect and I do appreciate to know some filters are here to protect me.
You're point of view and confidence is quite worrying to be honest. I don't consider myself as a low quality crew while I'm far from being perfect and I do appreciate to know some filters are here to protect me.
BarbiesBoyfriend, I agree.
If you have very experienced and skilful pilots you could publish an Operations Manual which, in effect, says "Stay safe - don't crash!". Of course before SFLY jumps in that doesn't mean they are perfect and cannot make a mistake.
If you have inexperienced and/or less trained/skilful pilot then you have to pack the Ops Manual with all sorts of stuff - what I jokingly call the "MacDonalds" approach to aviation - "Put the chips here for 5 mins, add the burger..etc". This is all fine and dandy until the fat fryer breaks down or catches fire and nobody knows what to do!
Of course SOPS are vital for safe continued operation but, in my opinion, there is a difference between doing "things right" and doing the "right thing". One of the basics is that somebody should always be "minding the shop" - remember the Tristar in the Everglades? All crew members got involved in a relatively minor problem and they ended up CFIT.
SFLY I do understand where you are coming from and we all, I am sure, have the same objective. It's just how we go about it. It's just a fact of life that sometimes you might have to intercept the GS from above - if you're not happy ask for more track miles and/or Go Around!
If you have very experienced and skilful pilots you could publish an Operations Manual which, in effect, says "Stay safe - don't crash!". Of course before SFLY jumps in that doesn't mean they are perfect and cannot make a mistake.
If you have inexperienced and/or less trained/skilful pilot then you have to pack the Ops Manual with all sorts of stuff - what I jokingly call the "MacDonalds" approach to aviation - "Put the chips here for 5 mins, add the burger..etc". This is all fine and dandy until the fat fryer breaks down or catches fire and nobody knows what to do!
Of course SOPS are vital for safe continued operation but, in my opinion, there is a difference between doing "things right" and doing the "right thing". One of the basics is that somebody should always be "minding the shop" - remember the Tristar in the Everglades? All crew members got involved in a relatively minor problem and they ended up CFIT.
SFLY I do understand where you are coming from and we all, I am sure, have the same objective. It's just how we go about it. It's just a fact of life that sometimes you might have to intercept the GS from above - if you're not happy ask for more track miles and/or Go Around!
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It's just a fact of life that sometimes you might have to intercept the GS from above - if you're not happy ask for more track miles and/or Go Around!
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I have noticed a trend, particularly under JAR (or whatever it is called this week), to cram everything possible into the Ops Manual, as if to show that even a chimp, assuming it could read, should be able to fly for XYZ Airlines safely. There's very little assumption of average skill and good judgment any longer and when you read some of these crash reports you begin to see why.
As to intercepting the glideslope from above, while that might be slightly naughty, it is often a fact of life, particularly when ATC is focused on "pushing tin." Don't they usually ask if you can accept a close-in turn onto the localiser? (Maybe not Schiphol ATC; I only went there a few times in the RHS when I was impressed with how frantic it could be.) If it is one of those days when you are not feeling particularly happy about that then asking for more spacing or else going around are probably preferable to getting in way over your head. Depending on how far above the GS you are then isn't it a fairly simple matter on autopilot of selecting "NAV", arming "APP" and then doing a "VS" descent while monitoring developments to make sure that, yes, you are stabilised by 1000' AGL?
There is that part of airmanship where one expected to be aware of one's experience and ability level and operate accordingly, so that if you find things getting a bit too hectic it's just part of the job to back off and find something more within your capabilities. Most of my "There I was..." stories involve feats of great daring of course but there are a few that involve humbly backing out of something that was not going to have a happy ending to live to fly another day.
In fact, one day at Schiphol my Captain, one of those "I can do this all by myself so just sit there and watch me," types got a tiny bit mixed up between the taxiways and the next thing you know we were peering up out of our little Dornier 328 at an MD-11 radome. Oh, yes, CRM...
As to intercepting the glideslope from above, while that might be slightly naughty, it is often a fact of life, particularly when ATC is focused on "pushing tin." Don't they usually ask if you can accept a close-in turn onto the localiser? (Maybe not Schiphol ATC; I only went there a few times in the RHS when I was impressed with how frantic it could be.) If it is one of those days when you are not feeling particularly happy about that then asking for more spacing or else going around are probably preferable to getting in way over your head. Depending on how far above the GS you are then isn't it a fairly simple matter on autopilot of selecting "NAV", arming "APP" and then doing a "VS" descent while monitoring developments to make sure that, yes, you are stabilised by 1000' AGL?
There is that part of airmanship where one expected to be aware of one's experience and ability level and operate accordingly, so that if you find things getting a bit too hectic it's just part of the job to back off and find something more within your capabilities. Most of my "There I was..." stories involve feats of great daring of course but there are a few that involve humbly backing out of something that was not going to have a happy ending to live to fly another day.
In fact, one day at Schiphol my Captain, one of those "I can do this all by myself so just sit there and watch me," types got a tiny bit mixed up between the taxiways and the next thing you know we were peering up out of our little Dornier 328 at an MD-11 radome. Oh, yes, CRM...
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Depending on how far above the GS you are then isn't it a fairly simple matter on autopilot of selecting "NAV", arming "APP" and then doing a "VS" descent while monitoring developments to make sure that, yes, you are stabilised by 1000' AGL?
The Turkish aircraft was cleared to 2000' and vectored for a loc interception at 6 NM, which is beyond the FAP and above GS. Beyond this point you can't go lower than 2000' without being on the GS or cleared to a new lower altitude.
While ATC instructions were obviously incompatible with the ILS procedure, it was also the crew's responsibility to refuse it. Apparently you would have done the same
