I’ll admit that where the aircraft met the metal strip is speculation on my part, I just don’t know. In my opinion though it is just one of a number of mishaps to befall the aircraft on its fateful journey. The argument about single cause is fatuous. A single broken fuse-pin brought down a DC10 at LA, a single grain of sand accounted for the Sioux City disaster, a single poor repair accounted for the Japanair 747, the list is long.
What is clear and unequivocal, and taken from the official report by the BEA, is that at the point of take-off, the Captain was aware of the ZFW and the fuel on board so therefore he knew that the aircraft was overweight. It doesn’t matter how they calculated the ZFW, or what weight they had used for the passengers and their luggage, or what procedure they had used to load extra fuel. The Captain had been given a ZFW and a fuel load acknowledged as such on the CVR which exceeded the aircraft structural limit (source, the report), let alone his failure to account for the 7kt tailwind.
I imagine many operators share the last minute mental process that flows through the mind of the professional aviator as he/she enters the runway with the intention of committing aviation. Is this the right runway, is it clear, is there anyone on finals, what’s the wind and which way am I going to turn if we have a fire is the performance data still valid, if I stop what is the nature of the overrun, in the event that we get airborne what was the engine out procedure, and what is the initial part of the SID, what is the extent of my clearance, do I accept it, is the cabin secure, lights, transponder, can I go?
A brief examination of the Captain's situation would have led him to say NO GO. That is the cause of this accident.