Did the pilot originally scheduled to fly [i]that[/i] Concorde refuse?
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As you say, BEagle - I suspect that this is the case; that Air France's training methodology is to blame in large part for the crash. Certainly, there were major CRM problems, with everyone apparently acting independently.
Are any BA Concorde PPRuNers aware of what the AF training is like? Have they flown together at all?
You know, the more that gets revealed here (and elsewhere) the more it appears to look like AF and probably other major French concerns such as ADP are potentially catastrophically flawed and need to be re-engineered from the ground up.
Remember, the French government has long been in the business of covering up things that have the potential of hurting France plc. From the Rainbow Warrior through to multiple A320 and A330 crashes, the blame has been laid anywhere except at the door of anyone that may adversely affect French economics. We've seen how the ridiculous insistence of French pilots and ATCOs in speaking French has cost many lives over the years. How much longer are we going to put up with this - when our own lives are on the line?
In the interim, I think we need to ask ourselves - is it really safe to fly to (and over) France?
Are any BA Concorde PPRuNers aware of what the AF training is like? Have they flown together at all?
You know, the more that gets revealed here (and elsewhere) the more it appears to look like AF and probably other major French concerns such as ADP are potentially catastrophically flawed and need to be re-engineered from the ground up.
Remember, the French government has long been in the business of covering up things that have the potential of hurting France plc. From the Rainbow Warrior through to multiple A320 and A330 crashes, the blame has been laid anywhere except at the door of anyone that may adversely affect French economics. We've seen how the ridiculous insistence of French pilots and ATCOs in speaking French has cost many lives over the years. How much longer are we going to put up with this - when our own lives are on the line?
In the interim, I think we need to ask ourselves - is it really safe to fly to (and over) France?
Thread Starter
Far be it for me to defend the French, but cover-ups of 'multiple A320 and 330 crashes'? If there is a serious worry about cover-ups being endemic in French accident investigations, then examples should be carefully and quietly noted, with our reasons for the belief that the conclusions were not as the accident reports made out. I'm not saying don't post such examples, but let's not leave ourselves open to accusations of knee-jerk 'Frog-bashing'.
We have to remember, of course, that the primary requirement of the investigation is not to apportion blame, but to establish the facts surrounding the accident.
However, one cannot help but to draw certain conclusions from the ATOW, the wind value used for calculation of RTOW and the actual wind velocity, 090/08, which was passed to the crew when they were cleared for take-off.
Would anyone, knowing that the wind velocity was so different to that assumed at the planning stage, not at least pause to confirm that this had not affected RTOW and V1? It's one of the basic exercises we throw at our students in the simulator; hence last week when I knew that we were late and that RW26 was in use, when I asked the crew to check whether we could use the much closer RW08, the answer was immediate - at the weight we were at, we could accept a 10kt tailwind and V1 would change from 117kt to 116kt. So we did!
However, one cannot help but to draw certain conclusions from the ATOW, the wind value used for calculation of RTOW and the actual wind velocity, 090/08, which was passed to the crew when they were cleared for take-off.
Would anyone, knowing that the wind velocity was so different to that assumed at the planning stage, not at least pause to confirm that this had not affected RTOW and V1? It's one of the basic exercises we throw at our students in the simulator; hence last week when I knew that we were late and that RW26 was in use, when I asked the crew to check whether we could use the much closer RW08, the answer was immediate - at the weight we were at, we could accept a 10kt tailwind and V1 would change from 117kt to 116kt. So we did!
Thread Starter
BEagle,
Quite right! Blame is, in itself, irrelevant. But my concern is that the real lessons of this accident (or indeed any accident) should be reflected in the report, since otherwise, it will be of less value. (I'm convinced that the much of the value of accident reports is in acting as general object lessons for other aircrew, almost as much in highlighting specific weaknesses or problems which need to be addressed for the type, airline or aircrew involved in the specific incident being reported. If the report glosses over the dangers of taking off downwind, overweight, with a c of g outside limits, with a missing undercarriage spacer and a flight engineer who shuts down engines on his own initiative, at the drop of a hat, these may not be fully appreciated. The aviation community might assume that that could never happen, and instead think: 'Better watch the runway carefully for bits of broken lawnmower - what's that - an eight knot tailwind - no I'm sure that won't matter - but are you sure this jet's got the new tank liner? How much baggage went on? Should have checked earlier, but .... I'm sure it'll be alright - what are you doing there engineer....'
I know it's too serious to joke about, but you get the idea, I'm sure.
Quite right! Blame is, in itself, irrelevant. But my concern is that the real lessons of this accident (or indeed any accident) should be reflected in the report, since otherwise, it will be of less value. (I'm convinced that the much of the value of accident reports is in acting as general object lessons for other aircrew, almost as much in highlighting specific weaknesses or problems which need to be addressed for the type, airline or aircrew involved in the specific incident being reported. If the report glosses over the dangers of taking off downwind, overweight, with a c of g outside limits, with a missing undercarriage spacer and a flight engineer who shuts down engines on his own initiative, at the drop of a hat, these may not be fully appreciated. The aviation community might assume that that could never happen, and instead think: 'Better watch the runway carefully for bits of broken lawnmower - what's that - an eight knot tailwind - no I'm sure that won't matter - but are you sure this jet's got the new tank liner? How much baggage went on? Should have checked earlier, but .... I'm sure it'll be alright - what are you doing there engineer....'
I know it's too serious to joke about, but you get the idea, I'm sure.
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I’ll admit that where the aircraft met the metal strip is speculation on my part, I just don’t know. In my opinion though it is just one of a number of mishaps to befall the aircraft on its fateful journey. The argument about single cause is fatuous. A single broken fuse-pin brought down a DC10 at LA, a single grain of sand accounted for the Sioux City disaster, a single poor repair accounted for the Japanair 747, the list is long.
What is clear and unequivocal, and taken from the official report by the BEA, is that at the point of take-off, the Captain was aware of the ZFW and the fuel on board so therefore he knew that the aircraft was overweight. It doesn’t matter how they calculated the ZFW, or what weight they had used for the passengers and their luggage, or what procedure they had used to load extra fuel. The Captain had been given a ZFW and a fuel load acknowledged as such on the CVR which exceeded the aircraft structural limit (source, the report), let alone his failure to account for the 7kt tailwind.
I imagine many operators share the last minute mental process that flows through the mind of the professional aviator as he/she enters the runway with the intention of committing aviation. Is this the right runway, is it clear, is there anyone on finals, what’s the wind and which way am I going to turn if we have a fire is the performance data still valid, if I stop what is the nature of the overrun, in the event that we get airborne what was the engine out procedure, and what is the initial part of the SID, what is the extent of my clearance, do I accept it, is the cabin secure, lights, transponder, can I go?
A brief examination of the Captain's situation would have led him to say NO GO. That is the cause of this accident.
What is clear and unequivocal, and taken from the official report by the BEA, is that at the point of take-off, the Captain was aware of the ZFW and the fuel on board so therefore he knew that the aircraft was overweight. It doesn’t matter how they calculated the ZFW, or what weight they had used for the passengers and their luggage, or what procedure they had used to load extra fuel. The Captain had been given a ZFW and a fuel load acknowledged as such on the CVR which exceeded the aircraft structural limit (source, the report), let alone his failure to account for the 7kt tailwind.
I imagine many operators share the last minute mental process that flows through the mind of the professional aviator as he/she enters the runway with the intention of committing aviation. Is this the right runway, is it clear, is there anyone on finals, what’s the wind and which way am I going to turn if we have a fire is the performance data still valid, if I stop what is the nature of the overrun, in the event that we get airborne what was the engine out procedure, and what is the initial part of the SID, what is the extent of my clearance, do I accept it, is the cabin secure, lights, transponder, can I go?
A brief examination of the Captain's situation would have led him to say NO GO. That is the cause of this accident.
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never had the luxury of a flight engineer so don't know whether or not there are any circumstances where the F/E is required to make an uncommanded engine shutdown. Seems a touch precipitate though. Cant think of any situation where one crew member just shuts one down without a bit of a discussion taking place first. Anyone enlighten me?
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CDG has oodles of runway. Concorde has oodles of power. Do we know that the 7 knot tailwind was a causal factor in the accident? The Captain may have made a poor decision in not making new performance calculations but the tailwind did not cause the fire. For all we know he may have taken off into a decreasing tailwind!
On the Classic in BA the Flight engineer could shut down an an engine with no reference to the Pilots. On the ground, on the landing roll, if the engine surged in reverse.
On the Classic in BA the Flight engineer could shut down an an engine with no reference to the Pilots. On the ground, on the landing roll, if the engine surged in reverse.
Thread Starter
The tailwind meant that as well as being a tonne over the structural limit, he was six tonnes over the appropriate limit for those conditions. And no, it didn't cause the fire, but nor did the fire cause the loss of the aircraft. It may eventually have done, but what caused the crash was that the crew lost control of the aircraft, which stalled and spun in. And if weight, out-of-limits aft cg and the unnecessary shut-down of an engine isn't germane to that, what is?
Question: Is anyone still content with the simple verdict that the failure of a tyre directly caused the loss of the aircraft and all those aboard?
Are you happy that none of the other factors explored here were seriously discussed in the accident report, even if they were then logically countered and discounted?
Is anyone happy that the report is completely impartial and that no 'political interests' are being protected by its conclusions?
Question: Is anyone still content with the simple verdict that the failure of a tyre directly caused the loss of the aircraft and all those aboard?
Are you happy that none of the other factors explored here were seriously discussed in the accident report, even if they were then logically countered and discounted?
Is anyone happy that the report is completely impartial and that no 'political interests' are being protected by its conclusions?
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Absolutely not.
There's no doubt in my mind that if AF had complied with the Airworthiness Directive covering the tyreburst situation the accident would never have happened.
Equally, BA's Concordes should never have been grounded; as they had carried out the requisite ADs.
And I'm absolutely certain that the report will not blame Air France for poor training and lack of CRM - nor will it dwell too much on ADP's role in the chain of events.
There's no doubt in my mind that if AF had complied with the Airworthiness Directive covering the tyreburst situation the accident would never have happened.
Equally, BA's Concordes should never have been grounded; as they had carried out the requisite ADs.
And I'm absolutely certain that the report will not blame Air France for poor training and lack of CRM - nor will it dwell too much on ADP's role in the chain of events.
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Might be of interest:
the 2nd interim report has now had its english translation published as a PDF only
http://www.bea-fr.org/anglaise/concorde-en.html
Gordon.
the 2nd interim report has now had its english translation published as a PDF only
http://www.bea-fr.org/anglaise/concorde-en.html
Gordon.
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It doesn’t matter what the wind was. I’ll reiterate what I said about he transcript. From the conversations of the crew it is clear that at the start of the take-off roll was ZFW + take-off fuel = 91.9 + 95.3 = 187.2 tonnes, which is 2.13 tonnes above the structural limit.
By the way, it didn't stall. Delta wings can operate at any angle of attack so long as you have the thrust to go with it. The lift comes from 'vortex lift' and as such separation is not an issue. Hence the alarming displays we all enjoy from the Mig 29. What Concorde did was run out of speed and so control authority. The crew were unable to control a roll toward the dead engines and susbsequent falling of the nose.
No, the structural limit is the structural limit. They knew that and yet they elected to attempt the take-off.
By the way, it didn't stall. Delta wings can operate at any angle of attack so long as you have the thrust to go with it. The lift comes from 'vortex lift' and as such separation is not an issue. Hence the alarming displays we all enjoy from the Mig 29. What Concorde did was run out of speed and so control authority. The crew were unable to control a roll toward the dead engines and susbsequent falling of the nose.
No, the structural limit is the structural limit. They knew that and yet they elected to attempt the take-off.
There's something very odd indeed about the flight preparation. Although the lower max take-off weight used by the flight dispatcher can perhaps be explained by the original thrust reverser unserviceability, we also learn that the data used was not archived, the crew decided to take over the flight preparation themselves, the load manifest 'was not found', neither was the captain's signature. The met data used by the crew wasn't archived either. The report then states that the technical investigators 'redid the calculations using the meteorological conditions on the day of the accident'. IMPORTANT QUESTION! Does that mean the original 12 kt headwind as assumed by the Flight Dispatcher, or the 8 kt tailwind passed to the crew when cleared for take-off??.
We must be told:
1. What was the Zero Fuel Weight, how much fuel was loaded and what, therefore, was the estimated Actual Take-Off Weight, given the FE's CVR statement that 800kg had been used for taxiing ? 187.2T??
2. What was the Regulated Take-Off Weight assuming the actual conditions at the time? I.e., with a tailwind of 8 kt? 177T??
3. What was the maximum certificated take-off weight for F-BTSC? 185.07T??
If 1. is greater than either 2. or 3., the captain's decision to take-off would have imperilled his passengers and crew from the moment of brake release. What happened next is history, but the culture which seemingly paid scant attention to the rules of scheduled performance is deeply concerning.
Imagine a scenario where you know that you need a certain mass of fuel to complete the flight. That is then loaded onto the aeroplane. When the ZFW is finally declared, you discover that you're going to be over max certificated take-off weight. But you can't offend the punters by offloading some of them and their baggage - so what do you do? <<Alors, mes copains. We will burn off the 'overweight amount' during taxi, n'est-ce pas?>> You are concerned that this will be a bit close to reality, so just as you arrive at the holding position, you ask the FE how much you've really used. When given the answer, you know that you're still just above the structural limit. What do you do now? <<Merde alors!! Close enough...we go!>> perhaps? And because you've been so concerned that you'll be over max certificated weight (although it's unlikely that anyone will find this out), when cleared for take-off with a wind of 090/8, neither you nor your questionably-CRM performing crew even mention the potential effect of the tailwind on Regulated Take-Off Weight?
I really hope that this would never happen. Would it??
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
We must be told:
1. What was the Zero Fuel Weight, how much fuel was loaded and what, therefore, was the estimated Actual Take-Off Weight, given the FE's CVR statement that 800kg had been used for taxiing ? 187.2T??
2. What was the Regulated Take-Off Weight assuming the actual conditions at the time? I.e., with a tailwind of 8 kt? 177T??
3. What was the maximum certificated take-off weight for F-BTSC? 185.07T??
If 1. is greater than either 2. or 3., the captain's decision to take-off would have imperilled his passengers and crew from the moment of brake release. What happened next is history, but the culture which seemingly paid scant attention to the rules of scheduled performance is deeply concerning.
Imagine a scenario where you know that you need a certain mass of fuel to complete the flight. That is then loaded onto the aeroplane. When the ZFW is finally declared, you discover that you're going to be over max certificated take-off weight. But you can't offend the punters by offloading some of them and their baggage - so what do you do? <<Alors, mes copains. We will burn off the 'overweight amount' during taxi, n'est-ce pas?>> You are concerned that this will be a bit close to reality, so just as you arrive at the holding position, you ask the FE how much you've really used. When given the answer, you know that you're still just above the structural limit. What do you do now? <<Merde alors!! Close enough...we go!>> perhaps? And because you've been so concerned that you'll be over max certificated weight (although it's unlikely that anyone will find this out), when cleared for take-off with a wind of 090/8, neither you nor your questionably-CRM performing crew even mention the potential effect of the tailwind on Regulated Take-Off Weight?
I really hope that this would never happen. Would it??
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
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But why so much blah blah about the eventual overweight of the concorde at take off? Want you to say than would the concorde have been ten tons under MTOW, it would have made it to Le Bourget with 2 engines?
It's not. The speed mini to fly the concorde with 2 engines is about 280 Kts (Concorde specifications), far away from the speed they could have made althought they have been lighter, without speaking of making a landing far overweight at hot speed, with the huge fire and with a tyre bursted...
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: MGloff ]
It's not. The speed mini to fly the concorde with 2 engines is about 280 Kts (Concorde specifications), far away from the speed they could have made althought they have been lighter, without speaking of making a landing far overweight at hot speed, with the huge fire and with a tyre bursted...
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: MGloff ]
Had the aeroplane reached V2, in all probability a positive climb gradient would have resulted. An engine deliberately shut down even though it was producing thrust would not have helped the situation.
With the aircraft outside scheduled performance limits, a desperate atttempt to reach Le Bourget was perhaps the only option once the aircraft's fate was sealed by the uncommanded shut down of No 2 and No 1 starting to fail before V2 had been achieved.
Limits are limits. They must be observed precisely; any pilot knowingly taking-off in contravention of such limits is acting in a criminally irresponsible manner. One hopes that this is not a culture which exists in many companies.......
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
With the aircraft outside scheduled performance limits, a desperate atttempt to reach Le Bourget was perhaps the only option once the aircraft's fate was sealed by the uncommanded shut down of No 2 and No 1 starting to fail before V2 had been achieved.
Limits are limits. They must be observed precisely; any pilot knowingly taking-off in contravention of such limits is acting in a criminally irresponsible manner. One hopes that this is not a culture which exists in many companies.......
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
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As for the repeatedly qualified "uncommanded" of the shutting down of N2 engine, read the CVR, and you clearly see that even not closed once, the captain had orderred the shutting down seconds laters
( -Marty: "Tu coupe le moteur 2 là?"
-FE "J'ai coupé".)
And the sentences don't mean "Have you shutted the engine two?" but, without question, "Will you Shut down engine two at last?", and even a sligthly impatient kind of order.
And for v2, which V2 are you talking of? V2 originaly planned, V2 for 3 engines or V2 for 2 engines?
I've just posted above than they just NEVER SOULD HAVE REACHED V2 FOR 2 ENGINES, even under MTOW...
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: MGloff ]
( -Marty: "Tu coupe le moteur 2 là?"
-FE "J'ai coupé".)
And the sentences don't mean "Have you shutted the engine two?" but, without question, "Will you Shut down engine two at last?", and even a sligthly impatient kind of order.
And for v2, which V2 are you talking of? V2 originaly planned, V2 for 3 engines or V2 for 2 engines?
I've just posted above than they just NEVER SOULD HAVE REACHED V2 FOR 2 ENGINES, even under MTOW...
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: MGloff ]
14 43.20 FE <<failure....engine 2>>
14 43.24 FE <<shut down engine 2>>
14 43.25 Capt <<engine fire procedure>>
14 43.27 No 2 Engine parameters fall
14 43.28.7 No 2 Engine stops receiving fuel
14 43.29 A fire handle is pulled. In the wreckage the No 2 fire handle is discovered to have been pulled.
14 43.45 Capt <<(are you) shutting down engine 2 there>>
14 43.45 FE <<I've shut it down>>
Thus it is clear that the engine was indeed shut down without a clear, unambiguous command having been given by the Captain. Indeed, in a classic piece of Gallic ambiguity, the report states "The engine 2 fire alarm came on and the crew announced shut down of this engine a few seconds later". This is most certainly NOT the same as "The Captain ordered the shut down of the No 2 engine"..............
The report only refers to the overweight take-off; nowhere do we read what the RTOW actually was. Have any PPRuNers access to a Concorde ODM or take-off graph for the RW in question? If so, perhaps they would care to calculate the RTOW for both a zero wind and an eight knot tailwind on that RW??
14 43.24 FE <<shut down engine 2>>
14 43.25 Capt <<engine fire procedure>>
14 43.27 No 2 Engine parameters fall
14 43.28.7 No 2 Engine stops receiving fuel
14 43.29 A fire handle is pulled. In the wreckage the No 2 fire handle is discovered to have been pulled.
14 43.45 Capt <<(are you) shutting down engine 2 there>>
14 43.45 FE <<I've shut it down>>
Thus it is clear that the engine was indeed shut down without a clear, unambiguous command having been given by the Captain. Indeed, in a classic piece of Gallic ambiguity, the report states "The engine 2 fire alarm came on and the crew announced shut down of this engine a few seconds later". This is most certainly NOT the same as "The Captain ordered the shut down of the No 2 engine"..............
The report only refers to the overweight take-off; nowhere do we read what the RTOW actually was. Have any PPRuNers access to a Concorde ODM or take-off graph for the RW in question? If so, perhaps they would care to calculate the RTOW for both a zero wind and an eight knot tailwind on that RW??
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14 43.45 Capt <<(are you) shutting down engine 2 there>>
14 43.45 FE <<I've shut it down>>
14 43.45 FE <<I've shut it down>>
Here's the section of the report that deals with the issue of weight.
--------------------------------------------------------------
16.1.2.1 Flight Planning
The preparation of flight AFR 4590 began at 09 h 12. The dispatcher’s work screen indicated QFU 27. In addition, the non-availability of thrust reverser 2 led to a reduction of 2.5% in the maximum weight in operation.
Based on data on the wind (a twelve kt headwind), the QNH (low, 1008 hPa), the temperature (higher than the norm) and the usable length of the runway, the dispatcher calculated the maximum weight as 177,930 kg. However, flight preparation showed a takeoff weight of 184,800 kg with the one hundred passengers checked in.
At about 09 h 30, the dispatcher informed the duty officer of the weight problem, without however specifying the QFU used for the calculation. The duty officer first thought of using another aircraft, then tried to resolve the technical problem with the reverser and finally thought of loading the baggage onto another flight.
On his side, the dispatcher studied two hypotheses for routes (one direct and one with an optional technical stop) and loading so that the flight could take place in terms of its weight.
A little before 10 h 00, the crew called the dispatcher who informed them of the problem. The crew informed him that they had asked for the replacement of the failed pneumatic motor on reverser 2, asked him to file a direct ATC flight plan and told him that they were going to take over the flight preparation themselves.
(Note: work had been under way on runway 27 for three weeks. The instructions to assist flight preparation stated that they should “favour (runway 27) for Concorde, because of noise pollution”, runway 26 being used only “exceptionally”. However, information relating to the runway configurations, in particular runway length, was available.)
The meteorological data used by the dispatcher were not archived. No directives instructed him to do so. The preparation undertaken by the crew was not archived either. The technical investigators therefore redid the calculations with the flight dispatcher, using the meteorological data of the day of the accident, runway 26 right and without the technical restriction due to the reverser. In these conditions, the estimated takeoff weight come out at 184,802 kg for a MTOW of 185,070 kg.
16.1.2.2 Flight Departure
It was impossible to discover whether the crew took possession of the flight dossier, even though it had become redundant. The load sheet, including the fuel loading sheet and the Captain’s signature, was not found.
--------------------------------------------------------------
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: stagger ]
--------------------------------------------------------------
16.1.2.1 Flight Planning
The preparation of flight AFR 4590 began at 09 h 12. The dispatcher’s work screen indicated QFU 27. In addition, the non-availability of thrust reverser 2 led to a reduction of 2.5% in the maximum weight in operation.
Based on data on the wind (a twelve kt headwind), the QNH (low, 1008 hPa), the temperature (higher than the norm) and the usable length of the runway, the dispatcher calculated the maximum weight as 177,930 kg. However, flight preparation showed a takeoff weight of 184,800 kg with the one hundred passengers checked in.
At about 09 h 30, the dispatcher informed the duty officer of the weight problem, without however specifying the QFU used for the calculation. The duty officer first thought of using another aircraft, then tried to resolve the technical problem with the reverser and finally thought of loading the baggage onto another flight.
On his side, the dispatcher studied two hypotheses for routes (one direct and one with an optional technical stop) and loading so that the flight could take place in terms of its weight.
A little before 10 h 00, the crew called the dispatcher who informed them of the problem. The crew informed him that they had asked for the replacement of the failed pneumatic motor on reverser 2, asked him to file a direct ATC flight plan and told him that they were going to take over the flight preparation themselves.
(Note: work had been under way on runway 27 for three weeks. The instructions to assist flight preparation stated that they should “favour (runway 27) for Concorde, because of noise pollution”, runway 26 being used only “exceptionally”. However, information relating to the runway configurations, in particular runway length, was available.)
The meteorological data used by the dispatcher were not archived. No directives instructed him to do so. The preparation undertaken by the crew was not archived either. The technical investigators therefore redid the calculations with the flight dispatcher, using the meteorological data of the day of the accident, runway 26 right and without the technical restriction due to the reverser. In these conditions, the estimated takeoff weight come out at 184,802 kg for a MTOW of 185,070 kg.
16.1.2.2 Flight Departure
It was impossible to discover whether the crew took possession of the flight dossier, even though it had become redundant. The load sheet, including the fuel loading sheet and the Captain’s signature, was not found.
--------------------------------------------------------------
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: stagger ]
Thread Starter
Without hearing the captain's words (and preferably seeing his expression) it's impossible to divine the exact emphasis.
Did he effectively say, as our French friend intimates,
"Haven't you shut down No.2 yet, you oaf?"
or did he say
"You shut down No.2 there, you idiot?"
Perhaps an elaborate mime-show was going on, with the crew communicating by hand signal, or even mental telepathy. Perhaps the evil British beamed thoughts into the cockpit forcing them to ignore the weight, the c of g and the runway, and then to shut down an engine at the wrong time, ensuring that they wouldn't then reach V2.
Or perhaps the evidence is actually clear.
The actual words were:
"Tu coupe le moteur 2 là"
Without hearing them we don't know if there was a question mark. The official French report translates this as:
14 43.45 Capt <<(are you) shutting down engine 2 there>>
The official report does not back MG's translation of "Will you Shut down engine two at last? nor his alternative (slightly impatient "Shut down the engine Two"
Had the Captain meant this, surely he'd have said:
"Coupe (or coupe tu) le moteur 2 là"
A direct, word for word translation would seem to leave little doubt: "You shut down the engine No.2 there?" I'm told that la in this context might be used when an English speaker might use 'back there' or 'then'. (Most likely emphasis - I can't believe it, tell me you didn't!)
I'm surprised at MG's translation, because it shifts the blame from the FE to being a stupid decision by the FE that was then fully validated by the Captain.
With regard to the weight.
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft will accelerate more slowly (especially once one engine has been lost)?
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft with a wrongly-reassembled undercarriage might veer off the runway more markedly than a lightweight one?
Might this not mean that a lighter aircraft might not have hit the runway light which probably killed the No.1 engine?
Might this not mean that a lighter aircraft would not have had to rotate 11 knots early?
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft (especially one with an aft c of g) will depart before a lightly loaded one?
Do we agree that a crew who wilfully ignore weight limitations and take off overweight for reasons of expediency are not demonstrating the degree of professionalism and responsibility we expect?
Do we not agree that there was more chance of a correctly loaded, not overweight aircraft reaching the sanctuary of Le Bourget even with two engines out and even with the fire. Remember that they nearly made it anyway.
It looks as though the key factors in the disaster, in order of importance were:
1) Shutting down an engine unnecessarily and thereby making it impossible to raise the gear or attain V2
2) Being overweight with an aft cg
3) Having a dragging undercarriage that caused the aircraft to veer off the runway
4) Having an ignition source (poorly maintained wiring to the brake cooling fans - or a spark from friction in the mis-assembled undercarriage perhaps?
5) Having the fuel tank rupture
6) Having a tyre blow out
Some-one remarked about fuel assymetry earlier - surely with the left wing becoming lighter as fuel escaped/was burned, this helped counter the effect of the dead engines.
WHAT SHOULD THE CAA BE DOING IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONCERNS?
IF THE CAA CONTINUE TO DO NOTHING AND SIMPLY RUBBER-STAMP THE FRENCH REPORT, HOW CONCERNED ARE WE?
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
Did he effectively say, as our French friend intimates,
"Haven't you shut down No.2 yet, you oaf?"
or did he say
"You shut down No.2 there, you idiot?"
Perhaps an elaborate mime-show was going on, with the crew communicating by hand signal, or even mental telepathy. Perhaps the evil British beamed thoughts into the cockpit forcing them to ignore the weight, the c of g and the runway, and then to shut down an engine at the wrong time, ensuring that they wouldn't then reach V2.
Or perhaps the evidence is actually clear.
The actual words were:
"Tu coupe le moteur 2 là"
Without hearing them we don't know if there was a question mark. The official French report translates this as:
14 43.45 Capt <<(are you) shutting down engine 2 there>>
The official report does not back MG's translation of "Will you Shut down engine two at last? nor his alternative (slightly impatient "Shut down the engine Two"
Had the Captain meant this, surely he'd have said:
"Coupe (or coupe tu) le moteur 2 là"
A direct, word for word translation would seem to leave little doubt: "You shut down the engine No.2 there?" I'm told that la in this context might be used when an English speaker might use 'back there' or 'then'. (Most likely emphasis - I can't believe it, tell me you didn't!)
I'm surprised at MG's translation, because it shifts the blame from the FE to being a stupid decision by the FE that was then fully validated by the Captain.
With regard to the weight.
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft will accelerate more slowly (especially once one engine has been lost)?
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft with a wrongly-reassembled undercarriage might veer off the runway more markedly than a lightweight one?
Might this not mean that a lighter aircraft might not have hit the runway light which probably killed the No.1 engine?
Might this not mean that a lighter aircraft would not have had to rotate 11 knots early?
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft (especially one with an aft c of g) will depart before a lightly loaded one?
Do we agree that a crew who wilfully ignore weight limitations and take off overweight for reasons of expediency are not demonstrating the degree of professionalism and responsibility we expect?
Do we not agree that there was more chance of a correctly loaded, not overweight aircraft reaching the sanctuary of Le Bourget even with two engines out and even with the fire. Remember that they nearly made it anyway.
It looks as though the key factors in the disaster, in order of importance were:
1) Shutting down an engine unnecessarily and thereby making it impossible to raise the gear or attain V2
2) Being overweight with an aft cg
3) Having a dragging undercarriage that caused the aircraft to veer off the runway
4) Having an ignition source (poorly maintained wiring to the brake cooling fans - or a spark from friction in the mis-assembled undercarriage perhaps?
5) Having the fuel tank rupture
6) Having a tyre blow out
Some-one remarked about fuel assymetry earlier - surely with the left wing becoming lighter as fuel escaped/was burned, this helped counter the effect of the dead engines.
WHAT SHOULD THE CAA BE DOING IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONCERNS?
IF THE CAA CONTINUE TO DO NOTHING AND SIMPLY RUBBER-STAMP THE FRENCH REPORT, HOW CONCERNED ARE WE?
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]