I hope we can at least all agree that this demonstrates why 1000 feet is a sensible gate in instrument conditions.
Yes 1,000 is a sensible gate. Still, a similar incident could have occurred above this gate while 1,000 ft wouldn't necessarily be sufficient to recover from the subsequent upset. The Perpignan A320 crashed in similar conditions (upset due to over trim+TOGA) while it was at 3,000 ft.
The gate is definitely a good safety check while other filters could be added.
Feedback from thrust levers, trim/pitch efforts appear to be critical in order to get a consistent awareness, more specifically during automated flights, allowing quick and appropriate recovery. The question is how to enforce/improve it.
The common point between all the mentioned accidents is the limited time to recognize, analyze and accept the situation in order to rapidly react with the most appropriate actions. Any delay to "accept" the situation or any inappropriate recovery actions can severely compromise the outcome.
Sully was definitely close to a 100% score of reactivity and efficiency, while the Turkish, Thomson, PPG A320 or BA038 crews had perfectible reactions with outcomes ranging from 0% to 100% of aircraft damages/casualties.
It is very interesting to understand the human parameters affecting the quality of the crew's reactivity and efficiency. This is precisely what I'd be pleased to discuss...