Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
Will;
I cannot tell you the nights of sleep I have lost and I am not alone, when looking at flight data and knowing that my reports would be both unwelcome and ignored. I have seen more near-accidents than I care too and seen the data dismissed as either not believed (even though it comes from the same data buses - ARINC 427/629/717- that feed the crash-recorder) or 'confusing' - all of which in my mind is a symptom of larger issues. To be sure, no manager is predisposed to such things nor sets out to "do evil" On the contrary, airline managements are as earnest and professional as any employee. They just don't know what they don't know. The legitimation processes which permit such data to be somehow acceptable, lie deep within the human psyche and not with private corporations or governments - they are merely the (likely unaware) facilitators of the normalization of deviance. The rest are just details.
Rather than being a sidebar to the Colgan accident discussion, this discussion is at the heart of this and other "accidents". (In fact, the notion of "accident" is itself, a "normalizing" term because many accidents have visible precursors and are emminently preventable). However, this is not being seen or understood yet and therefore will not change. For change, which is essentially political and not either ethical or even economic, it has to hurt those in this industry more than the fatal accident rate. That means for some, the price will be very high indeed. After observing this industry for almost fourty years, 35 working in it, that is the way it is and will be - until the flying public says, "enough" and starts to dis-believe that dollar-fourty-nine fares can actually support the industry. It is not up to the industry - they won't change until the public demands it. Trouble is, the industry-fed illusion of cheap fares combined with the vicious cycle of widespread deep wage losses by American (and Canadian) employees over the past 30 years makes any increases in fares almost impossible. We are indeed setting up for a large-scale government intervention.
For those interested in further, the book, "Capital and Language" (Christian Marazzi. Semiotexte), among many, many works on a neoliberal economy, is worth examining and so is "Accident Precursor Analysis & Management", (National Academy of Engineering. National Academic Press).
I don't know about you, but the culture at any given Airline today scares me. From Colgan to UAL to AirFrance, it doesn't bode well.
Rather than being a sidebar to the Colgan accident discussion, this discussion is at the heart of this and other "accidents". (In fact, the notion of "accident" is itself, a "normalizing" term because many accidents have visible precursors and are emminently preventable). However, this is not being seen or understood yet and therefore will not change. For change, which is essentially political and not either ethical or even economic, it has to hurt those in this industry more than the fatal accident rate. That means for some, the price will be very high indeed. After observing this industry for almost fourty years, 35 working in it, that is the way it is and will be - until the flying public says, "enough" and starts to dis-believe that dollar-fourty-nine fares can actually support the industry. It is not up to the industry - they won't change until the public demands it. Trouble is, the industry-fed illusion of cheap fares combined with the vicious cycle of widespread deep wage losses by American (and Canadian) employees over the past 30 years makes any increases in fares almost impossible. We are indeed setting up for a large-scale government intervention.
For those interested in further, the book, "Capital and Language" (Christian Marazzi. Semiotexte), among many, many works on a neoliberal economy, is worth examining and so is "Accident Precursor Analysis & Management", (National Academy of Engineering. National Academic Press).
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PJ2 and Will Fraser:
The picture you both paint of the airline industry (mainly dealing with managerial aspects and a not so subtle pointer to safety) is frightening. I realize that many, many industries are suffering a common fate. But I thought differently of the airline industry. As a frequent, and nervous, passenger here within the U.S. this does not sit well with me at all. I always ASSumed that safety was, and remains, priority Nummer Eins for the industry. I'm sure glad the vast majority of the flight crew think differently.
Sheesh.
Richard
The picture you both paint of the airline industry (mainly dealing with managerial aspects and a not so subtle pointer to safety) is frightening. I realize that many, many industries are suffering a common fate. But I thought differently of the airline industry. As a frequent, and nervous, passenger here within the U.S. this does not sit well with me at all. I always ASSumed that safety was, and remains, priority Nummer Eins for the industry. I'm sure glad the vast majority of the flight crew think differently.
Sheesh.
Richard
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PJ2
Your assessment is on the money. The frog in the saucepan is not an admirable image, but nothing describes the willful ignorance of the Industry better. A slow degradation of scruples, regulation, and simple ethics has nearly destroyed our industry. I honestly don't know if it is salvageable.
A while back I made an observation about a commonality of failures in these accidents we see on this forum. Turkish, Perpignan, Colgan, Birgenair, many others. The procuring cause of these mishaps were unheard of in other times. A low level and hasty slow flight? A complete loss of cockpit discipline? An inexcusable loss of situational awareness? For me it started in Tenerife when a lack of cockpit teamwork ended in disaster. It woke me up.
This will sound nostalgic, but long ago when gasoline was fuel, and engines had to come off the wing every 3,000 flight hours for months, navaids were rustic, even laughable. Pilotage was an Art, and equipment marginal. I have to say it is now the reverse. Pilotage is marginal and equipment is an Art. Metallurgy and Electronics have removed the need for highly skilled airmen. Or have they? Some in a position to help are mute, Regulation is for sale, accidents are hushed up and 'mitigated', safety in general is now the enemy, and merely because it costs money. Life has become Politics, and Politics has become dishonest. Corporate politics and management have become merchantable, and nothing is 'too cheap'.
That's the problem, as I see it. What to do ?
Your assessment is on the money. The frog in the saucepan is not an admirable image, but nothing describes the willful ignorance of the Industry better. A slow degradation of scruples, regulation, and simple ethics has nearly destroyed our industry. I honestly don't know if it is salvageable.
A while back I made an observation about a commonality of failures in these accidents we see on this forum. Turkish, Perpignan, Colgan, Birgenair, many others. The procuring cause of these mishaps were unheard of in other times. A low level and hasty slow flight? A complete loss of cockpit discipline? An inexcusable loss of situational awareness? For me it started in Tenerife when a lack of cockpit teamwork ended in disaster. It woke me up.
This will sound nostalgic, but long ago when gasoline was fuel, and engines had to come off the wing every 3,000 flight hours for months, navaids were rustic, even laughable. Pilotage was an Art, and equipment marginal. I have to say it is now the reverse. Pilotage is marginal and equipment is an Art. Metallurgy and Electronics have removed the need for highly skilled airmen. Or have they? Some in a position to help are mute, Regulation is for sale, accidents are hushed up and 'mitigated', safety in general is now the enemy, and merely because it costs money. Life has become Politics, and Politics has become dishonest. Corporate politics and management have become merchantable, and nothing is 'too cheap'.
That's the problem, as I see it. What to do ?
Richard;
These are observations people in the industry are making about the very large, long-term forces at work in the US economy primarily but elsewhere too. One can make unmitigated drives for high ROIs, returns on investment, in, say, furniture-making companies or a thousand other examples of good businesses but there where there is a conflict between high risk and reward, that enterprise requires mitigation and governance either through responsible and aware management, or regulatory enforcement. I much prefer the former, having lived under the latter and seen it not do the job. That said, the former is not doing the job either and we know why.
Take a look at Captain Sullenberger's presentation to Congress to understand the comments being made here. These are not "lobbying" positions being stated here. These are "how it is" statements which require not a political response from elected officials, but a responsible addressing by the industry and by it's passengers alike. For that to occur effectively, it must be clearly understood that this isn't about "punishing" those who stray from responsibility and who, "by ommission" may have played a part. Such an approach would never work because it does not target the sources of the original problem.
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough, that while the peculiar political economy in which we all live has engendered these circumstances for all business and not just airlines, no other enterprise carries the strongly polarized "risk-reward" equations as does commercial aviation. That requires special addressing and while "making a profit" cannot be legislated into existence or into the board room, it can facilitate those circumstances which require performance metrics now in the process of being lost and otherwise degraded.
It must be understood that pilots, unlike any management ever, are, because they cannot change employers readily, (I can discuss why, if you wish), are married to their employer and to their position at one airline. They therefore are subject to the demands and whims of very high-pressure negotiations and, ultimately, to the force of Chapter 11 or, in Canada, CCAA, in which management will achieve it's financial ends. While this works most of the time, the outcomes of such forces has essentially destroyed the career, and the profession of "airline pilot" to the point where, with always some exceptions, good people no longer come because they know how they'll be treated. In a business where mistakes can kill you and a lot of other people, this approach is proving unacceptable. How unacceptable is, as it is with other industries where those who know the most are ignored in favour of public perceptions, up to others to question and obtain answers. We cannot.
You must understand that these are very long-term trends being discussed. There is a problem in perceiving these issues as "causal" in the Cartesian sense of the word, (like mechanical linkages). These processes are "stochastic", in the sense that they are random but with a preferred, (meaning likely, not 'desired'!), outcome. The industry remains the safest way to travel and aircrews remain highly dedicated. The argument here is not whether it is safe to get on an airplane today or not and it is a fundamental mistake to "connect the dots" in this way. This is a dialogue where long-term trends are being perceived.
Richard, (and anyone else reading this), we live in a "frightened culture" where anyone who has an agenda uses fear to sell ideas. We live in fear of smelling bad to our friends so we have become an antisepic culture; we live in fear of offending so we invent pyschological dances which act as euphemisms for honesty and we invent notions like "accident" which excuse rather than address serious issues. We respond viscerally to the word "terrorist" because the last president of the United States and his entire adminstration honed and perfected the politics of fear, the powerful leverage of which is not lost on the private sector. It is now almost impossible to separate that which we should be concerned about, and that which is manipulative. So much so, that is has spawned an entire book industry about "being afraid, and we don't really need to be".
You need to understand that underneath the daily noise of all media, (which I think should be totally ignored, completely), there are many good people in this industry and elsewhere working quietly and looking at these trends with a serious eye to change. These are not "daily" threats which one must peek round the corner for - we are looking at hints of untoward trends, the perception of which many years ago, (about 60) through the efforts of many unsung, invisible and very clever people, turned this industry into the safest one in history. That is the way to think about these notions, now being discussed.
That said, the airline industry in the US and perhaps the regional industry especially, may have some self-examination required. That is certainly the way the FAA and NTSB seem to be seeing things.
I hope this helps place it all in perspective.
As a frequent, and nervous, passenger here within the U.S. this does not sit well with me at all. I always ASSumed that safety was, and remains, priority Nummer Eins for the industry.
Take a look at Captain Sullenberger's presentation to Congress to understand the comments being made here. These are not "lobbying" positions being stated here. These are "how it is" statements which require not a political response from elected officials, but a responsible addressing by the industry and by it's passengers alike. For that to occur effectively, it must be clearly understood that this isn't about "punishing" those who stray from responsibility and who, "by ommission" may have played a part. Such an approach would never work because it does not target the sources of the original problem.
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough, that while the peculiar political economy in which we all live has engendered these circumstances for all business and not just airlines, no other enterprise carries the strongly polarized "risk-reward" equations as does commercial aviation. That requires special addressing and while "making a profit" cannot be legislated into existence or into the board room, it can facilitate those circumstances which require performance metrics now in the process of being lost and otherwise degraded.
It must be understood that pilots, unlike any management ever, are, because they cannot change employers readily, (I can discuss why, if you wish), are married to their employer and to their position at one airline. They therefore are subject to the demands and whims of very high-pressure negotiations and, ultimately, to the force of Chapter 11 or, in Canada, CCAA, in which management will achieve it's financial ends. While this works most of the time, the outcomes of such forces has essentially destroyed the career, and the profession of "airline pilot" to the point where, with always some exceptions, good people no longer come because they know how they'll be treated. In a business where mistakes can kill you and a lot of other people, this approach is proving unacceptable. How unacceptable is, as it is with other industries where those who know the most are ignored in favour of public perceptions, up to others to question and obtain answers. We cannot.
You must understand that these are very long-term trends being discussed. There is a problem in perceiving these issues as "causal" in the Cartesian sense of the word, (like mechanical linkages). These processes are "stochastic", in the sense that they are random but with a preferred, (meaning likely, not 'desired'!), outcome. The industry remains the safest way to travel and aircrews remain highly dedicated. The argument here is not whether it is safe to get on an airplane today or not and it is a fundamental mistake to "connect the dots" in this way. This is a dialogue where long-term trends are being perceived.
Richard, (and anyone else reading this), we live in a "frightened culture" where anyone who has an agenda uses fear to sell ideas. We live in fear of smelling bad to our friends so we have become an antisepic culture; we live in fear of offending so we invent pyschological dances which act as euphemisms for honesty and we invent notions like "accident" which excuse rather than address serious issues. We respond viscerally to the word "terrorist" because the last president of the United States and his entire adminstration honed and perfected the politics of fear, the powerful leverage of which is not lost on the private sector. It is now almost impossible to separate that which we should be concerned about, and that which is manipulative. So much so, that is has spawned an entire book industry about "being afraid, and we don't really need to be".
You need to understand that underneath the daily noise of all media, (which I think should be totally ignored, completely), there are many good people in this industry and elsewhere working quietly and looking at these trends with a serious eye to change. These are not "daily" threats which one must peek round the corner for - we are looking at hints of untoward trends, the perception of which many years ago, (about 60) through the efforts of many unsung, invisible and very clever people, turned this industry into the safest one in history. That is the way to think about these notions, now being discussed.
That said, the airline industry in the US and perhaps the regional industry especially, may have some self-examination required. That is certainly the way the FAA and NTSB seem to be seeing things.
I hope this helps place it all in perspective.
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an idea to start a fix?
PJ2, Will, I wonder what you think of an idea I've had for a while- while we've seen the effects of 31 years of almost total deregulation, I'm wondering if it isn't time to put some sort of floor under the fare structure- say a mandate of so many cents/mile, with frequent adjustments as fuel sashays all over the place? Do you think that might help?
rgbrock1- You're old enough to have been paying attention for the last 20 years or so--what do you think happens when every major except AA and WN have been in CHXI in the past 7 years? How does NWA continue when they go to a strike deadline with their A&Ps and fire them all at once? It was in all the papers...and only 4 years ago.
Going back further, how much cash did Carl Icahn pull out of TWA by selling and leasing back the parts inventory? That wasn't exactly an inside industry secret, either.
Even further, what business did UAL have buying a hotel chain and a car rental company?
Do you have any idea how much of the overhaul work is now done offshore/farmed out? At one major, they're arguing about whether they have 24 or 25% still in house.
Remember the jetBlue 320 that flew around SoCal burning off fuel so they could land lighter with a nose gear pointed 90 degrees off center? Do you think that was the first incident or the FIFTH?
I think it would be a good idea if SLF started connecting the dots instead of looking for the cheapest fare. Start by knowing that AA still does most of their work in house, and then look for a good fare.
(disclosure- I don't work for any of the outfits mentioned above)
/rant mode
sb
rgbrock1- You're old enough to have been paying attention for the last 20 years or so--what do you think happens when every major except AA and WN have been in CHXI in the past 7 years? How does NWA continue when they go to a strike deadline with their A&Ps and fire them all at once? It was in all the papers...and only 4 years ago.
Going back further, how much cash did Carl Icahn pull out of TWA by selling and leasing back the parts inventory? That wasn't exactly an inside industry secret, either.
Even further, what business did UAL have buying a hotel chain and a car rental company?
Do you have any idea how much of the overhaul work is now done offshore/farmed out? At one major, they're arguing about whether they have 24 or 25% still in house.
Remember the jetBlue 320 that flew around SoCal burning off fuel so they could land lighter with a nose gear pointed 90 degrees off center? Do you think that was the first incident or the FIFTH?
I think it would be a good idea if SLF started connecting the dots instead of looking for the cheapest fare. Start by knowing that AA still does most of their work in house, and then look for a good fare.
(disclosure- I don't work for any of the outfits mentioned above)
/rant mode
sb
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Mandating a fare structure is something governments understand, so it is a possibility. Getting it right could be very difficult in the current environment. Governments are good at making laws, but it takes a long time, and they are lousy at changing them. So keeping the right fare structure could be problematic.
The real problem would seem to be that there is no investment in plant. The money, whatever it is, all goes to mandated costs (salaries, rent, fuel, etc) or to executive salaries/bonuses, or to the mutual fund investors that own every company in America and only want their quarterly profit.
Making a law that a company has to invest 20% of its income in plant and benefit improvements every year (and preventing the mutual fund managers from then suing the company because they aren't getting all the income passed directly to them) would be a better solution, but much harder for a government to understand and implement. Of course, this isn't going to happen since we have the best government money can buy, and those mutual fund investors have a heck of a lot of cash on hand to buy legislation.
Its simple really. In the old days people were proud of making things. They were proud that their company was the best in the business, and as a result they got the most business. They invested their company income in being able to make better things. Now we are proud of "making money". Most investors don't even know what the companies they invest in make, if anything. And if they found out, they would complain that was a waste of money that could be flowing into their pockets instead. Management may or may not know what the company makes. But whatever it is, it is an annoyance and distraction from "making money", whcih they see as their corporate goal. (I have met CEOs of $20B companies that didn't know what business their company was in.)
Just change the entire corporate and social philosophy of the US back to "proud of making THINGS" rather than "proud of making MONEY" and the whole problem will solve itself.
I wish I knew how to do that.
The real problem would seem to be that there is no investment in plant. The money, whatever it is, all goes to mandated costs (salaries, rent, fuel, etc) or to executive salaries/bonuses, or to the mutual fund investors that own every company in America and only want their quarterly profit.
Making a law that a company has to invest 20% of its income in plant and benefit improvements every year (and preventing the mutual fund managers from then suing the company because they aren't getting all the income passed directly to them) would be a better solution, but much harder for a government to understand and implement. Of course, this isn't going to happen since we have the best government money can buy, and those mutual fund investors have a heck of a lot of cash on hand to buy legislation.
Its simple really. In the old days people were proud of making things. They were proud that their company was the best in the business, and as a result they got the most business. They invested their company income in being able to make better things. Now we are proud of "making money". Most investors don't even know what the companies they invest in make, if anything. And if they found out, they would complain that was a waste of money that could be flowing into their pockets instead. Management may or may not know what the company makes. But whatever it is, it is an annoyance and distraction from "making money", whcih they see as their corporate goal. (I have met CEOs of $20B companies that didn't know what business their company was in.)
Just change the entire corporate and social philosophy of the US back to "proud of making THINGS" rather than "proud of making MONEY" and the whole problem will solve itself.
I wish I knew how to do that.
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Even though a spin maneuver is only required of a CFI applicant, I always taught one to my primary students and commercial students. It is a fairly simple recovery and instills confidence when things go wrong. If it is possible for a primary student to get into a spin why not show him how easy it is to get out?
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My reply about spins was to a post a few back. It has nothing to do with this thread about this accident. This all happened over 30 years ago. With both of these pilots experience neither one was required to have it and it wouldn't have helped in this situation anyway. Hopefully they will increase the entry level to 1500 hrs to fly on a commuter so basic skills will make the commuters safer.
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sb
Tell you what is needed. A stand alone rating and code proficient body of talented industry critics who can market a product honestly and with some belief in their clientele's intelligence. An insulated system who gauge safety, comfort, performance and prospects. Thick skinned with Kevlar vests, a Cordon Bleu that directs the market, by subscription, with a client bias, not a corporate veil. Should not be difficult. Think of the strokes and popped blood vessels in the boardrooms. Business model savvy, supporting a clear vision of basics re: safety and customer service.
A line that can embrace these assets would be wildly successful. The problem ? The playing ground needs to be groomed. The FAA needs to pull in its "For Sale" sign. The industry needs to stop competing with a McDonalds attitude about its product, and for goodness sake, can we have aviation people in the positions that determine the culture ?
I'll tell you what is wrong, and it goes back a ways, we have allowed our product to be devalued, why should it cost more than Greyhound? Let's take the risks out of the air, and put them back where they used to be, in Marketing.
Or, we can have Mass Transit, Government run (very) fractional jet. Get ready for barefeet and chicken cages.
Tell you what is needed. A stand alone rating and code proficient body of talented industry critics who can market a product honestly and with some belief in their clientele's intelligence. An insulated system who gauge safety, comfort, performance and prospects. Thick skinned with Kevlar vests, a Cordon Bleu that directs the market, by subscription, with a client bias, not a corporate veil. Should not be difficult. Think of the strokes and popped blood vessels in the boardrooms. Business model savvy, supporting a clear vision of basics re: safety and customer service.
A line that can embrace these assets would be wildly successful. The problem ? The playing ground needs to be groomed. The FAA needs to pull in its "For Sale" sign. The industry needs to stop competing with a McDonalds attitude about its product, and for goodness sake, can we have aviation people in the positions that determine the culture ?
I'll tell you what is wrong, and it goes back a ways, we have allowed our product to be devalued, why should it cost more than Greyhound? Let's take the risks out of the air, and put them back where they used to be, in Marketing.
Or, we can have Mass Transit, Government run (very) fractional jet. Get ready for barefeet and chicken cages.
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what I would do if I were king.
I would re-create the CAB (that's Civil Aeronautics Board to you neophytes). Pilots would have new requirements under CAB regulations for training, checkrides, rest requirements and the like.
The new CAB would mandate fares in order to create the monies required for additional training and a new pay scale. the new pay scale would take a snapshot of the proposed contracts on September 10, 2001, adjust them for inflation and that would be the only contract, with COLA each year.
Base salary for a copilot at a regional airline would no longer be an issue, as ''big '' airlines would be financially liable for anything that had their name or a variation of its name (ie express) on the side of a plane.
Yes, your ticket price would go up. Yes, the government would be in your business. but a whole lot of mediocre pilots would be looking for work.
I would re-create the CAB (that's Civil Aeronautics Board to you neophytes). Pilots would have new requirements under CAB regulations for training, checkrides, rest requirements and the like.
The new CAB would mandate fares in order to create the monies required for additional training and a new pay scale. the new pay scale would take a snapshot of the proposed contracts on September 10, 2001, adjust them for inflation and that would be the only contract, with COLA each year.
Base salary for a copilot at a regional airline would no longer be an issue, as ''big '' airlines would be financially liable for anything that had their name or a variation of its name (ie express) on the side of a plane.
Yes, your ticket price would go up. Yes, the government would be in your business. but a whole lot of mediocre pilots would be looking for work.
PTH
Nice thought, BUT contracts as of Sept 10, 2001 where already too expensive for most airlines--witness UAL's losses going into Sept 10th. Worse, contracts at that time were wildly reduced by inflation. In the CAB era of 1968, FAR 121 captains earned, get this, a Cadillac a month. A MONTH! Anyone want to go back to those days? Me, too.
Next, even at those salaries, airlines were desperate for pilots. I flew with a captain who got hired at EAL with 90 hours in a Luscombe. Horrid, he was. I knew another UAL pilot who got hired on a bet with 600 hours in a Colt. There were simply no way to get the experience then that there is now.
Finally, when ticket prices rise, in accordance with the new CAB's directives on economics, the airlines will shirk. What do you think will be the company's reaction to that?
GF
Nice thought, BUT contracts as of Sept 10, 2001 where already too expensive for most airlines--witness UAL's losses going into Sept 10th. Worse, contracts at that time were wildly reduced by inflation. In the CAB era of 1968, FAR 121 captains earned, get this, a Cadillac a month. A MONTH! Anyone want to go back to those days? Me, too.
Next, even at those salaries, airlines were desperate for pilots. I flew with a captain who got hired at EAL with 90 hours in a Luscombe. Horrid, he was. I knew another UAL pilot who got hired on a bet with 600 hours in a Colt. There were simply no way to get the experience then that there is now.
Finally, when ticket prices rise, in accordance with the new CAB's directives on economics, the airlines will shirk. What do you think will be the company's reaction to that?
GF
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In the CAB era of 1968, FAR 121 captains earned, get this, a Cadillac a month. A MONTH! Anyone want to go back to those days? Me, too.
Times have changed.
surplus1;
Regarding Caddy's, a month's salary, and "lo-cost", permit me a little drift for a thought experiment:
A 1958 schedule from an airline advertised fares from western Canada to Europe at about "$780" in 1958 dollars, one-way. Today, you can do the same for about $380 2009 dollars or less than $40 1958 dollars. Both technology and inflation are at work here.
Through design efficiencies, (wing & engine), the microchip and safety advances dramatically reducing the traditional causes of accidents such as mechanical failure, weather, navigation, avionics, runway design, and to a great extent, human factors, the industry has kept and even lowered the "numerical" charge for a seat on the safest transportation system in the world.
This fact is invisible to "what have you done for us lately?" thinking. Turn-around, tight scheduling "makes" more airplanes without buying more but such a system can break down during IRROPS. Staffing is bare-bones and the neoliberal economy has created The New Serfdom out of employees who at one time were actually loyal to their company...for life.
If we used the same numbers for the auto industry, your 1958 "$5500" Cadillac (or $7750 for a limited edition Eldorado Convertible) would today cost about $400.
Today we pay five-figures for a car and think nothing of it while a twenty-dollar difference in an air fare or a grouchy flight attendant on his or her sixth or seventh leg of the day, or no blankie and no peanuts drives passengers to the complaint department, the earliest part of our triune brain fully engaged.
We wait fifteen minutes in line at Starbucks or whatever for our designer coffee or 30 minutes for a fine dinner but a visceral sense of entitlement bubbles to the surface from the cauldron of institutionalized impatience at an airport if our flight is delayed for the same amount of time because of weather or a mechanical, our ticket bought for the price of a hundred west-coast lattes or a night and a half in most hotels.
Airlines are not without serious faults but the flying public has the airline system it wants and has demanded. Airlines are complicitous in the "low-cost" mantra by convincing the flying public that aviation can be done for such fares. It can't.
Since it began nearly a hundred years ago, this industry has consistently charged less for its services than it costs them. That means there is something other than profit that drives individuals into aviation but that is another thread for another day. The very old story on how to become a millionaire is, start with a billion dollars and then buy and run an airline.
A 1958 Flight magazine states how difficult it is to make a profit even with US taxpayer subsidies and heavy regulatory route approvals and interventions. The CAB and IATA had teeth and at least the industry was stable compared to today. Employees have no idea how bad they really have it and passengers have no idea how good they have it in terms of price, which is, it seems, all they think about when it comes time to put their cash down, largely oblivious to the twin, oppositional effects of de-regulation and the aviation improvements described above which make their trip possible for "a dollar forty-nine", one way.
Things have changed indeed since you and I and many others left
Aviation can be done "lo-cost", but not forever. Despite reliability and a spectacular safety record, the industry is a "bricks and mortar" one and cannot be done "virtually". People need training, airplanes need maintenance and investors need a reasonable return. It isn't complicated, nor are the outcomes of parsimony difficult to comprehend. Its the next oldest story in aviation.
Though it's the same all over for all employees as well as owners and shareholders, this industry cannot continue to nickel-and-dime those who do the work and expect that flight safety levels will remain the same. But flight safety is the elephant in the living room and this industry doesn't want to talk about it.
Times have changed.
A 1958 schedule from an airline advertised fares from western Canada to Europe at about "$780" in 1958 dollars, one-way. Today, you can do the same for about $380 2009 dollars or less than $40 1958 dollars. Both technology and inflation are at work here.
Through design efficiencies, (wing & engine), the microchip and safety advances dramatically reducing the traditional causes of accidents such as mechanical failure, weather, navigation, avionics, runway design, and to a great extent, human factors, the industry has kept and even lowered the "numerical" charge for a seat on the safest transportation system in the world.
This fact is invisible to "what have you done for us lately?" thinking. Turn-around, tight scheduling "makes" more airplanes without buying more but such a system can break down during IRROPS. Staffing is bare-bones and the neoliberal economy has created The New Serfdom out of employees who at one time were actually loyal to their company...for life.
If we used the same numbers for the auto industry, your 1958 "$5500" Cadillac (or $7750 for a limited edition Eldorado Convertible) would today cost about $400.
Today we pay five-figures for a car and think nothing of it while a twenty-dollar difference in an air fare or a grouchy flight attendant on his or her sixth or seventh leg of the day, or no blankie and no peanuts drives passengers to the complaint department, the earliest part of our triune brain fully engaged.
We wait fifteen minutes in line at Starbucks or whatever for our designer coffee or 30 minutes for a fine dinner but a visceral sense of entitlement bubbles to the surface from the cauldron of institutionalized impatience at an airport if our flight is delayed for the same amount of time because of weather or a mechanical, our ticket bought for the price of a hundred west-coast lattes or a night and a half in most hotels.
Airlines are not without serious faults but the flying public has the airline system it wants and has demanded. Airlines are complicitous in the "low-cost" mantra by convincing the flying public that aviation can be done for such fares. It can't.
Since it began nearly a hundred years ago, this industry has consistently charged less for its services than it costs them. That means there is something other than profit that drives individuals into aviation but that is another thread for another day. The very old story on how to become a millionaire is, start with a billion dollars and then buy and run an airline.
A 1958 Flight magazine states how difficult it is to make a profit even with US taxpayer subsidies and heavy regulatory route approvals and interventions. The CAB and IATA had teeth and at least the industry was stable compared to today. Employees have no idea how bad they really have it and passengers have no idea how good they have it in terms of price, which is, it seems, all they think about when it comes time to put their cash down, largely oblivious to the twin, oppositional effects of de-regulation and the aviation improvements described above which make their trip possible for "a dollar forty-nine", one way.
Things have changed indeed since you and I and many others left
Aviation can be done "lo-cost", but not forever. Despite reliability and a spectacular safety record, the industry is a "bricks and mortar" one and cannot be done "virtually". People need training, airplanes need maintenance and investors need a reasonable return. It isn't complicated, nor are the outcomes of parsimony difficult to comprehend. Its the next oldest story in aviation.
Though it's the same all over for all employees as well as owners and shareholders, this industry cannot continue to nickel-and-dime those who do the work and expect that flight safety levels will remain the same. But flight safety is the elephant in the living room and this industry doesn't want to talk about it.
Last edited by PJ2; 5th Aug 2009 at 17:16.
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Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee Hearing on Aviation Safety
Airline exec: Pilot on fatal flight shouldn't have been flying - CNN.com
And from Trenary's prepared statement -
And from Trenary's prepared statement -
When I arrived at Pinnacle Airlines 12 years ago, our average Captain salary was approximately $36,000. Today, at both Pinnacle Airlines and Colgan Air, our Captains earn an average of over $65,000 per year, and our First Officers earn an average of over $24,000 per year plus per diem allowances. These average salaries, as well as starting salaries, are consistent with the regional airline sector. While starting base salaries for co-pilots may seem low, they must be viewed in the context of many other professions where higher salaries are achieved through progressive levels of responsibility. Also, our pilots’ wages are subject to the collective bargaining process and are negotiated with our pilot groups.
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Whaaat?
In all cases you must maintain current altitude +-100 feet, or you fail the test.
Stall recovery is all about regaining FULL CONTROL quickly, least fuss and with the minimum of altitude loss, but that last proviso is just that.. a LAST proviso, and 99/100 times not important in the greater scheme of things. And that must be emphasised in training, if you use every last foot to recover, recovery is the important bit, no?
Has the world gone mad or is itme (again)?
Last edited by HarryMann; 7th Aug 2009 at 18:53.
Will;
Yessir. "Bottom line thinking" and aviation is a recipe for an accident. It's not that leaders, executives, shareholders aren't aware of this. Parsimony and aviation is a killer mix; that has been understood since the Wrights. It's just that "magical thinking" supplants common sense with the notion that [somehow], it can be got away with "this time". And, because of the past standards, skills, programs and regulations which brought the accident rate down and kept it there, there was some legitimacy to that thinking. No longer. We are now too close to the bone in the drive towards "lo-cost", and even passengers are beginning to sense it. We do ourselves no favour by telling them that "aviation can be done cheaply". It can't - for long.
With Reagan's neoliberalism and concurrent Thatcherism well ensconced and de-regulation of the economy well underway, the airlines, like execs at the banks and trading houses, the execs of airlines were ecstatic over the ability to "do what they want". I recall the mantras at the time in airline magazines and in-house publications - "we welcome the opportunity to compete" was the sales pitch. But they forgot they were in the aviation business where inattention, incompetency and a latent greed have serious outcomes and not just bankruptcy. The causes of last October's crash were merely a variation on the same theme.
Yes they will and have, but not for CEOs and other executives even today eight months after the October crash. Public money has bailed out capitalism's free market, rewarding those same personal and corporate qualities that brought the crash in the first place.
In the US and Canada, the privatization of profit and the socialization of risk have made wealthy men and women out of greed and incompetence while creating the New Serfdom out of a generation of displaced, unemployed or poorly-paid employees who, having lost their houses and/or pensions, have been dumped by the wayside as millstones around profit's neck. The dismantling of "the welfare state" for people is complete while the welfare state is in strong form for failed enterprise.
These are not hegemonic, political rantings of the left wing but statements of an increasing pubic reality for millions. But while the plight of airline pilots today pales in comparison that is not the point of these off-thread comments. I have been writing for about a dozen years now after it was obvious what was coming through the dismantling of the post-war economy (Bretton-Woods, et al), that low wages, atrocious treatment, workhouse productivity demands and a destroyed future were not the only serious social consequences; these social, and only partially-economic, realities were going to become a flight safety problem. It was profit that drove denial of these consequences, not lack of awareness. The principle in bold font above was well understood by business "leaders" then, as now. Witness the remarks from the quoted article in the previous post:
In my opinion this is a disingenuous comment. It his responsibility as the Accountable Executive to know or to ensure that his organization was aware. That is what SMS [Safety Management Systems - the "new safety environment"] means.
Again in my opinion, I think this is another disingenuous statement. In fact, the law requires that a pilot not fly if he or she is fatigued or "likely to be fatigued". Airline policy fails however, to deal with this legal requirement. What Mr. Trenary does not mention but what is keenly understood by all airline pilots is, if they are "excused from duty" due to fatigue, they are not paid for the trip. A pilot is therefore punished financially if he or she does not fly due to being fatigued. "Booking off sick" is not the solution, not only because it masks the problem and forces pilots to pay for what the law requires, but also because sick-pay is often 10% lower than regular wages but fatigue is not being sick - it is being fatigued.
Captain Babbitt, now in charge of the FAA has recently made some very tough statements on these matters. Let us hope that the air carriers hearken to the message but let us hope that such hearkening does not stop there - the flying public needs to listen up as well.
The issue is not whether Renslow or Shaw should have been in the seat. That issue can be fully examined and hopefully will be, but neither of their circumstances and/or decision-making to fly were (or are) rare. Today it is more the rule than the exception that pilots will fly fatigued and sick simply because of the airline policies described above.
The issue at hand here is the commentary from hindsight, excusing executives and placing sole blame on the crew. While the captain is the captain is the captain and carries ultimate responsibility, so too does the "captain of industry".
The industry has only begun to receive hints that it should engage in some serious navel-gazing. For once, the regulator, at least in the US, (Canada's regulator is still infatuated with SMS), is ahead of these trends and may actually forestall a reversal of the industry's excellent safety record.
Aviation should never have allowed itself to become a 'bottom line'
With Reagan's neoliberalism and concurrent Thatcherism well ensconced and de-regulation of the economy well underway, the airlines, like execs at the banks and trading houses, the execs of airlines were ecstatic over the ability to "do what they want". I recall the mantras at the time in airline magazines and in-house publications - "we welcome the opportunity to compete" was the sales pitch. But they forgot they were in the aviation business where inattention, incompetency and a latent greed have serious outcomes and not just bankruptcy. The causes of last October's crash were merely a variation on the same theme.
Free market has consequences, they will come.
In the US and Canada, the privatization of profit and the socialization of risk have made wealthy men and women out of greed and incompetence while creating the New Serfdom out of a generation of displaced, unemployed or poorly-paid employees who, having lost their houses and/or pensions, have been dumped by the wayside as millstones around profit's neck. The dismantling of "the welfare state" for people is complete while the welfare state is in strong form for failed enterprise.
These are not hegemonic, political rantings of the left wing but statements of an increasing pubic reality for millions. But while the plight of airline pilots today pales in comparison that is not the point of these off-thread comments. I have been writing for about a dozen years now after it was obvious what was coming through the dismantling of the post-war economy (Bretton-Woods, et al), that low wages, atrocious treatment, workhouse productivity demands and a destroyed future were not the only serious social consequences; these social, and only partially-economic, realities were going to become a flight safety problem. It was profit that drove denial of these consequences, not lack of awareness. The principle in bold font above was well understood by business "leaders" then, as now. Witness the remarks from the quoted article in the previous post:
Philip Trenary, president and CEO of Pinnacle Airlines, which is the parent company of Colgan Air [stated in the article . . .], "Let me stress one thing, Capt. Renslow was a fine man by all accounts," Trenary said. But he added, "Had we known what we know now, no, he would not have been in that seat."
In response to speculation that Renslow was impaired by fatigue, Trenary told the committee the fatigue policy of both Pinnacle and Colgan airlines is clear. "If a pilot is fatigued for any reason, all they have to do is say so and they are excused from duty. The night of (Flight) 3407, we did have 11 reserve pilots available."
Captain Babbitt, now in charge of the FAA has recently made some very tough statements on these matters. Let us hope that the air carriers hearken to the message but let us hope that such hearkening does not stop there - the flying public needs to listen up as well.
The issue is not whether Renslow or Shaw should have been in the seat. That issue can be fully examined and hopefully will be, but neither of their circumstances and/or decision-making to fly were (or are) rare. Today it is more the rule than the exception that pilots will fly fatigued and sick simply because of the airline policies described above.
The issue at hand here is the commentary from hindsight, excusing executives and placing sole blame on the crew. While the captain is the captain is the captain and carries ultimate responsibility, so too does the "captain of industry".
The industry has only begun to receive hints that it should engage in some serious navel-gazing. For once, the regulator, at least in the US, (Canada's regulator is still infatuated with SMS), is ahead of these trends and may actually forestall a reversal of the industry's excellent safety record.
Last edited by PJ2; 7th Aug 2009 at 16:39.
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HarryMann
Altitude cannot be maintained in a Stall, by definition. What is referred to in the Colgan training syllabus, is called 'Flying through the Shaker'. With the onset of Shaker, the pilot is to increase a/s above the trip limit of the Shaker and past, to resume stable flight. No altitude beyond 100 feet gain or loss is permitted, to pass the exercise. The Shaker is a Stall alert, not a Stall.
Altitude cannot be maintained in a Stall, by definition. What is referred to in the Colgan training syllabus, is called 'Flying through the Shaker'. With the onset of Shaker, the pilot is to increase a/s above the trip limit of the Shaker and past, to resume stable flight. No altitude beyond 100 feet gain or loss is permitted, to pass the exercise. The Shaker is a Stall alert, not a Stall.
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leitz2002al,
In my opinion you have highlighted an action that had the crew not undertaken, the original upset may have remained just an incident.
.
Italics are mine
22:16:26.6 HOT-2 uhhh. ......130kts Still salvageable but after ten seconds wrestling with the shaker and the pusher...
22:16:37.1 HOT-2 I put the flaps up. .... At only 94kts with over 90 deg bank angle? Little chance of recoveryfrom here. What were you thinking?
22:16:42.2 HOT-1 [grunt]
22:16:45.8 HOT-2 should the gear up?...............Yet more config changes?
22:16:46.8 HOT-1 gear up.
22:16:50.1 CAM [increase in ambient noise]
22:16:51.9 CAM [thump]
Apologies if I interrupted the flow of discussion from PJ2 et al...
above 500ft RA, you may accellerate and order configuration changes.
.
Italics are mine
22:16:26.6 HOT-2 uhhh. ......130kts Still salvageable but after ten seconds wrestling with the shaker and the pusher...
22:16:37.1 HOT-2 I put the flaps up. .... At only 94kts with over 90 deg bank angle? Little chance of recoveryfrom here. What were you thinking?
22:16:42.2 HOT-1 [grunt]
22:16:45.8 HOT-2 should the gear up?...............Yet more config changes?
22:16:46.8 HOT-1 gear up.
22:16:50.1 CAM [increase in ambient noise]
22:16:51.9 CAM [thump]
Apologies if I interrupted the flow of discussion from PJ2 et al...
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One of the saddest things:
When I taught flying, I demanded my students read, "Stick and Rudder". Simply put, when you get into trouble in an airplane...push forward on the stick and you will be OK.
So...sure, if you did this six inches above the ground on landing, it might not work great.
Sure, if you are trying to maintain altitude, or fighting windshear...might not work.
BUT...a stall...a regular stall, is simply more fully controlled with the ''push forward'' advice.
There is no free lunch in flying. IF you are stalling at 1500 feet agl, you might not recover. But there is no wisdom in making the stall worse by pulling on the controls.
Flying on the shaker, or whatever term you would like to use, is a mistake in training in my view. Again, I'm not talking about windshear recovery.
GET out of the stall first...then worry about your altitude (which you should have been worried about before all of this happened).
Stall recovery and Windshear Recovery should be seperated in training.
So...sure, if you did this six inches above the ground on landing, it might not work great.
Sure, if you are trying to maintain altitude, or fighting windshear...might not work.
BUT...a stall...a regular stall, is simply more fully controlled with the ''push forward'' advice.
There is no free lunch in flying. IF you are stalling at 1500 feet agl, you might not recover. But there is no wisdom in making the stall worse by pulling on the controls.
Flying on the shaker, or whatever term you would like to use, is a mistake in training in my view. Again, I'm not talking about windshear recovery.
GET out of the stall first...then worry about your altitude (which you should have been worried about before all of this happened).
Stall recovery and Windshear Recovery should be seperated in training.
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Our SOPs are making a difference between stall well clear of ground and stall with risk of immiment ground contact (which means below 500ft AGL).
I thought that might be it... but everywhere I read lately I see the potential for gross confusion...
The reason for this is that where the desired KISS philosophy cannot be adhered to, one must not glosss over the differences and implications of any differences - 'just a mention' or 'touch on the subject but don't hammer it' as a training guideline, is IMHO - lethal.
Either mention it, train for it and make damn sure it is understood and hard-wired in, or it shouldn't be part of a syllabus - at all!
The philosophy, psychology not just the structure & content of aircrew training programmes seems to require a certification in and of itself. Witness AA wake turbulence as well as several others now coming out of the woodwork - no doubt they've been waiting to bite for quite some time.
Of course, this is not from current hands-on industry experience but a 'remote viewpoint' from reading many topics in these pages, many accident investigations over the years and an involvement with flight & flying for a decade or some way back when... so not to be given too much weight
Last edited by HarryMann; 8th Aug 2009 at 23:19.