Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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For the last time.
They weren't trying to do a stall recovery.
They weren't trying to sort things out.
They got the a/c out of shape and decided to.....................
GO AROUND
Why?
Because, in our de-skilled world, that is the answer to every problem.
They weren't trying to do a stall recovery.
They weren't trying to sort things out.
They got the a/c out of shape and decided to.....................
GO AROUND
Why?
Because, in our de-skilled world, that is the answer to every problem.
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Buffalo Crash as a black comedy
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Barbiesboyfriend
I think you are right...the answer was go around...but the question begged : stall recovery.
indeed the copilot may have suggested the go around in her conversation.
I think you are right...the answer was go around...but the question begged : stall recovery.
indeed the copilot may have suggested the go around in her conversation.
As much as I've written here and elsewhere regarding these very issues, the article is a simplistic mess. It has nothing new to say. Why not?
Simplistic thinking is characterized by the notion that if something is tweaked, (pilot wages), or we just regulate "more" (present FAA licensing initiative) that'll "fix" the problem. The CEO of Colgan Air gave a graphic example of this kind of short-term thinking when he told one of the relatives of a passenger - "it's fixed", referring to the problem that killed his and many others' family members.
If it was that easy to fix, one asks, why wasn't it "fixed" before?
Because the problem was essentially invisible to his and others' perceptions, latent in the illusions of "success", (no accidents). They do not comprehend flight safety principles nor how flight safety is done. They think that safety is "wearing a bright vest" on the ramp or passing simulator check rides.
It's a pity that this kind of "solution" is captured by media and magazines because it only pushes the problem upstream or downstream by ignoring the fundamental problems, which, given knowledge and the wholesale ridding of politics over good sense, can be addressed effectively and over a relatively short period of time. The one big issue that must be faced is, the industry is accustomed to the way business is presently done and is therefore self-satisfied". For proof of this thesis we only need to examine the industry silence before and the outcry after the Colgan accident. Do airlines think that this problem just occurred in January, (2009)?
Why does the concept of "watershed event" have so much power when so many can already see the problem? Why does such a concept even exist today?
Why must such events as Colgan, Lexington and others continue to occur before change or resistance to inappropriate decisions are implemented? Gradual change towards "chronic ill health" is always invisible until an accident makes it visible. Why are we still doing business the way it was done half a century ago? Why are such articles still being written today the same way they were in the sixties?
PJ2
Simplistic thinking is characterized by the notion that if something is tweaked, (pilot wages), or we just regulate "more" (present FAA licensing initiative) that'll "fix" the problem. The CEO of Colgan Air gave a graphic example of this kind of short-term thinking when he told one of the relatives of a passenger - "it's fixed", referring to the problem that killed his and many others' family members.
If it was that easy to fix, one asks, why wasn't it "fixed" before?
Because the problem was essentially invisible to his and others' perceptions, latent in the illusions of "success", (no accidents). They do not comprehend flight safety principles nor how flight safety is done. They think that safety is "wearing a bright vest" on the ramp or passing simulator check rides.
It's a pity that this kind of "solution" is captured by media and magazines because it only pushes the problem upstream or downstream by ignoring the fundamental problems, which, given knowledge and the wholesale ridding of politics over good sense, can be addressed effectively and over a relatively short period of time. The one big issue that must be faced is, the industry is accustomed to the way business is presently done and is therefore self-satisfied". For proof of this thesis we only need to examine the industry silence before and the outcry after the Colgan accident. Do airlines think that this problem just occurred in January, (2009)?
Why does the concept of "watershed event" have so much power when so many can already see the problem? Why does such a concept even exist today?
Why must such events as Colgan, Lexington and others continue to occur before change or resistance to inappropriate decisions are implemented? Gradual change towards "chronic ill health" is always invisible until an accident makes it visible. Why are we still doing business the way it was done half a century ago? Why are such articles still being written today the same way they were in the sixties?
PJ2
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After 100's of hammerhead stalls teaching aerobatics I guarantee you speed has little to do with stall unless you are in horizontal flight. At the top of the hammerhead your airspeed is approaching zero, coming down at this airspeed the aircraft is not stalled but it will if you try to bring the nose up too quickly. Deciding to increase beyond stall AOA will guarantee a stall no matter what your airspeed.
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BabiesB: "They got the a/c out of shape and decided to.....................
GO AROUND
Why?
Because, in our de-skilled world, that is the answer to every problem.
"
To the extent that this is true, and you guys would know better than I, it is very very sad.
How to make the right change?
GO AROUND
Why?
Because, in our de-skilled world, that is the answer to every problem.
"To the extent that this is true, and you guys would know better than I, it is very very sad.
How to make the right change?
SDFlyer;
Well I think that the go-around maneuver was always intended to be a response to an unacceptable circumstance on the approach and not a catch-all maneuver to be executed without good reason.
For years and years, accidents resulted from "pressing on regardless", trying to rescue a bad situation only to result in a CFIT, an over-run or even a fouled-up go-around which was executed out of surprise rather than anticipation and possibly from which an accident resulted. We can all survey the record for accidents which began with both circumstances.
The key is judicious use of the maneuver, or a judicious continuing the approach with the reasons in mind which, but for degree or other circumstance might indicate a go-around but the considered decision is to continue. Not being "spring-loaded" either way is also a key. Often, getting back up in the air and re-assessing as well as re-establishing one's SA is all that is required.
It is a perfectly acceptable decision and part of the kit, so let's not try to undo, without good and provable reasons, what took years of changing attitudes towards the go-around maneuver to accomplish.
That said, there are indeed cautions associated with the maneuver and to airmen such cautions are, (or certainly should be), obvious. Preparation, training, a disciplined cockpit and a good set of SOPs should prevent untoward decisions either to go-around or continue. Again, that involves examining training regimes, checking in the sim and closely examining one's flight data to see where the serious issues are so they can be addressed.
I understand what you're saying when you offer the phrase, "in a de-skilled world", but this isn't a "de-skilled" industry; if it were, we'd be seeing a "Colgan" every day of the week.
We are seeing more calls for examining the go-around maneuver. I think this is warranted not because it is a questionable decision which rescues all ills and is used indiscretely but because there is a genuine concern regarding loss of SA, automation mode confusion and loss of control, for three - again, we have seen all these. I think however, to condemn the maneuver outright is unproductive as it doesn't address the issues which arise.
regards,
PJ2
Well I think that the go-around maneuver was always intended to be a response to an unacceptable circumstance on the approach and not a catch-all maneuver to be executed without good reason.
For years and years, accidents resulted from "pressing on regardless", trying to rescue a bad situation only to result in a CFIT, an over-run or even a fouled-up go-around which was executed out of surprise rather than anticipation and possibly from which an accident resulted. We can all survey the record for accidents which began with both circumstances.
The key is judicious use of the maneuver, or a judicious continuing the approach with the reasons in mind which, but for degree or other circumstance might indicate a go-around but the considered decision is to continue. Not being "spring-loaded" either way is also a key. Often, getting back up in the air and re-assessing as well as re-establishing one's SA is all that is required.
It is a perfectly acceptable decision and part of the kit, so let's not try to undo, without good and provable reasons, what took years of changing attitudes towards the go-around maneuver to accomplish.
That said, there are indeed cautions associated with the maneuver and to airmen such cautions are, (or certainly should be), obvious. Preparation, training, a disciplined cockpit and a good set of SOPs should prevent untoward decisions either to go-around or continue. Again, that involves examining training regimes, checking in the sim and closely examining one's flight data to see where the serious issues are so they can be addressed.
I understand what you're saying when you offer the phrase, "in a de-skilled world", but this isn't a "de-skilled" industry; if it were, we'd be seeing a "Colgan" every day of the week.
We are seeing more calls for examining the go-around maneuver. I think this is warranted not because it is a questionable decision which rescues all ills and is used indiscretely but because there is a genuine concern regarding loss of SA, automation mode confusion and loss of control, for three - again, we have seen all these. I think however, to condemn the maneuver outright is unproductive as it doesn't address the issues which arise.
regards,
PJ2
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This discussion reminds me of the way we often see calls for more anti-crime legislation when cooler heads then point out that we already have laws that simply need enforcement. Here this crew had everything they needed to avoid that accident if they had only used their skills properly.
I think the very basic problem is a "human factors" one, treating the crew like serfs. If you accept management's low estimation of your self-worth you tend to shut down, stop learning, stop reacting, to withdraw like a turtle into its shell and wait for better times.
Certainly here we saw a crew that was not on top of their aircraft, one that obviously had not practiced self-learning and independent thought about the task at hand, when as a pilot I would hope that being handed a nice, shiny new Q400 would have me happily looking into all its corners. For instance we are seriously being told that there is no expectation that accident crew should have known what that reference speed reset switch did because no one directly told them that? Come on! As pilots we look around, spot some switch and naturally ask, "Hey, what does that do?" when I am sure the answer is "in the book." If you are just given the bare, legal minimum of training on a new type of complicated airplane then it is up to you as a professional pilot to get busy and enhance your knowledge yourself. In the final analysis it isn't just pride in your knowledge and ability but, as here, your life and the lives of your passengers and crew!
Who should be a happy bunny being paid $16 thousand per annum before taxes in this day and age, as the FO reportedly was, reduced to sleeping in the Crew Room, seemingly unable or unwilling to spend money on a cheap motel room? That is not the way to start a long duty day and management have to know that. How did they react, though? Just a notice telling the crews not to sleep in the Crew Room! Under a bridge, that's okay, I guess... That you can end up with some beaten-up, beaten-down losers driving your multi-million dollar aircraft around the system, well... God forbid the company should spend the money on a system that should provide two cheap motel rooms if necessary. No, this is another sort of DADT (Don't Ask, Don't Tell) for crews positioning for flights, a "Don't sleep in the Crew Room but don't come to us with your problems if you don't have anywhere to sleep either because we don't want to know!" On the other hand, when one of the Colgan managers visits an out station, do you think he ends up with no accomodation?
I, too, found that article a pretty poor thing. Not least, it is written in rather emotional language, way too "hot" for a subject that demands cool thought. I think it's just an attempt to sell a narrow, warped view of a safety issue to the general public, for the benefit of our wonderful community of liability lawyers who are doing such sterling work in promoting aviation safety by winning multi-million dollar settlements in cases such as this one.
I think the very basic problem is a "human factors" one, treating the crew like serfs. If you accept management's low estimation of your self-worth you tend to shut down, stop learning, stop reacting, to withdraw like a turtle into its shell and wait for better times.
Certainly here we saw a crew that was not on top of their aircraft, one that obviously had not practiced self-learning and independent thought about the task at hand, when as a pilot I would hope that being handed a nice, shiny new Q400 would have me happily looking into all its corners. For instance we are seriously being told that there is no expectation that accident crew should have known what that reference speed reset switch did because no one directly told them that? Come on! As pilots we look around, spot some switch and naturally ask, "Hey, what does that do?" when I am sure the answer is "in the book." If you are just given the bare, legal minimum of training on a new type of complicated airplane then it is up to you as a professional pilot to get busy and enhance your knowledge yourself. In the final analysis it isn't just pride in your knowledge and ability but, as here, your life and the lives of your passengers and crew!
Who should be a happy bunny being paid $16 thousand per annum before taxes in this day and age, as the FO reportedly was, reduced to sleeping in the Crew Room, seemingly unable or unwilling to spend money on a cheap motel room? That is not the way to start a long duty day and management have to know that. How did they react, though? Just a notice telling the crews not to sleep in the Crew Room! Under a bridge, that's okay, I guess... That you can end up with some beaten-up, beaten-down losers driving your multi-million dollar aircraft around the system, well... God forbid the company should spend the money on a system that should provide two cheap motel rooms if necessary. No, this is another sort of DADT (Don't Ask, Don't Tell) for crews positioning for flights, a "Don't sleep in the Crew Room but don't come to us with your problems if you don't have anywhere to sleep either because we don't want to know!" On the other hand, when one of the Colgan managers visits an out station, do you think he ends up with no accomodation?
I, too, found that article a pretty poor thing. Not least, it is written in rather emotional language, way too "hot" for a subject that demands cool thought. I think it's just an attempt to sell a narrow, warped view of a safety issue to the general public, for the benefit of our wonderful community of liability lawyers who are doing such sterling work in promoting aviation safety by winning multi-million dollar settlements in cases such as this one.
If they were trying to go-around, and that certainly fits with the FO's actions, they seem to have forgot that fundamental saying that we've all heard, "aviate, navigate, communicate." You can't go-around in an aircraft that isn't flying. First you need to sort out the immediate problem of flying the aircraft, then navigate it through the missed approach procedure if you think you need some time to think, and then tell someone what you're up to. I realise I'm preaching to the converted in this thread, but it's worth pointing out that many accidents come about from a failure to get these fundamentals right.
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belgique, chuks
General Industry Laxity Criticized in Wake of Colgan Air Crash|Aviation Safety Journal
...just an attempt to sell a narrow, warped view of a safety issue to the general public, for the benefit of our wonderful community of liability lawyers who are doing such sterling work in promoting aviation safety by winning multi-million dollar settlements in cases such as this one.
...just an attempt to sell a narrow, warped view of a safety issue to the general public, for the benefit of our wonderful community of liability lawyers who are doing such sterling work in promoting aviation safety by winning multi-million dollar settlements in cases such as this one.
Let's remain mindful that the article was published by Nolan law group.
The same outfit who's premier expert, Jim Hall had declared the cause of the accident to be FAA's failure to address t-prop operations in icing conditions.
Same Jim Hall who had declared almost immediately after the MDW B737 overrun, "the pilot landed long".
Thanks, Jim.
Where would aviation be without our indespensible cadres of ambulance-chasers?
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PJ2, chuks and others: thank you for your many insights. This really has turned into a remarkable thread altogether. As an humble GA bystander, I'm finding it about as insightful and informative as any that I can recall - on this forum or any other. Hats off to you guys. Personally I find it most reassuring, the level of introspection and cool, rigorous analysis on display - wish'd I saw more of it in other walks of life. No, there aren't any easy answers - that's why commercial aviation is such a fine profession.
On with the motley ....
On with the motley ....
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PBS Frontline documentary
I didn't see this link posted elsewhere in the thread, so here it is:
FRONTLINE: flying cheap: watch the full program | PBS
This is a PBS Frontline documentary on the trouble with regional airlines in the U.S., and talks a lot about Colgan 3407. It's pretty interesting and you can view it online (56 minutes).
I don't know if other countries have this same problem with majors resorting to regionals in order to make more profit, but it looks like something seriously in need of fixing in the United States.
FRONTLINE: flying cheap: watch the full program | PBS
This is a PBS Frontline documentary on the trouble with regional airlines in the U.S., and talks a lot about Colgan 3407. It's pretty interesting and you can view it online (56 minutes).
I don't know if other countries have this same problem with majors resorting to regionals in order to make more profit, but it looks like something seriously in need of fixing in the United States.
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Back to this topic though - in this case we have what can most charitably be called a non-optimal situation regarding treatment by the industry as a whole of pilots working for regionals, which manifested itself in a terrible accident. But in many other cases it has caused smaller incidents which don't get reported outside industry rumour.
SDFlyer, we would all like to think that we'd do the right thing and take over when necessary, but the fact is that depending on the cockpit dynamic, it can be a lot easier to talk about than it is to actually do it. Particularly if you have confidence that your captain knows what he's doing, and perhaps have doubts in your ability to perceive a situation correctly. It's very easy to think to yourself, "well the other bloke seems happy so there mustn't be anything wrong." It is unfortunate but sometimes a Captain will fly an aeroplane into the ground killing everybody on board and the FO will sit on his hands and let the whole thing unfold, all the while thinking "gee this doesn't look good", but never saying or doing anything about it.
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There was a famous experiment where people thought they were filling out a questionnaire. In reality they were in there with actors, when the room started filling with thick smoke pouring out of a vent in the wall.
The usual test subject would panic but then look around at everyone else, just sat there calmly filling out their papers the way they were told to, and then settle down to stay in a room they would have fled just going by their own common sense. We get taught this in Crew Resource Management training, among other things.
There's always a grey area between being too passive, when you can be dangerously useless, and being too assertive, when you can be even more dangerous as a constant distraction and a general P.I.T.A.! Operating as part of a crew is something we all have to learn as another skill; we are not born knowing how to do it 100% correctly.
The usual test subject would panic but then look around at everyone else, just sat there calmly filling out their papers the way they were told to, and then settle down to stay in a room they would have fled just going by their own common sense. We get taught this in Crew Resource Management training, among other things.
There's always a grey area between being too passive, when you can be dangerously useless, and being too assertive, when you can be even more dangerous as a constant distraction and a general P.I.T.A.! Operating as part of a crew is something we all have to learn as another skill; we are not born knowing how to do it 100% correctly.
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Stanley Milgram's famous experiments also showed the extent to which people will ignore their own intuition, instinct, or conscience in order to be accepted by others or to conform to what they think is expected behavior.
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Very good points I'm sure and well taken. I don't wish to seem too naive ..... 
Everyone has some level of self-doubt, noone's perfect of course, and this goes into the mental process in a crisis. If anyone thought they were infallible they'd be either arrogant or in deep denial, or both - a bigger danger to the public of course. Also, a lot depends on what the alternatives are when the emergency hits - not always so attractive either. But still like I say, do the math (risks of inaction).
If I had a free lunch for every time I said to myself (on the job), "why didn't I do <this or that> " when I suspected something wasn't quite right and didn't act appropriately ....
(usually the consequences are relatively trivial in my case).
Yes, I can well imagine wishing I'd had my druthers as I augured in.
Thank you for your patience.
Everyone has some level of self-doubt, noone's perfect of course, and this goes into the mental process in a crisis. If anyone thought they were infallible they'd be either arrogant or in deep denial, or both - a bigger danger to the public of course. Also, a lot depends on what the alternatives are when the emergency hits - not always so attractive either. But still like I say, do the math (risks of inaction).If I had a free lunch for every time I said to myself (on the job), "why didn't I do <this or that> " when I suspected something wasn't quite right and didn't act appropriately ....
(usually the consequences are relatively trivial in my case).
Yes, I can well imagine wishing I'd had my druthers as I augured in.
Thank you for your patience.
Last edited by SDFlyer; 14th Feb 2010 at 22:35.
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many interesting points about human behaviour or is it behavior?
anyhow:
these two were pilots and should have had training in avoiding the pitfalls of human failings in the cockpit.
captain, you are getting slow
captain, you are getting slow
captain you are getting slow
I"VE GOT THE PLANE (reduce angle of attack, add power)
and that is the way training works at my airline...it is called the three communication rule.
anyhow:
these two were pilots and should have had training in avoiding the pitfalls of human failings in the cockpit.
captain, you are getting slow
captain, you are getting slow
captain you are getting slow
I"VE GOT THE PLANE (reduce angle of attack, add power)
and that is the way training works at my airline...it is called the three communication rule.