Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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They would say that...
I think this is legal stuff, not much to do with the real world of airmanship. Colgan's attorneys must now try to put as much of the blame as they can on stuff they didn't control. If the crew didn't follow an SOP, for instance, that is a small "get-out" for the company.
I don't think they will get away with that but they have to give it their best try. Meanwhile as pilots I think most of us know not to fly "low and slow" lest the earth rise up and smite us, as here. That is pretty basic stuff and not something to argue about.
I don't think they will get away with that but they have to give it their best try. Meanwhile as pilots I think most of us know not to fly "low and slow" lest the earth rise up and smite us, as here. That is pretty basic stuff and not something to argue about.
Last edited by chuks; 15th Dec 2009 at 10:57.
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Obviously a self-serving "report" by Colgan. But... might they have a point? The pilot was able to set the bugs below the stall speed, isn't that so? It would seem to be a good idea that there be some safeguard against that.
On the new generation aircraft, speeds are automatically calculated based on data input in the FMC... again, wrong speeds will be reflected if incorrect weights be input. It's happened before, and will happen again.
However, it was not the incorrect set speeds that caused the crash in KBUF... nor the reliability of the aircraft.
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I've seen it all
I just read that colgan trains people to relax back pressure as stall recovery...yet earlier on I read that powering out of a stall with minimum altitude loss was course de rigeur.
Forum readers may also recall that someone would be fired for losing altitude in a sim check...so one has to pull up a bit while waiting for full power to come in.
And , as to the non pertinent conversations, we have to at least acknowledge that they were speaking int he relm of aviation...its not like they were talking about knitting, or car racing, or the battle off samar.
They were talking about careers in aviation. Granted, not required for landing, but indicative of wanting to get out of colgan.
One thing I haven't seen spoken about is the FO's choice to bring up the flaps (retract the flaps) without being commanded to do so.
Forum readers may also recall that someone would be fired for losing altitude in a sim check...so one has to pull up a bit while waiting for full power to come in.
And , as to the non pertinent conversations, we have to at least acknowledge that they were speaking int he relm of aviation...its not like they were talking about knitting, or car racing, or the battle off samar.
They were talking about careers in aviation. Granted, not required for landing, but indicative of wanting to get out of colgan.
One thing I haven't seen spoken about is the FO's choice to bring up the flaps (retract the flaps) without being commanded to do so.
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Forum readers may also recall that someone would be fired for losing altitude in a sim check...so one has to pull up a bit while waiting for full power to come in.
In the event of an actual stall loss of altitude would be expected, especially if the stall occured with power at flight idle.
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captnjs
of course...but...if you are only trained to recover as in an approach to stall...but never, never, never train for a full stall...you will react incorrectly in a full stall...which this flight crew seems to have done.
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of course...but...if you are only trained to recover as in an approach to stall...but never, never, never train for a full stall...you will react incorrectly in a full stall...which this flight crew seems to have done.
Agreed. Unfortunately full stall/recovery maneuvers are not required training... as they should be.
During sim training, after all required syllabus items have been completed per the FOTM, I have the students "demonstrate" other important flight characteristics unique to the aircraft they will be flying, including deep stall recognition with recovery.
Fred T. Ruckus of the FAA does not want any maneuvers not contained within the FOTM entered on the training forms.
It took many years to require jet upset as part of the training program.
As manufacturers say... airlines buy airplanes to be flown, and not stalled, intentionally or otherwise.
Agreed. Unfortunately full stall/recovery maneuvers are not required training... as they should be.
During sim training, after all required syllabus items have been completed per the FOTM, I have the students "demonstrate" other important flight characteristics unique to the aircraft they will be flying, including deep stall recognition with recovery.
Fred T. Ruckus of the FAA does not want any maneuvers not contained within the FOTM entered on the training forms.
It took many years to require jet upset as part of the training program.
As manufacturers say... airlines buy airplanes to be flown, and not stalled, intentionally or otherwise.
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The fact is niether one of these pilots should have been in the "pointy end", no fault of theirs but they are the end product of the "dumbing down" of flight training and basic handling skills which has taken place over the last twenty odd years, experience is hard to quantify, but my insurance quote this year on a $600,000 airframe, $10,000,000 liability and $1,000000 per seat is $4,500CDN, a far cry from the $42,000CDN paid by the other twin in our hangar flown by a 1200 hour lawyer! and his coverage is about 33% of ours, so if this is obvious to the underwriters why not those doing the hiring for these second and third tier outfits?Oh, of course, they would have to pay a living wage to hire experience and the SLF would have to cough up the same price as a train fare to make it work. We dont have poor nav aids these days nor round turbo charged complex engines sheding parts every few hundred hours, but we do have perfectly serviceable aircraft getting bent whilst the crew seem unable to recognise whats going on and failing to do somthing to prevent a sudden stop, the decline of basic skills has to be rectified, how its to be done is the question.I think it was the Flight Safety Foundation of the UK who predicted things along these lines with the advent of high tech systems, and decline in pilot experience.
Last edited by clunckdriver; 16th Jan 2010 at 17:24.
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Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic is not helpful. There was an utter lack of professionalism on the FD on approach.
Earlier on in this thread, Colgan Training was described as "To the Shaker, (not the Pusher), and the recovery was throttle and 'maintenance of altitude'." The allowable excursion in altitude was I believe 50 feet.
In this way, the training can be faulted for this Captain's insistence on back stick, even at onset of pusher. His 'pull' measured seventy pounds.
He was unaware of his pitch angle. Is there another way to see it.?
Earlier on in this thread, Colgan Training was described as "To the Shaker, (not the Pusher), and the recovery was throttle and 'maintenance of altitude'." The allowable excursion in altitude was I believe 50 feet.
In this way, the training can be faulted for this Captain's insistence on back stick, even at onset of pusher. His 'pull' measured seventy pounds.
He was unaware of his pitch angle. Is there another way to see it.?
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On the new generation aircraft, speeds are automatically calculated based on data input in the FMC... again, wrong speeds will be reflected if incorrect weights be input. It's happened before, and will happen again.
However, it was not the incorrect set speeds that caused the crash in KBUF... nor the reliability of the aircraft.
However, it was not the incorrect set speeds that caused the crash in KBUF... nor the reliability of the aircraft.
22:05:29.5 HOT-1
... uh we got the weather. bugs are set eighteen
fourteen flaps fifteen. uh off of twenty three I forget let me look it up.
... uh we got the weather. bugs are set eighteen
fourteen flaps fifteen. uh off of twenty three I forget let me look it up.
So, their speed dropped to 130 knots, well above their bugged Vref. Stick shaker activated, pilot apparently panicked, and there you have it.
Soooo, if there was a warning of some kind that he was setting the Vref below the shaker activation point, might that not have saved the day? I think this is what Colgan is talking about.
Last edited by Diamond Bob; 15th Dec 2009 at 17:00.
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No. If the Captain was ahead of his a/c, he wouldn't have reacted with confusion. It's apparent he was well behind his a/c, and not recognizing shaker with an appropriate response had nothing to do with the bug. You could say the same about prop pitch, or poor scan, or.......
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Diamond, VRef to put it simply is the speed over the fence, plus whatever increments are added on for gusts ect, they were way back and should have been flying VRef plus whatever increment is called for by the configuration they were in at the time, they wernt even in the same ball park.
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Stick shaker activation without the INCR REF switch being turned on would have been 114Kts. Their bug was set at 118 and they were flying at 130 at the time of the upset. They would have landed without incident if it wasn't for the INCR REF switch being turned on. The pilots forgot or didn't know to factor this in. Colgan is saying that they shouldn't be able to set the bug at 118 when the shaker activation will be 134. That's the way I'm reading this.
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Again, no. In missing my point (and others) you are making a good argument for leaving the a/c as is and hiring/training better qualified airmen.
The Shaker went off. OMFG! Not really, we train for it, right? Captain Renslow by that time had become his own worst enemy instead of his a/c's best friend. The airplane was getting slow, but was flying, albeit in an attitude that needed attention.
Why not a red flip cover on the bug. Locked out until a check list is punched in on a screen. Why not a condition lever (s) that warns (audio), they need a finer pitch? props, props, props,.........
Instead of more refinement of systems to prevent knucklehead action, traditionally it is more incumbent on the aircrew to know their a/c.
Why a pull at shaker? Fear? A flash that he might 'fail' the checkride? He did what he was trained, except for the attitude of the a/c. Were it in level flight, and the Incr ref was on (switched on by the check airman), he maintains altitude, and increases power. 'Fly through shaker'. Either it wasn't trained well enough, or he was not competent to fly that a/c, or some combination. The a/c wasn't even close to departing when the shaker startled our captain. The a/c became his enemy, to be controlled, figured out, bested, whatever; it didn't depart until his constant pull slowed the a/c down to pusher, and he still didn't let go, aided by his lack of awareness of the condition levers at level out, his degrading a/s, and the rolling trim up of the nose to maintain altitude. He let's go, loses altitude, and gets fired, but everybody walks home.
bear
The Shaker went off. OMFG! Not really, we train for it, right? Captain Renslow by that time had become his own worst enemy instead of his a/c's best friend. The airplane was getting slow, but was flying, albeit in an attitude that needed attention.
Why not a red flip cover on the bug. Locked out until a check list is punched in on a screen. Why not a condition lever (s) that warns (audio), they need a finer pitch? props, props, props,.........
Instead of more refinement of systems to prevent knucklehead action, traditionally it is more incumbent on the aircrew to know their a/c.
Why a pull at shaker? Fear? A flash that he might 'fail' the checkride? He did what he was trained, except for the attitude of the a/c. Were it in level flight, and the Incr ref was on (switched on by the check airman), he maintains altitude, and increases power. 'Fly through shaker'. Either it wasn't trained well enough, or he was not competent to fly that a/c, or some combination. The a/c wasn't even close to departing when the shaker startled our captain. The a/c became his enemy, to be controlled, figured out, bested, whatever; it didn't depart until his constant pull slowed the a/c down to pusher, and he still didn't let go, aided by his lack of awareness of the condition levers at level out, his degrading a/s, and the rolling trim up of the nose to maintain altitude. He let's go, loses altitude, and gets fired, but everybody walks home.
bear
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I had the benefit of flying a stall package in a Q400 simulator recently and was pleasantly surprised by a number of observations.
Left to its own devices, in level flight with the AP engaged, power levers at flight idle, the shaker will activate followed by the pusher as you would expect. If you simply do nothing at this point, the AP will auto disconnect and the aircraft will settle into a gentle descent - with the shaker tripping on & off as you go on down.
If you add power to this equation, and nothing else - the aircraft will gently start to climb and bank to the left.
Adding a sharp pull back, increasing the g-loading only succeeds in destroying the last of the wing lift. I can only imagine what a reduction in wing flap at this moment would do to any potential recovery.
Left to its own devices, in level flight with the AP engaged, power levers at flight idle, the shaker will activate followed by the pusher as you would expect. If you simply do nothing at this point, the AP will auto disconnect and the aircraft will settle into a gentle descent - with the shaker tripping on & off as you go on down.
If you add power to this equation, and nothing else - the aircraft will gently start to climb and bank to the left.
Adding a sharp pull back, increasing the g-loading only succeeds in destroying the last of the wing lift. I can only imagine what a reduction in wing flap at this moment would do to any potential recovery.
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The major point missed by colgans submision is that the pilots (both of them) did not fly the aircraft corectly for the conditions and configuration the aircraft was in.
The captain flew by numbers - at x dme flap 5, at y dme gear down, at z dme flap 15 reduce speed to vref etc etc. It would have worked had the increase ref switch not been on.
Does that make the switch the killer? NO.
What it does mean is that he did not know how to corectly fly the aircraft in icing conditions and more importantly from icing on aproach to non icing on finals and landing.
That and his reaction to the stick shake is a result of training. That is down to Colgan and the FAA.
For those that are unaware the action of selecting incr ref on is matched by a manual increase in the Vref and of any V climb or Vga depending on company sops. The increase ref switch should be on for entering iceing conditions and when residual ice is on the airframe ( increase speeds). It can be switched of for approach only if there is no residual ice ( when normal speeds can be used). If in doubt leave them on and increase speeds.
In addition he was still manouvering in iceing conditions so should have had an increase to the minimum manouver speed for his flap setting (5 in this case).
There is a bloody great red tape that should have alerted him to something being wrong (like maybe too slow?) but that obviously did not fit into his mental model which required him to reduce speed towards Vref so he could be stable for the aproach. To those that say he leveled out and did not apply power - wrong. He maintained level flight prior to Loc intercept and even made corections to maintain speed. He deliberatly reduced speed in order to be at Vref. (the wrong one)
Training is the key because both of them failed to spot the error and both of them reacted very badly to the stick shake. Yes the aircraft will pitch up dramatically when the AP disconects and yes it will pitch up even more when the power is applied - but he killed them when he Pulled back. She helped by not knowing what the F**K was going on and raising flap.
TRAINING.
(the aircraft does warn you when you have set too low a Vref - it produces a red tape that goes higher than your selected speed. To have any other warning is stupid - Q what hapens if you set the bugs in the cruise as part of the brief for non iceing airport but are in IMC with the ref switch on? A the alarm will go off - thats usefull.)
The captain flew by numbers - at x dme flap 5, at y dme gear down, at z dme flap 15 reduce speed to vref etc etc. It would have worked had the increase ref switch not been on.
Does that make the switch the killer? NO.
What it does mean is that he did not know how to corectly fly the aircraft in icing conditions and more importantly from icing on aproach to non icing on finals and landing.
That and his reaction to the stick shake is a result of training. That is down to Colgan and the FAA.
For those that are unaware the action of selecting incr ref on is matched by a manual increase in the Vref and of any V climb or Vga depending on company sops. The increase ref switch should be on for entering iceing conditions and when residual ice is on the airframe ( increase speeds). It can be switched of for approach only if there is no residual ice ( when normal speeds can be used). If in doubt leave them on and increase speeds.
In addition he was still manouvering in iceing conditions so should have had an increase to the minimum manouver speed for his flap setting (5 in this case).
There is a bloody great red tape that should have alerted him to something being wrong (like maybe too slow?) but that obviously did not fit into his mental model which required him to reduce speed towards Vref so he could be stable for the aproach. To those that say he leveled out and did not apply power - wrong. He maintained level flight prior to Loc intercept and even made corections to maintain speed. He deliberatly reduced speed in order to be at Vref. (the wrong one)
Training is the key because both of them failed to spot the error and both of them reacted very badly to the stick shake. Yes the aircraft will pitch up dramatically when the AP disconects and yes it will pitch up even more when the power is applied - but he killed them when he Pulled back. She helped by not knowing what the F**K was going on and raising flap.
TRAINING.
(the aircraft does warn you when you have set too low a Vref - it produces a red tape that goes higher than your selected speed. To have any other warning is stupid - Q what hapens if you set the bugs in the cruise as part of the brief for non iceing airport but are in IMC with the ref switch on? A the alarm will go off - thats usefull.)
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I haven't had the chance to read all the posts but these are a few of my observations.
With my operator all icing aproaches on the Q400 are flap 35 and only 15 knts is added to the Vref not the 20 Kts as mentioned by others.
The barbers pole is only useful to show how close you are to the stick shaker. So as shown in the NTSB video it showed how close they got to the stall flap 5 and eventually stalled at flap 5 even though flap 15 was selected at nearly exactlly the same time of the stall.
I also noted that the captain reduced power in level flight whilst also selecting the gear down. That makes no sense at all.
And as for the F/0 selecting flap 0 as they entered the stall and increasing the stall speed by God knows how many knots, need I go on.
As I see it it is down to lack of situational awareness, a lack of adequate training and experience on type.
The Q400 is a challenging aircraft to fly well and I fly with FO's who have come off regional jets and a majority of them enjoy the new challenge.
There are a numerous number of possible slip ups operating the Q400 but my company knows the Q400 extremely well and the training is excellent.
With my operator all icing aproaches on the Q400 are flap 35 and only 15 knts is added to the Vref not the 20 Kts as mentioned by others.
The barbers pole is only useful to show how close you are to the stick shaker. So as shown in the NTSB video it showed how close they got to the stall flap 5 and eventually stalled at flap 5 even though flap 15 was selected at nearly exactlly the same time of the stall.
I also noted that the captain reduced power in level flight whilst also selecting the gear down. That makes no sense at all.
And as for the F/0 selecting flap 0 as they entered the stall and increasing the stall speed by God knows how many knots, need I go on.
As I see it it is down to lack of situational awareness, a lack of adequate training and experience on type.
The Q400 is a challenging aircraft to fly well and I fly with FO's who have come off regional jets and a majority of them enjoy the new challenge.
There are a numerous number of possible slip ups operating the Q400 but my company knows the Q400 extremely well and the training is excellent.
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Hopefully the FAA will follow the request of the relatives of this flight and require 1500 hrs to fly 121 operations. It has always made sense but now everything is the bottom line to get the lowest cost pilots. How can anybody be competent in a 121 operation with 250 hrs? Years ago, 60's, we got away with it because they were in the flight engineers seat for a few years. Now we can't, because there are no flight engineers. They go directly to a pilots seat they are not qualified to be in. Both of these pilots got hired with minimum experience so couldn't handle a self induced stall.
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1500 hours in part121 is fine,but no number certifies minimum quals. The entry level standards should be subject to strict controls of the line itself. This Captain, all respects, failed a number of checks. Allowing to enter, and continue to fly, while demonstrably unable to perform to industry standards is unacceptable, however commonplace the practice may be.
Add to that impossible situation the difficulties with deadheading, no standard of rest (observed) etc. and we have what we have.
Add to that impossible situation the difficulties with deadheading, no standard of rest (observed) etc. and we have what we have.