Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo

[galaxy flyer]

I'd be darned sure I informally taught him enough stuff that he wasn't going to kill me. And if he couldn't be taught, I'd make sure I didn't fly with him.

A degree of maturity and leadership not frequently found in the current generation. A generation untutored in the notion of integrity and character, merely what it takes to move on in aviation. Bitter? No, just disappointed.

GF

[Graybeard]

Dumbest Competitor

In business situation where supply exceeds demand, the price will fall to the level of the dumbest competitor. Seems like we've always had a surplus of pilots in the US.

Likewise, SLF are not demanding cheaper and cheaper frights, there is always some dumb guy with a few $million and an urge to get in the airline business. Sooner or later he drops the price to fill the seats, then his competitors do the same, until the weakest go bankrupt, and the rest are merely zombied.

GB

[WhyIsThereAir]

Sooner or later he drops the price to fill the seats, then his competitors do the same

When I was in highschool a few centuries back, we learned that was called "cutthroat competition", and learned from copious examples why you don't do that.

I imagine the modern generation is too busy being taught proper condom usage to have time to learn about any useless historical details like that.

[PA-28-180]

Agree with all the above. I guess I was VERY lucky early on! My flight school had very high time, professional instructors - my ppl instructor had over 2,500 hours, a degree in aeronautical engineering and an ATP (thank you Tim!!). Same for my ir, me, and cpl instructors. The school also had a 135 air taxi business, flying navajo's and even a metro (protect the hornet - I'm sure you know exactly what outfit I'm talking about at CCR!).
Many of the instructors went on to be FO's at regionals - but NOT at these salaries! They made more as instructors!
I made more as a PART TIME 135 pilot - mainly flying from ccr to monterey!
-Whyistheirair - I also learned this, and practiced it as a business owner. You NEVER compete on price!! You either compete on service, OR product...end of story!!
Unfortunately, Galaxy is also correct. There will ALWAYS be people willing to fly for burger flipper wages....just to build time. I guess we can't all be ex-military, or get jobs flying paper around (or CHICKENS like I did for a while in a an old, clapped out 402! Always thought it was WEIRD to be flying BIRDS around northern California!! )

[AerocatS2A]

Originally Posted by WhyIsThereAir

I have to wonder: Weren't there two people, both capable of flying the plane, sitting at the controls? Didn't they both have a yoke in front of them? If you are sitting there as PNF and watch the PF doing something absolutely boneheaded that you KNOW is going to kill you, is it your DUTY to remain silent and ignore it? Wouldn't it make more sense to swear and jam the stick forward? What the heck was the PNF thinking? Was he in the bathroom?

She was in the right seat where she was meant to be. She was also raising the flaps and making a bad situation worse. Yes there should have been two people, both capable of flying the plane, sitting at the controls, however at the time there was no one capable of flying the plane sitting at the controls. Neither of them were up to the task at the time it occurred, they may have been fine at other times, but in that situation, on that day, neither of them came up with the goods.

[Teevee]

"She was in the right seat where she was meant to be."

And actually if I've read through everything right on this particular day even she knew that she shouldn't be, maybe the PIC did too. I'm not a pilot but they did what millions of us do everyday, keep going and played the percentages because 999 times out of a thousand everything would have turned out o.k. and there might have been repercussions if they hadn't. Until those who get paid megabucks make the assumption that most of us are concienscious workers who will try our best to 'get the job done' and make it safe for people such are this F/O or anyone else taking critical safety related actions as part of their job to say, "sorry but the safest thing for me to do today is stay at home" without any career threatening or financial consequences, it'll happen again. "There but for the grace of God ...." and all that

[Bluestar51]

" She was also raising the flaps and making a bad situation worse"

Have you seen the FAA film on recovery from tailplane icing?

Bill

[AerocatS2A]

Have you seen the FAA film on recovery from tailplane icing?

Yep. I don't think it's being any kinder to her to suggest that she misdiagnosed a stick shaker as a tail stall.

[Will Fraser]

The uncommanded flap action to me may speak of a confused cockpit relative to leadership and interpersonal command flow. The pilot, though senior in total time, was 'new' to this type, F/O had more time in this a/c. She may have been a helpful 'senior in type' F/O, much like an instructor may allow some mistakes, but 'act in' when the 'student' is 'overwhelmed'. What is confusing is the lack of 'confidence' on the F/D, the F/O's statements to that effect, and the crumbling skills of the PF.

Having been young once, I can relate to youth and its aspirations.
Being old, I can relate to a significant mid life career change.

On landing, Ms. Shaw was too young to Rent an automobile.
Mr. Renslow was perhaps 25 years past a more common career benchmark.

Each of them were flying a highly complex a/c full of people.
Neither were making a decent living, and one was demonstrably ill, both were fatigued. There is a problem.

[PJ2]

Will;

Each of them were flying a highly complex a/c full of people.
Neither were making a decent living, and one was demonstrably ill, both were fatigued. There is a problem.

I won't repeat here what I have posted elsewhere on the larger issues highlighted by these two salient observations. They are searchable for those interested.

Some time ago, my airline negotiated a 10 percent reduction in pay when using sick days and reduced benefits for long-term off-work time. The results were not unexpected: pilots began coming to work sick so as not to lose pay.

The claim was, sick days are being "abused" by crews calling in sick for the "slightest reasons". There was no study done on such reasons so the effects of increased productivity demands leading to higher fatigue levels for one thing, and the "enthusiasm factor" when family/financial/health matters led to book-offs for another, are not known but merely assumed as unreasonable in all cases, (otherwise why dock pay?). There are always a few who abuse the system but the standard approach was taken - punish everyone.

Aviation and flying has far greater exposure to risk including economic risk, if participants choose to compromise the high standards required to maintain a safe and profitable enterprise. Docking pilots 10 percent off their pay for calling in sick simply invites pilots to show up for work for their already-low pay exposing their colleagues, their passengers and their company to slightly heightened risk. While "sniffles" don't make an accident, unclear thinking due to flu or cold may very well lay among the many causal pathways in an fatal accident.

The same negotiations also removed pay for training work days so all recurrent simulators are done for free as are other recurrent training work.

How very sad and deeply tragic for all, that the Colgan crew are becoming poster-children for the airline industry's current practises and attitudes towards their most valuable risk-management assets - a highly-trained, experienced, well-remunerated and respected flight crew.

Airline employees have given billions back in wage and benefit concessions over the last ten years, yet it's "What have you done for us lately?" all over again. The spiral cannot continue without result. Yes indeed Will, there is a problem. The accident rate, plummeting since the 50's and now flat, has begun to turn the corner and head up. Airline passengers cannot expect to demand nickel-and-dime fares without result and airline managements cannot continue to nickel-and-dime their best resources forever.

[protectthehornet]

I've seen it all

I've worked for three regionals...in the middle 80's/early 80's.

People coming to work (pilots/copilots) who were ''out of it''. people commuting overnight and staggering into work.

people who haven't the knowledge that some good private pilots have.


its been along time on this thread...can someone post the total flying time of both crewmembers one more time.

I would also like to know the total time on date of hire with colgan.

and by the way...the first regional I flew for, I had an atp, cfiimei, 2000 plus hours including jet time and ''bank check'' time.

[surplus1]

Thanks for your reply. To be honest, I hoped my question would generate something similar to what you wrote. Maybe I can learn something here.

It appears that the DFDR did not have the facility to record control column forces as opposed to positions (thats a relatively recent requirement for FDRs). So no-one is ever going to meet your apparent standards of proof that the control column was "pulled". Maybe it moved full aft of it's own accord? But the only logical conclusion is that the pilot flying the aircraft was moving the control column. Especially since it did the opposite of what the stick pusher would have had it do if there were no pilot intervention.

First - let me state clearly that I am not an expert on interpreting DFDR traces. Keep that in mind. Additionally, I am not rated in the Q-400; keep that in mind as well.

As you point out we are not recording 'forces' we are recording positions. However, I see readouts in lbs on the side of many relevant traces. Here is my thinking - please shoot it down where it goes wrong.

A) I am not interested in what happened after the stick pusher activated. I accept the premise that the PF may have been fighting the pusher but, from my perspective, the upset had already occurred at that point. By the time the pusher triggered, for all practical purposes this accident had already occurred. My interest is what happened before pusher activation. Whatever that was it is what, in my opinion, caused the upset and stall that activated the pusher.

Some things we believe that I do not dispute.

a) the REF SPEED switch (whatever its real name may be) was turned on. It reprograms the shaker and the pusher to activate at a higher airspeed.
b) the aircraft was being flown by the autopilot. It descended and leveled on the autopilot. Additional power was not added by the flight crew when the autopilot leveled the aircraft. As a result the airspeed continued to dcay, the pitch and AOA to increase, until the stick shaker activated and the auto-pilot disconnected.
c) at that point, one of the pilots added maximum power to the engines - within one second.
d) the addition of max power following shaker activation is a standard response and does not indicate suspicion of a tail stall.

Something I don’t believe and do dispute: The pilot intentionally yanked back on the control column as soon as the shaker went off and the autopilot disconnected.

Now let's go back to the NTSB report, figure A2.1 on pg 18 and look at the various traces – in all of the figures.

[Note: We can tell when a force is moving the elevators and the direction of movement. We can also tell when the control column moves and the direction of movement. But, we cannot tell which pilot is actually applying that force/movement (the reading comes form paired transducers). We also cannot tell what moved the control column - we only know that it moved and the direction of movement.

It is reasonable to assume that it is the pilot in the left seat since that was the PF. However it could have been either pilot or both pilots. There is an F/O in the cockpit that does things independent of coordination with the captain, let alone command (“I put the flaps up”).]

My question is this: It may be reasonable to assume that the PF flying moved the control column aft. But, is it logical to assume that the PF intentionally pulled back on the yoke when the shaker first went off and never relaxed that input? I do not think it is logical. Is it possible that something else could have produced the aft movement recorded by the transducers on the control columns? If so, what would that be?

I note that the power levers are reduced to an angle of 42 deg (I’m told by the report that 35deg is the equivalent of flight idle). I can see the auto-pilot engage and the a/c level at 2400 pa in alt hold mode. I note the airspeed, which continues to decline progressively and I also note that the power lever position does not change – until the shaker activates. [During this phase the crew is not fully aware of what the aircraft is doing.]

I also note that the elevator trim is moving nose up progressively as the airspeed continues to decrease. I see the flaps selected and extending to 10 deg. Further airspeed decay and further nose up elevator trim (which appears to reach the maximum). I see the AOA increasing – pitch attitude increasing to about +7 deg. then +9 deg. I see the shaker activate and the autopilot disconnect (at the same time). I then see power lever angle increase to about 70 deg. and pitch increase to about +20 deg and continue to about +30 deg. I do not see any change in elevator trim. As the pitch increases the control column moves aft. Very shortly thereafter the aircraft stalls, rolls left and the pusher activates. The upset is in progress. I then see the pilot(s) fighting the controls with extreme aileron and rudder inputs. The pitch goes to 0 at some point but very briefly. Shortly thereafter the pusher activates for the second time and the rest is history.

Observation/conjecture: Until the shaker activated and the autopilot disconnected – the wing was flying and the aircraft was NOT stalled. The pitch up following power increase resulted in the stall and pusher activation.

This is a high-wing aircraft with a great deal of available power and large propellers. According to the manufacturer it is not susceptible to tail stalls. I also do not believe that either of the pilots thought they were in a tail stall. Had they known enough to think that and react by applying back pressure – they would also have known enough not to add power. I rule out the tail stall theory as a source of the apparent initial control movement.

The elevator is hydraulically actuated. There are no trim tabs on the elevator. Therefore when it is “trimmed” (which is electrically controlled) either by the trim switches on the yoke or through the auto pilot, the actuators displace the entire elevator [similar to a trimable stabilizer]. The elevator will stay in that position until the trim is changed [it never was]. A large increase in power – which took place immediately after shaker activation – will raise the nose. If the elevator is already trimmed at or close to the maximum nose up [see the FDR trace], it seems that the addition of near maximum power will help to raise the nose quite rapidly and much farther. A lot of forward pressure (not anticipated) would be required to stop it. If the pilot never touched the control column the resulting pitch up moment is highly likely to exceed the critical AOA and stall the wing [with no applied back pressure].

It is pretty obvious that neither pilot realized that the airspeed was decaying rapidly, due to insufficient power to sustain level flight. The autopilot was trimming the nose up rapidly (there is no trim wheel to observe) and the aircraft was very close to the artificially augmented stall speed increased by the REF SPEED switch in the INCR position. When the shaker activated and the auto-pilot disconnected they were most likely totally surprised. They added near max power immediately and the nose pitched up very rapidly, almost certainly another ‘surprise”. If they did not observe the low airspeed it is highly unlikely they would have expected the nose to be trimmed full up. The autopilot did that to maintain the selected altitude – as it is supposed to. Sudden and unexpected control pressures are rarely corrected instantly.

The FDR shows the trim increasing [to near max] and the elevator moving, just before the upset. It does not show movement of the control column because it doesn’t need to move [the autopilot is just balancing the pressures to hold the altitude – ortherwise the pitch would decrease]. The FDR shows the pitch and AOA increasing. When the autopilot disconnects and near max power is applied the trim is still there and the nose pitches up to +20. In the process the control column transducers show an aft movement of the column. Of course they do, it is now responding to the fixed up-elevator position induced by trim.

Pilot response/reaction time to anomalies is normally calculated to be 3 seconds. Look at the time-trace following autopilot disconnect:

22:16:26.9 – CAS-130, Pitch +9, AOA +12 – Autopilot disengages/shaker activates
22:16:27.9 – Power levers move to 70 deg position (max is 80)
22.16.29.9 – CAS 122, Pitch +20, AOA +20 – Aircraft begins roll to left – right aileron and rudder applied – roll continues which means the left wing has lost lift. Time elapsed = 3 seconds.
22:16:31.9 – left roll angle reaches 45 deg and begins to recover.
22:16:33.9 – CAS -90/110, Pitch +31, AOA +31 – Aircraft rolls thru wings level and continues roll to right, Flaps retracted (oops), Stick pusher fires. Total time elapsed = 7 seconds.

I find it hard to believe that the PF intentionally applied back pressure when the shaker went off. I think the pitch up was caused by the elevator trim setting and the power application. After the aircraft upset and was snapping left and right in a complete stall it is not too surprising that they didn’t know what to do and applied incorrect control movements. When the bank angle is 105 deg and you’re on instruments which way is up/down isn’t readily figured out [the AI screen was most likely solid Blue]. When you’re rapidly applying full aileron and rudder from one side to the other – the airplane is way ahead of the crew.

I have no idea what the stall characteristics of a Q-400 might be, but given the left roll experienced before the pusher it does not appear that they are benign. Usually, though not always, an airplane needs a shaker and pusher because its stall characteristics are abrupt and with little or no warning – so both devices are installed to prevent stalls. I don’t know what AOA is required to make this wing stall but it appears to be in the neighborhood of +20 degrees. The energy/momentum of the pitch up kept it going to +30 degrees. Much sustained forward pressure would have been required to lower the nose – it was never applied. But, that doesn’t necessarily mean that back pressure was applied immediately following shaker activation. Something did move the column aft – was it the pilot or was it the elevator that was already displaced to near max nose-up trim. I don’t know the answer but I’m just thinking out of the box.

Situational awareness was lost before the upset. It is highly improbable that it would be regained while the upset is in progress. Even if it were, it is rare indeed that a transport that upsets (for whatever reason) at 1500 ft +- AGL can be recovered successfully. Most likely the loss of situational awareness was the result of complacency, inadequate training, and inexperience [all working together at the same time]. IMO, this crew was not qualified to operate this aircraft [yes, I know they were “properly rated”]. I further think that the PF flying was not ready to ‘command’ anything and the F/O was so inexperienced as to be of virtually no help. Additionally, the number of flight hours is not an accurate measure of experience or command ability. I argue that there is a substantial difference between being “PIC” in a light aircraft and Captain of a transport category aircraft of the size and relative sophistication of a Q-400. I realize it’s not an Airbus, but it’s not a Saab 340 either. CRM is a good thing; a complete lack of cockpit discipline is not.

Being paid more money or less money has nothing to do with one’s piloting skills. It does however, result in management’s need to accept lower levels of experience and minimal qualifications. Don’t blame pilots for accepting jobs that pay less than others – that’s a system created by management and sanctioned by government. In many instances in major carriers, management has reduced pilot pay by as much as fifty percent, eliminated pensions, greatly reduced medical benefits and devastated work rules returning them to FAR standars, which are rediculous. Pilots in legacy carriers have accepted these changes because they have no choice – but their aircraft haven’t started falling out of the sky because their pay is now lower than it once was. Pilots in regional/feeder carriers have done the same. Lower pay does not decrease individual qualifications and pilots have no real control over their compensation. When you need to feed your family or yourself you take the job that’s available. We all do this and it is not limited to the airline industry.

I'm jurasic and date from a time when being an airline pilot was a respectable and desirable career profession. That has changed and today it has regressed to the point where, candidly, it is an insecure profession filled with undue stress - an undesirable job. That's truly sad. I never wanted to be a bus driver but that's what I felt like by the time I reached retirement. I watched my friends and myself deprived of our pensions while incompetent managers walked away with millions leaving our companies in bankruptcy. You could say I'm bitter about that but somehow I managed to avoid letting it degrade my on-the-job performance. I'm not a member of the ME generation. Sorry, I digress.

An experienced captain can ‘carry’ an inexperienced first officer so long as things don’t get too critical. An inexperienced captain can’t, and pairing the two together is high risk. As the complexity of the aircraft increases, the need for maturity, and training increases with it. Due to economic considerations, regulations have not kept pace with advances in aircraft technology and design. FAA ‘minimum standards’ are outdated and inadequate. That’s not the pilot’s fault and it was not the fault of the Colgan crew. If they were products of the pay-for-training cadre they are not guilty of wrong doing, they are victims of wrong doing.

I have no desire to crucify this crew because mistakes were made. They are just victims of a system that is essentially sick at too many critical levels. Expedience led to them being where they were when they were and as far as I’m concerned that was not of their making. When the dollar or the pound or the euro is allowed to replace the sound judgment of managers and regulators, the result will be more accidents of this nature.

Many accidents and incidents in regional carriers in the last few years are indicative of this. The upset and dual flameout of the CRJ-200 at FL410 is a good example. The PIC of that a/c had more than 6000 flight hours [in what?] but neither member of that crew had a clue related to high altitude operations. They demonstrated a total lack of judgment and it cost them their lives. Their lack of judgment was first preceded by management’s lack of judgment – for not ensuring that they were properly trained. They died with a permanent black mark on their records. Management collected the insurance and walked away with a smile to repeat the error of their ways. The same is true of the CRJ-200 departure accident in KY. That crew didn’t know what runway they were on, but they did know that the runway was unlighted. Nevertheless, the “captain” elected to take off without so much as a second thought and the F/O said not a word. Is it ‘normal’ for airliners to depart on unlighted runways? Somehow I don’t think so. Fifty people died in the resulting wreck. There was nothing wrong with the manipulation of controls in either case. There was everything wrong with their training and their judgment. No one in their company ever told them that wasn't a good idea. There was no SOP. They are balmed. Management has since been promoted and collected their bonuses. Same story, different day.

In contrast, the USAir flight crew that landed in the Hudson River was very seasoned – even though they had lost 50% of their former pay, all of their pension benefits, were embroiled in a nasty merger and likely to lose their seniority, and the commander commuted from the West coast to the NY area. They experienced a double flame out shortly after take off in the middle of NYC. The outcome was successful. It wasn’t because the captain demonstrated any unusual stick and rudder technique. However, both crewmembers did demonstrate excellent judgment, both dated from a era when training was adequate and, as a consequence, made the only logical decision available to them. Sure they were lucky that the river was there and that the aircraft remained essentially intact on touchdown but luck didn’t save the day, sound judgment and adequate training did. Will the younger folks coming along in the same airline have the same experience? I doubt it – times have changed and now the bare minimum has become the norm. If that happens again the outcome is quite likely to be different.

Very few accidents, if any, result from moving the controls the wrong way. A great many accidents result from poor judgment. Good judgment is acquired over time and with maturity - sometimes never. You can’t teach judgment in a simulator. The chain of most accidents results from errors in judgment – not stick and rudder manipulation. This accident is a sad demonstration of just that. However in defense of the crew, the bad judgment that ultimately led to this accident did not begin in the cockpit; it began in the board room.

Apologies for the rant; I’ll get off the soapbox now.

[captainsmiffy]

Well said sir! An awful lot of truth in there.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

With regard to the FDR data it may be more useful to look at this item: http://www.ntsb.gov/dockets/aviation...027/417238.pdf

(Apologies, I didnt spot this more complete output previously)

In this case we do have column force data (I did think it slightly odd it wasn't available)

I've not looked at this in enough depth to respond in detail but I will make two comments:

1. Firstly, however illogical it may seem, for flight crew to pull back on the stick at shaker activation is not unknown; depending on the system design, when the AP disconnects it may release the stick forward a little, and the crew may tend to "snatch" back at the stick, since it looks like a sudden and unwanted movement.

2. Secondly, be vary careful in making assumptions as to how the trim system will be affecting the control system dynamics. With AP on, the trim is acting to relieve the AP servo (assumption based on other designs) and so when the AP disconnects you should NOT get a big input from the trim - it should be more or less aligned with the current elevator position. I thought there was a docket item on the control system (in the presentations on day 1 of the hearing) but I cant find it right now.

[PJ2]

Surplus1;

A stellar, perceptive and superbly crafted piece of writing about our industry. Thank you.

Being paid more money or less money has nothing to do with one’s piloting skills. It does however, result in management’s need to accept lower levels of experience and minimal qualifications. Don’t blame pilots for accepting jobs that pay less than others – that’s a system created by management and sanctioned by government. In many instances in major carriers, management has reduced pilot pay by as much as fifty percent, eliminated pensions, greatly reduced medical benefits and devastated work rules returning them to FAR standars, which are rediculous. Pilots in legacy carriers have accepted these changes because they have no choice – but their aircraft haven’t started falling out of the sky because their pay is now lower than it once was. Pilots in regional/feeder carriers have done the same. Lower pay does not decrease individual qualifications and pilots have no real control over their compensation. When you need to feed your family or yourself you take the job that’s available. We all do this and it is not limited to the airline industry.

Fully concur, and you have said it so well.

The key here is not the relationship between pay and skill; - no pilot ever decides that lower pay deserves less skill, but that was never the way I thought of these dynamics. The flight safety issue arises when, over time, those with less ability, desire, discipline, background etc etc, are hired while those with top-notch capabilities, intelligence and education find work elsewhere, not in the aviation industry and certainly not as a pilot. So the issue is not perceived as a threat. I think that is a mistake not because the issue is presently a problem - it isn't; but it's going to be.

I'm jurasic and date from a time when being an airline pilot was a respectable and desirable career profession. That has changed and today it has regressed to the point where, candidly, it is an insecure profession filled with undue stress - an undesirable job. That's truly sad. I never wanted to be a bus driver but that's what I felt like by the time I reached retirement. I watched my friends and myself deprived of our pensions while incompetent managers walked away with millions leaving our companies in bankruptcy. You could say I'm bitter about that but somehow I managed to avoid letting it degrade my on-the-job performance. I'm not a member of the ME generation. Sorry, I digress.

There is no digression here as far as I am concerned. This is the key issue with the airline industry today and I see no signs of the forces of change on the horizon. There seems a willingness on the part of those managing airlines to perhaps accept a higher fatal accident rate. Otherwise, the resistance I see and have experienced to robust flight safety programs such as FOQA, would not be there. The tools to keep risk down while the industry grows itself out of this depression are there but short-term, short-scale vision which is essentially "quarterly" in nature, does not permit such investments. Especially under SMS, the results are closer to box-ticks than substantive action and/or responses.

An experienced captain can ‘carry’ an inexperienced first officer so long as things don’t get too critical. An inexperienced captain can’t, and pairing the two together is high risk. As the complexity of the aircraft increases, the need for maturity, and training increases with it. Due to economic considerations, regulations have not kept pace with advances in aircraft technology and design. FAA ‘minimum standards’ are outdated and inadequate. That’s not the pilot’s fault and it was not the fault of the Colgan crew. If they were products of the pay-for-training cadre they are not guilty of wrong doing, they are victims of wrong doing.

I have no desire to crucify this crew because mistakes were made. They are just victims of a system that is essentially sick at too many critical levels. Expedience led to them being where they were when they were and as far as I’m concerned that was not of their making. When the dollar or the pound or the euro is allowed to replace the sound judgment of managers and regulators, the result will be more accidents of this nature.

Couldn't agree more. Indeed that is exactly why I said it is so sad and tragic that this crew is being focussed upon while "the board room" is not. Once again this is a management issue, not an airline pilot issue and they, not the pilots, are the personnel who belong in the oak chair.

[surplus1]

1. Firstly, however illogical it may seem, for flight crew to pull back on the stick at shaker activation is not unknown; depending on the system design, when the AP disconnects it may release the stick forward a little, and the crew may tend to "snatch" back at the stick, since it looks like a sudden and unwanted movement.

I don't disagree with that general statement but, due to this design (if I understand it correctly) that is unlikely to happen if the aircraft is stable. I do think, in this scenario, there would be a sudden and unwanted nose up movement following the application of full power. Not because the elevator did anything but because full power was applied and the elevator remained in the same position. If power had not been applied the nose would drop because at the decreasing speed there is not enough up elevator to keep it from doing that. The only reason this elevator was deflected, IMO, was because alt hold was engaged and there was insufficient power to maintain a constant speed.

2. Secondly, be vary careful in making assumptions as to how the trim system will be affecting the control system dynamics. With AP on, the trim is acting to relieve the AP servo (assumption based on other designs) and so when the AP disconnects you should NOT get a big input from the trim - it should be more or less aligned with the current elevator position. I thought there was a docket item on the control system (in the presentations on day 1 of the hearing) but I cant find it right now

Your warning is accepted. I acknowledge that I am making some assumptions and they may be unwarranted.

Perhaps I'm not articulating correctly and making myself clear. I agree as to why the trim is acting with AP engaged. If there was enough power to maintain constant airspeed the AP servos would not be under duress and trim would not change. When the AP disconnects - absolutely nothing happens as a result of previously input trim - unless speed is increased or a large change in power is added. In other words the elevator is not going to change its physical position because the AP disconnected - it will stay where it was. If no power is added, the nose will drop and speed will increase slowly. If only enough power is added to hold the speed at the time of AP disconnect - the aircraft will fly level as it did with the AP engaged and speed will neither increase or decrease. (In stable air) There is nothing to upset the balance (between power required and power available).

In the scenario I envision the pitch up is caused by the addition of max power. The already deflected elevator, which has not changed its positon, operates to increase the rate of pitch change. If it happens fast enough, the additional power can't increase the speed fast enough - and therefore drag and AOA increase rapidly. If the change is big enough the wing will stall.

Take a look at this incident report.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...9%20G-THOF.pdf

Although the situation is somewhat different and the aircraft design is different (the Boeing uses a trimmable stabilizer - the Dash a trimmable elevator) the concepts involved is similar.

Once the shaker went off in Colgan 3407 the recovery was intiated by the application of full power. Regardless of elevator trim this was going to result in very significant pitch up moment. This is due to the high power output of which these engines are capable. [Keep in mind that the aircraft was actually considerably above its actual stall speed and below its stall AOA. The only reason the shaker activated at that point was because the REF SPEED switch had been activated - and there really wasn't any significant ice.] This fact, I believe, helped to increase the rate of pitch up. The trimmed up displaced elevator simply aided in the pitch up rate.

Without immediate and heavy nose down input from the PF it is no surprise that the pitch went beyond +20 in a couple of seconds and continued in that direction for another +10 deg. Of course I could be dead wrong but I don't think the PF had to "pull" on the column at all to get that high pitch attitude. There appeared to be a pulling force registered by the tranducers because the elevator was already trimmed close to maximum nose up. When the AP "released" the column moved to the elevator position (in theory). I would sure like to see that tested during the investigation.

With nearly 10K SHP available, this airplane should have easily been able to fly out of this situation. The only thing the PF had to do was push as hard as he could (and perhaps trim out some of the back pressure).

Note that once the pitch reached +20 deg the aircraft began to roll hard left. Most probably that was initiated by the high torque moment generated by those huge propellers at max power. Attempts to counter the roll didn't help the PF to realize the need for agressive nose down control pressure. From my perspective once the pitch up reached +25 this was no longer a stall warning recovery drill, it was an upset recovery drill.

I have no idea if the Q-400 QRH includes any procedure for upset recovery but even if it does, I seriously doubt that either of these pilots had received any upset recovery training. Again I could be dead wrong but I doubt either of them had ever seen a pitch attitude above +25 deg.

What their airplane was doing just didn't relate to anything they had done before and it did not compute mentally. If ever it did during the remainder of the event, it was already too far gone to effect a recovery.

I know nothing of Colgan's training procedures but if they are anything like those of the regional airlines I have witnessed, they did not include anything close to what happened even in discussion, let alone in practice. Most probably it was just FAA minimums and that's it.

One also has to wonder how the experience levels of the training captains might compare to that of the Pilot Flying the accident aircraft. You can't teach what you don't know yourself.

In one regional carrier that I happen to be familiar with, when they first introduced jets no one in the training department had ever flown a jet. Those line pilots with extensive jet experience were not used - because their politics were not compatible with management's. They were 'union members' and that made them anathema to the management culture. The chief pilots also had no hands on experience with swept wing jet aircraft. The final frosting on the cake -- the POI, responsible for oversight, had never flown any airplane larger than a twin Comanche. The Feds sent him up to Canada for a quickie course and type rating and a month later he was back as the 'resident expert' - making critical decisions about things that he didn't fully understand himself. In spite of it they survived, but it was far more luck than brains.

When pilots have to work in that type of environment I have a very hard time blaming then for the mistakes they make. It is also an injustice to young airmen who are intelligent, eager and willing to learn but just don't get the support that is required. In a year or two they upgrade to the left seat and survive by the grace of God. Sometimes they don't.

From a Piper to the right seat of a Q-400 or an RJ is a long way to go with very little training and sparce experience. Especially so when you sit next to a "Captain" with only one year's exposure to a Saab or some other light turboprop.

[galaxy flyer]

Surplus 1

Outstanding, well-thought posts. Thank you very much.

GF

[surplus1]

PJ2,

Thank you for your comments - they are most appreciated.

S1

[AerocatS2A]

surplus, your idea of a power increase will indeed cause a pitch up, but it won't cause a pull force on the control column.

[Part of post deleted, the FDR report is from a different incident and it doesn't say what I thought it said, however the above point is still valid, a power induced pitch up does not cause a force on the column.]

Right, here is the Colgan FDR data. You can see from this that there is a significant pull force on the control column just after the stick shaker activation. This was not the result of a power increase.

[protectthehornet]

don't think that light plane flying isn't a good background for other flying.

I've flown with guys who flew C141's for the USAF and they weren't as good as guys who came up the hard way via a cherokee and up from there.

in a light plane, you appreciate the sky's power and your own stupidity.

in a big plane, you think you are KING SH&*T.

there are good c141 pilots and bad....good cherokee pilots and bad