Without hearing the captain's words (and preferably seeing his expression) it's impossible to divine the exact emphasis.
Did he effectively say, as our French friend intimates,
"Haven't you shut down No.2 yet, you oaf?"
or did he say
"You shut down No.2 there, you idiot?"
Perhaps an elaborate mime-show was going on, with the crew communicating by hand signal, or even mental telepathy. Perhaps the evil British beamed thoughts into the cockpit forcing them to ignore the weight, the c of g and the runway, and then to shut down an engine at the wrong time, ensuring that they wouldn't then reach V2.
Or perhaps the evidence is actually clear.
The actual words were:
"Tu coupe le moteur 2 là"
Without hearing them we don't know if there was a question mark. The official French report translates this as:
14 43.45 Capt <<(are you) shutting down engine 2 there>>
The official report does not back MG's translation of "Will you Shut down engine two at last? nor his alternative (slightly impatient "Shut down the engine Two"
Had the Captain meant this, surely he'd have said:
"Coupe (or coupe tu) le moteur 2 là"
A direct, word for word translation would seem to leave little doubt: "You shut down the engine No.2 there?" I'm told that la in this context might be used when an English speaker might use 'back there' or 'then'. (Most likely emphasis - I can't believe it, tell me you didn't!)
I'm surprised at MG's translation, because it shifts the blame from the FE to being a stupid decision by the FE that was then fully validated by the Captain.
With regard to the weight.
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft will accelerate more slowly (especially once one engine has been lost)?
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft with a wrongly-reassembled undercarriage might veer off the runway more markedly than a lightweight one?
Might this not mean that a lighter aircraft might not have hit the runway light which probably killed the No.1 engine?
Might this not mean that a lighter aircraft would not have had to rotate 11 knots early?
Do we agree that an overweight aircraft (especially one with an aft c of g) will depart before a lightly loaded one?
Do we agree that a crew who wilfully ignore weight limitations and take off overweight for reasons of expediency are not demonstrating the degree of professionalism and responsibility we expect?
Do we not agree that there was more chance of a correctly loaded, not overweight aircraft reaching the sanctuary of Le Bourget even with two engines out and even with the fire. Remember that they nearly made it anyway.
It looks as though the key factors in the disaster, in order of importance were:
1) Shutting down an engine unnecessarily and thereby making it impossible to raise the gear or attain V2
2) Being overweight with an aft cg
3) Having a dragging undercarriage that caused the aircraft to veer off the runway
4) Having an ignition source (poorly maintained wiring to the brake cooling fans - or a spark from friction in the mis-assembled undercarriage perhaps?
5) Having the fuel tank rupture
6) Having a tyre blow out
Some-one remarked about fuel assymetry earlier - surely with the left wing becoming lighter as fuel escaped/was burned, this helped counter the effect of the dead engines.
WHAT SHOULD THE CAA BE DOING IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONCERNS?
IF THE CAA CONTINUE TO DO NOTHING AND SIMPLY RUBBER-STAMP THE FRENCH REPORT, HOW CONCERNED ARE WE?
[ 24 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]