I have noticed a trend, particularly under JAR (or whatever it is called this week), to cram everything possible into the Ops Manual, as if to show that even a chimp, assuming it could read, should be able to fly for XYZ Airlines safely. There's very little assumption of average skill and good judgment any longer and when you read some of these crash reports you begin to see why.
As to intercepting the glideslope from above, while that might be slightly naughty, it is often a fact of life, particularly when ATC is focused on "pushing tin." Don't they usually ask if you can accept a close-in turn onto the localiser? (Maybe not Schiphol ATC; I only went there a few times in the RHS when I was impressed with how frantic it could be.) If it is one of those days when you are not feeling particularly happy about that then asking for more spacing or else going around are probably preferable to getting in way over your head. Depending on how far above the GS you are then isn't it a fairly simple matter on autopilot of selecting "NAV", arming "APP" and then doing a "VS" descent while monitoring developments to make sure that, yes, you are stabilised by 1000' AGL?
There is that part of airmanship where one expected to be aware of one's experience and ability level and operate accordingly, so that if you find things getting a bit too hectic it's just part of the job to back off and find something more within your capabilities. Most of my "There I was..." stories involve feats of great daring of course but there are a few that involve humbly backing out of something that was not going to have a happy ending to live to fly another day.
In fact, one day at Schiphol my Captain, one of those "I can do this all by myself so just sit there and watch me," types got a tiny bit mixed up between the taxiways and the next thing you know we were peering up out of our little Dornier 328 at an MD-11 radome. Oh, yes, CRM...